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Abstract
Safety critical systems place additional requirements to the programming
language used to implement them with respect to traditional environments.
Examples of features that influence the suitability of a programming lan-
guage in such environments include complexity of definitions, expressive
power, bounded space and time and verifiability. Hume is a novel program-
ming language with a design which targets the first three of these, in some
ways, contradictory features: fully expressive languages cannot guarantee
bounds on time and space, and low-level languages which can guarantee
space and time bounds are often complex and thus error-phrone. In Hume,
this contradiction is solved by a two layered architecture: a high-level fully
expressive language, is built on top of a low-level coordination language
which can guarantee space and time bounds.
This thesis explores the verification of Hume programs. It targets safety
properties, which are the most important type of correctness properties,
of the low-level coordination language, which is believed to be the most
error-prone. Deductive verification in Lamport’s temporal logic of actions
(TLA) is utilised, in turn validated through algorithmic experiments. This
deductive verification is mechanised by first embedding TLA in the Isabelle
theorem prover, and then embedding Hume on top of this. Verification of
temporal invariants is explored in this setting.
In Hume, program transformation is a key feature, often required to guaran-
tee space and time bounds of high-level constructs. Verification of transfor-
mations is thus an integral part of this thesis. The work with both invariant
verification, and in particular, transformation verification, has pinpointed
several weaknesses of the Hume language. Motivated and influenced by
this, an extension to Hume, called Hierarchical Hume, is developed and
embedded in TLA. Several case studies of transformation and invariant ver-
ification of Hierarchical Hume in Isabelle are conducted, and an approach
towards a calculus for transformations is examined.
| |
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Chapter1
Introduction
1.1 Motivations
In the relative short history of computers, there are many cases where errors have
resulted in both financial and human costs. The following examples are taken from
Wired [74] and DevTopics [55]. In the Mariner 1 space probe (1962), a computer bug
caused the rocket to divert from its intended launch path, forcing mission control to
destroy it over the Atlantic ocean. The error had an estimated cost of $18.5 million
(at the 1962 value). Due to a race-condition bug in the Canadian Therac-25 medical
accelerator, at least 5 people were killed, and others seriously injured (1985). The reuse
of code from Ariane 4 on a different architecture caused Ariane 5 flight 501 to crash
40 seconds after launch (1996). And, a bug in a Soviets warning software indicated
that the US had launched five ballistic missiles, almost starting a third world war in
1983. In more recent times, the Financial Times [110] reported that a bug in Moody’s
software caused it to incorrectly award triple-A ratings, thus mistakenly accepting sub-
prime mortgages worth billions of dollars. Problems with such sub-prime mortgages
were part of the reasons behind the current global credit crunch.
The software industry now uses at least 30% of its budget on verification and
testing, and Gartner Inc [101] estimates that the worldwide testing market will reach
$13 Billion by 2010. However, for safety, security and mission-critical systems like
the ones described above, verification and testing count for closer to 80% of the total
budget [14].
In [180], Storey identifies complexity of definitions, expressive power, bounded space
and time, logical soundness, security and verifiability as the key features for a pro-
gramming language targeting safety-critical systems. No language supports all of these
features, and several of them are conflicting: for example, results from Turing [185] and
Go¨del [78] show that the verification problem is, in general, undecidable for sufficiently
1
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expressive programming languages, called Turing-complete languages.
Memory leaks are common errors in computer programs, hence the inclusion of
space bounds in Storey’s list. Clearly, this becomes an even more important property
in resource constrained environments, like embedded systems. These are often control
systems, where response time is another key feature. However, determining time and
space bounds are undecidable for Turing-complete languages, while languages where
time and space properties are decidable, are often not expressive enough to work with
effectively, and tend to be too low level.
Hume [92] is a Turing-complete programming language which attempts to guarantee
bounded space and time, while being high-level, meaning a low complexity of definitions.
This is achieved by a layered design, where a finite state automata coordination layer
with a large set of decidable properties, is built on top of a Turing-complete declarative
expression layer. Programming involves balancing the expressiveness and high-level of
the expression layer, with decidable properties of the coordination layer. Thus, Hume
is divided into a set of levels, where each level has a set of allowed constructs and
decidable properties. Hume can therefore be seen as a family of languages.
The resource analysis required to guarantee bounded space and time is currently
only well-developed for the expression layer. Moreover, many environments targeted
by Hume have a strong requirement for correctness. One example is the UK Ministry
of Defence standard [152], which describes the requirements for software developed for
the UK MoD. Currently, Hume cannot give any correctness guarantees. This thesis
attempts to fill this gap, by exploring formal correctness verification of Hume programs.
Formal verification is a form of formal methods, a notion used in the application
of mathematical tools and techniques in the development of software and hardware
systems. In addition to formal verification, formal specification and formal development
are considered formal methods, and these features are often connected: for example,
a property must be specified to be verified. Formal methods are mainly applied when
there are strong safety or security requirements, where merely testing is not sufficient,
since only selected cases can be checked, and not all cases. The rigour of the application
of formal methods, depends on the nature of the problem, and in most cases it is only
applied to the safety-critical parts of the program, not the complete program. Rushby
[174] has thus identified four levels of rigour labelled from 0 to 3: level 0 is no use of
formal methods; level 1 is the use of concepts and notation from discrete mathematics;
level 2 is the use of formalised specification languages with some mechanised support
tools; while level 3 is full use of formal specification and mechanisation of proofs.
Mechanised tool support consists either of an automatic algorithmic approach known
as model checking, or a more expressive deductive approach known as theorem proving,
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which often requires user interaction.
Although no evidence is provided, the claim that verification of the Hume coordina-
tion layer is more challenging than the expression layer due to its low-levelness, should
be uncontroversial. Thus, this thesis focuses on the coordination layer. Moreover, level
3 rigour is the target, albeit only a subset of the language and properties is discussed.
The Hume methodology is based around decidability analysis and transformations.
A high level program is first developed. If space and time bounds cannot be guar-
anteed, it is transformed into a lower, more decidable level. Thus, since program
transformations is such an integral part of the methodology, transformation verifica-
tion is the other main topic of this thesis. Finally, although software verification is the
main topic, the two other “types” of formal methods: specification of properties, and
development in the form of program transformations, are discussed.
In order to formally verify Hume programs, they must be represented in a formal
logic, preferable with mechanical tool support. To enable both the reuse of current
tools and techniques, and to support the reuse of tools and techniques developed in
this thesis, the use of an existing logic is a target. When compared with developing
a purpose-specific logic for Hume, the use of an existing logic liberates one from deal-
ing with low-level logical details like a soundness proof of the logical system. Leslie
Lamport’s novel temporal logic of actions (TLA) [120], is the main logic used here.
The Hume coordination layer can be seen as a concurrent system, and TLA is a result
of more than 30 years of experience with such systems. Moreover, the structure of
TLA fits very well with both the structure of Hume and the target of this thesis, and
includes tool support via the TLC model checker [124, 203].
This thesis is the first step towards a verification environment for Hume programs.
Thus, extensibility of the tools and techniques discussed here is a key feature. In
particular, the expression layer of Hume is being developed in parallel in Isabelle/HOL
[135]. Hence, to enable future integration with this work, the focus is on theorem
proving in Isabelle/HOL, compared to develop TLC for Hume.
1.2 Contributions
The main contributions of this thesis are:
• correctness and transformation verification of Hume programs are discussed;
• TLA is used at the programming language level and in program transformation
verification;
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• TLA is mechanised in the Isabelle/HOL theorem prover (Isabelle/TLA) in par-
ticular, through the mechanisation of sequences for “TLA style” logics;
• Hume is formalised in TLA. Hume is mechanised in Isabelle/TLA and the TLC
model checker. Several new tactics which automate Hume reasoning in Isabelle/
TLA are developed;
• an extension to Hume, called Hierarchical Hume, is formalised in TLA and mech-
anised in Isabelle/TLA. Tactics that automate invariant and transformation ver-
ification are developed for Hierarchical Hume;
• the Hierarchical Hume extension and an existing scheduling extension, called
self-out scheduling, are formally verified to be conservative using TLA;
• the approaches are illustrated by case studies, among them an implementation
of NASA’s SAFER system in Hierarchical Hume, and real-time model checking
of Hume using TLC;
• a box calculus for Hume transformations is outlined.
Chapter 9 surveys other more experimental contributions:
• the mechanisation of Hume in Isabelle/TLA is integrated with a mechanisation
of the expression layer [135], which is developed in parallel in Isabelle/HOL. The
integration is within Isabelle/HOL, and applied to an example;
• the use of rippling to automate both correctness and transformation proofs is
discussed;
• the liveness of Hume programs is discussed, and is illustrated by model checking.
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1.3 Thesis roadmap and outline
| |
Figure 1.1: Thesis roadmap| |
Figure 1.1 shows the roadmap of the thesis. It has been divided up into fifteen distinct
parts, where the last three, shown on left of the figure, are some relevant explorations
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discussed in Chapter 9. Since these are not fully implemented and not in the critical
path of the thesis, the boxes are stippled. The arrows show the dependency. Note that
the arrows are assumed to be “transitive”. For example, VIII depends on II. Since,
VIII depends on VII, which in turn depends on VI, which depends on V and so on, the
arrow from II to VIII is omitted. In the top right corner of each box, it is indicated
which section or chapter implements the part. The thesis is organised as follows:
• Chapter 2 contains the relevant background information on TLA;
• Chapter 3 describes Isabelle/TLA, a mechanisation of TLA in Isabelle/HOL
(Part I);
• Chapter 4 describes the Hume formalisation in TLA, the Isabelle/Hume mecha-
nisation and Hume mechanisation in TLC (Parts II, III and IV);
• Chapter 5 describes the reasoning process of Hume within TLA, including case-
studies (Parts V and VI);
• Chapter 6 introduces, formalises and mechanises Hierarchical Hume, and dis-
cusses reasoning within Hierarchical Hume (Parts VII, VIII, IX and X) ;
• Chapter 7 contains Hierarchical Hume case studies (Part XI);
• Chapter 8 outlines a box calculus for Hierarchical Hume transformations (Part
XII);
• Chapter 9 discusses some relevant explorations (Parts XIII, XIV and XV);
• and finally, Chapter 10 outlines future directions and concludes.
1.4 Notation and notions
TLA, TLA+, Isabelle and Hume use different syntax in relevant papers. To avoid
bewildering readers who are familiar with these, an attempt is made to use the standard
syntax. Thus, several different notations are used throughout the thesis, and these are
summarised below:
TLA terms are written in italic and keywords are written with a bold font. It uses
, for definitions, while ⇒, ∧, ∨, ¬ and ≡ represent implication, conjunction,
disjunction, negation and equivalence. ∀ and ∃ are used for quantification of
constants, while ∃ is existential quantification of variables. Reasoning with ∃ with
respect to refinements, involves finding a refinement mapping, which is the sum
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of all witnesses of ∃-bound variables. For a formula F , F [f/x] is the substitution
of witness f for variable x in F , and is often written F . Function parameters are
bracketed by (· · · ), and tuples are written 〈· · · 〉. ;
TLA+ deviates from TLA by using this font for keywords. Moreover, functions
are separated by operators. Here, function parameters are encapsulated by [· · · ],
whilst operator parameters are encapsulated by (· · · );
Isabelle terms are written with this font, while this font is used for keywords. Is-
abelle contains a meta-level logic and an object-level logic. In the meta-level,
∧
and =⇒ are universal quantification and implication, while ≡ is used for defi-
nitions. The object level logic used in this thesis is higher order logic (HOL),
called Isabelle/HOL. The mechanisation of TLA in Isabelle/HOL, described in
Chapter 3, is written Isabelle/TLA, although is should strictly speaking be Is-
abelle/HOL/TLA. Object-level implication is written −→ and type application
is written ⇒. The remaining predicate connectives are the same as in TLA.
Currying is used, thus f(a, b) is written f a b. Tuples are written (· · · ), while
existential variable quantification (∃) in Isabelle/TLA is here written ∃∃;
Hume. All Hume code is written in this font. However, in most cases only a graph-
ical representationof Hume programs, illustrated below, is shown. Currying is
also here used for functions. Isabelle/Hume and Isabelle/HHume are used for the
mechanisations of Hume and Hierarchical Hume in Isabelle/TLA. The following
graphical notations are used for Hume boxes:
box A is a “standard” Hume box which buffers the output; box B also buffers the
input, while box C buffer neither the input nor the output; box D is a “standard”
flat box, which also shows the expression layer (but ignores types); finally, box E
is a hierarchical box, which buffers the inputs and outputs. Here, is used
to graphically illustrates a program transformation. The term spatial component
is used for a cluster of boxes, which is neither semantically nor syntactically,
separated from the rest of the program.
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A construct is formalised when it is represented in a formal logic, whereas mechanised
is used for a formalisation inside a mechanical tool, such as Isabelle. Similarly, a formal
proof is a pen-and-paper proof in a formal logic, while a mechanised proof has been
checked by a theorem prover. An informal proof is not inside a formal logic, and a
proof outline is a high level description of a formal, informal or mechanised proof. A
program is a (computable) algorithm that has been implemented in a programming
language, and software verification denotes verification at the programming language
level, while assertion and specification captures such requirements. Static analysis is
analysis applied without running a program, while dynamic analysis is analysis while
running a program. An interpreter runs a program inside another program, while a
compiler turns a program into executable machine code.
Chapter2
Background
2.1 Software verification
The idea of mathematically reasoning about programs goes back to Goldstine and
von Neumann [79] and Turing [186]. However, the introduction of Hoare-triples, or
Hoare logic, by Hoare [95], based on a paper by Floyd [70] is often considered the first
seminal work in this area. Here, a program is described axiomatically, thus operational
reasoning is not required. This is achieved by annotating program code C with pre-
condition P and post-condition Q, written as
{P}C{Q}.
The triples show partial correctness : if P holds, and command C terminates, then Q
holds afterwards. Total correctness is partial correctness with an additional termination
proof of C. The task of finding both the code and annotation requires user interaction,
but heuristics exist to guide this, such as predicate transformers like Dijkstra’s weakest
preconditions [56]: wp(C,Q) computes the weakest precondition (state) from code C
where the post-condition Q holds after execution. Weakest preconditions also handle
termination.
The concept of Hoare triples is an example of ad-hoc verification: a given program
is annotated and these annotations are then verified, while heuristics, like the weakest
precondition aids the user in finding annotations. However, for non-trivial sized pro-
grams such ad-hoc verification is only possible for correct programs. As described in
[109], decomposition and refinement are required: decomposition enables the proof of a
component to be reduced to the proof of its sub-components; refinement is a result of a
step-wise design: parts of the program are developed and verified gradually. The early
phases are very abstract, while the later phases are closer to an implementation. One
9
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of the first such refinement-based development methods was the Vienna Development
Method (VDM) [107]. A VDM model defines a class of states and a series of operations
that depend upon, and update the state, with clear semantics of de-composition and
refinement [109]. A similar system to VDM is Z [179], originally proposed by Jean-
Raymond Abrial. ZRC [40] is a refinement calculus for Z specifications. Based mainly
on Z, Abrial developed the B-method [8], geared more towards software development
and refinement. Event-B [9] is developed from B, and focuses on system development.
TLA also reflects decomposition [4, 5] and refinement [3].
The Hoare-triples assume that the program C is executed sequentially in isolation,
and sequences are handled by the sequential composition axiom:
{P} C1 {R} {R} C2 {Q}
{P} C1 ; C2 {Q} .
However, if C1 and C2 are not executed in isolation, other programs may update the
state at the same time as C1 and C2, thus {P} C1 ; C2 {Q} cannot be derived due to the
potential side-effect introduced by other programs. Thus, the composition axiom is not
valid. In [163], Susan Owicki, supervised by David Gries, extended the Hoare-triples
into concurrent systems, by dividing the proof process into two phases: first the proof
is as in the sequential case; followed by a proof that the different processes could not
interfere with each other. This method is known as the Owicki-Gries method. However,
the second step requires reasoning about the complete system, thus local reasoning
and decomposition are not supported, and details admitted later in the process may
interfere, thus refinement is not possible.
More recently, separation logic [170], has been suggested for reasoning about con-
current programs [161]. Separation logic was originally developed by Reynolds [170]
to reason about heap data-structures like pointers, by adding connectives to split the
heap into parts. This enables local reasoning, and can be applied to concurrent system
as later shown by O’Hearn [161].
Both separation logic and the Owicki-Gries method rely on an underlying state,
and communication is by shared variables. Another technique for the verification of
concurrent systems is the use of process algebras [18]. Here, communication is by
processes and no variables are shared. The word ‘process’ refers to the behaviour of
a system, while ‘algebra’ reflects the use of algebraic laws to manipulate and analyse
the system. Hoare’s CSP [96] is an example of a process algebra. It was developed
as a programming language for concurrent systems. Another example is Milner’s CCS
[149], although its intended use was not as a programming language. The Π-calculus
[150] extends CCS by allowing configurations to change during computation, while
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Figure 2.1: Types of program transformations [191]| |
the Join calculus [71] targets distributed programming languages, where rendezvous
communications are not supported. Process algebras support equivalence verification
of processes, which is stronger than than refinement, through the use of bisimulations.
Finally, property specification is an interesting topic for concurrent systems: in the
sequential cases properties are specified in a classical predicate logic. For concurrent
systems, temporal logic has been successful. It was first suggested by Burstall [35] for
program development, while Pnueli [167]1 first suggested it for concurrent systems.
Temporal logic permits reasoning with time without explicitly introducing it. Leslie
Lamport was the first to distinguish the notions of safety and liveness [118]: a safety
property asserts that bad things never occur, while a liveness property asserts that
something good will eventually occur. This was later formalised by Alpern and Schnei-
der [13]. They also showed that all properties are combination of safety and liveness
properties. In general, safety properties are considered more important, and liveness
properties are harder to verify. TLA is a temporal logic supporting safety, liveness,
refinement and decomposition, discussed in detail in Section 2.3. This is preceded by
a classification of program transformations.
2.2 Program transformation classification
Visser [191] separates between high-level programming languages and low-level pro-
gramming languages : a high-level programming language abstracts over the underly-
ing hardware; while a low-level programming language depends on the hardware. An
aspect language is sub-language, which can be either high-level or low-level, which only
shows particular aspects of the language, like the control-flow or the data-flow.
Visser classifies program transformations into two distinct types: translation and
1The citation is the journal version (1981) based on a report from Tel-Aviv University from 1977.
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rephrasing – each of which have different sub-types. The relationship between the
different sub-types is shown graphically in Figure 2.1.
Translation. In a program translation the source language deviates from the target
language. Program synthesis is an example of a program translation, where the
abstraction level is lowered. For example: program refinement is, as described
above, an implementation derived from a high-level specification; while, in a com-
pilation, the target language is machine code. The opposite of program synthesis
is reverse engineering where the abstraction level is increased. In program migra-
tion the translation is between two different languages at the same level, while
program analysis reduces a program to just one aspect. For example, in data-flow
analysis only the data-flow aspect is required.
Rephrasing. In program rephrasing the source and target language is the same. Nor-
malisation reduces a program to a program in a sub-language: de-sugaring elim-
inates syntactic sugar; simplification is more general, and reduces the program to
a normal form, but does not need to remove simplified parts. Program optimisa-
tion is a transformation that improves certain properties, such as time or space
usage. Program refactoring restructures the program design to make it easier
to understand, whilst preserving the functionality: obfuscation transformation
makes the program harder to understand for protection against re-engineering.
Program reflection changes the program to also compute meta-values of itself,
such as tracing a variable. Program (software) renovation changes the behaviour
of a program to repair a bug, such as the Y2K bug.
2.3 The temporal logic of actions
“. . . temporal logic is a necessary evil that should be avoided as much as
possible.”
– Leslie Lamport [120, page 46]
The temporal logic of actions (TLA) targets concurrent systems. It allows both liveness
and safety properties to be expressed in the same uniform logic.
A property Φ holds in a specification Π if Π implements Φ. These are expressed
in the same uniform logic, thus logically they are not distinguished. Moreover, a
specification Π refines another specification Φ, if Π implements Φ. Implementation
is expressed as logical implication, thus both property and refinement verification are
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expressed as
Π⇒ Φ. (2.1)
TLA combines a linear temporal logic with an action logic. In a linear temporal
logic, time is linear, compared to branching temporal logic, where time has a tree-like
structure with a branch for each potential future direction. There, quantification over
the different branches is supported, which does not hold for linear temporal logics. The
temporal and action logic combination in TLA creates a three tier logic where
• in the state level, a state function/predicate is a function/predicate on one par-
ticular state. In [127], Lamport argues that type systems are hard to get right,
and getting them wrong can lead to inconsistencies. He then states that set the-
ory can be used as a basis for a type free specification language. Thus, TLA
is a type free logic, where all values are members of an infinite set Val, and all
variable names are members of an inifinite set Var. A state s assigns values to
variables, i.e. it is a function from Var to Val. The value of a variable x in s is
semantically s(x), albeit abbreviated by x. The state level also contains a full
predicate calculus;
• in the action level, an action A is a predicate on two states (s, t): a ‘before state’
s and ‘result state’ t state of A. Syntactically, s(x) is written x, while t(x) is
written x′, and ′ distributes over all operators;
• in the temporal level, a formula is a predicate on an infinite sequence of states.
A sequence σ is represented as a function from natural numbers nat to states St,
where St is an infinite set of all possible states. Below 〈s0, s1, · · · 〉 is used for
σ, and 〈t0, t1, · · · 〉 for the sequence τ . σ|i is the suffix of sequence σ, starting at
state si, i.e. 〈si, si+1, · · · 〉.
Lamport uses the term rigid variables for what a programmer calls constants, and
flexible variables for what are simply known as variables. 2, meaning something
always holds, and 3, meaning something will eventually hold, are supported,
together with an existential quantifier ∃ for flexible variables, which is essential
for most refinement proofs. The term behaviour is often used for the temporal
level, and St∞ is an infinite set of all behaviours of all states in St.
A stuttering step is a step in a sequence that leaves the state unchanged. For
example, assume that s0 6= s1. Then the sequence 〈s0, s0, s1 · · · 〉, contains a stuttering
step followed by a non-stuttering step. Two sequences are equal up to stuttering iff
they are separated only by stuttering steps. For example, 〈s0, s0, s1, s1, s1, s2, · · · 〉 and
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〈s0, s1, s2, · · · 〉 are equal up to stuttering. To enable refinement, a formula must be
stuttering invariant : the validity of a formula is the same for sequences that are equal
up to stuttering – or steps that leave the state unchanged do not change the validity of
a formula. This excludes the temporal ‘next’ (state) operator, which is not stuttering
invariant. This can be shown by the following example. Assume that x = 1 holds in
state s0, written s0  (x = 1), and x = 2 holds in state s1, written s1  (x = 2).
Then 〈s0, s1, s2, · · · 〉 
(
(x = 1) ⇒ ‘next’(x > 1)
)
holds since anything prefixed by
‘next’ refers to the second state s1 of the sequence, while non-prefixed terms refer to
the first state s0. Thus, the proof reduces to showing that x > 1 from x = 2, which
holds. However, this property is invalid under sequence 〈s0, s0, s1, s1, s1, s2, · · · 〉, which
equals 〈s0, s1, s2, · · · 〉 up to stuttering. Here, 〈s0, s0, s1, s1, s1, s2, · · · 〉 
(
(x = 1) ⇒
‘next’(x > 1)
)
is invalid, since the second state, which ‘next’ refers to, is s0. Here,
x = 1 is assumed, which contradicts the required goal x > 1.
In TLA, computation is modelled by an action A. The computation should be
valid throughout execution (and not just in the first two steps), which requires a lifting
into the temporal level. A naive lifting of A, induces 2A. However, an action is
not necessarily stuttering invariant, and 2 only preserves, and does not introduce,
stuttering invariance. Instead of A, A ∨ v′ = v is used, where v is a tuple of state
functions. This is stuttering invariant, and is abbreviated by [A]v. 2[A]v lifts this into
into the temporal level.
All variables must be given an initial value by a state predicate I. Moreover, internal
variables i of the specification can be hidden by binding them with the ∃ operator. Let
v = 〈e, i〉 be a tuple of the external (visible) variables e and internal (hidden) variables
i. In a monolithic specification, 〈e, i〉 should contain all variables in the state space,
and A should update all variable. Such monolithic specifications are of the form:
∃i. I ∧2[A]〈e,i〉. (2.2)
∃ hides the internal variables i, thus e are the only free variables of (2.2). I must
specify the initial value of e and i, while A describes how e and i are updated in the
computation.
2.3.1 Liveness
Only safety requirement can be verified from (2.2). To verify liveness properties, the
actions must be constrained by liveness assumptions. Arbitrary liveness properties
may introduce unexpected safety properties, thus the liveness assumption should be
restricted to a form of liveness called fairness. There is a separation between weak
Chapter 2. Background 15
and strong fairness properties of actions. These require some auxiliary definitions and
meanings: 3F denotes 3F ≡ ¬2¬F ; the action variant of this is written 3〈A〉v and is
defined as 3〈A〉v , ¬2[¬A]v and it can easily be shown that 3〈A〉v ≡ 3(A∧ v′ 6= v);
and finally, an action A is enabled in a state s, written Enabled A, if it is possible to
execute A starting in s. Weak fairness (WF ) for A asserts that if A is continously
enabled then it must always eventually be executed. Strong fairness (SF ) asserts that
if A is infinitely often enabled than it must always eventually be executed:
WFv(A) , 32Enabled 〈A〉v ⇒ 23〈A〉v
SFv(A) , 23Enabled 〈A〉v ⇒ 23〈A〉v
(2.3)
Now, (2.2) can be extended with fairness as follows: ∃i.I ∧ 2[A]〈v,i〉 ∧ Live, where
Live is a conjunction of SF and WF declarations. If all actions used in the WF/SF
declarations are sub-actions of A, then no unexpected safety properties have been
introduced and the specification is machine closed [5, page 519].
2.3.2 TLA semantics
A detailed exploration of the logical details of TLA is discussed in [7], while this
discussion is based on [120]. The following definitions show the semantics for the
safety and propositional parts of the TLA semantics:
(1) s  f iff f [s(v)/v] holds for all variables v
(2) (s, t)  A iff A[s(v)/v, t(v)/v′] holds for all variables v
(3) σ  ¬A iff σ  A does not hold.
(4) σ  A ∧B iff σ  A and σ  B holds.
(5)  A iff (s, t)  A holds for all s, t ∈ St
(6)  F iff ∀σ ∈ St∞. σ  F
(7) σ  2F iff σ|i  F holds for all i ≥ 0.
(8) σ  A iff (s0, s1)  A.
(1) f [s(v)/v] denotes v substituted by s(v) in f . Thus, (1) implies a state predicate f
of state s holds if all variables are substituted by their (semantic) values. (2) Similarly,
primed variables are looked up in the after state t and unprimed in the before state s
of an action A. (3) A behaviour satisfies ¬A iff it does not satisfy A. (4) A behaviour
satisfies A∧B iff it satisfies A and it satisfies B. The remaining propositional operators
can be derived from these. (5) An action is valid iff it holds for all state pairs, while
(6) a formula is valid iff it holds for all sequences. (7) A formula always holds (2F )
throughout a sequence, if it holds in all suffixes of the sequence. (8) An action holds
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for a sequence, iff it holds over the first two states (the first step).
Liveness proofs require reasoning about the ability to carry out an action, that is
whether or not an action is enabled : an action A is enabled in a state s if it is possible
to do an A step, meaning there exists a result t state such that (s, t)  A:
s  Enabled A iff ∃t ∈ St. (s, t)  A (2.4)
The definition of flexible quantification requires some auxiliary definitions: firstly, the
equivalence of two sequences σ and τ up to a variable x, written σ =x τ : with the
exception of x, all variables of all corresponding states in the sequences are equal;
secondly, \ removes all, but infinite sequences of stuttering steps of a sequence:
σ =x τ , si(v) = ti(v) for all i ≥ 0 and for all v 6= x.
\σ , if si = s0 for all i ≥ 0
then 〈s0, s0, s0, · · · 〉
else if s1 = s0 then \(σ|1) else 〈s0〉 ◦ \(σ|1)
Flexible2 and rigid quantification is then defined as follows:
σ  ∃ x. F iff ∃ρ, τ ∈ St∞. (\σ = \ρ) ∧ (ρ =x τ) ∧ (τ  F )
σ  ∃ c. F iff ∃ c ∈ Val. σ  F
2.3.3 Reasoning within TLA
Figure 2.2 shows the proof system for TLA, as defined in [120]. Here, F , G and Hc are
TLA formulas; P,Q and I are temporal predicates; A, B, N andM are actions; f and
g are state functions; e is a constant expression; c is a rigid variable; and x is a flexible
variable. The proof system always attempts to reduce temporal formulas into the
action level, and is expressed in Raw TLA (RTLA) which is a non-stuttering invariant
super-set of TLA. This is required since actions are not stuttering invariant. Rules
(STL1)-(STL6) are standard temporal logic rules. Rule (TLA1) introduces an induction
principle to prove properties of the form 2P , while (TLA2) is used in refinement proofs.
Rule (INV1) is used to prove that a program satisfies an invariant I. Such invariant
proofs often require a strengthening of the action N by other (weaker) invariants. This
is achieved by rule (INV2).
(WF1) is used to prove leads-to properties P ; Q (2(P ⇒ 3Q)), which means that
it is always the case that if P , then eventually Q. This is proved from a weak fairness
2Please see [120] for the reason of the complexity of ∃’s definition.
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(STL1) ` F is tautological (STL4) ` F ⇒ G
` 2F ` 2F ⇒ 2G
(STL2) ` 2F ⇒ F (STL5) ` 2(F ∧G) ≡ (2F ) ∧ (2G)
(STL3) ` 22F ≡ 2F (STL6) (32F ) ∧ (32G) ≡ 32(F ∧G)
(LATTICE)  is a well-founded partial order on a set S
` F ∧ (c ∈ S)⇒ (Hc ; (G ∨ ∃ d ∈ S. (c  d) ∧Hd))
` F ⇒ (∃ c ∈ S. Hc) ; G)
(TLA1) ` P ∧ (f ′ = f)⇒ P ′ (TLA2) ` P ∧ [A]f ⇒ Q ∧ [B]g
` 2P ≡ P ∧2[P ⇒ P ′]f ` 2P ∧2[A]f ⇒ 2Q ∧2[B]g
(INV1) ` I ∧ [N ]f ⇒ I ′ (INV2) ` 2I ⇒ (2[N ]f ≡ 2[N ∧ I ∧ I ′]f )
` I ∧2[N ]f ⇒ 2I
(WF1) (WF2)
` P ∧ [N ]f ⇒ (P ′ ∨Q′) ` 〈N ∧ B〉f ⇒ 〈M〉g
` P ∧ 〈N ∧ A〉f ⇒ Q′ ` P ∧ P ′ ∧ 〈N ∧ A〉f ∧ Enabled 〈M〉g ⇒ B
` P ⇒ Enabled 〈A〉f ` P ∧ Enabled 〈M〉g ⇒ Enabled 〈A〉g
` 2[N ]f ∧WFf (A)⇒ (P ; Q) ` 2[N ∧ ¬B]f ∧WFf (A) ∧2F
∧32Enabled 〈M〉g ⇒ 32P
` 2[N ]f ∧WFf (A) ∧2F ⇒WFg(M)
(SF1) (SF2)
` P ∧ [N ]f ⇒ (P ′ ∨Q′) ` 〈N ∧ B〉f ⇒ 〈M〉g
` P ∧ 〈N ∧ A〉f ⇒ Q′ ` P ∧ P ′ ∧ 〈N ∧ A〉f∧ ⇒ B
` 2P ∧2[N ]f ∧2F ` P ∧ Enabled 〈M〉g ⇒ Enabled 〈A〉g
⇒ 3Enabled 〈A〉f ` 2[N ∧ ¬B]f ∧ SFf (A) ∧2F
` 2[N ]f ∧ SFf (A) ∧2F ⇒ (P ; Q) ∧23Enabled 〈M〉g ⇒ 32P
` 2[N ]f ∧ SFf (A) ∧2F ⇒ SFg(M)
(E1) ` F [f/x]⇒ ∃x. F (E2) ` F ⇒ G
x does not occur free in G
` (∃x. F )⇒ G
(F1) ` F [e/c]⇒ ∃ c. F (F2) ` F ⇒ G
c does not occur free in G
` (∃ c. F )⇒ G
Figure 2.2: TLA proof rules [120].| |
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assumption, while (WF2) deduces a weak fairness condition from another. (SF1) and
(SF2) are the strong fairness versions of (WF1) and (WF2).
The following simple example illustrates the application of rules in a proof. Firstly,
a standard inductive definition of Even, the set of even numbers, is given:
(even base) 0 ∈ Even (even step) X ∈ Even
X + 2 ∈ Even
and the following property is verified:
x = 0 ∧2[x′ = x+ 2]x ⇒ 2(x ∈ Even)
The proof is given in a backwards fashion, where the goal is manipulated to resemble
the assumption: firstly, by (even base), x ∈ Even holds for the initial state; then, rule
(INV1) reduces the proof to the action level, requiring the proof that x′ ∈ Even as a
result of the action; next, the “unchanged step”, which follows from the subscript, and
the “step case” x′ = x + 2 are split: the “unchanged case” is trivial; while the “step
case” is trivial after applying rule (even step). The proof is shown by the following proof
tree, and should be read bottom-up:
x ∈ Even⇒ x ∈ Even (simp)
x ∈ Even ∧ x′ = x⇒ x′ ∈ Even
x ∈ Even⇒ x ∈ Even (even step)
x ∈ Even⇒ x+ 2 ∈ Even
(simp)
x ∈ Even ∧ x′ = x+ 2⇒ x′ ∈ Even
([···]···)
x ∈ Even ∧ [x′ = x+ 2]x ⇒ x′ ∈ Even (INV1)
x ∈ Even ∧2[x′ = x+ 2]x ⇒ 2(x ∈ Even) (even base)
x = 0 ∧2[x′ = x+ 2]x ⇒ 2(x ∈ Even)
(F1) and (F2) are the introduction and elimination rules for existential quantifica-
tion of rigid variables, and follow from standard introduction and elimination rules for
∃. Note that e is a constant expression and c is a rigid variable. (E1) is the introduction
rule for ∃, while (E2) is the elimination rule. These are comparable to (F1) and (F2).
However, f is a state function while x is a flexible variable. (E1) and (E2) are used
with the internal, or ∃-bound, variables, as shown in (2.2) for example. Let Φ be a
high-level specification and Π a refinement of it, without hiding the internal variables
x1, x2, · · · xn and y1, y2, · · · ym, respectively. The refinement proof reduces to showing
that
∃ y1, y2, · · · ym. Π⇒ ∃ x1, x2, · · ·xn. Φ. (2.5)
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In the proof of (2.5),
Π⇒ ∃ x1, x2, · · ·xn. Φ (2.6)
is normally first proved, and then (E2) is applied to ∃-bind y1, y2, · · · ym. The proof of
(2.6) is the main part of the proof (2.5). As with any “existential proof”, the proof
requires obtaining witnesses f1, f2, · · · , fn for the ∃-bound variables x1, x2, · · · , xn, re-
spectively. Each witness fi is a state-function, expressed by all free-variables in Π,
and the sum of all the witnesses f1, f2, · · · , fn is called the refinement mapping [3].
Moreover, Φ[f1/x1, f2/x2, · · · , fn/xn] is written Φ, and Φ ⇒ P means that P holds
under this refinement mapping. The substitution, and thus the · · · operator, dis-
tribute over most operators, and all propositional and safety operators. For example,
2(· · · ∧ · · · ) ≡ 2(· · · ∧ · · ·). However, as illustrated in rules (WF2) and (SF2), it does
not distribute over Enabled, WF and SF [120]. Now, to prove (2.6) Π ⇒ Φ, is first
proved, and then (F1) is appled to x1, x2, · · · , xn (f1, f2, · · · , fn) to show (2.6). For
example, the simple refinement
(x = 0 ∧2[x′ = x+ 2]x)⇒ (∃ y. y = 1 ∧2[y′ = y + 2]y),
is verified by the [(x+ 1)/y] substitution. Thus F becomes F [(x+ 1)/y]. This reduces
the goal to the following, which can be verified by (TLA2) and (STL4):
(x = 0 ∧2[x′ = x+ 2]x)⇒
(
(x+ 1) = 1 ∧2[(x+ 1)′ = (x+ 1) + 2](x+1)
)
.
Sometimes the refinement mapping requires augmenting the specification by an
auxiliary variables [3]. For example, a history variable, which records past information,
can be added to a specification without altering the system behaviour.
2.3.4 TLA∗
TLA∗ [144] is a generalisation of TLA. It is partly a result of a lack of a proper
proof-system for TLA, which has caused problems in prevoius mechanisations of TLA
[65, 115, 128, 143, 197, 202]. The discussion of these embeddings are delayed to Section
3.1.1. It is motivated by two related TLA shortcomings. Firstly, strong syntactic re-
strictions so that particularly many specifications and properties cannot be expressed
in a natural way. In particular, 3(F ∧3G) can be expressed, whilst the action counter-
part 3〈P ∧3〈G〉v〉w is not a well-formed TLA term. Secondly, TLA does not have an
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adequate proof system3. Lamport [120] only shows a relative completeness result for
standard monolithic specifications, and the proof system resorts to the non invariant
stuttering RTLA. The proof system becomes particularly important with respect to
mechanisation, and Merz argues that TLA∗ is better suited for mechanical verification
than TLA [144].
TLA∗ replaces the action layer of TLA with a pre-formula layer, subsuming the
temporal level, which in TLA∗ is called the formula layer. The priming operator is
omitted, and replaced by a local ◦F operator, where F is a formula. This is only
allowed in a pre-formula, and thus deviates from the global ‘next’ operator. Merz [144]
addresses only the propositional case, which is extended here to the predicate case in
Chapter 3.
Let V be the set of all atomic propositions, hence v ∈ V is a formula. All proposi-
tional operators are also both formulas and pre-formulas, hence if, for example, F and
G are formulas then F ∧G is a formula4. Furthermore, if F is a formulas then F and
◦F are pre-formulas and 2F is a formula. Finally, if v ∈ V and P is a pre-formula,
then 2[P ]v is a formula. Sequences, abbreviations etc. are similar to TLA, but note
that only the propositional case is addressed, thus a state is a predicate on V . The
semantics of TLA∗ is then defined inductively as follows:
(1) σ  v iff s0(v) (for v ∈ V).
(2) σ  ¬A iff σ  A does not hold.
(3) σ  A⇒ B iff σ  A implies σ  B.
(4) σ  2F iff σ|i  F holds for all i ≥ 0.
(5) σ  2[P ]v iff si(v) = si+1(v) or σ|i  P holds for all i ≥ 0.
(6) σ  ◦F iff σ|1  F holds.
The semantics is similar to standard possible world semantics for modal logics [28],
with the difference that stuttering invariance of TLA∗ formulas are ensured. (1) Since
only the propositional case is discussed, v ∈ V is either true or false. Thus, v satisfies
a behaviour iff it holds in the first state. (2) A behaviour satisfies ¬A iff it does not
satisfy A. (3) A behaviour satisfies A ⇒ B iff it satisfies B when it satisfies A. (4)
A behaviour σ satisfies 2F iff F holds in all suffices of σ. (5) A behaviour σ satisfies
2[P ]v iff for all suffixes σ|i of σ, the first step is either a stuttering step, or P holds for
σ|i. (6) A behaviour σ satisfies ◦F iff F satisfies the tail σ|1 of σ.
Flexible quantification has the same semantics as in TLA and is therefore not
3In [2], Abadi defines a proof system for an earlier version of TLA. However, TLA has changed
drastically since then.
4F and G are used for formulas, P and Q for pre-formulas, while A and B are both.
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(ax0) ` F whenever F is tautological (pax0) |∼ P whenever P is tautological
(ax1) ` 2F ⇒ F (pax1) |∼ ◦¬F ≡ ¬ ◦ F
(ax2) ` 2F ⇒ 2[2F ]v (pax2) |∼ ◦(F ⇒ G)⇒ (◦F ⇒ ◦G)
(ax3) ` 2[F ⇒ ◦F ]F ⇒ (F ⇒ 2F ) (pax3) |∼ 2F ⇒ ◦2F
(ax4) ` 2[P ⇒ Q]v ⇒ (2[P ]v ⇒ 2[Q]v) (pax4) |∼ 2[P ]v ≡ [P ]v ∧ ◦2[P ]v
(ax5) ` 2[◦v 6≡ v]v (pax5) |∼ ◦2F ⇒ 2[◦F ]v
(mp) ` F ` F ⇒ G (pmp) |∼ P |∼ P ⇒ Q
` G |∼ Q
(sq) |∼ P (pre) ` F (nex) ` F
` 2[P ]v |∼ F |∼ ◦F
Figure 2.3: TLA∗ hetereogenous proof system [144].| |
discussed it here. Also note that to ensure stuttering invariance F must be a formula
in ◦F and 2F . Merz [144] shows by example why this is the case.
Figure 2.3 shows the proof system of TLA∗. It uses two provability relations: `
for formulas; and |∼ for pre-formulas. In particular note that: in (ax3) the subscript
F is short hand for the free variables of F ; (ax5) asserts that pre-formula P in 2[P ]v
is evaluated only when v changes value; (pax1) expresses linear time; (sq) is used to
convert a pre-formula into a formula; and (pre) and (nex) convert in the other direction.
In the predicate case, the TLA rules from Figure 2.2 can be derived using the rules
from Figure 2.3 and standard predicate calculus rules.
Formulas contain the interesting properties. Pre-formulas are merely auxiliary in
order to achieve this. Thus, Merz also suggests a homogenous proof system, where the
|∼ relation is omitted. It requires some changes to the (pax) axioms, which are then
“boxed” by the (sq) rule. Merz argues that this will be better suited for mechanical
verification. However in the attempt to mechanise TLA∗ in Chapter 3, the proof system
of Figure 2.3 proved easier to use. Thus, the homogenous variant is not discussed
further.
2.3.5 TLA+
TLA is lifted in the sense that it is generic with respect to the underlying data struc-
tures. TLA+ [124] is a full specification language5 which combines TLA with a variant
of first-order Zermelo Fraenkel (ZF) set-theory with choice. It provides facilities to
define operators and recursive functions. Further, it allows specifications to be divided
into parametric hierarchical modules, albeit this is simply syntactic sugaring to sim-
plify specifications. Moreover, it adds a module system to TLA, where modules are
5See [145] for a detailed discussion of the underlying logic of TLA+.
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imported by the extends statement, and a set of pre-defined modules are included.
For example, the natural numbers module Naturals provides Peano-numbers, while In-
tegers extends this to integers, and Reals provides real numbers. The Sequence module
formalises tuples, lists and sequences – which are the same since TLA+ is type-free.
Seq(T ) defines a sequence of type T , where by type we mean a set of constants. It
also provides operators on sequences, like Len, Head and Tail, which have the obvious
meaning – and the binary · which adds a sequences to the end of of the first. Sequences
can also be written 〈· · · 〉, where 〈〉 denotes an empty sequence. A TLA+ operator is
semantically the same as replacing it with its definition, and arguments are given inside
brackets (· · · ). Functions, on the other hand, are not purely syntactic, and support
recursion. Here arguments are given inside square brackets [· · · ]. Note that the valid
input “type” must be given in the definition to support the recursion. For example,
f [a ∈ T ] , · · · defines a function f , where the input a must be a member of the set
T . if and case expressions are also supported.
Recently, TLA+ has been extended with a hierarchical proof language [122], and
support is added for recursion and lambda notation for operators. This is called TLA+2
[126]. TLA+ is a proper sub-language of TLA+2 [126], and TLA+2 will eventually
replace TLA+. All work in this thesis has been in TLA+. However, since TLA+ is a
proper sub-language of TLA+2 the work in this thesis is just as valid in TLA+2, albeit
better mechanisms may exists in TLA+2 to achieve a more direct embedding of the
Hume semantics.
2.4 Automated reasoning
Automated reasoning techniques attempt to automate the proofs of system properties
using computer programs. The verification problem is, in general, undecidable for suffi-
ciently expressive programming languages. Thus, mechanical verification often requires
user interaction, and automated reasoning techniques attempts to reduce this interac-
tion as much as possible. Broadly speaking, there are then two types of mechanical
verification techniques:
• an algorithmic or state-based approach known as model checking, which is dis-
cussed in Section 2.4.1;
• a deductive or proof-based approach known as theorem proving, which is discussed
in Section 2.4.2, followed by an introduction to the Isabelle theorem prover in
Section 2.4.3.
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Section 2.4.4 discusses various mechanical verification tools for formal software verifi-
cation.
2.4.1 Model checking
Model checking [43] was independently developed by Clarke and Emerson [42] and by
Queille and Sifakis [168]. Clarke, Emerson and Sifakis received the 2008 Turing award
for this work. In the model checking problem, the model M of the system is represented
as a Kripke structure over a quadruple M = (S, S0, R, L):
1. S is a finite set of states.
2. So ⊆ S is the set of initial states.
3. R ⊆ S × S is a total transition for the states.
4. L : S → 2AP is a labelling function that labels each state s ∈ S with the set of
atomic propositions that hold in state s.
If liveness properties are used then the Kripke structure is extended with a fairness
constraint F ⊆ 2S. The model checking problem for a temporal property pi is then
expressed as M  pi , meaning ‘given the model M , does pi hold’. This is verified
by traversing the Kripke structure M for violations of pi. If a violation is found a
counter-example is given. The advantage of model checking is full automation and
counter-example generation, which can be helpful in identifying and repairing errors.
However, it requires the model to be finite and is not as expressive as theorem provers.
Moreover, it does not say why a property holds: often a property holds for other
reasons than those assumed. The largest problem with model checkers is the state
space explosion problem: a computer only has a finite sized memory, and at some point
the program becomes too big, and the model checker will fail.
With regard to state representation, explicit state model checking is the simplest
form and represents the complete state. TLC [124, 203] is an explicit time model
checker. In automata based model checkers, automata are used to represent both
specification and property, and validation is by containment of the property in the
automaton. Spin [97] is an example of this type of model checker. Symbolic model
checking uses the symbolic OBDD representation of Kripke structures, while fixed
points [140] are used to verify properties. SMV [140] is an example of a symbolic
model checker.
There are also various techniques to reduce both the search time and space required
for a given model checking problem. These techniques may rely on the state representa-
tion. For example, Spin is an on-the-fly model checker, where the state space is created
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during search. Thus, some errors can be found early, without creating the full state
space, which enables identification of some errors even if the full state space cannot
be generated. Spin also supports partial-order reduction which explores commutativity
of concurrent transactions to reduce the state space. There are also techniques that
explore symmetry in the search tree of the state space, and abstraction techniques that
attempt to simplify the model to reduce the steps. For example, predicate abstraction
[52] combines model checking with theorem proving to verify that the abstraction is
indeed correct. Predicate abstraction and bounded model checking, which uses a fixed
number n of steps of M , and then check whether a property violation can occur in n
or fewer steps, can be used to model check infinite state systems.
As a concluding remark, model checking is suitable for finite systems, which can
be expressed by a finite state machine (FSM), and is well-suited for control-centric
problems which can often be expressed as an FSM.
TLA+ supports model checking via the TLC tool [124, 203], where the specifica-
tion must import the TLC module. Only a decidable finite subset of the language is
supported, whilst all constants must be given a value. This is achieved by augmenting
the model checker with a configuration file, restricting sets into acceptable subsets, and
giving constants values. TLC version 2.0 has been used here.
2.4.2 Theorem proving
Theorem proving has a longer history than model checking: the earliest well known
system is the Logic Theory Machine (1963) [155]. In a theorem prover deductive
techniques are used to verify conjectures. There is a difference between:
• proof checkers which, given a conjecture and a proof, check that the proof is
correct;
• automatic theorem provers which, given a conjecture, attempt to automatically
prove it;
• interactive theorem provers which, given a conjecture, attempt to verify it by
interaction with a user.
In the area of automatic theorem provers, Robinson [172] has carried out seminal work
on resolution. Automatic theorem provers are undecidable for sufficiently expressive
logics, like first-order, or higher-order, predicate logic. However, for the first-order
predicate calculus, it is semi-decidable: if a conjecture holds it will be found, but the
prover may never terminate.
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An interactive theorem prover, also called a proof assistant, is something between
a proof checker and an automatic theorem prover, depending on the level of automa-
tion supported. At one end of the spectrum, the user guides every small step in the
deduction, while at the other end the user only gives high-level guidance of the proof.
Here, the smaller steps are handled by special made tactics and decision procedures : a
tactic is a method/program that performs one or more steps in a proof; while a deci-
sion procedure is an algorithm that attempts to solve an (often undecidable) decision
problem.
Another classification of theorem provers is based on their underlying logic: classical
provers are based on higher-order logic, for example Isabelle/HOL [158], HOL [80] and
PVS [164]; constructive provers, like Coq [25] and Agda [50], are based on constructive
logics; set-theoretic provers, like Larch [75] and Isabelle/ZF [158], are based on some
sort of set theory; while first-order provers, like ACL2 [117] and Isabelle/FOL [158]
uses first-order logic.
2.4.3 The Isabelle/HOL theorem prover
“Don’t write a theorem prover. Try to use someone else’s.”
– Lawrence C. Paulson [165]
Isabelle is a framework for interactive theorem proving, following the LCF (Logic for
Computable Functions)-approach [82], where ML [151] is used as an implementation
language, and abstract data type constructors are used to ensure secure inferences. It
contains a generic meta-logic, called Isabelle/Pure, which is a minimal version of higher
order logic, used to define and manipulate object logics. Initially, ML was used to both
specify and verify systems and conjectures. Now, this is handled by a framework which
allows much more sophisticated specifications and infrastructure called Isar [200]. Here,
Isabelle/HOL [158] an implementation of higher-order logic, is assumed. This is by far
the most developed object logic in Isabelle. Note that to be precise Isabelle/Isar/HOL
should have been written, however, Isar is now used in all Isabelle object logics and is
thus omitted.
Isabelle/HOL follows the definitional approach, where new axioms should not be
asserted. Instead, constants, types and functions should be defined, and properties
about these should be proven. Here, abstract syntax can be defined using mixfix syntax
and mathematical symbols, which is then translated into the concrete syntax. To enable
the definitional approach, Isabelle/HOL allows definitions using for example inductive
datatypes, inductively defined sets and several ways of writing recursive functions.
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lemma A ∧ B −→ B ∧ A
apply (rule impI)
apply (erule conjE)
apply (rule conjI)
apply assumption
apply assumption
done
lemma A ∧ B −→ B ∧ A
proof (rule impI)
assume A ∧ B
then obtain A and B ..
then show B ∧ A ..
qed
Figure 2.4: Example of a procedural (left) and a structural (right) proof in Isabelle/HOL.| |
Isabelle formalisations are structured into theories, and the theories are organised
as graphs. Further, modularity is supported by axiomatic type classes [166, 199] and
locales [20, 21, 116]: axiomatic type classes allow a class of types to be defined in terms
of their properties, and is comparable to Haskell’s type classes [196]; Isabelle is built
up around theory contexts, and locales introduce local contexts.
Isabelle/Pure contains a quantifier
∧
, to express arbitrary, but fixed entities; =⇒
expresses logical entailment; and ≡ for equality. Here, A =⇒ B =⇒ C, JA; BK =⇒ C
and ‘assumes A and B shows C’ are semantically equivalent. Rules are represented
in Gentzen style natural deduction [76]. Care must be taken in separating the meta-
level connectives with object-level connectives, which here refer to Isabelle/HOL. With
regard to types; the product type is represented as × and function types are written
⇒. Note that object level implication is written −→, while = is used for both equality
and equivalence. Moreover, lemma and theorem are both used to express a theorem
in Isabelle.
Isar allows the user to work with a sophisticated interface compared to the ML level.
However, ML is still used to implement higher level tactics, defined using primitive
inference rules, previously defined rules and tactics, and previously proved theorems.
A tactic can then be lifted into an Isar method. In the original ML representation, proofs
were formalised in a backwards fashion, where the goal was reduced to sub-goals by
resolution, directed by a sequence of ML commands which specified the tactics to apply.
This representation is called a procedural proof. This proof style is still supported in
ML, albeit Isar methods and not tactics are applied. In addition, Isar also supports
forward structural proof scripts [157, 200]. Figure 2.4 illustrates a procedural (left)
and structural (right) proof of the A ∧B −→ B ∧ A conjecture.
The rule method performs introduction resolution, while the erule method per-
forms elimination resolution. The former is normally applied to the goal (right of the
rightmost =⇒) while the latter is normally applied to the assumptions (left of the
rightmost =⇒). In the procedural example (Figure 2.4, left), the impI rule applied to
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the rule method reduces object-level implication −→ into meta-level entailment =⇒.
This reduces the conjecture to A ∧ B =⇒ B ∧ A. conjE applied to the erule method
performs conjecture elimination in the assumption, thus reducing the conjecture toJA;BK =⇒ B ∧ A. Conjunction introduction (rule conjE) reduces this to the two con-
jectures JA;BK =⇒ B and JA;BK =⇒ A which are both proved by the assumption
method. The proof is completed by done.
A structural proof is encapsulated within proof · · · and qed. Here, · · · can be a list
of method applications in a backward style. In the structured proof example (Figure
2.4, right), rule impI is first applied backwards creating the conjecture A∧B =⇒ B∧A.
In the proof, the assumption is made explicit by assume. From this, the goal B ∧ A
must be showed. The .. method attempts to solve a goal by standard introduction
rules followed by applying the (given) assumptions. This is used to obtain A and B,
from the A ∧ B assumption. A and B are then used to show the goal using the same
method. Note that procedural and structural proofs can be interleaved.
A practical verification task will use higher level tactics and tools, instead of the one-
step resolution used in Figure 2.4, and Isabelle/HOL provides a number of such tools.
Most importantly, is the built in simplifier, which performs higher order conditional
rewriting using previously proven theorems. The set of used theorems, henceforth the
simplification set, can be customised by the user. Other important tactics are the
classical reasoner (the blast tactic), and the automatic tactic (auto) which combines
the simplifier and classical reasoner.
A Isabelle proof state consists of a list of sub-goals that needs to verified. Isar
methods are normally implicitly applied to either the first sub-goal or all the sub-
goals. For example, simp applies the simplifier to the first sub-goal, while simp all and
auto applies the simplifier and automatic tactic to all sub-goal. ML level tactics, which
are not lifted to the Isar level, can be called by the tactic method, e.g. apply (tactic
”my tac”). The ML level is often more flexible, allowing tactics or inference rules to
be applied to particular sub-goals.
Proof General for Emacs [16] is the standard user-interface with Isabelle, but it is
also possible to execute Isabelle theories in a ML shell level. Finally, Isabelle/HOL
2007 has been used here, unless otherwise specified.
2.4.4 Mechanical software verification
Below, examples are given of automated reasoning techniques applied to software ver-
ification, with a focus on the source code level.
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Verification by model checking
Intel has applied TLC to verify multiprocessor memory designs formalised in TLA+ [24].
A famous case-study is the Java Pathfinder [193]. Here, a tool translated Java code into
the Spin model checker, and found bugs in NASA’s Mars Rover [169]. Later versions
of the Java Pathfinder abandoned Spin, and instead used a tailor-made model checker
for Java programs, called Bandera [51]. There are also purpose built model checkers
for many other languages, like Ada [62], Erlang [160] and C [19, 48, 49]. BOGOR [171]
is a generic model checker which can be configured to work in a particular way for
a particular language. Recently, Microsoft’s Terminator tool [48, 49] has drawn most
attention. It is used to verify termination of C program, and has later been extended
to other liveness properties [47].
Verification by theorem proving
The Verisoft project [190] uses Isabelle/HOL to formalise a compiler for a C-like lan-
guage [132], while [177] formalised a C-like language with dynamic memory allocation,
and derived Hoare-triples from it. The Why/Krakatoa/Caduceus platform [68] com-
bines three tools. The Why tool [66] reads inputs in a specific language dedicated
to software verification. It then converts them to verification conditions, and several
interactive and automated theorem provers can be applied. Krakatoa [138] is a front
end for Java programs annotated by JML – the Java Modelling Language [131]. Java
programs with annotations are translated into the Why input language. Caduceus [67]
is a front-end for C programs annotated with a specialised version of JML. These are
also translated into the Why input language. Finally, SPARK [23], an Ada subset
with a purpose build theorem prover, has been used for many industrial safety-critical
systems.
Combining techniques
Microsoft’s Slam [19] uses predicate abstraction to verify drivers written in unannotated
C-code. The invariants are automatically inferred from the source code. The Stanford
Temporal Prover (STeP) [27] combines automatic- and interactive theorem proving
with model checking, and has been developed at Stanford University (USA) since 1994
to verify both temporal safety and liveness properties.
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2.5 Programming Languages
In his book on safety-critical systems [180], Storey lists six requirements for program-
ming languages in such domains. They are: low complexity of definitions (i.e. high-
levelness); expressive power ; bounded space and time usage; logical soundness ; security ;
and verifiability.
Low-level languages depend on the underlying hardware, and include first-generation
languages (machine-code) and second-generation (assembly code) languages. High-level
languages abstract over the hardware, and may be portable over many platforms. In
general, low-level languages tend to be more efficient, while high-level languages are
simpler to work with. A high-level language may be imperative or declarative. Impera-
tive languages, like C, C++, Java and Ada, are based on the theory of Turing machines
[185]. They describe “how” to compute, represented as a sequence of statements that
change the state of a program. Declarative languages are more abstract and describe
“what” to compute. There are two types of declarative languages: logical languages,
like Prolog [45], use mathematical logic for computation; and functional languages, like
ML [151] and Haskell [111], represent computations as applications of mathematical
functions.
Functional languages are based on the lambda calculus [22], and have many desirable
properties: the abstraction over the state implies no mutable objects, hence there are no
side effects in a computation. A function can therefore ignore global properties, thus
enabling local reasoning. Most functional languages are higher order, meaning that
functions can accept functions as inputs and return functions as results. This enables
the principle of currying where inputs can be partially applied. The Church-Rosser
property [41] holds, meaning a result is independent of evaluation order. Functional
languages have mainly been successful in academia, and most theorem provers are
implemented by a functional language. A problem with pure functional languages, as
described above, is that some required constructs cannot be handled. For example, I/O
has side-effects, hence languages that require I/O must have some impure fragments as
well, where the mathematical properties described above do not hold. In Haskell this
is handled by monads [195], while ML allows programs to contain variables (state).
No programming language fulfils all of Storey’s requirement, and many of the re-
quirement are contradicting. For example, for Turing-complete languages space and
time bounds are undecidable. However, these are decidable for a (Turing incomplete)
finite state automaton (FSA) language. A FSA is an abstract model of a computer
with a very primitive internal memory, and consists of: a finite number of states; and,
transitions between the states based on input and/or the current state. Notwithstand-
ing, they are low level, and working with them is known to be both tedious and time
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consuming, and it is easy to introduce errors.
Logical soundness refers to the existence of a sound unambiguous definition of
the language, i.e. formal semantics. There are three types of formal semantics. In
operational semantics the execution of a program is described, which can be seen as
an interpreter of a program. Hoare-triples forms an axiomatic semantics. While, in
denotational semantics, each program construct is given a meaning (denotation), which
is translated into another language.
Security denotes whether violations of the language definitions are detected before
execution, while verifiability denotes whether it can be proved that the program is
consistent with its specification, and is the topic of this thesis. Moreover, there are
also other requirements to programming languages, for example, UK MoD Standard 00-
55 [152] bans assembly code in all MoD applications, and [180] further lists tool support
and language expertise as key factors when choosing a language. Thus, defining a safe
subset of an existing language is a common solution, since existing tools like compilers
can be applied directly, and users are familiar with the language. Examples of this
approach are SPARK [23] for Ada, Misra-C for C and Spade-Pascal for Pascal.
2.6 The Hume programming language
Hume6 [92] is a high-level expressive programming language which targets resource
bounded safety-critical systems. Hume contains a Turing-complete functional lan-
guage. It targets resource bounded systems, and since time and space properties are
undecidable for Turing-complete languages, a finite state automaton (FSA) language is
built on top. Here, the I/O is also handled. It is normally attempted to work as much
as possible in the functional language, known as the expression layer, only resorting
to the FSA language, known as the coordination layer, when required. Since Hume
focuses on time and space properties, which are operational requirements, it has been
given a formal operational semantics [112].
The Hume coordination layer consists of boxes and wires, where transitions are
achieved in the expression layer within a box, by a set of of matches of the form
pattern -> expression.
Boxes can only communicate over wires, and each box has a set of input wires and
output wires. Each wire is directional and single-buffered: only one box can read from
it and only one box can write to it, although the source and destination may be the
6Please see [98] and [64] for details.
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type Nat = word 64;
box even
in (i,st::Nat)
out (o,st’::Nat)
match
(n,_) -> (n+1,n)
|(*,n) -> (*,n);
box odd
in (i,st::Nat)
out (o,st’::Nat)
match
(n,_) -> (n+1,n)
|(*,n) -> (*,n);
wire even(even.st’ initially 0, odd.o initially 0) (even.st, odd.i);
wire odd (odd.st’ initially 1, even.o)(odd.st, even.i);
Figure 2.5: Source code and box diagram of a simple Hume example| |
same box. During execution, the pattern of a match is matched against the inputs,
and if it succeeds the purely functional expression generates output. If it fails the next
match is tested until there are no matches left. In that case, nothing happens.
Figure 2.5 shows an example of a simple Hume program. It consists of two connected
boxes: even and odd. In the box diagram of the figure, a wire is represented by an arc,
and the beginning and end may have a variable name, which indicates where the wire
plugs into the box. A wire can optionally have an initial value as well, shown towards
the center of the wire. The program has four wires: both boxes have a feedback wire,
in addition to one wire in each direction between the two boxes. Since the expression
layer is pure, box state can only be achieved by such feedback wiring. The body of each
box is identical: each box has two matches, and the keyword match enforces an unfair
top-down ordering of the match. There is also support for a fair least-recently-used
ordering of the matches, but this feature has not been used throughout this thesis.
In a pattern, ‘ ’ succeeds if an input value is present, while ‘*’ ignores the input,
i.e. always succeeds. In the event of a match, all inputs, except where the pattern
is ‘*’, are consumed from the input wires. These two patterns are combined by ‘ *’,
which always succeeds, and consumes the input if present. A variable in the pattern
has the same effect as ‘ ’, but will bind the variable to the input. Finally, if a pattern
is a constant, then the input must have this value. In an expression, ‘*’ denotes that
no value is produced for that particular output.
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Shared between the coordination and expression layer is a rich type system, allow-
ing, for example, inductive data types. Function types are supported in the expression
layer, but a wire cannot contain such types. Declared constants may also be used
in both layers. Although the expression and coordination layers have well-defined
and disjointed tasks, the interface between them is less clear. As will become evi-
dent throughout this thesis, this follows from a strong dependency between the layers:
firstly, pattern matching is a feature found in many functional languages, and used
for example in Hume case-expressions. The pattern matching of a “box match” is
also used to bind variables, used in the expression, to the input values. On the other
side, this pattern matching determines if a box is executed, and which input values are
consumed. Thus, pattern matching can be seen as a feature of both layers. Secondly,
due to the single-buffering of wires, the result of a transition may have an impact on
the scheduling, since a box cannot execute before all the outputs are asserted.
Box scheduling
Hume programs never terminate. Consequently, the scheduler enforces a cyclical ex-
ecution of the boxes of a program. Previous versions of Hume used a round-robin
scheduling algorithm for boxes. Here, each box is executed in a round-robin fashion,
and for each execution, the input wires are consumed and the result updated on the
output wires. However, this scheduling makes proper analysis of the coordination layer
difficult, since the result depends on the order of box execution. Note that the Hume
interpreter and compiler implement the scheduling described below. However, the tools
implementing the cost models for time and space [29, 90], focuses on the expression
layer, and uses a round-robin scheduling of boxes. This is also shown in the operational
semantics [112] which the cost model is built on.
Since wires are directional and one-to-one relations, only one box can consume a
wire and only one box can write to it. Thus, if all boxes first consume the wires, and
then all boxes assert and write to them in a second phase, then the result is independent
of how the boxes are executed. In Hume, this is achieved by creating two phases for
each execution cycle: in the first phase, each box is run once and attempts to consume
inputs and generate outputs; in the second phase, the output changes are resolved on
the output wires in a unitary super-step. At the end of each phase a box will be in one
of the following states:
• Runnable: the box has successfully consumed inputs and asserted outputs.
• Blocked : the box has successfully consumed inputs but failed to assert outputs.
It will attempt to assert outputs on subsequent cycles.
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Figure 2.6: Hume levels: decidibility vs. expressiveness| |
• Matchfail : the box has failed to match inputs.
The lock-step scheduling then works as follows:
for ever
for each Runnable and Matchfail box
execute (box)
super-step
The first phase is called the execute phase. Here, boxes are matches with the inputs. If
it succeeds, the wires are consumed and output is produced. In the unitary super-step
phase, the result is asserted with the output wires.
Hume levels
Hume attempts to be both high-level and expressive, whilst being able to guarantee
bounds on time and space usage statically. This is achieved by introducing a set
of levels, or sub-languages: each level adds expressive power compared to the level
below, while reducing expressiveness compared to the level above; in contrast, the set
of decidable properties (i.e. ease of costing) is increased compared to the level above,
but reduced compared to the level below. The levels and a graph illustrating this
relationship are shown in Figure 2.6:
• HW-Hume, or Hardware Hume, is the lowest level. Its low levelness enables a
direct embedding of hardware components, no functions are supported and only
bits and tuples are allowed. HW-Hume guarantees exact time and space costing
and decidable equivalence and termination;
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Figure 2.7: Hume methodology| |
• FSM-Hume, or finite state machine Hume, supports non-recursive first-order
functions. It allows a richer set of types, but they are limited to finite non-
recursive data structures. FSM-Hume guarantees strong bounds on time and
space and decidable equivalence and termination;
• Template-Hume supports predefined higher-order functions (like map) and induc-
tive data structures. Weak bounds on time and space and decidable termination
are guaranteed;
• PR-Hume, or primitive recursive Hume, extends Template-Hume with primitive
recursive functions, and termination is decidable;
• Full Hume extends PR-Hume with full recursion, and is undecidable.
Hume methodology
Since resource costing [29, 90], whilst being high-level, is a panacea in Hume, this is
reflected in the methodology. Thus, if a high-level program cannot be costed, then
either the bounds have to be adjusted, or the program has to be turned into a lower-
level version. Since the undecidable constructs are found in the expression layer, a
high-to-low level transformation involves moving computation into the coordination
layer, and costing is reapplied. Figure 2.7 illustrates this methodology.
Hume syntax
Figure 2.8 shows the Hume abstract syntax in BNF form. It incorporates all of HW-
Hume. It also allows enumeration types (using data), and a richer set of basic types
from FSM-Hume. Finally, in some of the examples, non-recursive and primitive recur-
sive functions, and the built in list type is allowed. Thus, a small part of Template-
Hume and PR-Hume are allowed. This is illustrated by the shaded area of the levels in
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program ::= decl1 ; . . . ; decln n ≥ 1
decl ::= box | wire | stream | id pat = expr
| data id = 〈 con1 | . . . | conn〉 n ≥ 1
box ::= box id ins outs match 〈 bmatch1 | · · · | bmatchn 〉 n ≥ 1
ins/outs ::= 〈 id1::typ1, . . . , idn::typn 〉 n ≥ 1
bmatch ::= 〈 bpat1 , . . . , bpatn 〉 -> bexpr n ≥ 1
match ::= 〈 pat1 , . . . , patn 〉 -> expr n ≥ 1
bexpr ::= int | bool | word | con | *
| var expr0 · · · exprn n ≥ 0
| id expr0 · · · exprn n ≥ 0
| ( expr1 , . . . , exprn ) n ≥ 1
| if expr1 then expr2 else expr3
expr ::= bexpr | case expr of 〈 match1 | · · · | matchn 〉 n ≥ 1
typ ::= int int | word int | bool | id
bpat ::= pat | * | *
pat ::= vpat | | var
vpat ::= int | word | bool | con | ( pat1 , . . . , patn ) n ≥ 2
stream ::= stream id to/from string
wire ::= wire id ( link1 , . . . , linkn ) ( link1 , . . . , linkm ) n,m ≥ 1
link ::= id1.id2 [ initially vpat ] | id
Figure 2.8: TLA-Hume abstract syntax| |
Figure 2.6. The restrictions have followed directly from features required by the case-
studies using TLA, thus the name TLA-Hume. Most of the examples are a HW-Hume
version, with added FSM-Hume types. However, in a few case-studies, parts of PR-
Hume were required. case expressions are not supported inside a box, while inductive
data types (data) are restricted to working as an enumeration type. For simplicity, the
syntax does not capture macros (like the type abbreviation) and built-in list, boolean
and arithmetic operators.
Hume tool support
There is a Hume interpreter and compiler. The compiler turns Hume into an inter-
mediate Hume Abstract Machine (HAM) representation, which is comparable to the
standard abstract machine, like the Java Virtual Machine, with additional extensions
for concurrency. HAM is used by the cost models. The code is then compiled into C,
which can be compiled to machine code by e.g. gcc. The cost model for time is dis-
cussed in for example [29], while time and space are treated in for example [90]. Hume
attempts to create verified certificates of time and space usage: the art3 program,
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which implements the cost model, returns the actual time/space numbers, and this is
used to create a certificate using an embedding of the expression layer in Isabelle/HOL.
2.7 Summary & discussion
This chapter has introduced the key concepts of this thesis: the target language Hume;
the automatic reasoning techniques model checking and theorem proving; and the logic
TLA to achieve the verification of Hume programs using these reasoning techniques.
TLA fits well into both Hume’s design and the required properties, and the moti-
vations behind using TLA is detailed further in Chapter 4. TLA has model checking
support via TLC. However, the work in this thesis is seen as first step towards a large
verification environment for Hume programs. In parallel to this work, the expression
layer has been mechanised in the Isabelle/HOL theorem prover [135], and in such veri-
fication environment, integration is highly desirable. A small integration experiment is
shown in Section 9.2. Moreover, the focus here is mainly the lower Hume levels. An em-
bedding of the higher data-centric levels, will require theorem proving support. Thus,
the focus here is on theorem proving, and the next chapter shows a mechanisation of
the TLA∗ extension of TLA in Isabelle/HOL.
Chapter3
Mechanising TLA in Isabelle/HOL
“Assumption differs from derivation as theft differs from honest toil.”
– Bertrand Russell
3.1 Introduction
| |
Figure 3.1: Thesis roadmap: Chapter 3| |
Figure 3.1 highlights which part of the roadmap this chapter implements. This is re-
quired to achieve theorem proving capabilities for verifying Hume properties within
TLA. However, TLA has previously been mechanised in theorem provers in [65, 115,
128, 143, 197, 202], and Merz’s mechanisation [143] is in an older version of Isabelle/HOL.
Part of the mechanisation presented here is based directly on [143], and [143] is ac-
knowledged accordingly. However, Merz’s work is extended in the following ways: by
37
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Figure 3.2: The Theory Structure of the TLA∗ Embedding: shaded boxes are independent of
the logic; theories independent of the underlying state-space are encapsulated by singe-lined
boxes; while double lined boxes are state and logic dependent| |
mechanising an independent theory of sequences, enabling possible-world semantics
mechanisation and stuttering invariant proofs; TLA∗ [144], which was developed as a
result of [143], is embedded; the TLA∗ semantics is derived using the sequence theory,
and the proof system is derived from semantics, whilst [143] axiomatised both; and
finally, the theory is lifted to the Isar level, instead of the old ML-based level.
The main contributions of the work in this chapter are the mechanisation of se-
quences and the corresponding TLA∗ semantic and proof system derivations, and the
mechanisation of stuttering invariant proof of the TLA∗ operators. In Merz’s TLA∗
paper [144], he argues that a homogeneous proof system is more suitable for mechani-
sation than a heterogeneous version, however, here the opposite was found to be true.
Finally, some negative results are provided for the “variable to value function” repre-
sentation of the state space for modal logics with quantification. This representation
was argued for by Ehmety and Paulson [63].
Figure 3.2 shows the theory structure of the mechanisation. The following seven
sections discuss each theory separately. The mechanised theorems and lemmas are
listed in Appendix A.1. Note that arcs illustrates theory dependencies, and Intentional
and Sequences import the Main theory, which is the standard Isabelle/HOL prelude.
Further, Intentional and State are more or less, a direct porting of corresponding the-
ories in [143] into Isar. Intentional and Sequence are independent of the mechanised
modal logic, while Semantics, Rules and Liveness are independent of the state space
representation.
3.1.1 Relevant work
The work presented here is based on Merz’s previous work in Isabelle/HOL [143], and
extended as described above. Kalvala [115] mechanises TLA in Isabelle/ZF, which she
argues is closer to Lamport’s definition than Isabelle/HOL [115]. She only supports
natural numbers, and sequences are lists of natural numbers, which makes it hard to
use for practical verification tasks. Moreover, even though sequences are mechanised,
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the proof system is axiomatised and not derived.
[128, 202] mechanises TLA in the HOL system. Tuple representation is used for the
state space, and actions and formulas are separated, thus the user must deal with three
different types of logical connectives, which is avoided here. [128] discusses quantifi-
cation over state predicates, achieved by dividing the state space into the bound and
unbound variables. It is hard to understand how and why this is correct, how it relates
to Lamport’s original definition, and whether or not stuttering invariance is preserved.
Furthermore, liveness properties are not discussed.
Wahab’s mechanises TLA in PVS [197]. He does not attempt to separate actions
from formulas, and stuttering invariance, the proof system and actual verification is
not discussed. Thus, it is unclear if this system actually works. The mechanisation of
\ in the Sequence theory follows from this work.
TLP [65] is the first known mechanisation of TLA, albeit it is now abandoned. It
works by translating TLA specifications into LP proof scripts, which are then verified
by the first-order LP prover. Action and temporal proofs are there treated separately.
TLA is also used in VSE [17, 173], although the details of this work is not known.
Finally, none of the above work mechanises the TLA∗ logic.
3.2 The Intentional theory
In higher-order logic, every proof rule has a corresponding tautology. Thus, if F `
G then ` F ⇒ G, and this is known as the deduction theorem [94, 182]. Isabelle
implements this since object-level implication (−→) and meta-level entailment (=⇒)
are not semantically distinguished. However, the deduction theorem does not hold
for most modal and temporal logics [124, page 95][143]. For example A ` 2A holds,
meaning that if A holds in any world, then it always holds. However, ` A ⇒ 2A,
stating that A always holds if it initially holds, is not valid.
Merz [143] overcame this problem by creating an Intentional logic. It exploits Is-
abelle’s axiomatic type class feature [199] by creating a type class world, which provides
Skolem constants to associate formulas with the world they hold in. The class is trivial,
not requiring any axioms. Here, formulas are of the type
types (’w,’a) expr = ’w ⇒ ’a
’w form = (’w,bool) expr
where type variable ’w belongs to the world type class, and written as w  F instead of
F w for a formula F of type ’w form. Validity of a formula is defined as follows:
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Valid :: ’w form ⇒ bool (` )
` F ≡ ∀ w. w  F
In both ` F and w  F, F must be lifted into the world class. Postfixing the constant
definition with (` ) in the definition of Valid abuses the Isabelle syntax translation
feature. In the Isabelle theory it is necessary to explicitly introduce a non-terminal
lift, and introduce the ` explicitly using this non-terminal. However, to simplify the
reading these details are ignored. To lift a formula F, lifting functions are defined
for the required Isabelle/HOL types. Firstly, lifted constants, or rigid variables, are
prefixed by # and are independent of the world they are in:
consts :: ’a ⇒ (’w,’a) expr (# )
w  #c ≡ c .
Secondly, since Isabelle functions are pure, they are lifted by lifting their parameters.
A lifted function receives the curried parameters separated by a comma, encapsulated
by < · · · >. Functions are explicitly lifted based on the number of parameters, e.g.
lift2 :: (’a ⇒ ’b ⇒ ’c) ⇒ (’w,’a) expr ⇒ (’w,’b) expr ⇒ (’w,’c) expr ( < , >)
w  f<x,y> ≡ f (w  x) (w  y)
lifts a two parameter function. Similar function are defined for up to four parameters.
Standard HOL notation is reused and explicitly lifted into the world type to ease spec-
ification. This includes: pairs; finite sets and set operators; lists and list constructors;
boolean connectives; (rigid) quantifiers; arithmetic operators; and if then else. 
distributes over these operators, e.g. w  (A ∧ B) is equal to (w  A) ∧ (w  B), and
w  (∀ v. P v) equals ∀ v. (w  P v) which equals ∀ v. P (w  v). Finally, in both `
and , the formula is implicitly lifted. For domains outside these operators, a formula
is implicitly lifted by the LIFT combinator, where LIFT F ≡ λ s. F s.
3.3 The Sequence theory
Many possible world based logics require that sequences are possibly infinite, i.e. they
must be able to deal with both finite and infinite sequences. Devillers et al [53] discusses
several variants of this kind of sequence which are implemented in HOL, Isabelle and
PVS. One approach represents a sequence as a nat⇒ ’a option function where datatype
’a option = None | Some ’a and None identifies the end of a finite sequence. Another
approach uses a union type where finite sequences are of type ’a list and infinite se-
quences are of type nat ⇒ ’a. However, for stuttering invariant logics, finite sequences
can be represented by postfixing them with infinite stuttering of the last state. This
follows from the fact that stuttering does not change the validity of a formula. Thus,
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finite and inifinite sequences do not need to be separated, and the complexity of the
two representations can be avoided.
The Sequence theory contains a framework for mechanising such stuttering invari-
ants logics. The theory abstracts over the underlying state space, represented as a
type variable ’a, meaning state-dependent formalisation cannot be mechanised. For
example, flexible quantification requires formalisation of equality of two states up to
a variable, and can only be defined for a particular Sequence instantiation. Now, a
sequence is represented as a function from natural numbers nat to the state space ’a:
types ’a seq = nat ⇒ ’a
This is the same representation as you would often find in papers and textbooks on
the subject, enabling a more direct formalisation of the semantics compared to other
representations like lazy lists. Standard required operators are defined as follows:
first :: ’a seq ⇒ ’a
first s ≡ s 0
suffix :: ’a seq ⇒ nat ⇒ ’a seq ( |s )
s |s i ≡ λ n. s (n+i)
tail :: ’a seq ⇒ ’a seq
tail s ≡ s |s 1
prefix :: ’a seq ⇒ nat ⇒ ’a seq ( [... ])
s[...i] ≡ λ n. if n ≤ i then s n else s i
app :: ’a ⇒ ’a seq ⇒ ’a seq ( ## )
w ## s ≡ λ n. if n = 0 then w else s (n-1)
s |s i returns the suffix of sequence s starting at the ith state, and s[...i] returns the
finite prefix of s ending in the ith state. To achieve a type-correct definition, it is made
infinite by suffixing the sequence with infinite stuttering of the last state i. A sequence
s is finite if it contains an infinite sequence of stuttering steps:
fin :: ’a seq ⇒ bool
fin s ≡ ∃ i. ∀ j≥i. s j = s i
One particular property of a finite sequence is that it has a last element. The index of
which is returned by
last :: ’a seq ⇒ nat
last s ≡ LEAST i. ∀ j≥i. s j = s i .
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This uses Isabelle’s LEAST operator, which returns the smallest i such that ∀ j≥i. s j
= s i holds. In other words, the termination step of the finite sequence is returned. It
assumes that such an i exists, i.e. fin s.
A special case of a finite sequence is an empty sequence, which only contains stut-
tering steps, while a non-empty sequence contains a non-stuttering step:
empty :: ’a seq ⇒ bool
empty s ≡ ∀ i. s i = s 0
notemptyseq :: ’a seq ⇒ bool
notemptyseq s ≡ ∃ i. s i 6= s 0 .
For an infinite sequence, the reverse of property fin, must hold:
inf :: ’a seq ⇒ bool
inf s ≡ ∀ i. ∃ j≥i. s j 6= s i ,
and the following properties hold
lemma finite or infinite: ∀ s. fin s ∨ inf s
lemma not finite is infinite: (¬ fin s) = inf s
lemma not infinite is finite: (¬ inf s) = fin s
where unbound variables are free, and can thus be seen as universally quantified. The
proofs of these properties explore standard predicate negation over quantifiers.
3.3.1 Stuttering invariance
The key novelty with the Sequence theory, is the treatment of stuttering invariance,
which enables verification of stuttering invariance of the operators derived using it.
Such proofs require contrasting sequences up to stuttering. Here, Lamport’s [120]
method is used to mechanise the equality of sequences up to stuttering: he defines
the \ operator, which collapses a sequence by removing all stuttering steps, except
possibly infinite stuttering at the end of the sequence. These are left unchanged. Now,
mechanising this operator requires some auxiliary definitions:
nonstutseq :: ’a seq ⇒ bool
nonstutseq s ≡ ∀ i. s i = s (Suc i) −→ (∀ j > i. s i = s j)
stutstep :: ’a seq ⇒ nat ⇒ bool
stutstep s n ≡ (s n = s (Suc n))
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nextnat :: ’a seq ⇒ nat
nextnat s ≡ if emptyseq s then 0 else LEAST i. s i 6= s 0
nextsuffix :: ’a seq ⇒ ’a seq
nextsuffix s ≡ s |s (nextnat s) .
Suc is Isabelle/HOL’s successor function for natural numbers. The nonstutseq predicate
holds if the sequence only contains stuttering steps at the end, i.e. no stuttering steps
except after termination; the stutstep predicate holds if the given state identifier of
a sequence is stuttering; nextnat returns the index of the next non-stuttering step.
If the sequence is empty, the first element is returned, since the sequence is infinitely
stuttering; nextsuffix returns the suffix of sequence s, starting at the first non-stuttering
step. The primitive recursive next function finds the nth non-stuttering step:
next :: nat ⇒ ’a seq ⇒ ’a seq
next 0 = id
next (Suc n) = nextsuffix o (next n).
Here, o expresses function composition and id is the identity function. The definition
of next follows from Wahab’s work in PVS [197]. Finally, the collapse (\) function is
then defined as follows:
collapse :: ’a seq ⇒ ’a seq (\ )
\ s ≡ λ n. (next n s) 0.
Similarity of sequences
Since adding or removing stuttering steps does not change the validity of a stuttering-
invarant formula, equality is often too strong, and the weaker equality up to stuttering
is sufficient. This is often called similarity (≈) of sequences in the literature, and is
required to show that logical operators are stuttering invariant. This is mechanised as:
similar :: ’a seq ⇒ ’a seq ( ≈ )
s ≈ t ≡ ∀ n. (\ s) n = (\ t) n.
Due to ease of use, this definition is used, instead of the more general \ s = \ t, however:
lemma coleq seqsim: (\ s = \ t) = (s ≈ t)
Proof outline. The proof follows directly from the definition of \ and ≈ . ∴
The following two theorems are required for the stuttering invariance proofs in the next
section. Firstly, if the same element is appended to two similar sequences, then the
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resulting sequences are similar:
theorem app similar: assumes: s ≈ t shows: (x ## s) ≈ (x ## t)
Proof outline. By case-split of stutstep (x ## s) 0:
(1) when stutstep (x ## s) 0, the assumption implies stutstep (x ## t) 0, and lemma
seqsim stutstep implies (x ## s |s (Suc 0)) ≈ (x ## s |s 0) and (x ## t |s (Suc 0)) ≈ (x
## t |s 0). The goal follows from the assumption and properties of |s and ≈ .
(2) when ¬ stutstep (x ## s) 0, ¬ stutstep (x ## t) 0 follows directly. Further, lemma
seqsim notstutstep implies both ((x ## s) |s (Suc 0)) ≈ nextsuffix ((x ## s) |s 0) and ((x
## t) |s (Suc 0)) ≈ nextsuffix ((x ## t) |s 0). The goal follows from the assumption and
standard |s and ≈ properties, together with nextsuffix distribution over next. ∴
The second theorem is the key theorem for stuttering invariance of transitions. In
[144], Merz formalises this theorem as:
theorem sim step (first attempt): assumes: s ≈ t
shows: ∀ n. ∃ m. (s |sn ≈ t |sm) ∧ ( s |s(Suc n) ≈ t |s(Suc m)).
and uses it to prove that actions in TLA∗ are stuttering invariant. However, mecha-
nising it shows that this does not hold. For example, a contradiction is obtained when
the (sn, sn+1) step is stuttering, while the (tm, tm+1) step is not stuttering. Instead, the
following weaker (and more complicated), but correct, theorem is used:
theorem sim step: assumes: s ≈ t
shows: ∀ n. ∃ m. (s |sn ≈ t |sm) ∧
(( s |s(Suc n) ≈ t |s(Suc m)) ∨ (s |s(Suc n) ≈ t |sm))
Proof outline. By induction on n:
(1) the base-case is by a case-split on stutstep s 0: stutstep s 0 follows from lemma
seqsim notstutstep, as described in the proof of app similar above; when ¬ stutstep s
0, notemptyseq s and notemptyseq t follows from stutnempty, seqsim empty or notempty
and seqsim notempty notempty. Firstly, (s |s Suc 0) = nextsuffix s follows from notstut-
step nextsuffix1. Secondly, nextsuffix t = t |s Suc ((nextnat t)-1) follows from nextnat empty
gzero, seqsim prev nextnat and gzero sucpreveq. The goal then becomes trivial since the
assumption and lemma seqsim suffix seqsim implies that nextsuffix s ≈ nextsuffix t.
(2) in the step-case the two disjuncts of the second conjunct of the induction hy-
pothesis are proved separately: here, both the (2a): s |s(Suc n) ≈ t |s(Suc m) case and
the (2b): s |s(Suc n) ≈ t |sm case are similar to the base case. ∴
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3.4 The Semantics theory
This section describes a shallow embedding of TLA∗ using Sequence and Intentional. A
shallow embedding represents TLA∗ using Isabelle/HOL predicates, while a deep em-
bedding represents TLA∗ formulas and pre-formulas as mutually inductive datatypes1.
The choice of a shallow over a deep embedding is motivated by the following factors:
a shallow embedding is normally less involved, and existing Isabelle theories and tools
can be applied more directly to enhance automation; due to the lifting in the Inten-
tional theory, a shallow embedding can reuse standard logical operators, whilst a deep
embedding requires a different set of operators for both formulas and pre-formulas; and
finally, since the target is system verification and not meta-properties of TLA∗, which
requires a deep embedding, a shallow embedding is more fit for purpose.
To mechanise the TLA∗ semantics, the following type abbreviations are required:
types (’a,’b) formfun = ’a seq ⇒ ’b
’a formula = (’a,bool) formfun
(’a,’b) stfun = ’a ⇒ ’b
’a stpred = (’a,bool) stfun.
An (’a,’b) formfun is a function over a sequence with state space of type ’a, returning
a value of type ’b. A TLA∗ formula is a sequence predicate, thus of type ’a formula.
Similarly, a stfun is a function on a state, while a stpred is a predicate on a state. Now,
the always (2) operator has the definition:
always :: ’a formula ⇒ ’a formula (2 )
2F ≡ λ s. ∀ n. (s |sn)  F,
and, as with the Intentional theory, brackets are used to show the syntax in the lifted
world type-class. The ◦ operator generalises TLA’s priming operator to formulas. It
accepts state functions lifted to sequences, and is thus of the (’a,’b) formfun type:
nexts :: (’a,’b) formfun ⇒ (’a,’b) formfun (◦ )
◦F ≡ λ s. (tail s)  F
This embedding deviates from [143], where state, action and temporal levels are dis-
tinct. Thus, before ($) lifts state functions into functions on sequences. Moreover, ◦ is
very often used on state functions, thus after is a specialisation of ◦ for state functions,
and is equivalent to the priming operator in TLA:
1See e.g. [201] for a discussion about deep vs. shallow embeddings in Isabelle/HOL.
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before :: (’a,’b) stfun ⇒ (’a,’b) formfun ($ )
$f ≡ λ s. (first s)  f
after :: (’a,’b) stfun ⇒ (’a,’b) formfun ( $)
f$ ≡ ◦$f
Based on these two definition, the Unchanged state predicate can be lifted to a sequence:
unch :: (’a,’b) stfun ⇒ ’a formula (Unchanged )
Unchanged f ≡ f$ = $f
The final semantic modality is the action, which uses the Unchanged predicate:
action :: ’a formula ⇒ (’a,’b) stfun ⇒ ’a formula (2[ ] ( ))
2[P] v ≡ λ s. ∀ i. (s |si)  (P ∨ Unchanged v)
The remaining modal operators, like 3F and 3〈P〉 v, are abbreviated from these. Flex-
ible quantification is state-dependent, thus it cannot be defined just yet.
3.4.1 Stuttering invariance
A key feature of TLA∗, is that specification at different abstraction levels can be com-
pared. The soundness of this relies on the stuttering invariance of formulas. Since
the embedding is shallow, it cannot be showed that a generic TLA∗ formula is stutter-
ing invariant. However, this section will show that each operator behaves as required
with respect to stuttering, which can be used to show stuttering invariance for given
specifications.
Stuttering invariance states that if two formulas are similar, then F holds in one
iff it holds in the other. Since ◦ is generalised to sequence functions, and not just
predicates, the definition of stuttering invariance must be generalised to functions:
stutinv :: (’a,’b) formfun ⇒ bool (STUTINV )
STUTINV F ≡ ∀ s t. s ≈ t −→ (s  F) = (t  F).
The requirement for stuttering invariance is too strong for pre-formulas. A transition
requires two states, thus a stuttering invariant pre-formula cannot define progress.
The only place a pre-formula P can be used is inside an action: 2[P] v. To show that
2[P] v is stuttering invariant, is must be shown that a slightly weaker predicate holds
for P. For example, if P contains a term of the form ◦◦Q, then it is not a well-formed
pre-formula, thus 2[P] v is not stuttering invariant. This weaker version of stuttering
invariance has been named nearly stuttering invariance:
nstutinv :: (’a,’b) formfun ⇒ bool (NSTUTINV )
NSTUTINV F ≡ ∀ s t. (first s = first t) ∧ (tail s ≈ tail t) −→ (s  F) = (t  F)
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and deviates from stutinv by requiring that in the first step either both or none of the
sequences changes (to the same!) value, and is strictly weaker than stutinv:
theorem stut imp nstut: assumes: STUTINV F shows: NSTUTINV F
Proof outline. The proof reduces to proving that (first s = first t) ∧ (tail s ≈ tail t)
implies s ≈ t. This follows from lemma seq app first tail and app similar. ∴
before is defined for one state (state function), and is therefore stuttering invariant:
theorem stut before: stutinv $F
Proof outline. The proof follows directly from lemma sim first. ∴
Next, 2P must be stuttering invariant. However, it requires that P is stuttering invari-
ant, i.e. stuttering invariance is preserved:
theorem stut always: assumes: stutinv F shows: stutinv 2F
Proof outline. The proof reduces to showing that (s  2F)=(t  2F), with the
assumptions (A1): s ≈ t and (A2): ∀ s t. s ≈ t −→ (s  F)=(t  F). Both directions
are similar, thus only the −→ direction is shown: By the definition of 2 the proof
reduces to showing (t |s n)  F) for an arbitrary but fixed n. (A1) and lemma sim step
implies (s |s n)=(t |s n), and the goal then follows from unfolding 2 in the assumption
((s |s n)  F). ∴
◦ F is nearly stuttering invariant if F is stuttering invariant:
theorem stut next: assumes: stutinv F shows: nstutinv ◦F
Proof outline. The proof follows from the definition of stutinv and nstutinv. ∴
Finally, stuttering invariance of the action is shown, which is the most involved proof:
theorem stut action: assumes: nstutinv P shows: stutinv 2[P] v
Proof outline. The proof reduces to showing that (s  2[P] v)=(t  2[P] v), with
the assumptions (A1): s ≈ t and (A2): ∀ s t. (first s = first t) ∧ (tail s ≈ tail t) −→ (s
 P)=(t  P). Both directions are similar, thus only the −→ direction is shown: firstly
from (A1), sim step implies that (A3): (t |s n) ≈ (s |s m) and (A4): (((t |s Suc n) ≈ (s
|s Suc m)) ∨ ((t |s Suc n) ≈ (s |s m))). Now, the proof reduces to proving (t |s n  P)
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∨ (t |s n  Unchanged v), and is proved with the assumptions (1) s |s n  P and (2) s
|s n  Unchanged v separately. (1): The proof has two branches where each of the two
disjunctions of (A4) are assumed in each of the branch: the first implies t |s n  P and
the second implies t |s n  Unchanged v. (2): The proof has the same structure as (1),
however, both branches imply t |s n  Unchanged v. ∴
Note, that Merz’s paper proof of this theorem [144] is based on the false sim step(first
attempt) theorem above, which results in a shorter and more elegant proof. Finally,
the proofs of the abbreviated operators, like F$, follow from the proofs above:
theorem nstut after: nstutinv F$
Proof outline. The proof follows from stut before and nstut next. ∴
3.5 The PreFormulas theory
Semantic separation of formulas and pre-formulas requires a deep embedding. However,
the PreFormulas theory introduces |∼
PreValid :: (’w::world) form ⇒ bool (|∼ )
|∼ F ≡ ∀ w. w  F
which is semantically identical to `. It’s intention is to help users to separate pre-
formulas from formulas to achieve correct stuttering-invariant specification.
The theory also proves a large set of theorem about the distribution of before ($ ),
after ( $) and Unchanged, used to enhance automation. All of these are trivial to prove,
and are listed in Appendix A.1. For example, Unchanged distributes over pairs:
theorem unch pair: |∼ Unchanged (x,y) = (Unchanged x ∧ Unchanged y)
which can be used to (automatically) rewrite Unchanged into a “normal form” (together
with it’s definition): for example, Unchanged (x,y,· · · ) into x$ = $x ∧ y$ = $y ∧ · · · .
3.6 The Rules theory
In the Rules theory, the proof system from Figure 2.3 is derived, which is used to mech-
anise the higher-level rules from Figure 2.2. This theory is still state-independent, thus
state-dependent enableness proofs, required for proofs based on fairness assumptions,
and flexible quantification, are not discussed here.
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3.6.1 Heterogeneous vs. homogeneous proof system
Merz [144] suggest both a hetereogeneous and a homogenous proof system for TLA∗,
where the former is shown in Figure 2.3. The homogeneous version eliminates the
auxiliary relation |∼, creating a single provability relation `h. This axiomatisation is
based on the fact that a pre-formula can only be used via the (sq) rule. To simplify, (sq)
is applied to (pax1), . . . , (pax5), and (nex),(pre) and (pmp) are changed to accommodate
this. For example, (pax2) becomes
`h 2[◦(F ⇒ G)⇒ (◦F ⇒ ◦G)]v.
Merz argues that while the hetereogenous version is easier to understand, the ho-
mogenous system should be better to use for mechanisation and actual verification.
In particular, since pre-formulas cannot be separated from formulas in the shallow
embedding, a single homogenous proof system whould be preferable. However, the In-
tentional theory is based on unlifting the world type-class into Isabelle/HOL, and using
Isabelle/HOL directly for the proofs. For example, unlifting 2[P] v creates w  2[P] v,
which doesn’t enable reasoning about P. In fact, P has to be reasoned about separately,
thus resulting in a heterogeneous version, which is why heterogeneous is explored.
3.6.2 The basic axioms
Most axioms of Figure 2.3 can be derived directly using the semantic definitions in the
Semantic theory. For example,
(sq) |∼ P
` 2[P ]v
is derived as
theorem sq: assumes: |∼ P shows: ` 2[P] v
Proof outline. The proof becomes trivial after unfolding the definitions. ∴
The only axiom that cannot be derived is:
(ax3) ` 2[F ⇒ ◦F ]F ⇒ (F ⇒ 2F )
which provides an induction principle for invariants, and is thus heavily used. The F
subscript of (ax3) is a short-hand notation for the free-variables of F, which cannot be
computed in a shallow embedding. Now, the free variables of F provide the smallest
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possible state function v such that if F holds and v is unchanged then ◦F holds. Thus,
(ax3) can be generalised to:
theorem ax3: assumes: |∼ F ∧ Unchanged v −→ ◦F
shows: ` 2[F −→ ◦F] v −→ (F −→ 2F)
Proof outline. By induction on the sequence. ∴
id returns the complete state function, thus (∗): |∼ F ∧ Unchanged id −→ ◦F holds, if
stutinv F holds. Thus, in cases where v is not used in the goal of a theorem, (∗) can be
replaced by stutinv F. This follows from lemma pre id unch (see Appendix A.1).
3.6.3 Derived rules
The failure of the deduction theorem [94] for temporal logic has already been discussed.
However, Merz defines a variant of this for TLA∗:
(` 2F ⇒ G) = ((` F )⇒ (` G))
This is proved by derivation over the ` and |∼ relations. Further, Deduct is required
with the basic axioms for the derivation of many higher-level rules, unless semantic
reasoning is used. To derive Deduct, ` and |∼ must be given a mutual inductive defini-
tions using the basic axioms (Figure 2.3). Deduct then follows by derivation over these
two relations. However, ` and |∼ are derived semantically in this mechanisation, thus
Deduct cannot be proved, and has to be assumed:
axioms Deduct: (` 2F −→ G) = ((` F) −→ (` G))
Based on these derivations (and axiom), a rule-set, strong enough to derive the higher-
level TLA rules for both safety and liveness (see Section 3.7), is derived. Note that rules
(STL5) and (STL6) require a semantic derivation, mainly due to the extra assumption
of (ax3).
3.6.4 Higher level derived rules
In most verification tasks the low-level rules discussed above are not used directly.
Instead the higher level rules (TLA1), (TLA2), (INV1) and (INV2), and specialisation
and even higher-level rules for particular domains are applied. Compared to Lamports
rules (Figure 2.2), the non-stuttering invariant proofs are separated by the |∼ relation.
The following rules are directly applied in the later chapters.
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INV1 mechanises Lamports (INV1) rule in TLA∗. Here, ◦ replaced the priming op-
erator, and |∼ separates the pre-formula from formula:
theorem INV1: assumes: |∼ I ∧ [N] f −→ ◦I shows: ` I ∧ 2[N] f −→ 2I
Proof outline. By induction using ax3, and application of the rules sq and ax4. ∴
invmono specialises INV1 for invariants P, which deviates from the initial state I, of a
monolithic specification:
theorem invmono: assumes: ` I −→ P and |∼ P ∧ [N] f −→ ◦P
shows: ` I ∧ 2[N] f −→ 2P
Proof outline. The proof follows directly from INV1. ∴
preimpsplit is used to split the unchanged and computation steps of an action:
theorem preimpsplit:
assumes: |∼ I ∧ N −→ Q and |∼ I ∧ Unchanged v −→ Q
shows: |∼ I ∧ [N] v −→ Q
Proof outline. The proof follows from the definition of [N] f. ∴
refstep is used to split the unchanged and computation steps of an action in a refine-
ment (transformation) proof:
theorem refstep:
assumes: |∼ Unchanged v −→ Unchanged w and |∼ P −→ Q ∨ Unchanged w
shows: |∼ [P] v −→ [Q] w
Proof outline. The proof follows from the definition of [N] f. ∴
refinement1 is used to reduce a temporal level refinement (transformation) goal into a
goal comparing the initial states, and a goal comparing the computations:
theorem refinement1: assumes: ` P −→ Q and |∼ [A] f −→ [B] g
shows: ` P ∧ 2[A] f −→ Q ∧ 2[B] g
Proof outline. The ‘initial state’ Q of refinement1 is trivial from the first assumption.
The action 2[B] g follows from the second assumptions, using lemmas MM8, T3 and
T5. ∴
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spec inv2 mono is used strengthen the action N by an invariant J, in the proof of P.
Note that there are no restrictions on P, thus this rule can be used in for example
invariant and refinement (transformation) proofs:
theorem spec inv2 mono:
assumes: ` I ∧ 2[N] v −→ 2J and ` I ∧ 2[N ∧ J ∧ ◦J] v −→ P
shows: ` I ∧ 2[N] v −→ P
Proof outline. The proof follows from ax1 and INV2. ∴
inv join is used to join two invariants of the same specification into one. This helps
automate the application of spec inv2 mono when the specification must be strengthen
by several invariants:
theorem inv join: assumes: ` P −→ 2Q and ` P −→ 2R
shows: ` P −→ 2(Q ∧ R)
Proof outline. The proof follows from STL5. ∴
inv case enables case-split directly in the temporal level:
theorem inv case: assumes: ` P −→ 2(A −→ B) and ` P −→ 2(¬A −→ B)
shows: ` P −→ 2B
Proof outline. The proof follows from STL5. ∴
3.7 The Liveness theory
As discussed in Section 2.3, liveness properties are verified using weak (WF) or strong
(SF) fairness assumptions, together with exploring well-foundedness (LATTICE). The
Liveness theory mechanises these proof rules. Proofs using fairness assumptions, require
reasoning about enableness of actions.
The Enabled predicate for TLA action is defined in (2.4) on page 16. In TLA∗,
actions are replaced by pre-formulas which generalise formulas, thus the enabled predi-
cate has to be extended to pre-formulas, defined over sequences and not pairs of states,
and is not discussed in [144]. Now, in TLA, Enabled reduces an action predicate into
a state predicate, thus in TLA∗ this must reduce a sequence predicate into a state
predicate:
enabled1 :: ’a formula ⇒ ’a (Enabled1 )
Enabled1 F ≡ λ s. ∃ t. (s ## t)  F,
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which states the existence of a sequence t, where F holds when appended to the current
state. However, since the state-level is seen as a temporal level in the embedding,
enabled lifts enabled1 into sequences, i.e. the temporal level:
enabled :: ’a formula ⇒ ’a formula (Enabled )
Enabled F ≡ λ s. ∃ t. ((first s) ## t)  F.
Weak and strong fairness is then defined as follows:
WeakF :: ’a formula ⇒ (’a,’b) stfun ⇒ ’a formula (WF( )’ ( ))
WF(F) v ≡ 32Enabled〈F〉 v −→ 23〈F〉 v
StrongF :: ’a formula ⇒ (’a,’b) stfun ⇒ ’a formula (SF( )’ ( ))
SF(F) v ≡ 23Enabled〈F〉 v −→ 23〈F〉 v.
Only weak fairness will be discussed, although strong fairness rules has also been de-
rived, and are listed in Appendix A.1. The following lemma is used in the proofs below:
lemma WF always: ` 2WF(F) v = WF(F) v
Proof outline. The −→ direction follows directly from the axiom ax1. The ←−
direction follows from the rules WF alt (which follows from E12), MM6 and STL4. ∴
Now, strong fairness deviates from weak fairness by the modalities prefixing Enabled.
Thus, if 〈F〉 v is always enabled then weak and strong fairness for F is equivalent:
theorem Enabled WF SF: ` 2Enabled〈F〉 v −→ SF(F) v = WF(F) v
Proof outline. The −→ direction of the conclusion follows from rule E3, which im-
plies ` 2Enabled〈F〉 v −→ 32Enabled〈F〉 v. The ←− direction applies rule STL4 in
addition to rule E3. ∴
The WF1 rule, used to verify leads-to properties from a weak fairness assumption, is
mechanised as follows:
theorem WF1: assumes: |∼ P ∧ [N] f −→ ◦P ∨ ◦Q
and: |∼ P ∧ 〈N ∧ A〉 f −→ ◦Q
and: ` P −→ Enabled 〈A〉 f
and: |∼ P ∧ Unchanged f −→ ◦P
shows: ` 2[N] f ∧ WF(A) f −→ (P ; Q)
Proof outline. By STL4, STL5, T2 and WF always, the goal is reduced to ` 2[N] f ∧
WF(A) f −→ (P −→ 3Q), and by LT32 it is sufficient to show w  2P −→ 3Q. Now,
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the assumptions STL4 and E3 imply w  32Enabled 〈A〉 f, and by the weak fairness
assumption and E3, w  3〈A〉 f holds. By sq, AA5, AA18, AA24, AA19, E25 and E10,
together with the assumption w  P ∧ 〈N ∧ A〉 f holds. The second assumption of
WF1 implies w  ◦Q, thus the goal holds by rule E23. ∴
The rule deviates from Lamport’s only by the additional |∼ P ∧ Unchanged f −→ ◦P
assumption as a result of the (indirect) use of ax3, and the syntactic separation of |∼
from `. WF2 is used to derive a fairness assumption from another fairness assumption:
theorem WF2: assumes: |∼ 〈N ∧ B 〉 f −→ 〈M〉 g
and: |∼ P ∧ ◦P ∧ 〈N ∧ A〉 f −→ B
and: ` P ∧ Enabled 〈M〉 g −→ Enabled 〈A〉 f
and: ` 2[N ∧ ¬B] f ∧ WF(A) f ∧F ∧ 32Enabled 〈M〉 g −→ WF(M) g
shows: ` 2[N] f ∧ WF(A) f ∧ 2F −→ WF(M) g
Proof outline. By contradiction. w  ¬WF(M) g is assumed, and (A1) w  ¬23〈M〉 g
and consequently (A2) w  32[¬M] g follows directly from this. The proof follows by
showing both (1) w  ¬23〈B〉 f and (2) w  23〈B〉 f. Only the proof of (1) is outlined.
(1) By rule AA26 the proof is reduced to w  32[¬B] f. Now, the first assumption
together with (A1), AA25 and STL4 implies w  ¬ 23〈N ∧ B〉 f. This, together with
w  2[N] f, which is the implication assumption of the goal, and the rules MM11, E14,
E8 and T2, implies w  32[N ∧ ¬B] f. The goal then follows from rule STL6 act, E14
and M6. ∴
The (LATTICE) is derived by directly applying Isabelle/HOL’s well-founded rela-
tion wf, and has thus been given the name wf lattice, and follows directly from [143].
This direct application of wf illustrates the advantage of a shallow embedding:
theorem wf lattice: assumes: wf r
and: ∀ x. w  F x ; (G ∨ (∃ y. #((y,x) ∈ r) ∧ f y))
shows: w  F x ; G
Proof outline. By induction using Isabelle/HOL’s induction rule for wf. The re-
maining proofs use the rules LT19, LT21, MM4, MM2, MM4b, MM3 and a case-split on
#((y,x) ∈ r. ∴
3.8 The State theory
Since TLA is untyped, and Isabelle/HOL is simply typed, the state space represen-
tation is of great importance. Firstly, is strong typing yielded? Here, strong typing
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denotes that each variable has a declared type and is only assigned values of that type
[63]. Secondly, does the state space representation enable sufficient meta-reasoning
to formalise flexible quantification? There are several possible options. A tuple rep-
resentation enables strong typing, but variable access is by index in the tuple, and
meta-reasoning is not supported. Records, used in e.g. [176, 177], extends tuples by
supporting variable access by name. A hidden, or abstract state space, supports strong
typing and direct variable access, but does not supports meta-reasoning. A variable-
to-value mapping does not support strong typing, but support meta-reasoning, and is
used in the statespace package of Isabelle/HOL.
Ehmety and Paulson [63] uses an abstract type to represented the state space in
their Unity mechanisation in Isabelle/HOL, based on [143]. Here, they conclude that
a variable-to-value representation may be better, and is first explored in Section 3.8.1,
which shows that it is inadequate when the target is system verification. Section 3.8.2
implements the State theory, which follows from [63, 143].
3.8.1 The state space as a variable-to-value mapping
The hidden state space does not support sufficient meta-reasoning to derive the ∃
operator. Merz used this hidden state representation in his Isabelle/HOL embedding
[143], hence ∃ is axiomatised and not derived. Here, it is attempted to properly derive
the operators whenever possible, which motivates the variable-to-value representation.
Strong typing is not supported in such embedding. However, as explained below, it was
believed that this could be overcome by projection functions, which further motivated
this work. As will become evident below, this is in fact not the case, which caused this
representation to be abandoned.
Now, to achieve the embedding, an undefined new type Var is used to represent a
variable:
typedecl Var
types ’a state = Var ⇒ ’a
Flexible quantification requires equivalence of sequences (equpto), which is defined
based on equivalence of two states (state equpto):
state equpto :: ’a state ⇒ Var ⇒ ’a state ⇒ bool ( st= )
s st=v t ≡ ∃ q. s = t(v := q)
equpto :: (’a state) seq ⇒ Var ⇒ (’a state) seq ⇒ bool ( = )
s =v t ≡ ∀ i. (s i) st=v (t i),
where Isabelle’s function update t(v := q) equals t for all inputs except v, which is q.
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These two definitions are sufficient to mechanise Lamport’s ∃ operator:
EEx :: Var ⇒ (’a state) formula ⇒ (’a state) formula (∃∃ : )
∃∃ x : F ≡ λ s. ∃ p t. (s ≈ p) ∧ (t =x p) ∧ (t  F)
which preserves stuttering invariance:
theorem stut EEx: assumes: stutinv F shows: stutinv ∃∃ x : F
Proof outline. By standard predicate reasoning following the definition of EEx and
stuttering invariance, and symmetry and transitivity of ≈ . ∴
In a proof, ∃ is reasoned with using either the introduction or elimination rule. As
discussed in Section 2.3, these rules are similar to the corresponding rules for rigid
quantification. In Isabelle/HOL, ∃ introduction is defined as F x −→ ∃ x. F x, and
exploits Isabelle’s binder constructs. This construct implicitly keeps track of bound
variables, and ensures capture avoiding substitution.
Now, an Isabelle binder has the type (’a ⇒ ’b ) ⇒ ’b, hence using binder to
define EEx, requires the type (Var ⇒ (’a state) formula) ⇒ (’a state) formula. In
Isabelle/HOL, the corresponding witness and binding variable are both the same term
type, while in ∃ the witness is a state function ((’a state) ⇒ ’b), and the binding
variable is a variable (Var). Furthermore, representing state functions and variables
with a union type, either result in too large a set of hypothesis in the introduction and
elimination rules (for practical usage), or the rules are not valid. Thus, the binder
construct cannot be applied, and substitution of a variable with a state function must
be explicitly mechanised to create the ∃ introduction rule.
For this discussion, capture avoidance can be ignored. This could for example been
achieved nominally [187, 188]. Substitution of a state function for a variable in a
formula (tempsub), is defined by substitution in the sequence of the formula (seqsub),
which is defined by substitution for a state (stsub):
stsub :: (’a state) ⇒ ((Var ⇒ ’a) ⇒ ’a) ⇒ Var ⇒ (’a state)
stsub s f x ≡ s(x := f s)
seqsub :: ((’a state) seq) ⇒ ((Var ⇒ ’a) ⇒ ’a) ⇒ Var ⇒ ((’a state) seq)
seqsub s f x ≡ λ n. stsub (s n) f x
tempsub :: ((’a state) formula) ⇒ Var ⇒ ((Var ⇒ ’a) ⇒ ’a)
⇒ ((’a state) formula) ( [ 7→ ])
F[x 7→ f] ≡ λ s. (seqsub s f x)  F
The introduction rule for ∃ is then derived using the tempsub:
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theorem eexI: ` F[x 7→ f::(’a state ⇒ ’a)] −→ ∃∃ x : F
Proof outline. By the definition of EEx and substitutions. ∴
At first glance, the problem with the weak typing of the variable-to-value mapping
can be overcome by representing the state space (’a) with the union type of all required
types, and creating projection functions for each variable: for example instead of using
variable x directly, the project px ≡ λ s. to myType(s x) is applied.
The problem with this is that the proof of eexI, requires that a state function has
type (Var ⇒ ’a) ⇒ ’a, and not the more general (Var ⇒ ’a) ⇒ ’b, required to use
the projection function px instead of x in a specification. Needless to say, such an
approach will be very cumbersome to actually work within a system verification task,
and specification alone will be difficult to get correct. This problem is a result of
Isabelle/HOL’s weak type system, and may be resolved in systems like PVS or Coq,
which support dependent types (the type of a projected Var depends on Var), or a
type-free logic like Isabelle/ZF. In summary, flexible quantification in TLA cannot be
mechanised in a convenient way in a variable-to-value mapping approach, when the
motivation is system verification. Since this is the case in this thesis, the variable-
to-value mapping was abandoned and the hidden state space approach [63, 143] was
instead deployed.
3.8.2 A hidden state space
The idea behind the hidden state space approach [63, 143] is a state space which is
defined by it’s projections, and everything else is unknown. Thus, a variable is a
projection of the state space, and has the same type as a state function. Moreover,
strong typing is achieved, since the projection function may have any result type. To
achieve this, the state space is represented by an undefined type, which is an instance
of the world class to enable use with the Intentional logic:
typedecl state
instance state :: world ..
The proof is achieved by the .. method, since world does not contain any axioms. Since
the state space type is defined, the types can be simplified:
types ’a statefun = (state,’a) stfun
statepred = bool statefun
’a tempfun = (state,’a) formfun
temporal = state formula
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Reasoning about both enableness of pre-formulas and application of the ∃ elimina-
tion rule require the set of free variables. This cannot be found in a shallow embedding,
and must be specified by the user for each specification, using the basevars predicate:
basevars :: ’a statefun ⇒ bool
basevars f ≡ range f = UNIV
which states that the state function f comprises the full state space, which means that
the range of it is the universal set. For example, basevars (x,y) states that x and y
are the base/free variables of the given specification. Note that each variable must be
distinct, i.e. basevars (x,x) is false. A consequence of this definition is:
theorem basevar: ∀ vs. basevars vs −→ ∃ u. vs u = c
Proof outline. This follows from the elimination rule of Isabelle’s range, and prop-
erties of the universal set UNIV. ∴
The key lemma used in enableness proofs is base enabled:
theorem base enabled:
assumes: basevars vs and ∃ c. ∀ u. vs (first u) = c −→ (((first s) ## u) ` F )
shows: s  Enabled F
Proof outline. By the definition of enableness and the basevars theorem. ∴
Since state meta-reasoning is not possible, the required rules are axiomatised:
axioms
eexI: ` F x −→ ∃∃ x. F x
eexE: J s  (∃∃ x. F x); basevars vs;∧
x. J basevars (x,vs); s  F x K =⇒ s  G K =⇒ s  G
eex stut: stutinv (F x) =⇒ stutinv (∃∃ x. F x)
history: ` (I ∧ 2[A] v) = (∃∃ h. $h = ha ∧ I ∧ 2[A ∧ h$ = hb] (h,v)) .
eexI is the introduction rule for ∃ and is similar to the Isabelle/HOL introduction rule
for ∃. eexE formalises the elimination rule for ∃, and the basevars predicate ensures
freeness of variable x. eex stut states that ∃ preserves stuttering invariance. Finally,
history is used to introduce a history variable [3]. The validity of eexI and eex stut are, at
least to some point, justified from eexI and stut EEx theorems in the “variable-to-value
mapping” section.
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3.9 Reasoning in Isabelle/TLA
A formula F, lifted into the Intensional logic by ` F, is verified by unlifting it to the
HOL level. Moreover, assumption of ` F must be unlifted to enable use at the unlifted
HOL level. To achieve this, Intensional contains an introduction (intI) and destruction
rule (intD) for lifted formulas, derived as follows:
theorem intI: assumes:
∧
w. w  A shows: ` A
theorem intD: assumes: ` A shows: ∧ w. w  A.
The following example shows how these theorems are applied to show modus podens
in the lifted logic:
lemma int mp: assumes: ` A and ` A −→ B shows: ` B.
Proof outline. intI is first applied in a backwards style, which reduces the goal to the
unlifted form w  B. intD is then applied to two assumption, thus deriving w  A and
w  A −→ B, and simplication reduces the second assumption to (w  A) −→ (w  B).
From w  A and (w  A) −→ (w  B), the derived goal w  B trivially holds. ∴
The Isabelle simplifier contains a set of rules of the form A ≡ B, and when applied
it rewrites A into B. The following rules turns lifted equality into meta-equiality, so the
lifted rule can be treated as a rewrite rule in the simplifier:
theorem inteq reflection: assumes: ` x=y shows: x ≡ y
Since the TLA mechanisation is shallow, an arbitrary (lifted) Isabelle/TLA formula
in Isabelle cannot be shown to be stuttering invariant: this must be shown for each
specific formula. Furthermore, as explained in Section 3.4, rules like pre id unch (see
Appendix A.1) requires a formula to be proven stuttering invariant. Now, in Section
3.4 it was shown that each formula “behaved as expected” with respect to stuttering.
Thus,
lemmas all stutinv = stut action stut always . . .
contains all the “stuttering lemmas and theorems”, and can be used together with the
simplifier to show that a given formula is stuttering invariant.
To reason in Isabelle/TLA at the unlifted HOL level, TLA operators must be
“pushed” as far down a term as possible. Moreover, to enable automation some “normal
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form” must be used. For example, Unchanged (x,y), (x,y)$ = $(x,y), (x$,y$) = ($x,$y)
and x$ = $x ∧ y$ = $y are all semantically equivalent terms, and there several other
equivalent permutations. However, in x$ = $x ∧ y$ = $y, all the $ operators are pushed
furthest down the term tree and is thus preferable. Any Unchanged term is rewritten
to this form by repetitively applying unch pair (Section3.5), followed by unfolding the
definition of Unchanged (Section3.4).
SectionA.1 of Appendix A list all the lemmas required to simplify $ and $ terms.
They have the names before foo and after foo respectively. For example,
lemma before fun2: ` $(f<x,y>) = f <$x,$y>
lemma after const: |∼ (#c)$ = #c
pushes $ into the arguments of a function, and simplifies a $ constants, which cannot
change by definition. Note, that since $ is not stuttering invariant, |∼ is used instead
of `. As above, all the theorems are combined by the lemmas construct:
lemmas all before = before const before fun1 before fun2 . . .
lemmas all before eq = all before[THEN inteq reflection]
and all before eq applies inteq reflection to all terms, to enable use of the simplifier.
Similar lemma lists are developed for the after foo lemmas.
Since TLA∗ is a linear temporal logic, ◦ can be pushed down a term in the same way
as $ and $. In fact, this is a generalisation of pushing $. However, this assumes that
in ◦F, F is not a TLA∗ operator, with the exception of the form $f, since e.g. 3◦G and
2◦G are not valid TLA∗ terms. However, for these two cases there are the special cases:
theorem next eventually: assumes: stutinv F
shows: |∼ 3F −→ ¬F −→ ◦3F
theorem next always: assumes: stutinv F
shows: |∼ 2F −→ ◦2F
For the non-TLA∗ operators (i.e. HOL operators) the similar rules to $ and $ are
derived and listed in Appendix A.1. The lemmas have the same next foo, for example:
theorem next eq: |∼ ◦(F = G) = ((◦F)=(◦G))
These are combined, and converted into the form used by the simplifier using the
next all and next eq lemmas, similar to all before and all before eq above.
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3.10 Summary & discussion
Isabelle/TLA, a mechanisation of the TLA∗ extension of TLA in Isabelle/HOL, has
been described. To achieve this, a generic formalisation of sequences for stuttering
invariants logics has been created, and a theory for formalising possible-world semantics
has been ported from a previous Isabelle/HOL version. Together, these two theories
create a base for mechanising stuttering invariant logics using possible-world semantics.
A shallow embedding of the TLA∗ operators has been mechanised. Stuttering
invariance of these operators is proved, and the TLA∗ proof system derived. Finally,
state representation for these types of logics are discussed, and a problem with a
(standard) variable-to-value encoding is illustrated.
The motivation for a shallow, instead of a deep, embedding was based on ease
of use and automation. As discussed in e.g. [201] a shallow embedding is normally
less involved than a deep embedding, and since the overall target here is to embed a
logic to reason about Hume programs, this is a key feature. For the possible world
semantics embedded here, an additional incentive for a shallow embedding is that
the existing Isabelle connectives can be re-used for both formulas and pre-formulas,
while in a deep embedding different notations are required. TLA syntax, in particular
when mechanised, requires a high level of insight and expertise. The introduction of
additional syntax for semantically equivalent connectives makes specification even more
difficult, and should thus be avoided if possible. Finally, a shallow embedding allows a
direct use of existing theories and tools which helps to enhance automation. Since the
overall target was Hume program verification, these properties motivated the use of a
shallow embedding.
A deep embedding would enable access to the set of free variables, allowing a correct
definition of (ax3), and more elegant way of dealing with enableness and ∃ elimination
(instead of basevar). Moreover, in a deep embedding, substitution can be defined
independently of the the underlying sequence, and capture avoidance would be easier to
define, e.g. using Isabelle’s nominal datatype [187, 188]. In a deep embedding the whole
TLA∗ logic can be shown to be stuttering invariant, while in a shallow embedding only
the operators can be shown. Thus, all specifications have to explicitly prove stuttering
invariance (if required), while this becomes implicit in the deep case. Finally, formulas
can be semantically separated from pre-formulas in a deep embedding. Now, whether
or not these extra features make up for the extra work and extra difficulties with
specification (for example, due to the different types of connectives), requires further
work. Considering the ultimate goal is verification, a shallow embedding was probably
the correct choice.
A mutual inductive definition of ` and |∼, will enable mechanised soundness and
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completeness proofs of the TLA∗ proof system. Moreover, the “temporal deduction
theorem” can be derived. However, as above, these are not important criteria for system
verification. Here, for example, integration with TLC would be more worthwhile.
In the next chapter, the Hume embedding into TLA is described. It also describes
the mechanisation of Hume in TLA+/TLC for model checking and shows a mechani-
sation of Hume in Isabelle/TLA.
Chapter4
The Hume coordination layer in TLA
4.1 Introduction
| |
Figure 4.1: Thesis roadmap: Chapter 4| |
This thesis discusses safety invariants and associated transformations of the Hume
coordination layer. The lock step scheduling of Hume boxes introduces two phase: one
phase which updates the result buffers; and one phase which updates the wires using
the result buffer. Thus, invariants can, and in many cases must, be over both result
buffers and wires. The term wire invariants will be used for both invariants over the
result buffers and wires, unless otherwise is clear from the context.
Tool support, extensibility with liveness and integration with existing expression
layer verification tools and techniques are desirable. TLA can capture invariants, trans-
formations and liveness. Tools are supported through the TLC model checker, as well
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as theorem proving in Isabelle/TLA.
This chapter discusses the embedding of Hume in TLA, and mechanisation in TLA+
for model checking using TLC and mechanisation in Isabelle/TLA for theorem proving.
Figure 4.1 highlights these parts in the roadmap. First however, the motivations behind
abandoning an approach extending a translator from HW-Hume into Promela for model
checking with Spin is discussed, followed by a discussion of relevant work. Note that
Section 9.2 discusses integration with the expression layer in Isabelle/HOL.
4.1.1 Model checking HW-Hume using Spin1
In [84] model checking support for Hume was enabled by translating HW-Hume into
Promela and model checking with Spin [97]. Since the coordination layer is a finite
state automata, this approach was initially considered to be feasible. As part of this
PhD, this work was first extended with an assertion language in the Hume source
code, which captured both safety and liveness properties. However, this approach was
subsequently abandoned for the following reasons:
• the Promela modelling language used by Spin is not expressive enough to capture
the Hume expression layer;
• the mechanised expression layer work in Isabelle/HOL [135] cannot be integrated
in a direct way;
• the strong dependency between the layers makes it hard to verify the higher-
levels, and the strict scheduling makes abstraction difficult;
• the higher-levels tend to be more data-centric and contain more data-centric
properties where deductive reasoning is more suitable;
• properties are expressed in a propositional temporal logic, which is often not
sufficiently expressive. However, using a Buchi automaton directly in Spin may
overcome this particular point;
• transformation verification is not supported;
• experiments suggest that Spin creates more unnecessary extra search states than
TLC. However, this may be a result of the embedding of HW-Hume in Promela.
1Some of these motivations are discussed in [85].
Chapter 4. The Hume coordination layer in TLA 65
4.1.2 Relevant work
There are several mechanised logics that have been used to reason at the programming
language level. Isabelle/HOL has been used to mechanise Hoare logic [156, 177] and the
semantics of for example Java [162] and C [184]. However, due to the concurrency in the
Hume coordination layer, none of these are applicable to Hume. Hoare logic is extended
with concurrency by the Owicki-Gries method [163], and has been mechanised in [159].
However, in the context of Hume, only wire invariants, and not transformations (or
liveness), are supported, while local reasoning is not possible. The latter is solved in
separation logic [170], which initially extended Floyd-Hoare to pointer programs. It
has been used for concurrent systems [161], and mechanised in Isabelle/HOL [198]. In
the context of Hume, wire invariants are supported still. There has also been work on
data refinement within separation logic [147, 148], however the applicability of this to
Hume transformations is a subject of further research.
This chapter describes the embedding of the Hume semantics in TLA. With respect
to Hume, the reasoning is thus semantically, since the TLA representation of a Hume
program is used, and TLA proof rules are applied directly. In contrast, in a Hoare-
based logic the rules are applied syntactically at the programming language level. At
the end these are turned into verification conditions (VCs) by a verification condition
generator (VCG), and the VCs are verified in a theorem prover. Hence, a Hoare logic
must be defined for each programming language, while standard TLA rules are used
regardless of which programming language is embedded. As a result, the reuse of tools
and integration is better supported in TLA.
Process algebra2 [18], like CCS [149], CSP [96], the Join calculus [71], the Π-calculus
[150] and E-LOTOS [1], is a common technique used to reason about concurrent pro-
cesses (such as boxes). E-LOTOS is probably the closest to Hume since computation
in a process is represented by a functional language. However, communication in a
process algebra is stateless, and based purely on processes, while Hume communica-
tion is by stateful wires. Thus, a state based representation reduces the semantic gap
between Hume and the logic. Moreover, E-LOTOS does not support transformation
proofs.
The B-method [8], Event-B [9] and Z [179] extended with the ZRC [40] refinement
calculus, could be used for both wire invariants and transformations. They do not
have a temporal level, which simplifies both the proofs and representation. However,
with the exception of limited leads-to properties in B [10], none of these currently
support rich liveness properties. There has also been work integrating such state-based
methods with process algebras, like CSP-OZ [69], csp2b [37, 38] and CSP||B [178]. This
2Unpublished notes on extending TLA with process algebra constructs are found in [121, 123].
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(1) S , (s = Execute⇒ s′ = Super) ∧ (s = Super⇒ s′ = Execute)
(2) Bei , sti 6= Blocked⇒ 〈iwsi, resi, sti〉′ = execute(rsi, iwsi)
∧ sti = Blocked⇒ 〈iwsi, resi, sti〉′ = 〈iwsi, resi, sti〉
(3) Qi , ∀k ∈ len(owsi).
(
(resi)k = ⊥
) ∨ ((outi)k = ⊥)
(4) Bsi , Qi ⇒ 〈owsi, resi, sti〉′ = 〈nw(resi, owsi), 〈⊥, · · · ,⊥〉,Runnable〉
∧ ¬Qi ⇒ 〈owsi, resi, sti〉′ = 〈owsi, resi,Blocked〉
(5) Bi , (s = Execute⇒ Bei ) ∧ (s = Super⇒ Bsi )
(6) I , ws = wI ∧ s = Execute
∧ ∧i∈BS (sti = Runnable ∧ resi = 〈⊥, · · · ,⊥〉)
(7) H l , I ∧2[S ∧∧i∈BS Bi]〈s,ws,res,st〉
(8) H , ∃ s,st. H l
Figure 4.2: An abstract view of Hume coordination in TLA| |
results in a state-based computation, and state-less coordination. This is the opposite
of the Hume design, where computation is purely functional, and communication is
by stateful wires. Thus, a state-based logic like TLA, is more suitable for the Hume
communication layer. Since TLA is lifted on top of a predicate logic, it can also be
tightly integrated with a mechanisation of the Hume expression layer, as discussed in
Section 9.2. With respect to functional languages [129] gives a shallow embedding of a
call-by-value functional program, (like ML [151]), while Agerholm’s PhD [11] discusses
reasoning about functional programs in HOL [80]. Extended-ML [114] is a specification
language supporting refinements. As the name implies, it is based on ML [151], and
the target of a development is to synthesise ML code. However, Extended-ML is more
applicable to the Hume expression layer, than the coordination layer.
4.2 A high-level coordination layer3
Figure 4.2 contains a high-level formalisation of the Hume coordination layer. The
formalisation has the following assumptions:
• there is a set BS of box identifiers, henceforth boxes ;
• all variables in Figure 4.2, except the scheduling variable s, are tuples of distinct
variables;
• the ith tuple-element is projected by a sub-script, e.g. sti;
• for boxes, tuples are ordered with respect to the box identifier, for example sti is
the state for box i ∈ BS;
3The main content of this section has been published in [88].
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• there is a tuple ws of wires; each box i has a tuple of input wires iwsi and output
wires owsi;
• feedback loops are allowed, thus a wire in iwsi may also occur in owsi;
• if for all i ∈ BS, iwsi or owsi are joined, it equals ws assuming there are no
streams and the ordering is ignored;
• a wire in ws may occur in only one iwsi and one owsi;
• each box i has a state variable sti and a result buffer resi;
• for all i ∈ BS sti ∈ {Runnable,Blocked,Matchfail};
• resi has the same number of elements as owsi.
The definitions in Figure 4.2 then have the following informal meanings:
(1) the scheduler S alternates between the execute (Execute) and super-step (Super)
phase;
(2) Bei is the box action for an arbitrary box i ∈ BS in the execute phase. Since un-
changed variables must be explicitly specified in TLA, the check that the box is
Runnable or Matchfail is part of the box action. Note that sti ∈ {Runnable,Blocked,
Matchfail} is assumed for all i ∈ BS (sti can be set to Matchfail by the execute
function). Hence a box is Runnable or Matchfail when it is not Blocked . If
this check succeeds then execute(rsi, iwsi) will match and consume the required
inputs, produce the result output, and set the new state – i.e. Runnable if a
match succeeds and Matchfail if not. This is achieved by the given rule set rsi,
which contains the matches of box i ∈ BS. The execute function is for now left
undefined. It refers to execute in the description of the scheduling algorithm in
Section 2.6. If the check fails, then iwsi and resi are left unchanged;
(3) the Qi predicate implements the output assertions, and succeeds if, for all corre-
sponding elements k of resi and owsi, one of them is empty (⊥), that is, either
the wire or output buffer is empty. Here, len(owsi) is the number of elements in
tuple owsi;
(4) Bsi represents the super-step phase of a box i ∈ BS. If Qi holds then the output
wire is updated according to nw(resi, owsi), which for now, is left undefined.
Moreover, the output buffer is set to the empty value⊥, and the state is Runnable.
If Qi fails, the output buffer’s value is left dangling, and the box will be Blocked
at least until the next super-step, where Bsi is re-applied;
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Figure 4.3: Repetition as box iteration| |
(5) Bi selects Bei or Bsi , depending on the current scheduling phase s;
(6) I defines the initial state. In the Hume source code wires can be specified with
an initial value, and wI is a tuple holding all the initial values, depending on the
Hume source code: if no initial value is specified for a wire, then the wire equals
⊥. Moreover, the scheduler is initially in the Execute phase, all boxes are initially
Runnable and the result buffers are initially empty;
(7) H l is the program specification: the complete next-state action is the conjunction
of the scheduler S and the next actions for all boxes i ∈ BS;
(8) finally, H hides the scheduler s and the box states st, which are required to encode
a Hume program in TLA, but not part of the actual program. As will be dis-
cussed in Section 4.3, this hiding of variables constrains the possible refinements.
Moreover, one could argue that res is internal for the specification, and should
thus be hidden. However, hiding the result buffer would disable the specification
of properties over it, which is desirable. Hence, it is not hidden.
4.2.1 Self-out scheduling
In functional languages repetition is expressed as recursion. Even if the recursion is
primitive, meaning here that the program is in the PR-Hume level, resource costing
becomes hard. However, Hume can instead represent repetition as box iteration [83,
137] , as shown in Figure 4.3. The mult box interfaces the program, and itermult
computes the result of multiplying the inputs by repeated addition, achieved by “box
iteration”: the first match copies the input from itermult.comp into the feedback loop
iter’ → iter; the second match is the termination of the iteration, where the result
is sent back to mult.res; the third match is the step case of the iteration, where the
result r is incremented by x, and y is decremented by 1. Thus, the overall computation
increments x, y times. The mult box returns the result from itermult on the o wire,
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and the c’ → c wire assures that a new computation is not initialised before the result
from the previous is returned.
This example is a FSM-Hume program, which compared to PR-Hume, has more de-
cidable resource properties. However, this iteration introduces an unnecessary schedul-
ing overhead: an iteration of depth N (the initial y value), requires N + 4 scheduling
cycles before the output is on the o wire, and in N + 2 of these cycles, the mult box
will be in a Matchfail state. This will be the case for all boxes that depend, directly
or indirectly, on such an iteration.
To overcome this problem, a more efficient scheduler algorithm, called self-out
scheduling, has been implemented in both the Hume interpreter and compiler. Empir-
ical studies have suggested an average 14% time saving in the interpreter for programs
with box iteration. This algorithm explores the fact that in the usual execution of a
box, a Runnable box may have either asserted outputs to other boxes and itself, or
just to other boxes, or just to itself. If it has asserted outputs just to itself then it can
have no impact on the ability of any other boxes to consume inputs. Such boxes have
the self-output property.
Thus, in principle, such boxes may execute repeatedly until they assert an output
for another box, without affecting the overall outcome of program execution, provided
there are no strong timing dependencies elsewhere in the program. To achieve this,
Runnable is divided up into two sub-states:
• Runnable: The box has successfully consumed inputs and asserted outputs, and
is not only writing to internal wires.
• Selfout : The box has successfully consumed inputs and asserted outputs, and is
only writing to internal wires.
Then the staged scheduling strategy is:
for ever
if no box is Runnable
then for each Selfout box
execute (box)
else for each Runnable,Selfout and Matchfail box
execute (box)
super step.
Figure 4.4 shows the TLA actions for the self-out scheduling. S and I are unchanged
from Figure 4.2. The new definitions have the following meanings:
(1) SO holds when no boxes are Runnable and is used in the execute phase;
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(1) SO ,
∧
i∈BS sti 6= Runnable
(2) emp(nows) , ∀k ∈ len(nows). nowsk = ⊥
(3) Pi , (SO⇒ sti = Selfout) ∧ (¬SO⇒ sti 6= Blocked)
(4) sBei , Pi ⇒ 〈iwsi, resi, sti〉′ = execute(rsi, iwsi)
∧ ¬Pi ⇒ 〈iwsi, resi, sti〉′ = 〈iwsi, resi, sti〉
(5) sBsi ,
(
Qi ⇒ 〈owsi, resi〉′ =
〈
nw(iwsi), 〈⊥, · · · ,⊥〉
〉
∧ (emp(nows′i)⇒ st′i = Selfout)
∧ (¬emp(nows′i)⇒ st′i = Runnable)
)
∧ (¬Qi ⇒ 〈owsi, resi, sti〉′ = 〈owsi, resi,Blocked〉)
(6) N , ∧i∈BS (s = Execute⇒ sBei ) ∧ (s = Super⇒ sBsi )
(7) sHl , I ∧2[S ∧ N ]〈st,s,ws,res〉
(8) sH , ∃ s,st. sHl
Figure 4.4: Self-output scheduling in TLA| |
(2) emp(nows) holds if all projections of nows equals ⊥. This is used in the super-step
phase to separate Selfout state from Runnable;
(3) Pi is separated out from (4) for purely aesthetic reasons;
(4) sBei defines the execute phase for an arbitrary box i ∈ BS. It behaves as speci-
fied above, by executing only Selfout boxes when SO holds, and as in lock-step
scheduling when it does not hold;
(5) sBsi defines the box action in a super-step. Here, the tuple nowsi, which is
contained in owsi, holds all the wires that are not wired back to box i ∈ BS.
emp(nows′i) holds if all output values are on the wires wired back to i. If the box
only writes to internal wires, i.e. emp(nows′i), then it is in a Selfout state;
(6) N is separated out from (7) for purely aesthetic reasons;
(7) sHl updates H l with the new definitions;
(8) sH updates H with sHl.
The TLA specification of self-output scheduling is more complex than lock-step schedul-
ing, thus reasoning with self-output scheduling is more involved and complex than
lock-step scheduling. However, Theorem 4.1 states that self-output scheduling is a
refinement of lock-step scheduling. Thus, all properties of a program under lock-step
scheduling, consequently hold for the same program under self-output scheduling. As
a result, it is sufficient to reason using lock-step scheduling, and self-output scheduling
is ignored henceforth.
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〈a, b, c〉 : the list consisting of a, b and c
〈〉 : the empty list
L1 · L2 : appends list L2 at the end of list L1
hd(L) : the head of list L, e.g. hd(〈a, b, c〉) = a
tl(L) : the tail of list L, e.g. tl(〈a, b, c〉) = 〈b, c〉
len(L) : the length of list L, e.g. len(〈a, b, c〉) = 3
if e1 then e2 else e3 : standard conditional expression
case e1 → e′1 2 · · · 2 else → e′n : standard case expression
Table 4.1: Underlying operators| |
Theorem 4.1. Self-output scheduling is a refinement of lock-step scheduling: sH ⇒ H
Proof outline. The refinement mapping replaces s by the state function s , s and
sti with sti , if sti = Selfout then Runnable else sti. The proof is by case analysis on
s, followed by case analysis on sti in the s = Execute phase, and Qi in the s = Super
phase, for an arbitrary but fixed box i ∈ BS. ∴
A detailed proof of Theorem 4.1 is shown in Appendix B.
4.3 Refining the coordination layer
A mechanisation of Hume programs in TLA for actual system verification, requires
more details than shown in Figure 4.2. Moreover, the atomicity of the execute phase is
too abstract when discussing transformation verification. Firstly, details are given of
the operators, which are given a more operational definition, by replacing quantifiers
by recursive functions. This is followed by a discussion on how streams are handled,
before the atomicity of the expression layer is removed.
4.3.1 Refining operations
To define the operations a list notation is used, as shown in Table 4.1. Note that
since TLA is type-free, this notation also serves for tuples, and (potentially infinite)
sequences, although the append operator · assumes that L1 is finite. In addition to list
operators, if and case expressions are required.
execute of Bei in Figure 4.2 is first refined. This requires a formalisation of pattern
matching in TLA. Firstly, two disjointed sets are assumed: Id holding box, wire, con-
structor and function identifiers, ranged over by id or i for boxes (BS ⊆ Id); and Var
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holding variables, ranged over by x. A single pattern p is of the form
p ∈ { *, *, x, id, } (4.1)
As specified in Figure 2.8 (on page 35), c is an enumeration type. Moreover, id has
to have arity 0, i.e. it is a constant. The rule-set rsi for a box i ∈ BS is a list of
pattern lists and expression pairs, written p → e, with the following projections and
definitions:
rsi , 〈(p1 → e1), · · · , (pn → en)〉
patt(p→ e) , p
exp(p→ e) , e
Pattern matching for a single pattern-value pair is then defined as
pm1(p, iw) , p ∈ { *, *} ∨ (p ∈ {x, } ∧ iw 6= ⊥) ∨ (p = id ∧ id = iw)
A list of patterns matches if all pattern elements match. Pattern matching over a list
of patterns and a list of values, assumed to be of equal length, is then defined by a
primitive recursive function:
pm(patt, iws) , patt = 〈〉 ∨
(
pm1
(
hd(patt), hd(iws)
) ∧ pm(tl(patt), tl(iws)))
Following a match, a consumption of the inputs are inferred. Here, all wires except
those with a * in the corresponding pattern are set to the empty value ⊥:
consume(rs, iws) ,
case iws = 〈〉 → 〈〉
2 iws 6= 〈〉 ∧ hd(rs) 6= * → 〈⊥〉 · consume(tl(rs), tl(iws))
2 else → 〈hd(iws)〉 · consume(tl(rs), tl(iws))
The final part of execute, after the pattern matching and input consumption, is execut-
ing the expression layer. However, since this is purely an expression layer feature, this
discussion is delayed to Section 4.4 and Section 4.5. For now, the undefined function
run represents this. Finally, execute is thus defined as:
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execute(rs, iws) ,
case rs = 〈〉 → 〈iws, 〈⊥, · · · ⊥〉,Matchfail 〉
2 rs 6= 〈〉 ∧ pm(patt(hd(rs)), hd(iws) → 〈 consume
(
patt
(
hd(rs)
)
, iws
)
,
run
(
exp
(
hd(rs)
)
, iws
)
,
Runnable
〉
2 else → execute(tl(rs), iws)
It attempts to pattern match each match, and Matchfails if all matches fail.
The super-step action Bsi consists of two operations: Qi which asserts the outputs;
and nw which returns the new wire value. Qi is defined by a bounded universal
quantifier over the length of the output wire list. This is given a more operational
recursive definition in the ao function:
ao(res, ows) , res = 〈〉 ∨ (hd(res) = ⊥ ∨ hd(ows) = ⊥) ∧ ao(tl(res), tl(ows))
The nw function updates each output wire recursively, with either the corresponding
result buffer, or wire, depending on which, if any, are empty ⊥:
nw(res, ows) , case ows = 〈〉 → 〈〉
2 ows 6= 〈〉 ∧ hd(res) 6= ⊥ → 〈hd(res)〉 · nw(tl(res), tl(ows))
2 else → 〈hd(ows)〉 · nw(tl(res), tl(ows))
Finally, the new box action for box i in the super-step phase Bsi is refined to:
Bsi ,
(
ao(resi, owsi) ⇒ 〈owsi, resi, sti〉′ = 〈nw(resi, owsi), 〈⊥, · · · ⊥〉,Runnable〉
)
∧ (¬ao(resi, owsi) ⇒ 〈owsi, resi, sti〉′ = 〈owsi, resi,Blocked〉)
4.3.2 Open systems: representing streams
Hume’s finite state machine based design makes it well suited for implementing control
systems. Most control systems are reactive by nature, thus communication with the
outside world is a paradigm. A Hume program communicates values from and to the
outside world by (input and output) streams. The I/O has not been given formal
semantics yet. However, both the interpreter and compiler handle this as a special box
in the coordination layer, and the same approach is followed here.
The environment, representing the outside world, can either be part of the system
or an assumption of the system. The latter approach will form an assume-guarantee
approach where the environment E is an assumption of the program H. TLA contains
a special operator for such specifications, which helps avoiding circular reasoning when
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conjoined [6, 5]:
E +−. H.
This is read as “if E holds for the first n steps, then H holds the first n + 1 steps”.
Now, since a stream is represented as a box, the first approach, where it is part of the
system, is more natural. Let E0 represent the action that handles all the streams. He
extends Hl from Figure 4.2 by conjoining the next action with E0:
He , I ∧2[S ∧
∧
i∈BS
Bi ∧ E0]〈s,ws,res,st〉.
Now, E0 has the informal meaning:
E0 , (s = Execute ⇒ 1.“Consume output stream wires”)
∧ (s = Super ⇒ 2.“Update/write input stream wires”)
Both input consumption (1) and output update (2) can be deterministic or non-
deterministic: the environment may always consume/update wires, or it may chose
whether or not to consume/update wires. Let w denote the input or output wire, and
T the type of w. The deterministic and non-determinstic cases are then formalised as:
update consumption
deterministic ∃v ∈ T : w′ = v w′ = ⊥
non-deterministic ∃v ∈ T ∪ {⊥} : w′ = v w′ = w ∨ w′ = ⊥.
Let in ws be the set of wires connected to input streams, and out ws be the set of
wires connected to output streams, such that in ws ⊂ ws and out ws ⊂ ws4. E0 is then
formalised as follows:
E0 , (s = Execute ⇒ ∀w ∈ out ws : w′ = w ∨ w′ = ⊥)
∧ (s = Super ⇒ ∀w ∈ in ws : ∃v ∈ T ∪ {⊥} : w′ = v)
4.3.3 Sequential box execution
The final refinement splits the atomic execute phase into a sequential execution of the
boxes. This is the same level of abstraction as used in the Hume structural operational
semantics [112], for the round-robin box execution. This concretisation of H from
Figure 4.2 has two major impacts:
4The ⊂ and ⊆ set operators are abused here, since ws,out ws and in ws are tuples. Note that a
wire cannot be wired directly between an input and output stream, thus ⊂ and not ⊆ is used.
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1. program independence of box atomicity, which simplifies transformation proofs;
2. wire consumption atomicity is broken, which complicates wire invariants over
several wires consumed by different boxes.
Formalising sequential box execution requires the introduction of a program counter
pc, and an update of the scheduling action S, the environment E0 and the full next
action 2[· · · ]〈s,ws,res,st〉. Let |BS | be the cardinality of the set BS of all boxes in program
H. Now, in the s = Execute phase, S should change s to Super when all boxes have
executed, thus the execute phase is extended from 1 to |BS | steps. Moreover, a box
i ∈ BS should only attempt to execute once per execute phase, achieved by pc which
holds the identifier of the box to be executed. Let ≺ be a well-founded partial order on
BS ∪ {env}, where env is a constant identifying the “environment box”. The function
first box returns the smallest box i ∈ BS∪{env} according to ≺, while last box returns
the largest box, which exists since BS ∪ {env} is finite. The function next box(pc)
returns the box immediately following pc according to ≺, unless pc is last box :
first box ,  pc ∈ BS ∪ {env}. ∀p ∈ BS ∪ {env}. pc 6= p⇒ pc ≺ p
last box ,  pc ∈ BS ∪ {env}. ∀p ∈ BS ∪ {env}. pc 6= p⇒ p ≺ pc
next box(pc) ,
if pc = last box
then last box
else  p ∈ BS ∪ {env} − {pc}. ∀q ∈ BS ∪ {env} − {pc, p}. pc ≺ p ∧ p ≺ q
where  is Hilbert’s choice operator5, and the ∪ and − set operators have the same
precedence and are read left to right. These functions ensure that each box is executed
once and only once. Sseq, the scheduler for sequential box execution, is updated to
ensure that all boxes are executed before the super-step:
Sseq , (s = Execute ∧ pc′ 6= last box ⇒ s′ = Execute)
∧ (s = Execute ∧ pc′ = last box ⇒ s′ = Super)
∧ (s = Super ⇒ s′ = Execute)
Nseq replaces
∧
i∈BS Bi (in Hl) of Figure 4.2:
Nseq ,
(
s = Execute ⇒ (pc ∈ BS⇒ Bepc)
∧(∧i∈BS−{pc}〈iwsi, resi, sti〉′ = 〈iwsi, resi, sti〉)
∧ pc′ = next box(pc))
∧ (s = Super ⇒ (∧i∈BS Bsi ) ∧ pc′ = first box)
5 x. P (x) denotes an x such that P (x) holds.
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| |
Figure 4.5: Program with “internal wires” hidden.| |
The pc ∈ BS guard before the box action Bepc is necessary since the environment is
executed as a box, while E extends E0 to reflect sequential execution:
E , (s = Execute ∧ pc = env ⇒ ∀w ∈ oout ws : w′ = w ∨ w′ = ⊥)
∧ (s = Execute ∧ pc 6= env ⇒ ∀w ∈ ows : w′ = w)
∧ (s = Super ⇒ ∀w ∈ in ws : ∃v ∈ T ∪ {⊥} : w′ = v)
The complete program with sequential execution Hseq is then defined as:
H lseq , I ∧ (pc = first box) ∧2[Nseq ∧ Sseq ∧ E ]〈s,ws,res,st,pc〉
Hseq , ∃ st,s,pc. H lseq
(4.2)
Is lock-step scheduling preserved?
With the current set of free (not hidden) variables (res and ws), lock step scheduling
is not preserved. This follows from the split of atomicity of wire consumption in
the execute phase (1 on page 74 of this section) and the fact that wires are not ∃-
bound. Informally, since wires are 1-1 relationship, boxes are without side-effects, and
output wires are not written to before the super-step, this should hold. However, these
properties cannot be captured by the model without ∃-binding the wires and result
buffers, which would not correctly reflect a Hume program. A compromise could be
to ∃-bind all wires not connected to a stream and look at them as internal, as shown
by the thin wires of Figure 4.5. Additional constraints are: (A1) all inputs are wired
to the same box; (A2) the result buffer res is hidden; (A3) the “input box” last is
scheduled last (∀i ∈ BS. i  last); (A4) the environment E is replaced by E l which is
executed in parallel with last. Let int ws be the internal wires. H and Hseq are then
updated as follows:
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H int , ∃ st,s,res,int ws. H l
H intseq , ∃ st,s,pc,res,int ws. I ∧ (pc = first box) ∧2[Nseq ∧ Sseq ∧ E l]〈s,ws,res,st,pc〉
Theorem 4.2. H intseq is a refinement of H
int: H intseq ⇒ H int
Proof outline. The proof requires the introduction of a history variables sth, resh and
int wsh for st, res and int ws. The refinement mapping formed by the state functions
st, res and int ws are equal to st, res and int ws respectively, except for all execute
phases but the last (s = Execute ∧ pc 6= last), where they are equal to sth, resh and
int wsh.
The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 4.1, with an additional case split
on pc. The super-step phase is unchanged from Theorem 4.1, thus is trivial. In the
execute-phase s is only changed when pc = last. Moreover, the refinement mapping st,
res and int ws and the definition of the sth, resh and int wsh ensures that all internal
variables (that are found in H int) are unchanged for all execute-step phases except when
pc = last. Finally, only E l and last can by definition update the free wires. However,
this is, by (A3 ) and (A4 ), in the last step when pc = last. Thus, all steps in the execute
phase, except when pc = last, are stuttering steps in the abstract model (H int). By
definition each box is executed once and only once in the sequential scheduling, and
each box is unchanged. Thus, by the definition of st, res and int ws, the execute step
where pc = last simulates the single execute step of H int. ∴
Nonetheless, this embedding disables reasoning about properties that are not on
wires connected to streams, which is not feasible. So it is not used. Now, the only
property verified so far is that the self-output scheduling preserves lock-step scheduling.
Since sequential scheduling does not refine lock-step scheduling, this can no longer be
assumed. However, self-out scheduling can be updated to sequential self-out scheduling
in the same way as lock-step scheduling, and Theorem 4.1 replaced by:
Theorem 4.3. Sequential self-output scheduling is a refinement of sequential lock-step
scheduling.
Proof outline. The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 4.1, with an additional
case split on pc in the execute phase. ∴
4.4 Hume in TLA+ (TLC) for model checking
Since system verification is the motivation behind the work here, Hume is given a
shallow mechanisation in TLA+, thus disabling meta properties of the embedding. In
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S(cond) , if s = Execute ∧ ¬cond then s′ = Super else s′ = Execute
pm1(p, iw) , (p = Ignore) ∨ (p = Var ∧ iw 6= Bot) ∨ (p = iw)
pm[patt ∈ Seq(Pattern), iws ∈ Seq(Lift(Dom))] ,
Len(patt) 6= 0 ∧ Len(iws) 6= 0⇒
pm1
(
Head(patt),Head(iws)
) ∧ pm[Tail(patt),Tail(iws)]
ao1(res, ow) , (res = Bot) ∨ (ow = Bot)
ao[res, ows ∈ Seq(Lift(Dom))] ,
Len(res) 6= 0 ∧ Len(ows) 6= 0⇒
ao1
(
Head(res),Head(ows)
) ∧ ao[Tail(res),Tail(ows)]
nw1(res, ow) , if res = Bot then ow else res
nw[res, ows ∈ Seq(Lift(Dom))] ,
if Len(res) 6= 0 ∧ Len(ows) 6= 0
then 〈〉
else nw1
(
Head(res),Head(ows)
) · nw[Tail(res),Tail(ows)]
Figure 4.6: TLA+ generic actions| |
all examples, natural numbers and sequences of natural numbers, are sufficient types.
Thus, the Naturals, Sequence, and TLC need to be imported to the model. Note that
∃ is not supported by TLC, so s and st are not hidden. Now, all mechanised Hume
programs require the following constants:
constants Bot, Dom, Ignore, Var
constants Runnable, Matchfail, Blocked, Execute, Super.
Bot represents the empty value⊥; Dom is the union-type of all types used in a program,
which is Nat in all Hume examples here. Bot can be defined as
Bot , choose x : x /∈ Dom
where choose is Hilbert’s  operator in TLA+. However, Bot has to be given a value
in the TLC configuration anyway, so this is unnecessary. A type T is lifted to the
bottom type by Lift
Lift(T) , T ∪ {Bot }
which is required by result buffers and wires; Ignore captures * and * patterns; while
Var captures a variable x and in patterns. Since all constants are contained in Dom,
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the pattern type Pattern is
Pattern , {Ignore, Var} ∪ Dom;
the remaining constants are as in the discussion above. Moreover, each program con-
tains a scheduler s and program counter pc:
variables s, pc
Figure 4.6 mechanises the the scheduler S (Sseq), pattern matching: pm1 (pm1) and
pm, output assertion ao and wire update function nw, together with auxiliary functions
ao1 and nw1. Head relates to the hd operator and Tail to the tl operator of Table 4.1.
The cond argument of S holds if pc′ 6= last box. Since this is a shallow embedding, the
condition has to be given as an argument.
4.4.1 An example embedding
| |
stream input from "std_in"; stream output to "std_out";
box inc
in(x::word 8) out(x’::word 8)
match
x -> x+1;
wire inc (input)(output);
Figure 4.7: A simple Hume example| |
Figure 4.8 shows the mechanisation of the Hume program listed in Figure 4.7: the
program consists of one box inc, with an input wire w1 from standard input; and an
output wire w2 connected to standard output; and inc increments the input by 1. In
addition to the wires, the box state inc st and result buffer inc res for inc are the
state components specific to this program:
variables w1, w2, inc st, inc res
constants penv, pinc.
PC is a constant set replacing BS, with respect to updating pc. Here, it is defined as
PC , {penv, pinc}. Moreover, only natural numbers (Hume word type) are used, thus
Dom , Nat.
In Figure 4.8, inc exe defines Bepinc in TLA+. However, for simplicity, the pc
check is moved into the box actions. Pattern matching is achieved using TLA+’s
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inc exe , pc = pinv⇒ pc′ = penv
∧ inc st 6= Blocked⇒ case pm1(Var, w1) → w1′ = Bot
∧ inc st′ = Runnable
∧ inc res′ = w1 + 1
2 other → w1′ = w1
∧ inc st′ = Matchfail
∧ inc res′ = Bot
∧ (pc 6= pinc ∨ inc st = Blocked)⇒ unchanged 〈 inc st, inc res, w1 〉
inc sup , if ao1(inc res, w2)
then w2′ = nw1(inc res, w2)
∧ 〈 inc res, inc st 〉′ = 〈 Bot, Runnable 〉
else unchanged 〈 inc res, w2 〉 ∧ inc st′ = Blocked
inc , (s = Execute⇒ inc exe) ∧ (s = Super⇒ inc sup)
E , s = Execute⇒ pc = penv⇒ pc′ = pinc ∧ (w2′ = w2 ∨ w2′ = Bot)
∧ pc 6= penv⇒ w2′ = w2
∧ s = Super ⇒ (∃v ∈ Lift(0..254) : w1′ = v) ∧ pc′ = pinc
I , s = Execute ∧ pc = pinc ∧ 〈 w1, w2 〉 = 〈 Bot, Bot 〉
∧ 〈 inc st, inc res 〉 = 〈 Runnable, Bot 〉
v , 〈s, pc, w1, w2, inc res, inc st〉
H , I ∧2[inc ∧ E ∧ S(pc′ 6= penv)]v
sN , (0..255)
Inv1 , w2 6= Bot⇒ w2 ∈ Nat
SPECIFICATION H
CONSTANTS Bot = bot
Ignore = ignore
...
Nat <- sN
INVARIANTS Inv1
Figure 4.8: TLA+ definition and TLC configuration file (boxed) for example| |
case expression, which is equivalent to nested if-then-else expressions. Note that
unchanged v , v′ = v, and there is only one input (and output), hence pm1
(ao1 /nw1 ) are used instead of the sequence pm (ao/nw) functions; inc exe and inc
defines Bspinc and Bpinc in TLA+ respectively; E defines E in TLA+. For simplicity, the
pc′ = first box (pinc) is part of E in the super phase; I is the initial state; v the set of
variables in the program; and H is the full program specification.
The box at the bottom right of Figure 4.8 outlines the specification file required
to model check the program with TLC. Firstly, it specifies the specification (H) and
assigns values to all the constants. All infinite sets has to be restricted to a finite
subsets, thus the defined sN is used instead of Nat. Note, since a box increments the
input by 1, E can only update w1 to a maximum of 1 less then the largest value of
sN, i.e. 254 (the largest 8 bit number is 255). This is actually a bug in inc, and the
box should be changed to reflect this. For example, by replacing x+1 by the “passive
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Figure 4.9: Isabelle/TLA∗/Hume theory structure| |
expression” if x < 255 then x+1 else x. However, the example is kept as simple as
possible since it serves merely as an illustration. The program contains one invariant,
Inv1 which states that w2 is a natural number (unless it is empty).
4.5 Hume in Isabelle/TLA for theorem proving
As in the TLA+ mechanisation and for the same reason, Hume is given a shallow mech-
anisation in Isabelle/TLA. Here, a shallow embedding entails less work in the actual
mechanisation and more direct use of existing Isabelle tools and theorems. The types
are also given a shallow embedding by using Isabelle/HOL types directly, since the
Hume type system is not the focus of the thesis. This is also the case in the expression
layer mechanisation, briefly discussed in Section 9.2. To avoid duplicating the expres-
sion layer mechanisation, Isabelle/HOL represents this layer directly: primary Hume
operators, like + and if-then-else are represented using corresponding Isabelle/HOL
operators (+ and if-then-else); user-defined Hume functions are represented using the
Isabelle/HOL function package. This pragmatic approach increases the semantic gap,
thus increasing the possibility of errors. However, both the Hume expression layer
and Isabelle/HOL are in the ML family [151], hence this gap should not be too large.
Finally, note that the expression layer mechanisation has been achieved in parallel and
was not ready when this work started, thus it has not been used. However, Section
9.2 shows how to integrate the two layers in Isabelle/HOL. For simplicity, s and st
are not ∃ bound here. Sections 7.2 and 7.3, discusses ∃ binding within the context of
transformations.
Figure 4.9 shows the theory structure for the Hume mechanisation: it is based on
the State theory discussed in the previous chapter; HumeSemantics contains definitions
and theorems used by both Hume and Hierarchical Hume (HHume described in Chapter
6); the Hume theory contains definitions and lemmas specific for Hume, which are used
for all Hume programs mechanised, illustrated by H1, · · · ,H1. The HumeSemantics and
Hume theories are discussed separately and followed by an example of a mechanisation.
The mechanised theorems and lemmas are listed in Appendix A.
Chapter 4. The Hume coordination layer in TLA 82
4.5.1 The HumeSemantics theory
Tuple projections
Tuples of differently typed elements are heavily used in Hume. Since the State theory
imposes strong typing, tuples are also required to mechanise both box result buffers
and wires. Isabelle has built in polymorphic functions fst(x,y)=x and snd(x,y)=y for
pairs. Thus, the second element of a triple t is accessed by fst(snd t). Projections are
used to mechanise both programs and properties. To simplify, projection functions for
tuples up to eleven elements are created (eleven is the largest sized tuple required).
Since tuples are not an algebraic type, each projection has to be defined for each size of
a tuple, where for example thd4 is the projection of the third element of a quadruple,
defined as:
thd4 :: (’a * ’b * ’c * ’d) ⇒ ’c
thd4 q ≡ case q of (x,y,z,zz) ⇒ z ,
Hume values
Both a wire and an element of the result buffer may be empty, which is represented by
the existing Isabelle/HOL type
datatype ’a option = None | Some ’a,
where None is used to represent an empty value. intoVal turns a value into an option
value; toVal projects the value (of a non-empty) option value; while the isVal predicate
holds if the given value is not empty:
intoVal :: ’a ⇒ ’a option
intoVal v ≡ Some v
toVal :: ’a option ⇒ ’a
toVal (Some v) ≡ v
isVal :: ’a option ⇒ bool
isVal None ≡ False
isVal (Some v) ≡ True
Since a variable in TLA is a function on the underlying state, a Hume value HVal is
an option type state function:
types ’a HVal = (’a option) statefun
For example, a wire w of integer type has the type int HVal. Lifting functions for $
and $ into Hume values help simplifying specifications:
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toBeforeVal :: ’a HVal ⇒ ’a tempfun (@ )
@v ≡ toVal<$v>
toAfterVal :: ’a HVal ⇒ ’a tempfun ( @)
v@ ≡ toVal<v$>
Pattern matching
A Hume pattern is defined using an algebraic type
datatype ’a pattern = PIgnore | PConsumeIgnore | PConsume | PConst ’a,
where, with respect to (4.1), PIgnore relates to * ; PIgnoreConsume to * ; PConsume
combines x and ; and PConst id relates to id. PMatch implements pm1, which accepts
a pattern and an input (wire) value. The function is defined by pattern matching on
the input ’a pattern type:
PMatch :: ’a pattern ⇒ ’a option ⇒ bool
PMatch PIgnore iw = True
PMatch PConsumeIgnore iw = True
PMatch PConsume iw = (isVal iw)
PMatch (PConst p) iw = (isVal iw ∧ toVal iw = p)
pm is defined by the conjunction of all PMatches for each match, since due to the
typing, a pattern is represented as a tuple, which is not algebraic. Note that the option
and not the HVal type is used. This is since the HVal type is lifted to the Intensional
logic, and functions in this logic are defined unlifted, and then lifted by enclosing the
arguments using <· · · >.
Wire assertion and updates
As with pattern matches, only ao1 and nw1 can be mechanised due to the strong typing,
and ao and nw for a given match, are conjunctions of all the ao1’s and nw1’s. assertOut
mechanises ao1 by pattern matching of the first input:
assertOut :: ’a option ⇒ ’a option ⇒ bool
assertOut None ow = True
assertOut (Some v) ow = (ow = None),
while new wire mechanises nw1 in a similar way:
new wire :: ’a option ⇒ ’a option ⇒ ’a option
new wire None ow = ow
new wire v ow = v.
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4.5.2 The Hume theory
The Hume theory mechanises the scheduler and box states. The scheduling state is
defined by an enumeration type
datatype sch state = Execute | Super.
Each program has a scheduler s, which is a state function of the sch state type
s :: sch state statefun .
As in TLA+, the scheduler Sseq cannot be directly implemented due to the shallow
embedding. Moreover, due to lifting into Intensional, it cannot update the scheduling
variable s either. Instead, S is a function, accepting a scheduling value and a condition
(pc 6= last box) and returns the new scheduling variable:
S :: sch state ⇒ bool ⇒ sch state
S Execute True = Execute
S Execute False = Super
S Super = Execute
A box’s state is defined by an enumeration type
datatype box state = Runnable | Matchfail | Blocked
and a box state variable thus has the box state statefun type:
types boxstate = box state statefun
4.5.3 An example embedding
The example shown in Figure 4.7 is used as illustration here as well. Firstly, PC is an
enumeration type, and contains the inc box (pinc) and the environment box (penv),
while pc is a PC state function
datatype PC = pinc | penv
pc :: PC statefun .
S’ specialises the scheduler S for this particular program:
S’ :: temporal
S’ ≡ s$ = S<$s, $pc 6= #penv>
The two wires, w1 and w2, of the program are both 16 bit Hume words, which are
represented using natural numbers nat in Isabelle:
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w1 :: nat HVal
w2 :: nat HVal .
The state inc st and result buffer inc res of the inc box have the types:
inc st :: boxstate
inc res :: nat HVal.
The box actions for the execute and super-step phase are represented by inc exe and
inc sup, respectively. To ease the reading, the main body of inc exe is separated into
inc body. inc is the complete action for the inc box:
inc exe :: temporal
inc sup :: temporal
inc body :: temporal
inc :: temporal.
inc exe first checks if it is its turn to execute, i.e. if $pc = #pinc. If this holds, the
program counter is set to the next box pc$ = #penv. This is followed by a check of
whether the box is executable (not Blocked) or not. If it is executable, then inc body
holds. In both checks, in a failure the “owned” variables must be explicitly set to be
unchanged. Note that the two checks cannot be combined since pc must be updated
whether or not the box is executable when it is the box’s turn to execute:
inc exe ≡
($pc = #pinc −→ pc$ = #penv
∧ ($inc st 6= #Blocked −→ inc body)
∧ ($inc st = #Blocked −→ Unchanged (w1,inc st,inc res)))
∧ ($pc 6= #pinc −→ Unchanged (w1,inc st,inc res)).
The body of a box consists of a set of nested if-then-else expressions, where each repre-
sents a match, followed by the last statement, which handles the case where all patterns
fail to match with the input. A match updates the result buffer, state and consumes
the input. In the inc box there is only one match, creating the following box body:
inc body ≡ if PMatch< #PConsume , $w1>
then inc res$ = intoVal<Suc<@w1>>
∧ (inc st, w1)$ = (#Runnable, #None)
else (w1, inc st, inc res)$ = ($w1, #Matchfail, #None).
The super-step phase is mechanised using one if-then-else expression, which is the case
for all programs and boxes:
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inc sup ≡ if assertOut<$inc res , $w2>
then (inc res, inc st)$ = (#None, #Runnable)
∧ w2$ = nwire<$inc res, $w2>
else (inc res, w2, inc st)$ = ($inc res, $w2, #Blocked).
Finally, inc finds the correct action, depending on the scheduler s:
inc ≡ ($s = #Execute −→ inc exe) ∧ ($s = #Super −→ inc sup).
The environment env resets pc to the first box (pinc) in addition to simulating the
streams. Since it behaves as a box, it only executes when it is its turn:
env :: temporal
env ≡ ($s = #Execute −→ (if $pc = #penv
then (w2$ = $w2 ∨ w2$ = #None) ∧ pc$ = $pc
else w2$ = $w2))
∧ ($s = #Super −→ (∃ v. w1$ = #v) ∧ pc$ = #pinc).
Note that the deterministic update is achieved in Isabelle/HOL by exploring typing
information, that is enclosing #v by intoVal: ∃ v. w1$ = intoVal<#v >. The initial
step is defined as:
init :: temporal
init ≡ $s = #Execute ∧ $pc = #pinc
∧ $(w1,w2) = #(None,None)
∧ $(inc st, inc res) = #(Runnable, None),
and the full specification of the inc example becomes :
program :: temporal
program ≡ init ∧ 2[S’ ∧ inc ∧ env] (s,pc,w1,w2,inc st,inc res)
4.6 Summary & discussion
This chapter has formalised the Hume coordination layer in TLA, and mechanised
Hume in TLA+ for model checking, and Isabelle/TLA for theorem proving. The latter
is henceforth called Isabelle/Hume. The main focus on the remaining chapters is
on theorem proving in Isabelle/Hume. This is mainly to support integration with
the higher Hume levels, which requires higher order logic, and integration with the
expression layer in Isabelle/HOL, discussed in Section 9.2. Chapter 9 also discusses a
liveness extension. Finally, model checking will eventually suffer from the state-space
explosion problem, and ways of avoiding this are not discussed further, due to the
theorem proving focus. Note that TLC has been very useful in achieving the Hume
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embedding in TLA.
The next chapter discusses verification of Hume wire invariants and program trans-
formation in TLA, and implements tactics to automate reasoning in Isabelle/Hume.
The approach is illustrated by model checking and theorem proving case-studies.
Chapter5
Verification of Hume programs
“Beware of bugs [in the code]; I have only proved it correct; not tried it.”
– Donald Knuth
5.1 Introduction
| |
Figure 5.1: Thesis roadmap: Chapter 5| |
This chapter discusses the verification of Hume invariants and transformation, and
Figure 5.1 highlights the parts of the roadmap which are implemented here. Generic
mechanised reasoning in Isabelle/Hume is first discussed, followed by a discussion of
invariant verification, and the mechanisation of this reasoning in Isabelle/Hume. This
is followed by a discussion of transformation verification. The approaches are then il-
lustrated by case-studies in Section 5.5. The main contributions of this chapter are the
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development and mechanisation of the reasoning approach for invariants, the trans-
formation verification using TLA, and the case-studies. The work presented here is
novel with respect to the application of TLA at the programming language level. All
mechanised Isabelle/Hume theorems and lemmas are listed in Appendix A.2 and A.3.
5.2 Isabelle/Hume reasoning
Tuple projections and Hume types
Tuples are heavily used within the Isabelle/Hume embedding, in particular to represent
the result buffer of a box with more than one output. There are two different ways to
rewrite a tuple: firstly, a lemma like
lemma tup proj4:
(x = (a,b,c,d)) = (fst4 x = a ∧ snd4 x = b ∧ thd4 x = c ∧ for4 x = d)
is proved for all sized tuples; secondly, the following lemmas illustrate how one par-
ticular value is projected from a tuple, and is proved for all possible projections of all
sized tuples:
lemma tup lup8: thd4 (a,b,c,d) = c
lemma tup lup9: for4 (a,b,c,d) = d
Proof outline. All the tup projN and tup lupN lemmas are proved automatically by
the built-in Isabelle/HOL tools using the tuple definition. ∴
The @ operator was introduced to simplify specification of properties and programs.
However, when reasoning it is easier to work with @ unfolded. Thus, @v and v@ are
automatically rewritten into Some $v and Some v$.
Pattern matching
The pattern matching function PMatch is defined using Isabelle/HOL’s function for
primitive recursion. Isabelle automatically generates a set of rewrite rules from this,
which are given to the simplifier. Here, the and id patterns (PMatch PConsume iw)
are rewritten to isVal iw, and a constant (PMatch (PConst p) iw) is rewritten to isVal
iw ∧ toVal iw = p. This is exploited when reasoning in the execute phase.
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Output wires
The output wires are updated in the super-step phase. In a proof obligation, ‘the given’
is the program and ‘the goal’ is the property. As discussed below, the proof always
requires a case split on assertOut. Thus, the key problem is how to verify the update
of output wires, i.e. nwire. There are three main lemmas:
lemma nwireE: Jx = nwire A B; x = A =⇒ P; x = B =⇒ PK =⇒ P
lemma nw1: isVal x =⇒ nwire x y = x
lemma nw2: ¬isVal x =⇒ nwire x y = y
Proof outline. All lemmas are proved by induction on x. ∴
nwireE is a (standard) elimination rule for nwire. It turns an assumption w$ = nwire
f<$res> $w into two subgoals: one with with assumption w$ = f<$res> and one with
the assumption w$ = $w. This is the most general rule. By applying this rule to
all nwire, all possible combinations are enumerated. However, there are cases where
a property is defined over several wires, and the property depends on whether all
or none of the wires are written. For such cases, the “blind” application of nwireE
is not sufficient. Moreover, it may enumerate too many unnecessary subgoals. For
example, if the property to be verified is over one wire, and the result buffer is an
eleven-element tuple, then 211 (2048) sub-goals are created while two are sufficient.
In this instance a case-analysis on isVal<f<$res>> followed by application of nw1 and
nw2 creates only the two required sub-goals. Moreover, let P be an invariant over two
wires, P ($w, $ww), where g<$res> is the projection for the second wire. Furthermore,
assume that P (f<$res>, g<$res>) is already verified. In the step case of an inductive
invariant proof, P ($w, $ww) is assumed, and P (w$,ww$) must be shown. Now, a
“blind application” of nwireE induces, for example, the sub-goal P (f<$res>, $ww), which
cannot be proved from the givens. This kind of invariant requires the verification of
isVal<f<$res>> = isVal<g<$res>>, followed by an application of nw1 and nw2. This will
create two sub-goals, P ($w, $ww) and P (f<$res>, g<$res>), where the givens can be
applied directly. This is discussed further in Section 5.3.
The scheduler
The Hume theory contains the scheduling specific theories, i.e. the scheduler s. As
discussed below, all the proofs are by case-analysis of s, exploring the enumeration
type. Thus, no particular proofs are required.
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5.2.1 Isabelle/Hume tactics developed
Common reasoning patterns and rule applications are encapsulated in tactics. These
tactics exploit the shallow embedding, and attempt to be as light-weight as possible.
The rewriting of goals and assumptions is performed by the built-in Isabelle simplifier,
controlled by limiting the set of rewrite rules used. The tactics here are used in higher-
level tactics described later, where control of the sub-goals is required. Thus, all the
tactics accept a parameter goal specifying the sub-goal to which the tactic should be
applied:
unlift tac goal is not Hume specific, i.e. it can be used for any Isabelle/TLA term. It
unlifts an Intensional-lifted formula to a HOL formula, i.e. ` A and |∼ A becomes
w  F, where w is bound by the HOL meta-level universal quantifier
∧
;
unchanged tac goal is not Hume specific either. It turns Unchanged (x1,· · · , xn) into
x1$ = $x1 ∧ · · · xn$ = $xn;
simplify hume tac goal pushes ◦, $,@ and  as far down the term tree as possible,
and attempts to combine them. For example, w  ◦(F ∨ $G) becomes (w  ◦F)
∨ (w  G$);
tuple project tac goal simplifies the tuples as illustrated by Lemma tup proj4 in a
largest tuple first order (11 first, then 10 and so on). The ordering is required
since for example thd3 (a,b,c,d,e) can be rewritten to (c,d,e);
tuple lookup tac goal applies the tuple look-up rewrites as illustrated by Lemmas
tup lup8 and tup lup9 in the same order as above.
5.3 Invariant verification
5.3.1 Overview
An invariant is either over one or more result buffer projections (of the same box), or one
or more wires. Let P , K and L be wire predicates. Their validity may depend on other
predicates of other wires. Figure 5.2 classifies invariants based on their dependency.
Here, it is assumed that the wire predicate P is on one wire w, where box A is the
source of the wire, K is a predicate on wire b of the same box, and L a predicate on
wire c from box C. There is then a separation of four different cases:
(D1) P (w) can be proved directly from A, without any strengthening;
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| |
Figure 5.2: The types of invariant and dependencies| |
(D2) P (w) must be strengthened by J(a) from box B. The result is used with A to
prove P (w). Note, there is no direct or indirect dependency from A required to
prove J(a);
(D3) K(b) is verified, where b is a feedback wire on box A;
(D4) L(c) from box C is verified. However, M(d) from A is required to prove L(c).
Note, that this nesting may involve several (C1, C2, · · · ) boxes, and (3) is a special
case of (4) where wire c equals wire d and predicate L equals predicate M .
Further, let f(resA) be the projection of the result buffer that corresponds to wire w,
g(resA) be the projection of the result buffer corresponding to wire b, h(resA) corre-
sponding to wire d, i(resB) wire a of the result buffer of box B and j(resC) wire c of
the result buffer of box C.
A result buffer projection and a wire may be empty. Moreover, in the execute phase
the result from the computation is stored in the result buffer resA, and in the super-
step phase f(resA) attempts to copy to w. Thus, the proof of (D1) type invariants first
requires the proof of 2
(
f(resA) 6= ⊥ ⇒ P
(
f(resA)
))
, which is then used to prove the
main property 2
(
w 6= ⊥ ⇒ I(w)).
In (D2) style invariants, 2
(
f(resA) 6= ⊥ ⇒ P
(
f(resA)
))
must be strengthened by
2
(
a 6= ⊥ ⇒ J(a)). This invariant is proved independently of box A.
For (D3) style invariants, 2
(
b 6= ⊥ ⇒ K(b)) must be verified. However, this
cannot be proved in the sequential way as in (D1) and (D2) since the loop introduces a
mutual dependency: K
(
g(resA)
)
depends on K(b) (execute phase) and K(b) depends
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on K
(
g(resA)
)
(super-step phase). Thus, the result buffer and wire have to be proven
at the same time, meaning the two invariants are combined into:
2
((
g(resA) 6= ⊥ ⇒ K
(
g(resA)
)) ∧ (b 6= ⊥ ⇒ K(b))). (5.1)
(D4) is a generalisation of (D3), where the feedback is via one or more other boxes.
In this case all the involved wires and result buffers must be captured by the invariant.
For the example in Figure 5.2, this becomes:
2
( (
j(resC) 6= ⊥ ⇒ L
(
j(resC)
)) ∧ (c 6= ⊥ ⇒ L(c))
∧ (h(resA) 6= ⊥ ⇒M(h(resA))) ∧ (d 6= ⊥ ⇒M(d))
)
. (5.2)
5.3.2 The verification approach
| |
Figure 5.3: Proof plan of a Hume invariant| |
Figure 5.3 shows the overall proof plan of a Hume invariant. Here, the hexagon denotes
OR choice, diamond denotes AND choice, and a box is a proof technique (e.g. a
tactic). Now, with the exception of the last case-analysis on the scheduler s, this is
a similar structure, as one would expect to that of a generic TLA invariant. First,
N is strengthened by the (already verified) invariants Q1, . . . , Qn in both the before
(Qi) and after (Q
′
i) states. The resulting conjecture is then unlifted from temporal-
to the state- and action-levels, using the standard TLA rule (INV1). This creates
three sub-goals: the first is the initial state ` I ⇒ P (w), which is assumed to be
trivially handled by the initial technique; the last sub-goal is the unchanged sub-script
|∼ P (w) ∧ v′ = v ⇒ P (w′), handled by the trivial unchanged technique; the second
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sub-goal is the next action step |∼ P (w)∧N2 ⇒ P (w′). The proof is by a case-split on
the scheduler s, where each of the resulting phases (sub-goals) are discussed separately
below.
The execute phase
| |
Figure 5.4: Proof plan of execute phase| |
The proof plan of the execute phase is shown in Figure 5.4. If the invariant is over
wires, then the wires are either left unchanged or consumed. Thus, although each case
of Figure 5.4 is trivial, this structure is still required for wires, unless a meta-theorem
has already been verified capturing that wires are either left unchanged or consumed,
which cannot be expressed in a shallow embedding. The first step is a case-split on
pc = A. Thus, the focus is on invariants updated by one box, i.e. not (D4) style
invariants. For such invariants, all combinations of enumerated cases (see Figure 5.4)
must be combined. This will still work, but generates several unnecessary sub-goals,
and a full case-analysis on pc may be better.
Now, pc 6= A is trivially handled by unchanged. The pc = A case follows by a case
split on the Blocked state of A. The Blocked case is trivially handled by unchanged,
while the non-Blocked case induces case-analysis on each match, in addition to the
Matchfail case, which is trivially handled by unchanged. The matches depend on the
property and box, and a generic structure cannot be created.
The super-step phase
Figure 5.5 shows the proof plan of the super-step phase of a single wire/result buffer
projection invariant. Both cases start with a case-split on output assertion ao. This is
sufficient for the result buffer invariant, as shown in the figure. For a wire invariant,
the ao case follows by case-split on the possible return value of nw.
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| |
Figure 5.5: Proof plan of super-step phase. Left: proof of wire invariant. Right: proof of
result buffer invariant.| |
The case where the invariant is over more than one wire has previously been dis-
cussed in Section 5.2. For a result buffer this case is handled in the same way as a
single projection.
5.3.3 Isabelle/Hume tactics developed
The following tactics implement the reasoning techniques described above. As in the
previously defined tactics, the rewriting is performed by the simplifier. Note that a
tactic may work on several sub-goals, and reasoning on one sub-goal may solve it or
create new sub-goals. To ensure that the correct technique is applied to the correct
sub-goal, the techniques are applied backwards with respect to the sub-goals’ number
(last sub-goal is reasoned with first):
inv strengthen tac rews invs goal implements the invariant strengthening mechanism
shown in Figure 5.3. It requires that the given goal sub-goal is of the form
` I ∧ 2[N ]v ⇒ F , while invs is a list of theorems of the same form where F has
to be of the form 2G. Now, rews is a list of rewrites which are applied to both
goal and all the theorem in invs. This mainly involves unfolding the name of the
program specification. All the invariants are then joined into a conjunction of
theorems. This is achieved by applying the rule (see Section 3.6):
theorem inv join: assumes: ` P −→ 2Q and ` P −→ 2R
shows: ` P −→ 2(Q ∧ R),
recursively for each adjacent element in the invs list. This creates a “conjunction
invariant” applied to goal using the rule (also in Section 3.6):
theorem spec inv2 mono:
assumes: ` I ∧ 2[N] v −→ 2J and ` I ∧ 2[N ∧ J ∧ ◦J] v −→ P
shows: ` I ∧ 2[N] v −→ P.
This, with the “conjunction invariant” reduces the goal to the second assumption.
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execute tac rews goal implements the execute phase described above. rews must at
least contain the definition of the execute phase of the box(es) updating the
wire/result buffer of the invariant. This is first used to simplify the goal. As
shown in Chapter 4, the execute phase of a box action, is represented by a case-
split on pc, followed by a case-split on the box’s Blocked state, both represented
as if-then-else expressions in Isabelle/HOL. The matches are also represented
by nested if-then-else expression. The structure of the execute phase is thus
implemented by splitting each of these if-then-else expressions into two sub-goals.
If there is more than one box, all possible combinations are enumerated. The
standard simplifier, which contains the assumptions (the match and strengthened
invariants), and the simplify hume tac and unchanged tac are then used to attempt
to solve all the sub-subgoals.
superstep tac sup goal mechanises the super-step phase described above. For each
box, the super-step action contains an if-then-else expression, where the condition
holds if the outputs are asserted. Depending on the context of the invariant and
program, there are many ways to deal with the super-step. This is handled
by introducing an inductive data type supType. sup must be of this type, and
it contains the following constructors: SupNothing leaves the goal unchanged.
(SupGen rews) requires that rews must at least contain the definition of the execute
phase of the box(es) updating the wire/result buffer of the invariant. This is so
for all remaining cases. rews is used to unfold the required definitions, followed
by a case-split on the ao if-then-else expression, and application of nwireE on the
ao case, as described in Section 5.2. If there is one box with n output wires, the
application of nwireE will create 2n + 1 sub-goals, an example of which is given
in the left tree of Figure 5.5. If there is more than one box, the number of sub-
goals changes such that all possible combinations are enumerated. (SupRes rews)
relates to the right tree of Figure 5.5, and is used if the invariant is on the result
buffer. After the unfolding, the ao if-then-else expression is split into two sub-
goals. (SupCase (rews,cs)) unfolds and splits the ao if-then-else expression. In the
ao case, it then applies (recursively) case-splits on all the elements in the cs list,
followed by rewriting using nw1 and nw2, as described in Section 5.2. The cs list
is assumed to be of the form isVal<· · · >. To achieve the “many wires predicate”
case, also described in Section 5.2, the theorem must first be strengthened by
all the necessary isVal<A>=isVal<B> lemmas; finally, (SupComp (rews,cs)) first
applies (SupCase (rews,cs)), followed by nwireE on the remaining nwires.
humeinv tac invs rews sup exe init attempts to solve a Hume invariant. It first sim-
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| |
Figure 5.6: Transformation illustration| |
plifies using rews, followed by invariant strengthening using inv strengthen tac
rews invs 1. The following rule (see Section 3.6) unlifts the goal to the action
level:
theorem invmono: assumes: ` I −→ P and |∼ P ∧ [N] f −→ ◦P
shows: ` I ∧ 2[N] f −→ 2P
The first goal is unlifted to the Isabelle/HOL level, and unl tac and the init rewrite
rules are applied to solve the goal. The rule (see Section 3.6)
theorem preimpsplit:
assumes: |∼ I ∧ N −→ Q and |∼ I ∧ Unchanged v −→ Q
shows: |∼ I ∧ [N] v −→ Q
is applied to the second subgoal. The second is applied to unchanged tac, followed
by unlifting to Isabelle/HOL, and applying the standard simplifier. The first sub-
goal is unlifted to Isabelle/HOL, followed by case-split on w  $s, creating the
(w  $s) = Execute and (w  $s) = Super cases. execute tac exe 1 is applied to
the first, while superstep tac sup 2 is applied to the second.
The tactics are used in the case-studies in Sections 5.5.2 and 5.5.3. They are also used
in the tactics developed in Chapter 6.
5.4 Program transformation verification1
Transformations in Hume are mainly motivated by a failed costing in the expression
layer, as shown by the Hume methodology described in Section 2.6. Since boxes are
executed in separation, and the costing will fail in the (expressive) expression layer,
the transformation will involve moving computation from the expression layer of one
1Parts of the motivations discussed in this section has been published in [89].
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box, into the coordination layer. Thus, one box is split up into many boxes, or extra
wires are introduced. In both cases the source of the transformation is always one box.
This is illustrated in Figure 5.6 where box D is transformed into the spatial component
of boxes D1 to D4.
The state components, that is connected wires, result buffer and state variable, of
the source program must be “reused” in the transformed program. The unchanged
boxes A,B,C and E of Figure 5.6, reuse their state components. The input wires of D
become the input wires of D1, and the output wires of D become the output wires of
D4. Thus, it must be the case that resD becomes resD4. In the source program the
input wires are consumed and resD are updated in the same step, while in the resulting
program resD4 is updated several cycles after D1 consumes the inputs. Since wires and
result buffers are free, that is, not ∃-bound, in the specification, a refinement mapping
which can capture this delay does not exist. Thus, a one-step box execution is too
abstract to reason about transformations. To verify a transformation, the execute step
of a box b ∈ BS must split into two distinct steps: the pattern matching and consume
step is split from the compute step, which updates the result buffer resb. This requires
introducing an input buffer inpb for all boxes b ∈ BS, which contains the consumed
value and is used in the compute step of the same box. This can be embedded by
replacing BS with the {bcon. b ∈ BS} ∪ {bcom. b ∈ BS}, such that pc = bcon executes
the consume step of box b and pc = bcom executes the compute step, and bcon ≺ bcom.
However, since boxes are executed sequentially, it is sufficient to introduce a boolean
variable con, where con denotes the consume step of the current box, and ¬con denotes
the compute step. This approach is formalised below.
5.4.1 A two-step box execution formalised
To split the execute step from Section 4.3.3, a new function,
pattcopy(patt, iws) ,
case iws = 〈〉 → 〈〉
2 iws 6= 〈〉 ∧ hd(patt) = * → 〈⊥〉 · pattcopy(tl(patt), tl(iws))
2 iws 6= 〈〉 ∧ hd(patt) 6= * → 〈hd(iws)〉 · pattcopy(tl(patt), tl(iws)),
is required. Based on a given pattern patt, a tuple holding the input wires iws that are
consumed by the consume function, is returned. This is used to update the box input
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buffer inp in the function:
executecon(rs, iws, expr) ,
case rs = 〈〉 → 〈iws, 〈⊥, · · · ⊥〉, expr,Matchfail 〉
2 rs 6= 〈〉 ∧ pm(patt(hd(rs)), hd(iws)) → 〈 consume
(
patt
(
hd(rs)
)
, iws
)
,
pattcopy
(
patt
(
hd(rs)
)
, iws
)
,
exp
(
hd(rs)
)
,Runnable
〉
2 rs 6= 〈〉 ∧ ¬pm(patt(hd(rs)), hd(iws)) → executecon(tl(rs), iws, expr).
Based on the pattern matching, the correct expression must be executed in the compute
step. The expr variable stores this expression. Now, given a box rule set rs ; input wires
iws ; and expr, executecon return a quadruple of: the consumed input wires; the new
input buffer; the new expr ; and the new box state.
Be2i updates Bei for the two-step box execution. The sti 6= Blocked guard is now split
into two cases: in the consume step (con) the input wires are consumed, and copied to
the input buffer. In the compute step (¬con) the expression is executed:
Be2i , sti 6= Blocked ∧ con ⇒ 〈iwsi, inpi, expr, sti〉′ = executecon(rsi, iwsi, expr)
∧ res′i = resi
∧ sti 6= Blocked ∧ ¬con ⇒ 〈expr, iwsi, inpi, resi, sti〉′ =
〈expr, iwsi, inpi, run(expr, inpi),Runnable〉
∧ sti = Blocked ⇒ 〈expr, iwsi, inpi, resi, sti〉′ = 〈expr, iwsi, inpi, resi, sti〉.
Bs2i updates the super-step action Bsi with the input buffer:
Bs2i ,
(
ao(resi, owsi)⇒
〈owsi, inpi, resi, sti〉′ = 〈nw(resi, owsi), 〈⊥, · · · ⊥〉, 〈⊥, · · · ⊥〉,Runnable〉
)
∧ (¬ao(resi, owsi)⇒
〈owsi, inpi, resi, sti〉′ = 〈owsi, inpi, resi,Blocked〉
)
S2seq updates Sseq with con which ensures that the compute step of last box is also
executed:
S2seq , (s = Execute ∧ (pc′ 6= last box ∨ ¬con′) ⇒ s′ = Execute)
∧ (s = Execute ∧ (pc′ = last box ∧ con′) ⇒ s′ = Super)
∧ (s = Super ⇒ s′ = Execute).
N 2seq updates Nseq in the following way: the input buffer inpi is added; con is updated;
expr is updated in the super-step; pc is only updated when con′ hold. Note that a box
is only executed in the compute step if it is Runnable: a Blocked or Matchfail box is
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left unchanged, and the environment is one-step:
N 2seq ,
(
s = Execute ⇒ (pc ∈ BS⇒ Be2pc)
∧(∧i∈BS−{pc}〈iwsi, inpi, resi, sti〉′ = 〈iwsi, inpi, resi, sti〉)
∧ con′ = if pc = env ∨ st′pc 6= Runnable then True else ¬con
∧ pc′ = if pc 6= env ∧ st′pc = Runnable⇒ ¬con
then next box(pc) else pc
)
∧ (s = Super ⇒ (∧i∈BS Bs2i ) ∧ pc′ = first box ∧ con′ = True ∧ expr′ = expr).
The initial state and full program specification is then updated as follows:
I2 , I ∧ (pc = first box) ∧ (con = True) ∧ (expr = 〈⊥, · · · ,⊥〉)
∧ ∧i∈BS inpi = 〈⊥, · · · .⊥〉
H lseq2 , I2 ∧2[N 2seq ∧ S2seq ∧ E ]〈s,ws,inp,res,st,pc,con,expr〉
Hseq2 , ∃ st,s,pc,con,expr. H lseq2 .
A comparison with one-step box execution
An invariant proof now requires an additional case-split on con, while a wire invariant
proof may require a lemma on the matching in addition to a lemma updating the result
buffer. One- and two-step box execution embedding can be combined, such that only
transformed boxes are given a two-step representation: let BS2-step ⊆ BS contain all the
boxes that should be executed in two-steps. The two representations can be combined
by replacing (pc ∈ BS⇒ Be2pc) in the first line of N 2seq by
(
pc ∈ BS⇒ (pc ∈ BS2-step ⇒
Be2pc) ∧ (pc /∈ BS2-step ⇒ Bepc)
)
and pc = env ∨ st′pc 6= Runnable in the third line of the
same action with pc /∈ BS2-step ∨ pc = env ∨ st′pc 6= Runnable.
Finally, since res and ws are free, it is not the case that the two-step execution
refines the one-step execution. The reason for this was discussed in great detail in
Section 4.2.
5.4.2 The verification of a transformation
In TLA, Hume transformations are represented as refinements : a TLA embedded
Hume program H1 is transformed into a program H2, written Trans(H1, H2), iff H2
refines H1. Here, refinement is the same as implementation, and implementation is
represented as implication. Thus, this is defined as:
Trans(H1, H2) ≡ H2 ⇒ H1. (5.3)
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Let I1 and I2 be the initial states, and N1 and N2 the next actions, and w and v the
state space, including hidden variables, of the two respective specifications. This can
then be written as
(∃ st, s, pc, con, expr. I2 ∧2[N2]w)⇒ (∃ st, s, pc, con, expr. I1 ∧2[N1]v).
To verify this conjecture, rule (E2) is first applied to all ∃-bound variables of the impli-
cation premise (H2), which removes the quantifiers, and replaces the bound variables
by new constants. Next, the refinement mapping for the ∃-bound variables in H1
must be found. Let F be F with all ∃-bound variables replaced by the refinement
mapping: F [st/st, s/s, pc/pc, con/con, expr/expr]. This substitution is achieved by rule
(E1). Consequently, all ∃ quantifiers in the implication conclusion are removed, and
the bound variables are replaced by the witnesses defined by the refinement mapping.
Then, by applying (TLA2) and (STL4) the temporal formula is unlifted to the action
level, by verifying the initial state and the step cases separately. This is summarised
in the following proof-tree which should be read backwards:
I2 ⇒ I1
w′ = w ⇒ v′ = v N2 ⇒ [N1]v
([···]···)
[N2]w ⇒ [N1]v
((TLA2) using (STL4))
(I2 ∧2[N2]w)⇒ (I1 ∧ 2[N1]v) (E1)
(I2 ∧2[N2]w)⇒ (∃ st, s, pc, con, expr. I1 ∧2[N1]v) (E2)
(∃ st, s, pc, con, expr. I2 ∧2[N2]w)⇒ (∃ st, s, pc, con, expr. I1 ∧2[N1]v)
Note that to allow internal steps in the more concrete N2 action, N2 ⇒ [N1]v is
verified instead of N2 ⇒ N1. The main work in the proof is this sub-goal. Section
5.5.4 discusses transformation verification by example, and for reasons shown there, a
generic structure proof structure of N2 ⇒ [N1]v cannot be given.
5.5 Hume verification case studies
In this section the embeddings and reasoning techniques outlined above and in the
previous chapter are applied to four case studies: Section 5.5.1 discusses invariant
verification by model checking in TLC; Section 5.5.2 and Section 5.5.3 discuss invariant
verification in Isabelle/Hume; while Section 5.5.4 discusses transformations. Section
5.5.3 and Section 5.5.4 illustrate the problem with reasoning in the Hume coordination
layer, and are used as motivations for Hierarchical Hume in Chapter 6. Several of the
tactics developed above are also used in case-studies in Chapter 7.
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5.5.1 Case study H1: traffic lights in TLC2
| |
Figure 5.7: A traffic light system in Hume.| |
The use of TLC, instead of Isabelle/Hume, liberates the user from the proofs, and is
ideal to test the embedding and experimental case studies, like the real time properties
shown below. Now, in this section, the example shown in Figure 5.7, is discussed. It is
embedded as discussed in Section 4.4. The program consists of two light boxes, light1
and light2, and a controller box controller. The program is in HW-Hume, which
only supports 0s,1s and tuples of 0s and 1s. The light boxes are in charge of switching
the correct colours on their associated traffic light. This is achieved by sending a triple
(X,Y,Z) to the light, where a 1 switches the light on and 0 off. Furthermore, X refers
to the top red light, Y the middle amber light, and Z the bottom green light. The
light box is in charge of changing the lights in the correct order, as used in the UK:
red is followed by red and amber, which is followed by green, then amber, and finally,
red again. The controller box is responsible for co-ordinating the two lights. It is
not required to know which lights are on. All it knows is that a sequence from red,
back to red requires 4 steps. It sends a signal to a light box when it should change
colour. Thus, 4 sequential signals are sent to light1, then 4 sequential signals are sent
to light2, then to light1 again, and so on. To achieve this, each box needs to know
their state, represented by feedback wires. The lights are assumed to initially be red.
Let
Init ∧2[N ∧ S ∧ E ]v. (5.4)
be the embedding of the program in TLA+, where v is the state-space of the program.
Note that since the program is in HW-Hume, Nat is replaced by {0, 1} in the configura-
tion file. Instead of reasoning directly with wires, i.e. of the form 2
(
w 6= ⊥ ⇒ P (w)),
the actual physical lights are embedded as variables tl1 and tl2. These are seen as part
2The example in this section has been published in [91].
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of the system (not program), and not ∃-bound. The action Ntl1,tl2 updates these vari-
ables if (and only if) the corresponding light changes colour – and Inittl1,tl2 sets them
to be red initially. Note that these auxiliary definitions do not change the behaviour
of (5.4):
Init ∧ Inittl1,tl2 ∧2[N ∧ S ∧ E ∧ Ntl1,tl2 ]〈tl1,tl2,v〉. (5.5)
(5.5) is used for the verification. (5.6) is an invariant asserting that both lights cannot
be green at the same time:
2
(
tl1 6= (0, 0, 1) ∨ tl2 6= (0, 0, 1)
)
(5.6)
However, (5.5) is stronger than that. (5.6) can be strengthened to show that if one of
the lights is not red, then the other light is red:
2
((
tl1 6= (1, 0, 0)⇒ tl2 = (1, 0, 0)
) ∧ (tl2 6= (1, 0, 0)⇒ tl1 = (1, 0, 0)))
TLA can also be used to reason about computation. This requires a before and after
state, and must thus be represented as an action. For example, an action can express
that the order in which the lights change is correct. Given a current light, the (Hume)
function Next returns the correct next value in the UK sequence:
Next l = case l of (1,0,0) -> (1,1,0) | (1,1,0) -> (0,0,1)
| (0,0,1) -> (0,1,0) | (0,1,0) -> (1,0,0);
Let Next be a direct porting of the Hume Next function into a TLA+ operator. The
properties have to be defined separately for each of the two lights:
2[tl1
′ = Next (tl1)]tl1 2[tl2
′ = Next (tl2)]tl2
The super-scripts tl1 and tl2 ensure that only those steps where the lights actually
change value are considered, which the validity depends on.
Real-time Hume model checking
The final example shows how TLC can be used to verify real-time properties of the
coordination layer, using a technique known as explicit-time model checking [125]. The
focus is on upper time bounds, i.e. properties of the form
“if P holds then Q will always hold within T time units.”
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To prove this, the costs for the expression layer are required, which can be found by
applying the analysis described in e.g. [29]. Moreover, the cost of copying in the
coordination layer must also be obtained. The exact property specifies that if the first
light is green then it will become red within 100 ms
“if tl1 = (0,0,1) holds then tl1 = (1,0,0) will always hold within 100 ms.”
To achieve this, (5.5) is augmented with a counter t, with the following type invariant:
2
(
t ∈ (Int ∪ {Error,Disabled})).
Disabled means that the first property (tl1 = (0,0,1)) has not occurred yet, or the
second property (tl1 = (1,0,0)) has occurred within the time bound; Error indicates
that the bound (100 ms) has been reached before the second property holds; while
t ∈ Int indicates that the first property has occurred and the second property and the
time bound has not been reached.
Let NT be an operator which takes the counter and returns the new value, based on
which boxes executes and the scheduling. The real-time specification with the counter
t is then defined as:
Init ∧ Inittl1,tl2 ∧ t = Disabled ∧2[N ∧ S ∧ E ∧ Ntl1,tl2 ∧ t′ = NT(t)]〈t,tl1,tl2,v〉.
Let Tl1, Tl2 and Tctl be the upper time bound for the execute phase when the two lights
and controller box execute, and Tsuper the upper-bound of the super-step. The cost
of copy, scheduling and so on of the coordination layer must be found. However, these
values are here assumed to be Tl1 = 2, Tl2 = 2, Tctl = 1, Tsuper = 1. The environment
has no cost, although this assumption may be false. Regardless, the approach is the
same.
t is initially Disabled. For each step NT(t) calculates the new value of t as follows:
if tl1
′ = (1, 0, 0) then t is set to Bound. For all the following steps t is decremented
with either Tl1, Tl2, Tctl or Tsuper, depending on the scheduling phase, and which box is
executed in the Execute phase. If tl2
′ = (0, 0, 1) then t is reset to Disabled. Finally, if
t ≤ 0 then t′ is set to Error. The desired property is then formalised as:
2(t 6= Error)
In this example, the lowest guarantee with these assumptions was 60 ms. Note that
[125] suggests that using TLC for explicit time model checking may not be too inefficient
compared to more specialised real time model checkers.
Chapter 5. Verification of Hume programs 105
| |
(E0) 0 ∈ EvenN
(ES)
X ∈ OddN
Suc X ∈ EvenN (OS)
X ∈ EvenN
Suc X ∈ OddN
Figure 5.8: Left: mutually inductive defined EvenN and OddN sets in Isabelle/HOL.
Right: Hume program with even and odd boxes.| |
5.5.2 Case study H2: even and odd numbers
The first Isabelle/Hume case study is the program shown on the right hand side of
Figure 5.9. It consists of two boxes connected by two wires, and forming a closed
system. The property that should be verified is that wire w1 is always an odd number
(or empty), and wire w2 is always an even number (or empty). These properties
are specified using two sets EvenN and OddN, defined in Isabelle/HOL by mutual
induction. The required introduction rules are shown on the left side of Figure 5.9.
These properties are formalised as follows:
2(w1 6= ⊥ ⇒ w1 ∈ OddN) (5.7)
2(w2 6= ⊥ ⇒ w2 ∈ EvenN) (5.8)
Proof outline. Both these properties are (D4) style invariants with mutual depen-
dency. Thus, the following theorem must first be verified
2
(
(odd res 6= ⊥ ⇒ odd res ∈ OddN) ∧ (w1 6= ⊥ ⇒ w1 ∈ OddN)
∧ (even res 6= ⊥ ⇒ even res ∈ EvenN) ∧ (w2 6= ⊥ ⇒ w2 ∈ EvenN)
)
The mechanised Isabelle/Hume version, called mainth, is listed in Appendix A.3.1.
There, (5.7) is called oddwire, while (5.8) is called evenwire. mainth is proved by the
humeinv tac followed by the application of the definitional rules of the EvenN and OddN
shown in Figure 5.9. (5.7) and (5.8) follow by the application of (STL5) to mainth.
∴
5.5.3 Case study H3: a vending machine
Figure 5.9 shows a vending machine in Hume, and is an adaptation of an example in
[90]: the inp box accepts coins and button input from the hardware; these are sent to
the control box, which handles the request. The current balance is kept in the w4
feedback loop, and an infinite amount of tea and coffe is assumed; the result of this is
sent to outp which either returns nothing, or tells the machine to produce coffee (0 is
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| |
Figure 5.9: Vending machine in Hume.| |
sent to wire w7), tea (1 is sent to wire w7), or the balance is returned on wire w8. This
requires the following types:
data coins = Nickel | Dime;
data drinks = Coffee | Tea | Money;
data buttons = BCoffe | BTea | BCancel;
data input = N | D | C | T | X;
The first property asserts that the balance is never negative:
2(w4 6= ⊥ ⇒ w4 ≥ 0) (5.9)
Proof outline. This is a (D2) type invariant, which first requires the proof of
2
(
(w4 6= ⊥ ⇒ w4 ≥ 0) ∧ control res2 6= ⊥ ⇒ control res2 ≥ 0
)
.
This is first automatically verified by humeinv tac, and (5.9) follows by rule (STL5).
In Appendix A.3.2 this is mechanised as vend mon1, while (5.9) is mechanised as
vend money. ∴
These three boxes create a spatial component, with several partial correctness prop-
erties: ‘if coins are deposited, then the balance is increased accordingly’; ‘if coffee is
requested, and there are sufficient funds, then coffee is produced’; and the opposite: ‘if
coffee is requested, and there are not enough funds, then coffee is not returned’.
The input of this component is w1, while the result is produced on w7 or w8,
meaning it will take three cycles to produce a result. Moreover, the wack wire has been
added to the original version [90], where a new computation could be started before the
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previous had terminated. Specifying partial correctness properties requires introducing
auxiliary variables, and specifying the properties using them. However, since they are
not part of the program, these properties are not preserved by transformations. These
variables must remember the input when inp first executes (wack is consumed) until
an output is produced (wack is written to).
To achieve such specification, it must be shown that during computation (wack is
empty), the auxiliary variables are unchanged. Moreover, in order to verify partial
correctness it must be shown that execution is sequential. This requires to show that,
with the exception of w4, w7 and w8, only one of the remaining wires or result buffers
is non-empty. Using this, it can be shown that the auxiliary variables are unchanged
during execution of the component, and can thus be used to specify partial correctness
with the output buffer of outp. Verifying, or even using this property, causes the
simplifier to loop, meaning that the humeinv tac fails. Thus, it has not been proved.
Irrespective of the failure of the humeinv tac tactic, this example has illustrated that
partial correctness properties over a spatial component cannot be specified naturally.
Even if the component is restricted, for example by disabling pipe-lining, specification
becomes difficult and requires the introduction of auxiliary variables. Consequently,
such properties will not be preserved by transformations, which is a key feature in
Hume development. The next chapter introduces an extension to Hume, which allows
such properties to be captured naturally, and enables automation of such proofs.
5.5.4 Case study H4: adder transformations verification3
A first attempt
This section discusses verification of the transformation shown in Figure 5.10. Here, a
full ripple carry adder represented as a truth table (the adder box) is transformed into
a spatial component consisting of two half adders (the half1 and half2 boxes) and a
logical OR gate (box or). The dotted wires are introduced by the transformation. The
verification is by model checking in TLC, where the embedding described in Section
4.4 is updated with two-step box execution. Let P1 be the TLA embedding of the
source program, and P2 the result. The first non-trivial step is to find the refinement
mapping for the ∃-bound variables. The s = Execute and s = Super steps are discussed
separately.
When s = Execute, the pc = gen and pc = show cases are trivial since they are
unchanged by the transformation. half1, half2 and or make up the behaviour of
adder. For both con and ¬con, pc must be one of these boxes since the result buffers
3Parts of this section has been published in [89].
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| |
Figure 5.10: Hume program transformation example.| |
and wires are free. However, half1 and half2 together consume the wires as adder,
and in different cycles. Moreover, half2 and or produces the adder’s result in different
cycles when ¬con. Thus, a refinement mapping does not exist.
When s = Super, adder’s output wires and result buffer are now asserted and
written to by half2 and or. These are produced in different cycles, thus the refinement
mapping does not exist.
A second attempt: hide everything
The verification failure follows from a lack of constraints in the TLA embedding of the
Hume program. The most constrained embedding involves hiding all variables, thus
Trans(P1, P2) becomes
(∃ ws, inp, res, st, s, pc, con, expr. I2 ∧2[N2]w)
⇒ (∃ ws, inp, res, st, s, pc, con, expr. I1 ∧2[N1]v).
The transformation is verified by “slowing down” the input consumption of the spatial
component until the cycle where half2 executes, and output is computed and written
to when or executes. This is achieved by introducing history variables to P2 which
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buffer and reset the “actual” values, and the refinement mapping · · · is defined over
these. In the consume step, iwsadder and inpadder are updated when half2 successfully
executes. This mapping refers to both half1 and half2 (via the history variable). In
the compute step, resadder is updated when or executes. owsadder is updated in the
super-step where or actually asserts and writes to the output.
In addition to these local properties for the resulting spatial component, the refine-
ment mapping must reflect global properties and an “initialisation phase” for the first
few cycles. This phase allows the first values to go through all boxes, before values are
produced in every other cycle by the show box. Globally, in P1, after the initialisation
phase, all three boxes match the input and produce output in all cycles, such that
at cycle n gen produces output to adder; these values are input to adder at cycle
n + 1, where the results are outputted to show in the same cycle; which produces the
result in cycle n+ 2. In P2 on the other hand, these values are not consumed by show
before the (n + 4)th cycle. Moreover, gen is Blocked in every other cycle, while show
will Matchfail in every other cycle. These global properties are also captured by the
history variables and refinement mapping, and the example has been verified by TLC
under this refinement mapping.
Discussion
The example illustrates the difficulties with verifying Hume transformations. It shows
that (complex) global analysis is required for the verification, and this is particular hard
in Hume, since the coordination layer is flat, and thus does not contain any support
for structuring. Consequently, all boxes in a program must be analysed.
Part of the problem in the example was that input and output were consumed and
produced by different boxes in different cycles. In general, having distinct “first” and
“last” boxes for a spatial component, as illustrated in Figure 5.6 where D1 is the “first”
box and D4 is the “last box”, does not solve the problem. For example, if box E has
the body
box E ...
... | (x,y) -> g x y | (*,y) -> f y ;
then the source program may trigger the first match producing the g x y result. The
extra cycles of the resulting spatial D1 to D4 component, compared to input from box C,
may cause the first match to fail, and trigger the second match, thus E produces the f
y result. Thus, change of coordination behaviour may change the functional behaviour.
Thus, although functional properties are preserved by the transformed component, the
coordination properties may have changed the whole system radically.
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5.6 Summary & discussion
This chapter has discussed the verification of invariants and transformation of Hume
programs. Tactics have been developed to automate invariant proofs in Isabelle/Hume,
and verification by both model checking and theorem proving has been illustrated by
a set of case-studies. The model checking case study in Section 5.5.1 also illustrates
verification of action/computation and real-time properties.
TLA+, and thus TLA, have been previously used in larger examples [73] and indus-
try [24]. However, the work here is novel by in that it applies TLA to a programming
language. In the B-method, which is quite similar to TLA, but without the temporal
level, specifications are refined to such a low level, that at the end, a C or Ada pro-
gram can be synthesised. Similarly, in [181], temporal logic is applied to synthesise
embedded programs. In TLA, the only known similar work, is some minor unpub-
lished notes on translating TLA into Ada programs [113]. The property verification
by model checking, as discussed in case study H1 (Section 5.5) and published in [91],
is on the HW-Hume level, which attempts to model low-level hardware systems in the
high-level Hume notation. Similar properties for hardware systems have been verified
using dependent types [30].
The structure of Hume programs (boxes and wires), and shallow embedding, have
been explored by developing tactics to automate the verification, and by heavily using
built-in Isabelle tools. One example (the vending machine) illustrated the problem with
this rather uncontrolled rewriting, since it failed on a proof. This is discussed further in
Chapter 7. Moreover, the example illustrated the problem of specifying properties over
a cluster of boxes, where many interesting properties lie. This requires the introduction
of auxiliary variables, used to specify partial correctness properties. This is used in,
for example, Hoare logic. However, the sequential imperative programs, do not require
the “sequentiality proof”, where in the vending example, the tactics failed. Moreover,
such properties will not be preserved by a transformation, since the auxiliary variables
are not part of the specification.
The work with program transformation using TLA is believed to be novel. The
verification approach taken, bears similarities to the reduction theorem [120, page 41],
used to prove when a finer-grained program implements a coarser grained one. This
can be used to turn a critical section into an atomic step. Here, all variables are ∃
bound and a predicate 2R , which must be verified, links the “real variables” and
refinement mapping. This seems similar to the linking invariant used in the B method,
albeit establishing how similar, requires more work. Note, that refinement, and thus
Hume transformations, can be verified by model checking in B with the ProB [133]
tool. In a process algebra, the transformation can be verified as a bisimulation.
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In this chapter the problems with transformation and reasoning over many boxes
have been illustrated. This is mainly down to a lack of structuring in the coordination
layer. In the next chapter, an extension to Hume, Hierarchical Hume, is introduced
which solves these problems.
Chapter6
Hierarchical Hume1
“Nothing is particularly hard if you divide it into small jobs.”
– Henry Ford
6.1 Introduction
| |
Figure 6.1: Thesis roadmap: Chapter 6| |
The previous two chapters described formal verification of Hume programs using TLA,
and revealed difficulties for both the specification and verification of coordination layer
properties in the current form. This chapter proposes an extension to Hume, called
1Section 6.1.2 and Section 6.2 has been developed jointly with Robert Pointon. He has extended
the Hume interpreter with a prototype Hierarchical Hume implementation. This has enabled testing
of programs, and provided empirical evidence showing that this extension works.
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Hierarchical Hume, which solves these difficulties. This is achieved by allowing boxes to
be nested within other boxes, thus introducing box hierarchies. The semantics of Hier-
archical Hume is both formalised in TLA and mechanised in Isabelle/TLA. Moreover,
automation of invariant and transformation verification is discussed and implemented.
Figure 7.1 highlights which parts of the roadmap this chapter implements. Firstly, the
motivations and other outcomes are summarised.
6.1.1 Motivations
Most program transformations are a result of a failed costing, which is always in the
expression layer. The result is to move computation into the coordination layer. Since
the expression layer can only communicate over the coordination layer, such transfor-
mations always involve one box being transformed into one or more boxes and wires.
The previous chapter showed that the changes imposed on the coordination layer by
these transformations could change the overall program behaviour and require full
global analysis. The nesting of boxes enables such transformations without changing
the structure of the coordination layer.
Moreover, non-trivial coordination properties are often over a cluster of boxes and
wires, which together produce a computation, or a box that produces the result over
may cycles. For example, in the vending-machine example (Section 5.5.3), the result
of three boxes resulted in a computation, while the mult box (Section 4.2) produced
the result over several cycles. Asserting these properties requires feedback wires to
stop new computations starting and auxiliary TLA variables. From a logical viewpoint
auxiliary variables can be used for verification, but not specification since they are not
part of the model. Hierarchical Hume provides a natural way of specifying assertions
of a (nested) cluster of boxes.
Now, Hierarchical Hume enables local reasoning of both transformations and in-
variants. This becomes important in both model checking and theorem proving large
programs, since the search space can be reduced. Moreover, it enables better integra-
tion of these techniques, where a theorem proven is used for the overall proof, while
(nested) box lemmas can be solved by model checking. Liveness properties, partly
discussed in Chapter 10, may depend on the blocking status of the relevant box, which
may depend on the blocking status of other boxes and so on. Thus, in these cases local
reasoning becomes very important.
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6.1.2 Further motivations and positive outcomes
Hume supports structuring via the layered architecture, where the expression layer is
independent of all other boxes. However, only two layers (coordination and expression)
are allowed. Thus, a large program will consist of one very large low-level coordination
layer of (dependent) boxes, which is hard to work with and error-prone. Hierarchical
Hume allows logically connected boxes to be composed, thus supporting many layers,
and a better program structure.
The issue with unnecessary box matching, which was solved by self-out scheduling
in Section 4.2, can also be handled by the user by nesting boxes with coordination
iteration. This is a more general solution than self-out scheduling which gives the user
more control.
Hume offers standard library functions for the expression layer. In particular, the
Template-Hume level contains a set of pre-costed higher-order functions like map and
foldl. Hierarchical Hume enables a library of pre-costed (possibly nested) boxes. Such
a library will support a software product line [44], where pre-costed components can be
plugged together to form a program. This fits into the costing-by-construction principle
[175] introduced for Hume development.
By executing various parts of a program in parallel [60], the performance is often
increased, in particular now since most processors are multi-core. In Hume single boxes
can easily be parallelised. However, due to box dependency and strict scheduling, a
cluster of boxes cannot in general be independently scheduled, meaning parallelism
of clusters becomes hard. The nesting of boxes enables independent scheduling, thus
enabling direct parallelism of a cluster of boxes.
6.2 Overview of Hierarchical Hume
Let flat Hume be the Hume version used so far. A nesting box is a box that contains
other boxes, and it is the parent of the nested boxes, which are its children. Boxes
with the same parent are siblings, and a box can only be wired to its siblings, parent
and children. A non-nesting box is flat, and is identical to a box in flat Hume. A
nesting box is mainly a scheduling abstraction, which allows a subset of (child) boxes
to be scheduled independently. When ignoring types and children, a nesting box is in
the HW-Hume level, with some minor (non-computational) extensions. Hierarchical
Hume should support existing Hume tools, thus a nesting box is still an input-output
relation, without any dangling state between calls, and no side-effects. However, initial
wire values which are reset between each call, are allowed.
A nesting box is executed by passing the “scheduling token” to it. If the input
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pattern matches, the children are scheduled until termination, and the token returned.
Since the children may be nested, this scheduling is recursive. If the pattern matching
succeeds, the match’s input wires are copied to “internal input wires” and when it
terminates “internal output wires” are returned. These wires are those which are
wired between the parent and children. The programmer must define the start and
termination of a nesting box, and the match syntax is exploited, with the meaning
‘pattern -> termination condition’, where the pattern also defines which values that
are copied to the “internal input wires”. The termination condition refers to “internal
output wires”, and also defines which values are returned.
| |
box ::= box id ins outs match 〈 bmatch1 | · · · | bmatchn 〉 n ≥ 1
| box id ins outs match hmatch boxes program end
hmatch ::= 〈 bpat1 , . . . , bpatn 〉 -> hexpr n ≥ 1
hexpr ::= int | bool | word | con | * | | ( 〈 hexpr1 , . . . , hexprn 〉 ) n ≥ 1
Figure 6.2: Hierarchical Hume abstract syntax extension| |
Figure 6.2 extends the TLA-Hume abstract syntax from Figure 2.8 (page 35) with
nesting boxes. Now, a pattern for a nested box is the same as a pattern for a flat box.
An expression in a nested box is either a constant, ‘*’, ‘ ’, or a tuple of expressions.
Here, as in a pattern, ‘ ’ denotes the existence of a value. In the body (program) of a
nesting box, boxes, wires and functions can be declared. Here, all input wires to the
parent box, must be wired to one or more of the children, while all output wires of a
nesting box must be wired from one or more of the children.
A nesting box behaves like a scheduler for its children. This hierarchical scheduling
is achieved by nesting the lock-step scheduling from Section 4.2, with an additional
check for termination. This requires changes in the possible states a box may be in
after each phase, resulting in six possible states:
• Runnable: the box has asserted output and is ready to consume input;
• Blocked : the box has successfully consumed inputs but failed to assert outputs.
It will attempt to assert outputs on subsequent cycles;
• Matchfail : the box has failed to match inputs;
• Terminated : the box has finished executing and is ready to super-step;
• Execute: the box is ready to execute its children;
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• Super : the box is ready to super-step its children.
The Blocked and Matchfail states are unchanged from Section 4.2, while the remaining
steps deviate from Section 4.2 as follows: the lock-step Runnable state is split into
Runnable and Terminated ; while the new Execute and Super states are used to schedule
sub-components. The hierarchical scheduling is then recursively given as follows:
schedule (boxes, condition, result) ,
until condition(boxes)
for each Runnable or Matchfail box in boxes
if box is nesting
then schedule
(
children(box), termination condition(box)
)
else execute(box)
super step (each Terminated or Blocked box in boxes)
copy
(
output wires(boxes), result
)
This schedule operation receives a set boxes and a predicate condition on the boxes
set. This predicate represents the termination condition. The assumed termina-
tion condition function on a box returns this predicate. As long as condition(boxes)
evaluates to False, all the boxes are scheduled. When it evaluates to True, the internal
output wires, returned by the output wires function over a box set, are then copied to
the given result buffer. The first-level scheduler never terminates, and is thus defined
as
schedule
(
all top-level boxes, (λb. False)
)
Above, the children function returns the set of children boxes for a given nesting box,
while execute behaves the same as in Section 4.2.
Figure 6.3 illustrates the source code and box diagram of a nesting box mult. It
accepts two inputs, which are multiplied by iteration using the nested itermult box.
The result is produced in one box mult step, and the boxes are in the FSM-Hume level.
The wiring between the mult (parent) and the itermult (child) boxes is defined in the
wire declaration of itermult.
6.3 Hierarchical Hume formalised in TLA
The body of a nesting box, which is the internal wires and boxes, can either be part
of the specification, or internal to the specification. The first case represents a “black-
box” embedding, whilst the latter enables reasoning about “nested properties”, that
is, properties of nested boxes and wires. Logically, the first approach is separated from
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type Nat = word 64;
box mult
in (a,b::Nat)
out(o::Nat)
match
(_,_) -> (_)
boxes
box itermult
in (a,b,iter::(Nat,Nat,Nat))
out (o,iter’::(Nat,Nat,Nat))
match
(a,b, * )->(*,( 0 ,a, b ))
| (*,*,(r,x,0))->(r, * )
| (*,*,(r,x,y))->(*,(r+x,x,y-1));
wire itermult (mult.a,mult.b,itermult.iter’) (mult.o,itermult.iter);
end;
Figure 6.3: Hierarchical Hume example| |
the latter by ∃-binding the internal wires and box components. Since reasoning about
nesting boxes is a desired feature, the box body is seen as part of the specification, hence
the nested boxes and wires are free. Now, let the total function children ∈ BS → 2BS
return a set containing the immediate children identifiers of the given box. That does
not include potential nested children. Note that BS contains all the box identifiers,
including nested boxes. From the children function, the following functions are derived:
first level(i) , ∀j ∈ BS. i /∈ children(j) flat(i) , children(i) = {}
BS1 , {b ∈ BS. first level(b)} nested(i) , ¬flat(i).
first level is a predicate holding if the box is a first-level (non-nested) box, and BS 1 ⊆
BS is the set of all first-level boxes. A box is flat if it does not have any children,
and nested if it has children. The syntax ensure that a nesting box must have at least
one child. Let s remain the first level scheduler. From this the following functions are
derived:
parent(i) ,  j ∈ BS. i ∈ children(j)
siblings(i) , if first level(i) then BS1 else children
(
parent(i)
)
boxsch(i) , if first level(i) then s else stparent(i)
parent is a partial function which returns the parent of the given box; siblings returns
the set of boxes with the same parent; while boxsch returns the scheduling value of
a given box, which is either the state variable of the parent or s. The (immediate)
internal wires Iwsi of a nesting box are divided into three disjointed tuples: Iiwsi is
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the internal input wires; Iowsi is the internal output wires; and IIwsi is the remaining
internal wires. Iiwsi and Iowsi are assumed to have the same order as the corresponding
input buffer inpi and result buffer resi. Iwsi is defined as Iwsi , Iiwsi · Iowsi · IIwsi,
while flat(i)⇒ Iwsi = 〈〉.
A nested box terminates when the termination condition is met, that is when the
following predicate holds for the box expression e and internal output wires ows :
wire terminated(ow, e) ,
(e = *) ∨ (e = ∧ ow 6= ⊥) ∨ (e ∈ {int,bool,word,con} ∧ e = ow)
box terminated(ows, e) ,
ows = 〈〉 ∨
(
wire terminated
(
hd(ows), hd(e)
) ∧ box terminated(tl(ows), tl(e)))
Note that * is used in the expression of the nesting box to describe a wire in which
wire terminated will always succeed, while ⊥ is an empty value still. A box is termi-
nated T , when the state st has the value:
T (st) , st ∈ {Terminated,Matchfail,Blocked}
To enable transformation proofs, the more concrete two step sequential box execution
described in Section 5.4, is formalised. Moreover, due to the nesting of boxes, the
scheduler is also nested. This requires a redefinition of first box, last box and next box
to a given set of boxes bs ⊆ BS, instead of all the boxes BS :
first box(bs) ,  pc ∈ bs. ∀p ∈ bs. pc 6= p⇒ pc ≺ p
last box(bs) ,  pc ∈ bs. ∀p ∈ bs. pc 6= p⇒ p ≺ pc
next box(pc,bs) , if pc = last box(bs)
then pc
else  p ∈ bs − {pc}. ∀q ∈ bs − {pc, p}. pc ≺ p ∧ p ≺ q
Since the scheduler is nested it is not only defined for s, but accepts the current
scheduler as input. Hence, it is a function S and not an action S, and is defined as:
S(sch, pc, terminated, bs) ,
case sch = Execute ∧ (pc = last box(bs) ∧ terminated) → Super
2 sch = Super ∧ terminated → Terminated
2 else → Execute.
It accepts: the (old) scheduling value sch; the (current) program counter pc; a boolean
terminated which hold if the (parent/scheduler) box is terminated in the Super step
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and the current (pc) box is terminated in the Execute step. The extra possible box
states absorb the need for the con variable used in Section 5.4. Finally, bs is the set
of boxes (children) that are scheduled. In the Execute phase the scheduler changes
to Super when the last box has terminated, while in the Super phase it changes to
Terminated if the box (scheduler/parent) has terminated. In all other cases Execute
is returned: hexecuteconf and hexecute
con
n update execute
con for a flat and nested box,
respectively:
hexecuteconf (rs,iws,e) ,
 〈w,inp,ne,st〉. ( ∃ ost. 〈w,inp,ne, ost〉 = executecon(rs, iws, exp(hd(rs)))
∧ st = (if ost = Runnable then Execute else ost) )
hexecuteconn (rs,iws) ,
 〈w,inp,inp,st〉. (∃ e1, e2. 〈w,inp,st,e2〉 = hexecuteconf (rs,iws,e1))
hexecuteconf replaces the Runnable state with Execute, required to avoid using the con
variable; hexecuteconn ignores the expression since a nested box can only have one.
Moreover, two copies of the input values are returned: one for the input buffer inpi;
and one for the internal input wires Iiwsi for i ∈ BS and nested(i).
Based on these functions, all the actions formalising Hierarchical Hume can be
defined. Firstly, the action Ui leaves all the box variables, included nested (at all
depths) components, unchanged:
Ui , (boxsch(i) = Execute⇒ iws′i = iwsi) ∧ (boxsch(i) = Super⇒ ows′i = owsi)
∧ 〈sti, inpi, resi〉′ = 〈sti, inpi, resi〉
∧ (nested(i)⇒ (∧j∈children(i) Uj) ∧ 〈pci, Iwsi〉′ = 〈pci, Iwsi〉)
hBsi extends the super-step box action Bs2i with explicitly unchanging nested compo-
nents: hBsi :
hBsi , Bs2i ∧
(
nested(i)⇒ 〈pci, Iwsi〉′ = 〈pci, Iwsi〉 ∧
∧
j∈children(i) Uj
)
.
Due to the nesting, each nesting box needs its own program counter. Thus, pc is now
a tuple holding all the program counters in an order based on ≺ of the box identifiers.
However, pc1 is assumed to be the first-level scheduler, that is pc in the formalisation of
flat Hume. hBefi is the box execute action for a flat box. The extra potential box states
remove the need for con to separate the consume and compute step. Moreover, with
respect to Be2i , the call to executecon is now replaced with executeconf , and the “guards”
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are over all the possible state variables:
hBefi , sti = Runnable ⇒ 〈iwsi, inpi, expr, sti〉′ = executeconf (rsi, iwsi, expr)
∧ res′i = resi
∧ sti = Execute ⇒ 〈expr, iwsi, inpi, resi〉′ = 〈expr, iwsi, inpi, hrun(expr, inpi)〉
∧ st′i = Terminated
∧ T (sti) ⇒ 〈expr, iwsi, inpi, resi, sti〉′ = 〈expr, iwsi, inpi, resi, sti〉.
Note that sti cannot be Super for a flat box i ∈ BS, i.e. 2
(
flat(i) ⇒ sti 6= Super
)
. A
proof of this is given in Appendix B.2.
| |
hBeni , sti = Runnable ⇒ 〈iwsi, inpi, Iiws, sti〉′ = hexecuteconn (rsi, iwsi)
∧ res′i = resi ∧ expr′ = expr
∧ 〈IIwsi, Iowsi〉′ = 〈IIIwsi , IIowsi〉
∧ pc′i = first box
(
children(i)
) ∧ ∧j∈children(i)Rj
∧ sti = Execute ⇒ hBepci ∧
∧
j∈children(i)−pci Uj∧ pc′i = if T (st′pci) then next box
(
pci, children(i)
)
else pci
∧ st′i = S
(
sti, pc
′
i, T (st
′
pci
), children(i))
)
∧ 〈iwsi, inpi, resi, Iowsi〉′ = 〈iwsi, inpi, resi, Iowsi〉
∧ sti = Super ⇒
(∧
j∈children(i) hBsj
) ∧ pc′i = first box(children(i))
∧ st′i = S
(
sti, pc
′
i, box terminated(Iows
′
i, exp(hd(rsi))),
children(i)
) ∧ expr′ = expr
∧ res′i = if st′i = Terminated then Iows′i else resi
∧ 〈iwsi, inpi, Iiwsi〉′ = 〈iwsi, inpi, Iiwsi〉
∧ T (sti) ⇒ Ui ∧ expr′ = expr
Figure 6.4: hBeni : TLA action for execute phase of nested Hume box| |
The box action hBeni for the execute phase of a nested box is shown in Figure 6.4.
It is defined by case-analysis on the box state sti.
In the Runnable state, the box attempts to match and consume inputs using
hexecuteconn . Moreover, the internal non-input wires are set to the initial values, given
by IIIwsi and IIowsi , and the program counter is set to the first box. All the children
are reset to start executing, achieved by the Ri action:
Ri , 〈sti, inpi, resi〉′ =
〈
Runnable, 〈⊥, · · · ,⊥〉, 〈⊥, · · · ,⊥〉〉
∧ (nested(i)⇒ Iws′i = Iwsi ∧
∧
j∈children(i) Uj);
In the Execute state, the current box pci , is executed using hBepci , which abstract
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over whether or not pci is nested:
hBei , (nested(i)⇒ hBeni ) ∧ (flat(i)⇒ hBefi ).
Due to the two-step execution and the fact that the box’s children may be nested, pci
is only updated when the current box terminates, i.e. T (st′pci) holds. Moreover, S is
used to obtain the new value of st i, with the obvious inputs.
In the Super state, all children boxes are executed, and pci is reset back to the
first box. S is used to check for termination, and if box i has terminated, the result
buffer is updated. Note that in the Super and Execute states, box i behaves as the
environment in flat Hume: the input and output wires are unchanged, since none of
the child boxes “own”” them. Finally, if the box is terminated, or either Blocked or
Matchfail , all variables “belonging to” box i are unchanged.
The first-level next state action is a simpler version of hBeni :
hN , (s = Super ⇒ (∧i∈BS1 hBsi ) ∧ pc′1 = first box(BS1 ∪ {env})
∧ s′ = S(s, pc1,False,BS1 ∪ {env}) ∧ expr′ = expr
)
∧ (s = Execute ⇒ (pc1 ∈ BS1 ⇒ hBepc1) ∧∧i∈(BS1−{pc1}) Ui
∧ pc′1 = if pc1 = env ∨ T(st′pc1)
then next box(pc1,BS1 ∪ {env}) else pc1
∧ s′ = S(s, pc′1, pc′1 = env ∨ T(st′pc),BS1 ∪ {env})
)
.
Initially, an Hierarchical Hume program has the following state:
hI , ws = wI ∧ s = Execute ∧ pc1 = first box(BS1 ∪ {env})
∧ ∧i∈BS (sti = Runnable ∧ 〈inpi, resi〉 = 〈〈⊥, · · · ,⊥〉, 〈⊥, · · · ,⊥〉〉)
∧ ∧i∈BS (nested(i)⇒ pci = first box(children(i))) ∧ expr = 〈⊥, · · · ,⊥〉
Note that ws includes the nested wires. hN subsumes both the next box action and
first-level scheduler. Finally, hE updates E by using pc1 instead of pc:
hE , (s = Execute ∧ pc1 = env ⇒ ∀w ∈ oout ws : w′ = w ∨ w′ = ⊥)
∧ (s = Execute ∧ pc1 6= env ⇒ ∀w ∈ ows : w′ = w)
∧ (s = Super ⇒ ∀w ∈ in ws : ∃v ∈ T ∪ {⊥} : w′ = v)
The full program Hhi is thus defined as follows:
Hrhi , hI ∧2[hN ∧ hE ]〈s,ws,inp,res,st,pc,expr〉
Hhi , ∃ st,s,pc,expr. Hrhi
(6.1)
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| |
Figure 6.5: Theory structure of Hierarchical Hume embedding Isabelle/TLA| |
From the syntax definition in Figure 6.2 it is clear that syntactically, the Hierarchical
Hume extension is conservative. However, it is also important to show that this is also
the case semantically. Thus, it must be verified that the behaviour of the two-phase
box execution of flat Hume from Section 5.4 is preserved. However, flat Hume does not
support box nesting, reducing the property to ‘if no boxes are nested, then hierarchical
scheduling preserves the behaviour of lock-step scheduling’. The property is formalised
in Theorem 6.1, and requires Lemma 6.1.
Lemma 6.1. If
∧
i∈BS flat(i) and BS1 = BS then
1. first box(BS1 ∪ {env}) = first box;
2. last box(BS1 ∪ {env}) = last box;
3. next box(pc,BS1 ∪ {env}) = next box(pc);
4. hBei ≡ hBefi .
Proof outline. The proof follows directly from unfolding the assumptions. ∴
Theorem 6.1. If
∧
i∈BS flat(i) then Hhi implies Hseq2.
Proof outline. The proof relies on the invariants 2(s ∈ {Execute, Super}), 2(∀i ∈
BS. sti 6= Super), 2(s = Execute ⇒ ∀p ∈ BS1. pc1  p ⇒ stp ∈ {Runnable,Blocked,
Execute}) and 2(s = Execute ⇒ ∀p ∈ BS1. pc1 ≺ p ⇒ stp ∈ {Runnable,Blocked}). It
uses the refinement mappings sti , if sti ∈ {Terminated,Execute} then Runnable else sti
and con , pc1 = env ∨ stpc1 6= Execute. The proof uses the (E2), (E1), (TLA2) and
(STL4) and follows mainly by case-analysis. ∴
The full proofs of the theorem and required invariants are given in Appendix B.2.
6.4 Hierarchical Hume in Isabelle/TLA
The mechanisation of Hierarchical Hume (Isabelle/HHume) in Isabelle/TLA is based
on the Hume mechanisation from Section 4.5. It is shallow, and pc is updated inside
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the boxes. This enables use of both one- and two-step box execution for flat boxes. To
enable more direct reuse of Section 4.5, all boxes that are not transformed are given a
one-step box execution. The theory structure is shown in Figure 6.5: HHume mecha-
nises commonalities of Hierarchical Hume, and re-uses the HumeSemantics theory. All
embedded Hierarchical Hume programs use the HHume theory.
6.4.1 The HHume theory
Since the possible box states are not separated from the possible scheduling states in
Hierarchical Hume, both these states are represented by the same enumeration type
datatype box state = Runnable | Blocked | Matchfail
| Execute | Super | Terminated .
types boxstate = box state statefun
S mechanises the scheduling function S as formalised in Section 6.3:
S :: box state ⇒ bool ⇒ bool ⇒ bool ⇒ BoxState
S Execute True True = Super
S Super True = Terminated
S = Execute .
Due to the shallow embedding, pc depends on the program, and the box identifier sets
are not applied directly. Instead, the second argument of S (pc in S) is a predicate that
must hold if pc is the last box. Further, in S, terminated has two different meanings
depending on the current value of the scheduler. This is split here, thus introducing
an additional argument. This enables a first-level scheduler S1:
S1 :: box state ⇒ bool ⇒ bool ⇒ box state
S1 sch pc t = S sch pc t False .
The following scheduling lemmas are required in the reasoning:
lemma sch1: S b pc t psch ∈ {Super,Execute,Terminated}
lemma sch2: S Execute pc t psch ∈ {Super,Execute}
lemma sch3: S Super pc t psch ∈ {Terminated,Execute}
lemma sch4: (S b pc t psch = Super) ∨ (S b pc t psch = Terminated) .
lemma S1sch1: S1 s pc t ∈ {Super,Execute}
Proof outline. sch1 by induction on b followed by case-analysis. The other lemmas
by case-analysis. ∴
The first-level scheduler s is of type boxstate:
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s :: boxstate .
Finally, the termination condition function is also defined by pattern matching:
termcond :: box state ⇒ bool
termcond Terminated = True
termcond Matchfail = True
termcond Blocked = True
termcond = False ,
and it can also be represented as a set:
lemma termcond1: termcond x = (x ∈ {Terminated,Blocked,Matchfail})
Proof outline. By induction on x. ∴
6.4.2 An example embedding
The mechanisation is illustrated by the program shown in Figure 6.3. It is assumed
that the input and output wires of mult are connected to streams, while itermult is
represented as a flat box, which is already explained in Section 4.5 and not given here.
Firstly, the PC type and pc variable are defined:
datatype PC = pinc | penv
pc :: PC statefun .
S’ specialises the first-level scheduler for this particular program:
S’ ≡ s$ = S1<$s, $pc 6= #penv,#True>.
Note that the last argument is True since the environment is the last box which termi-
nates in one step. The program contains three first level wires, and one first level box
mult:
w1, w2, w3 :: nat HVal
mult inp :: ((nat option)×(nat option)) statefun
mult res :: nat HVal
mult st :: boxstate.
Internally the mult box contains four wires:
iw1, iw2, iw4 :: nat HVal
iw3 :: (nat × nat × nat) HVal,
where iw1 and iw2 are the internal input wires, iw3 the feedback loop of the itermult
box, and iw4 the internal output wire. Moreover, a program counter type EPC and
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nested program counter epc (pcmult) are defined. Since there is only one nested box
this is strictly not required, however it is required in general when more than one box
is nested, and is thus included here:
datatype EPC = epitermult
epc :: EPC statefun .
Let itermult be the box action for the itermult box, consisting of the itermult exe and
itermult sup actions. Since itermult is nested by mult, the state of mult behaves as
the scheduler for itermult:
itermult ≡ ($mult st = #Execute −→ itermult exe)
∧ ($mult st = #Super −→ itermult sup).
itermult, and it’s actions uses the internal wires and epc. The following actions are
required to model the behaviour of the mult box:
mult init, mult exe exe, mult exe sup, mult exe, mult sup, mult :: temporal.
mult init is the consume phase of the box execution, while mult exe exe and mult exe sup
represents the compute phase where the child itermult box is scheduled. These actions
together create the execute phase action mult exe of the mult box:
mult exe ≡ mult init ∨ mult exe exe ∨ mult exe sup .
The definitions of these three actions are shown in Figure 6.6, and they are mutually
exclusive. mult init pattern matches the input which succeeds if w1 and w2 are not
empty (mCon succeeds). The internal input wires (iw1 and iw2) and input buffer
(mult inp) are given these values. The remaining mult components, and the scheduling
is initialised (mult st is set to Execute). Note that pc is unchanged, i.e. the box is not
terminated. If the pattern matching fails, the next box (environment) executes.
mult exe exe and mult exe sup behaves as a scheduler for the itermult box in ex-
ecute and super-step phase, respectively. mult exe exe is the execute-phase and is
straightforward. The termination conditions for mult is , i.e. when the internal out-
put wire iw4 is not empty. In that case, the value of iw4 is copied to the result buffer
of mult (mult res) by mult exe sup, and the box terminates.
The super-step action for mult, mult sup, is almost the same as for a flat box,
although all the internal variables must be explicitly set to be unchanged:
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mult init ≡
$mult st = #Runnable
∧ (if mCon<$w1> ∧ mCon<$w2>
then (w1,w2,pc,epc)$ = (#None,#None,$pc,#epbmult)
∧ (mult inp,mult res)$ = (($w1,$w2),#None)
∧ (iw1,iw2,iw3,iw4)$ = ($w1,$w2#None,#None)
∧ (mult st,itermult res,itermult st)$ = #(Execute,(None,None),Runnable)
else (mult st,mult res,mult inp)$ = #(Matchfail,None,(None,None))
∧ (pc,iw1,iw2,iw3,iw4)$ = #(penv,None,None,None,None)
∧ (itermult res,itermult st,epc)$ = #((None,None),Runnable),epbmult)
mult exe exe ≡
$mult st = #Execute ∧ itermult
∧ Unchanged (pc,w1,w2,iw4,mult res,mult inp)
∧ mult st$ = S<$mult st,$epc=#epbmult,termcond<bmult st$>,isVal<iw4$>>
mult exe sup ≡
$mult st = #Super ∧ itermult ∧ epc$ = #epbmult
∧ Unchanged (w1,w2,iw1,iw2,mult inp)
∧ mult st$ = S<$mult st,$epc=#epbmult,termcond<itermult st$>,isVal<iw4$>>
∧ (if isVal<iw4$>
then mult res$ = iw4$ ∧ pc$ = #penv
else Unchanged (pc,mult res))
Figure 6.6: Definition of mult init, mult exe exe and mult exe sup TLA actions| |
mult sup ≡
(iw1,iw2,iw3,iw4)$ = #(None,None,None,None)
(itermult res,itermult st)$ = #((None,None),Runnable)
∧ (if assertOut<$mult res,$w1>
then w3$ = nwire<$mult res,$w3>
∧ (mult st,mult res,mult inp)$ = #(Runnable,None,(None,None))
else Unchanged (w3,mult res,mult inp) ∧ mult st$ = #Blocked)
The mult action, defined as
mult ≡
($s = #Execute −→
(if $pc = #pmult
then (if $mult st ∈ #{Blocked,Matchfail,Terminated}
then Unchanged (mult res,mult inp,mult st,w1,w2,iw1,iw2,iw3,iw4)
∧ Unchanged(itermult res,itermult st,epc) ∧ pc$ = #penv
else mult exe)
else Unchanged (mult res,mult inp,mult st,w1,w2,iw1,iw2,iw3,iw4)
∧ Unchanged(itermult res,itermult st,epc)))
∧ ($s = #Super −→ mult sup),
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init :: temporal
init ≡ $(s,pc,w1,w2,w3) = #(Execute,pmult,None,None,None)
∧ $(mult res,mult inp,mult st) = #( mnnm None,(None,None),Runnable)
∧ $(iw1,iw2,iw3,iw4) = #(None,None,None,None)
∧ $(itermult res,itermult st,epc) = #((None,None),Runnable,epbmult)
program :: temporal
program ≡ init
∧ 2[S’ ∧ env ∧ mult] (s,pc,w1,w2,w3,mult res,mult inp,mult st,
iw1,iw2,iw3,iw4,itermult res,itermult st,epc)
Figure 6.7: TLA definition of the initial state init, and the full program program| |
first performs a case-split on the scheduler s. In the execute phase this is followed by
a test if it is the box’s turn to execute, that is if pc is pmult. If this is not the case, the
box cannot be executed, and all box components (including the input wires) are left
unchanged. If it holds, then the box state (mult st) is used to check if the box can be
executed, and if it holds mult exe is executed. If it fails, all components are unchanged.
Note that the pc check has to be separated from the mult st check since in the latter
case pc is updated as well. The initial state and full program are shown in Figure 6.7,
and have obvious definitions following Section 6.3.
6.5 Verifying Hierarchical Hume invariants
In Hierarchical Hume, the type of the scheduler s is the same as a box state, thus
requiring the proof of
2(s ∈ {Execute, Super}). (6.2)
This is proved in Appendix B.2, for the formal embedding. However, due the shallow
mechanisation, the meta-theorem cannot be proved in Isabelle/HHume. Hence, it
must be proved for each Isabelle/HHume program. To enable reuse of the tactics
developed in Section 4.5, flat boxes are represented by a one-step execution phase,
where flat(i) ∧ i ∈ BS1 implies 2(sti /∈ {Execute, Super}). Thus, the proofs of flat
boxes are similar to those in Section 4.5. Henceforth, the focus is on invariants inside
a nesting box, i.e. nested invariant, and partial correctness of nesting boxes. These are
discussed separately below. Note that it assumed that all nested boxes are flat (depth
2 hierarchies).
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6.5.1 Nested invariant
| |
a) overall step case structure
b) w is in IiwsB c) w is in IIwsB or P
(
p(resi)
)
d) w is in IowsB
Figure 6.8: Proof plan of nested invariants| |
Let w be a second level (nested) wire, nested by the first level box B ∈ BS1. Moreover,
let P be the predicate to prove, box i ∈ children(B) be the box that writes to w, and
p be the projection of the element of resi that writes to w. Thus,
2
(
w 6= ⊥ ⇒ P (w)) and 2(p(resi) 6= ⊥ ⇒ P(p(resi)))
formalises the two possible properties addressed. The overall proof plan for these
invariants is shown in Figure 6.9, with the premise strengthened by (6.2). Thus, only
the step case differs from the proof structures previously discussed. Figure 6.8.a shows
the generic structure, where empty boxes are considered trivial since w and resi are
not manipulated. The pc1 = B case results in a case split on stB, and there are three
different cases depending on the location of w: Figure 6.8.b shows the case when w is
an internal input wire, where the Runnable and Execute cases are handled similarly
to the execute phase of a flat box; Figure 6.8.c shows the case when w is not directly
connected to B, where it is verified as a normal flat Hume box; Figure 6.8.d shows the
case when w is an internal output wire, where it is verified as the super-step phase of a
flat Hume box. If the invariant is over the result buffer, that is of the form P
(
p(resi)
)
,
then it is verified as a flat Hume invariant (as shown in Figure 6.8.c).
Hierarchical Hume enables specification of properties with respect to the input
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| |
Figure 6.9: Overall proof plan of an invariant (duplicate of Figure 5.3)| |
buffer. These properties are of the form
2(w 6= ⊥ ∧ q(inpB) 6= ⊥ ⇒ Q(w, q(inpB)))
where q is a projection of one or more values of the input buffer of the parent box
B2. In all the examples of this thesis, * has not been used in the pattern of a nesting
box. In these cases it can be proved that 2(w 6= ⊥ ⇒ q(inpi) 6= ⊥), which reduces the
property to:
2(w 6= ⊥ ⇒ Q(w, q(inpi))).
The embedding of Hierarchical Hume implies that in all the states above, except stB =
Runnable, inpB is left unchanged. When stB = Runnable, the input wires are copied
to inpB. These properties are verified as above, albeit with additional strengthening.
This strengthening is required since the input buffer is not used by the internal wires:
the same values are duplicated by the internal input wires. However, these may be
consumed, thus cannot be used to specify properties as discussed in Chapter 5.
The required properties are invariants on wires from the internal input wires until
w is “reached”. These properties must be found in a similar way to Dijkstra’s weakest
precondition predicate transformer wp [56] in Hoare logic [70, 95]: the weakest invari-
ants on the iwsi wires (input wires of box i that writes to w) to prove Q(w, q(inpi)) is
2If q projects more than a single value, q(inpB) 6= ⊥ must be written as a tuple, that is of the
form q(inpB) 6= 〈⊥, · · · ,⊥〉. However, for simplicity, this is ignored.
Chapter 6. Hierarchical Hume 130
first verified. Then the weakest invariants required to prove these invariants are found,
and this process continues until the internal input wires IiwsB are reached. Lamport
has generalised the weakest precondition predicate transformer wp to a weakest invari-
ant predicate transformer win [119] for concurrent systems. win is closely related to
the approach taken here, and this connection is elaborated upon in Section 10.3. Note,
that this “weakest invariant approach” is manually applied.
6.5.2 Partial correctness of nesting boxes
Partial correctness properties for a box B ∈ BS1 and nested(B), is formalised as:
2
(
p1(inpB) 6= ⊥ ∧ p2(resB) 6= ⊥ ⇒ P (p1(inpB))⇒ Q
(
p1(inpB), p2(resB)
))
,
where p1 and p2 are projection functions which may be the identity function, P is the
pre-condition, and Q is the post-condition. As above, if * is not used in the pattern of
B, this can be strengthen to
2
(
p2(resB) 6= ⊥ ⇒ P
(
p1(inpB)
)⇒ Q(p1(inpB), p2(resB))).
By the definition of Hierarchical Hume, on termination of B, IowsB is copied to resB.
Since (the liveness property) termination is ignored, i.e. partial and not total correct-
ness is verified, the proof of partial correctness is reduced to:
2
(
p2(IowsB) 6= ⊥ ⇒ P
(
p1(inpB)
)⇒ Q(p1(inpB), p2(IowsB))),
which is the same type of property as discussed above, and is thus verified using
the “weakest invariant approach”. Note that resB and thus IowsB can be tuples of
elements/wires, and only single-wire properties have been discussed. For all examples,
this has not been a problem, and Q can be split into a conjunction Q1∧· · ·∧Qn where
all conjuncts are predicates over a single wire (and p1(inpB)).
6.6 Verifying Hierarchical Hume transformations
Figure 6.10 illustrates the flat- to nested-box transformations. Note that the same input
(inpA) and result (resA) buffers are updated by both the source box A and the result box
B. Figure 6.11 shows that the program structure is unchanged by the transformation,
and A and B are similarly wired.
As defined in Section 5.4, Trans(prog1, prog2) expresses a correct transformation.
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| |
Figure 6.10: Flat to nested box transformation overview| |
| |
Figure 6.11: Illustration of box to box transformation of a program| |
Unfolding Trans, prog1 and prog2, and applying (E2), reduces the conjecture to
(I2 ∧2[N2]w)⇒ (∃ st, s, pc, con, expr. I1 ∧2[N1]v). (6.3)
The key to the proof is the following partial correctness property:
` prog2 ⇒ 2
(
resA 6= ⊥ ⇒ resA = ea(inpA)
)
. (6.4)
Further, let
N2′ , N2 ∧
(
resA 6= ⊥ ⇒ resA = ea(inpA)
)∧ (res′A 6= ⊥ ⇒ res′A = ea(inp′A)). (6.5)
By applying the invariant strengthening discussed in Chapter 5 and (6.4), it can be
shown that 2[N2′ ]w ≡ 2[N2]w. To prove (6.3), the refinement mapping (witnesses) for
all the ∃-bound variables must first be found. These witnesses can be defined using
prog2’s variables, and, with the exception of stA, all the mappings are the corresponding
variables of prog2. Now stB (prog2), alternates between Super and Execute in the
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| |
Figure 6.12: Transformation proof plan of next state action| |
compute phase of the box execution, while in prog1, this phase is a single step where
stA is always Execute. Thus, the refinement mapping is defined as
F , [(if stB = Super then Execute else stB)/stA]F. (6.6)
F distributes over all connectives, thus using 2[N2′ ]w ≡ 2[N2]w, (6.3) reduces to
I2 ∧2[N2′ ]w ⇒ I1 ∧2[N1]v
Following the derivation shown in Section 5.4, the proof reduces to the following three
subgoals: (G1): I2 ⇒ I1; (G2): w′ = w ⇒ v′ = v; and (G3): N2′ ⇒ [N1]v. Now,
since initially stB = Runnable and all buffers are empty, while w contains v, and thus
contains v, (G1) and (G2) are trivial to show. Thus, only case (G3) is interesting and
discussed further. By the definition of [· · · ]···, in the proof of (G3) it must be shown
that N2′ either implies N1 or it implies v′ = v. Informally, there are 4 cases: (1) in
the consume step the pattern matching and input copying must be the same; in the
compute step there are two cases: (2) when the box terminates it must behave like N1,
i.e. the same values must be copied to the output buffer; (3) when the box does not
terminate, this must be a stuttering step of prog1, i.e. v′ = v; and (4) the super-step
must be the same. Figure 6.12 shows the formal proof structure of (G3). It starts
by a case-analysis on s, followed by case-analysis on pc1, stB and st
′
B in the relevant
branches. This results in seven cases (c1) to (c7):
(c1) : s = Super ∧N2 ⇒ N1.
This should be trivial to prove since it should be unchanged between A and B.
(c2) : s = Execute ∧ pc1 6= B ∧N2 ⇒ N1.
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Firstly, remember that A is the identifier of the source box, and B is the identifier
of the target box. It is assumed that A = B with respect to ≺. That is (A ≺
C) ≡ (B ≺ C) and (C ≺ A) ≡ (C ≺ B) for all C. The case where pc1 6= B is
trivial since only A is transformed and all other boxes are left unchanged. Note
that this case involves all boxes i ∈ BS1 − {B}.
(c3) : s = Execute ∧ pc1 = B ∧ stB ∈ {Matchfail,Blocked,Terminated} ∧ N2′ ⇒ N1.
The case where pc1 = B, results in a case-analysis on the box state stB. This
case is the trivial case where the box is not executed.
(c4) : s = Execute ∧ pc1 = B ∧ stB = Runnable ∧N2′ ⇒ N1.
The consume step of A and B must be the same. The main part of this case is to
show that pm(pb, iwsB) = pm(pa, iwsB) and pattcopy(pb, iwsB) = pattcopy(pa, iwsB).
(c5) : s = Execute ∧ pc1 = B ∧ stB = Execute ∧N2′ ⇒ v′ = v.
When stB = Execute then N1 will execute, while N2 will schedule the children
boxes. However, with the exception of stB, none of the variables in v are updated,
and based on the definitions of Hierarchical Hume, st′B = Execute or st
′
B = Super.
Thus, from the refinement mapping (6.6), this can be seen as a stuttering step
in prog1, since v is unchanged.
(c6) : s = Execute ∧ pc1 = B ∧ stB = Super ∧ st′B 6= Terminated ∧N2′ ⇒ v′ = v.
When stB = Super, B either terminates or continues scheduling the children. This
requires a case-split on the termination condition: st′B = Terminated. The latter
case, where st′B 6= Terminated is thus a stuttering step of prog1. stB is set to
Execute, and the remaining variables in v are unchanged, thus (6.6) implies that
v is unchanged.
(c7) : s = Execute ∧ pc1 = B ∧ stB = Super ∧ st′B 6= Terminated ∧N2′ ⇒ N1.
The step where B terminates simulates the execute step of N1. The key of the
proof is to show that the result buffer is updated with the same value, and the
box state is the same. The latter trivially follows from the Hierarchical Hume
definition and (6.6). The key here is to show that res′A = ea(inpA). (6.5) implies
that res′A = ea(inp
′
A) and the definition of Hierarchical Hume implies inp
′
A = inpA.
6.7 Isabelle/HHume tactics
The following tactics implement the reasoning discussed above. All the tactics de-
scribed in Chapter 5 are still used.
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first level sch tac rews automatically solves the 2(s ∈ {Execute, Super}) invariant.
rews must contain the program and scheduler definition, and the initial state.
For example, in the program above, rews must contain the definitions of program,
init and S’.
unf nesting tac invs box sup init omits all first level details, resulting in a subgoal
containing the Execute phase of the nesting box, in which all definitions may be
contained in box. Now, invs contains all the invariants to be strengthened with (by
inv strengthen tac). 2(s ∈ {Execute, Super}) must be in invs. The tactic unlifts
from the temporal level and then from the Intensional level into Isabelle/HOL.
The unchanged goal is attempted to be solved, and init is used to solve the initial
state. In the last (main) goal, a case analysis on s is performed, resulting in
six sub-goals. The use of 2(s ∈ {Execute, Super}) then reduces this into two
sub-goals. sup must contain the required definition for the s = Super case. If
the invariant is nested, this case is trivial. Let B be the box identifier. box must
contain the required “first-level parts” of B. In the above example, this is the
mult action (and none of the sub-actions). Now, in the last s = Execute sub-goal,
box is used to reduce this one sub-goal with the assumption that pc1 = B and
stB ∈ {Runnable,Execute, Super}. That is, the cases where the internal parts of
the box are actually executed. Thus, it reduces the proof to the “stippled box
case” of Figure 6.8.a.
Iiws inv tac st parent exe attempts to verify “Iiws type invariants” as shown in Fig-
ure 6.8.b. It assumes that unf nesting tac has been applied, and one sub-goal
as described above is remaining. Let B be the parent box which contains this
invariant. st must be the state-variable of the parent box, i.e. stB. The tac-
tic first applies a case-analysis to this. The stB /∈ {Runnable,Execute, Super}
cases are handled by assumptions resulting from unf nesting tac. Moreover, the
stB /∈ {Runnable, Super} cases are handled by the parent box. parent is assumed
to contain all the required parent definitions, and these cases are attempted solved
using parent. Thus, the stB = Execute case is the only one remaining. exe must
contain the execute phase of the nested box(es) which consumes the wire(s) the
invariant is over. The case is then attempted to be solved by execute tac exe 1.
IIws inv tac st parent exe sup attempts to verify “IIws type invariants” as shown
in Figure 6.8.c. The overall structure is similar to Iiws inv tac. Here however,
there are two resulting cases: (1) stB = Execute and (2) stB = Super. These are
attempted to be solved by execute tac exe 1 and superstep tac sup 2.
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Iows inv tac st parent sup attempts to verify “Iows type invariants” as shown in
Figure 6.8.d. The overall structure is similar to Iiws inv tac and IIws inv tac, with
the exception that stB = Super is the only remaining case. This is attempted to
be solved by superstep tac sup 1.
boxtransform tac invs progs source dest inits st aux implements the transformation
proofs structure discussed in Section 6.6. Let A/prog1 be the name of the source
box/program, and B/prog2 the name of the destination box/program of the trans-
formation. It solves a goal of the form ` prog2 ⇒ prog1, that is, after instantiat-
ing the refinement mapping. progs must contain the definition of these programs,
and the definition of the refinement mapping. The assumption, i.e. the next
state action of prog2 is first strengthen with invs (by inv strengthen tac). This list
must contain both 2(s ∈ {Execute, Super}) and the partial correctness property
of prog2 shown in (6.4). The following rule (see Section 3.6), which reduces the
temporal level to the action level, is then applied:
theorem refinement1: assumes: ` P −→ Q and |∼ [A] f −→ [B] g
shows: ` P ∧ 2[A] f −→ Q ∧ 2[B] g
inits must contain the initial states of both program and is used to solve the first
subgoal. The second sub-goal it applied to the rule (see Section 3.6):
theorem refstep:
assumes: |∼ Unchanged v −→ Unchanged w
and |∼ P −→ Q ∨ Unchanged w
shows: |∼ [P] v −→ [Q] w
where the first subgoal is solved using unchanged tac. The second case follows
the structure shown in Figure 6.12. This start by a case-analysis on s, which by
2(s ∈ {Execute, Super}) reduces to the s = Execute and s = Super cases. source
and dest contains all the box action related to A and B. Note that the actions of
the nested boxes of B are not required. Now, the super-step phase action for A
and B should be identical, hence the s = Super case is solved by the simplifier,
using source and dest. The case split on pc1 is handled by splitting the if-then-
else expression with this check (see for example the mult action above). The
case where stB ∈ {Blocked,Matchfail,Terminated} is handled similiarly. The
cases where pc1 6= B and stB ∈ {Blocked,Matchfail,Terminated} are trivially
handled by the simplifier, using source and dest. st contains the state variable
of box B (i.e. stB), and the proof follows by a case-analysis of st where the st
∈ {Blocked,Matchfail,Terminated} is handled by the assumption. The remaining
cases are implemented as shown in Figure 6.12. Note that in the st = Super case,
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the “termination case” is handled by a case analysis on if-then-else expression
(see the definition of mult exe sup in Figure 6.6).
first level sch tac only holds for a first-level scheduler. unf nesting tac first strengthens
the conjecture with the given invariants, and unlifts the conjecture to the HOL level.
This has to be done first in a verification task, and can only be done once. These
features have been included in this tactic since only two-level hierarchies are supported,
and thus a first-level box is assumed. Boxes are scheduled in the same way at any
level. Hence, if the strengthening and unlifting is moved into a separate tactic, which
is applied first, then unf nesting tac can be generalised to any level. However, this may
require more inputs, such as properties of the parent box, and user-interaction, through
the additional application of the strenthening/unlifting tactic. Iiws inv tac, IIws inv tac
and Iows inv tac can be applied to any level box. Finally, boxtransform tac assumes a
first level box. As with unf nesting tac, it should be possible to extend it to work at
any level.
6.8 Summary & discussion
This chapter has motivated and informally defined Hierarchical Hume, formalised its
semantics in TLA, and mechanised the semantics in Isabelle/TLA. This mechanisation
is called Isabelle/HHume. Proof plans for verifying invariants, partial correctness and
transformations have been described and implemented as tactics in Isabelle/HHume.
The Hierarchical Timing Language (HTL) [77] is a coordination layer with em-
phasis on real time which allows “foreign language” to define the computation. The
computations are known as tasks, which can be structured into modes, while modes
can be structured into modules, which can be nested. Hierarchical Hume deviates
from HTL, since the “foreign language” is assumed to be the expression layer, thus
the events,modes and modules are captured by a box. Moreover, whilst resource prop-
erties are important, the main design constraint of Hierarchical Hume is ensuring it
conservatively extends flat Hume. The structure of Hiearchical Hume is also compara-
ble to statecharts [93], and the simpler Hierarchical State Machines [31]. Here, the the
motivation is managing the number of states, and hierarchies of states are introduced
to structure the states into super- and sub-states. In Hierarchical Hume, boxes are
structured, which define the transitions of states, i.e. hierarchies of transitions are
introduced. However, since Hierarchical Hume uses the FSM model, it is still compa-
rable to statecharts. In statecharts, the super-state can be classified into AND-state
and XOR-state [61]. Following this taxonomy, a nesting box constitutes an AND-state,
since it holds the conjunction of all the children boxes and wires, and not an exclusive
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choice of them.
The invariant verification approach is a direct extension of the work in Section
4.5. The most common program transformations of statecharts are program refactor-
ing [72], as they are mainly implemented as class hierarchies in an object oriented
language. Here, commonalities or specialisation are moved into super-classes. Strictly
speaking, a flat- to nested-box transformation is a Hierarchical Hume to Hierarchical
Hume transformation, i.e. a program refactoring. However, it can also be seen as a
functional language (flat box) to coordination language (nesting box) transformation,
which is a program migration. Moreover, the expression layer is higher level than the
coordination layer, thus creating a program synthesis. In particular, the correctness
proofs are based on a synthesis type called program refinement where the lower level
transformed program implements the upper level program.
Ignoring the overall program structure, and only focusing on the structure inside
the resulting nesting box, the interplay between the two layers is strong. Changing
one of the layers requires change of the other, which is distinct compared with synthe-
sis techniques like Bird-Meertens Formalism [26] and calculational programming [99].
Thus, although the abstraction level is lowered, it may still be seen as a program mi-
gration. HTL supports mode refinement constrained by a non-increasing worst case
execution time (WCET). This enables use of the most abstract representation when
producing WCET guarantees, which are often easier to work with. In Hierarchical
Hume, transformations are motivated by failed resource (e.g. WCET) costing, thus
such a constraint does not make sense. Finally, note that the transformation proofs
could have been verified as bisimulations in process algebras [18]. The next chapter
contains several verification case-studies of Hierarchical Hume programs.
Chapter7
Hierarchical Hume case studies
7.1 Introduction
| |
Figure 7.1: Thesis roadmap: Chapter 7| |
This chapter contains three case-studies in Hierarchical Hume and Isabelle/HHume,
and Figure 7.1 highlights which part of the roadmap being implemented: Section 7.2
discusses property and transformation verification of a multiplication by iteration pro-
gram; Section 7.3 discusses property and transformation verification of an efficient
exponential function; and Section 7.4 discusses property verification of a back-pack jet
propulsion system developed by NASA and originally formalised in PVS. This provides
empirical evidence for both the use of Hierarchical Hume as a programming language,
and the application of the verification techniques developed in Isabelle/HHume. Ap-
pendix A.5. contains the mechanised lemmas and theorems that are not listed here.
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7.2 Case study HH1: multiplication by iteration
7.2.1 The program
| |
w1 : 2(w1 6= ⊥ ⇒ w1 = inp1)
w2 : 2(w2 6= ⊥ ⇒ w2 = inp2)
w3/ires2 :
2

(w3 6= ⊥
⇒ fmult w31 w32 w33 = fmult 0 inp1 inp2) ∧
(ires2 6= ⊥
⇒ fmult ires21 ires22 ires23 = fmult 0 inp1 inp2)

ires1 : 2(ires1 6= ⊥ ⇒ ires1 = fmult 0 inp1 inp2)
w4 : 2(w4 6= ⊥ ⇒ w4 = fmult 0 inp1 inp2)
Figure 7.2: The mult box and required lemmas| |
The program is shown on the left side of Figure 7.2. It is an adaption of the program
shown in Figure 4.3 of Chapter 4 into Hierarchical Hume, which performs multiplication
as coordination iteration, represented as a feedback loop. The “interface” mult box
now nests the itermult box instead of being its sibling. Thus, computation is within
one cycle, instead of N + 4, for an iteration of depth N .
7.2.2 Partial correctness
The mult box performs multiplication by iteration. Thus, an important property is
that the box does indeed perform multiplication. This is specified by a function fmult
in Hume, which performs multiplication by tail-recursion:
fmult r _ 0 = r;
fmult r x y = fmult (r+x) x (y-1);
First, it is proved that fmult behaves like Isabelle/HOL multiplication ∗, when r is 0:
fmult 0 x y = x ∗ y (7.1)
Proof outline. This requires a generalisation of the original conjecture to
∀r, x. fmult r x y = r + (x ∗ y),
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which is verified by induction on y. This is mechanised as fmult mult l, while (7.1),
which follows directly from this, is mechanised as fmult mult:
lemma fmult mult l: ∀ r x. fmult r x y = r + (x*y)
theorem fmult mult: fmult 0 x y = x*y .
∴
Thus, to show partial correctness it is sufficient to show the following property
2(res 6= ⊥ ⇒ res = fmult 0 inp1 inp2) (7.2)
The program is mechanised as program2 in Isabelle/HHume, where the input and out-
put streams are handled by the environment, and (7.2) is mechanised as pr2 main, and
the ‘scheduler property’ is mechanised as p2sch The required lemmas on the different
wires and the itermult output buffer are listed on the right hand side of Figure 7.2,
and are mechanised as lemmas pr2 2 to pr2 7:
lemma p2sch: ` program2 −→ 2($s ∈ #{Execute,Super})
lemma pr2 1: ` program2 −→ 2($mult st ∈ #{Execute,Super,Terminated}
−→ isVal<$fst<mult inp>> ∧ isVal<$snd<mult inp>>)
lemma pr2 2: ` program2 −→ 2(isVal<$iw1 > −→ @iw1 = @fst<mult inp>)
lemma pr2 3: ` program2 −→ 2(isVal<$iw2> −→ @iw2 = @snd<mult inp>)
lemma pr2 4: ` program2 −→ 2(isVal<$iw1> ∧ isVal<$iw2>
−→ fmult<# 0, @iw1, @iw2> = fmult<# 0,@fst<mult inp>,@snd<mult inp>>)
lemma pr2 5: ` program2 −→
2((isVal<$iw3> −→ fmult<fst3<@iw3>, snd3<@iw3>, thd3<@iw3>>
= fmult<# 0,@fst<mult inp¿,@snd<mult inp>>)
∧ (isVal<snd<$bmult res>> −→ fmult<fst3<@snd<bmult res>>,
snd3<@snd<bmult res>>, thd3<@snd<bmult res>>>
= fmult<# 0,@fst<mult inp>,@snd<mult inp>>))
lemma pr2 6: ` program2 −→ 2(isVal<fst<$bmult res>>
−→ @fst<bmult res> = fmult<# 0,@fst<mult inp>,@snd<mult inp>>)
lemma pr2 7: ` program2 −→ 2(isVal<$iw4>
−→ @iw4 = fmult<# 0,@fst<mult inp>,@snd<mult inp>>)
theorem pr2 main: ` program2 −→ 2(isVal<$mult res>
−→ @mult res = fmult<# 0,@fst<mult inp>,@snd<mult inp>>)
(7.2) is then proved as follows:
Proof outline. First, the ‘scheduler property’ 2(s ∈ {Execute, Super}) is verified
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by the hume sch tac tactic. In the proof of the remaining lemmas, including (7.2),
the unf nesting tac tactic, with strengthening of the previously proved lemmas, is first
applied. This reduces the proof to locally “inside” the nesting mult box. The w1 and
w2 wire invariants are proved by the Iiws tac tactic. The w3/ires2 property, that is
the loop invariant, is a (D3) type invariant (Figure 5.2), and is mechanised by pr2 5.
Furthermore, it requires a (D2) type strengthening by the properties of wires w1 and
w2. It is verified by the IIws tac tactic, followed by an application of:
y 6= 0 ∧ fmult r x y = fmult 0 a b⇒ fmult (r + x) x (y − 1) = fmult 0 a b,
mechanised by
lemma fmult3: J y 6= 0; fmult r x y = fmult 0 a b K
=⇒ fmult (r+x) x (y-(Suc 0)) = fmult 0 a b
which follows directly by the definition of fmult. ires1 is verified by the IIws tac tactic,
followed by the rule:
y = 0 ∧ fmult r x y = fmult 0 a b⇒ r = fmult 0 a b,
mechanised by:
lemma fmult4: J y = 0; fmult r x y = fmult 0 a b K =⇒ r = fmult 0 a b
which also follows directly by the definition of fmult. Finally, by using these lemmas,
w4 and (7.2) are verified by the Iows tac tactic. ∴
7.2.3 Transformation proof
Let emult be a box which directly applies the fmult function on the input as shown
in Figure 7.3. The transformation from the emult box into the mult box, as shown in
the same figure, is an example of the well-known recursion to iteration transformation
[83]. As discussed in Section 6.6, the proof of this transformation mainly reduces to the
proof of (7.2). To verify the transformation, the refinement mapping must be defined.
Let mult st be the mechanisation of the state of the mult box. The refinement mapping
mst is then mechanised as1:
1For simplicity, only the state variable is bound.
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| |
Figure 7.3: Multiplication recursion to iteration transformation| |
mst ≡ if mult st = #Super then #Execute else mult st
Remember that the ∃ operator is written ∃∃ in Isabelle/TLA, and accept a function
from a state function to a temporal formula. Let prog1 be the specification of the
source program of the transformation shown in Figure 7.3, as a function over the state
variable of the emult box. Moreover, let program1 be prog1 with the state variable
bound by ∃∃. The transformation is thus verified by the following conjectures:
lemma main trans lemma: ` program2 −→ prog1 mst
lemma main trans lemma2: ` program2 −→ (∃∃ st. prog1 st)
theorem trans thm: ` program2 −→ program1.
Proof outline. Lemma main trans lemma is verified mainly by the boxtransform tac
tactic using (7.2) and the ‘scheduling property’. Lemma main trans lemma2 follows
from Lemma main trans lemma by applying rule (E1), while Theorem trans thm follows
from Lemma main trans lemma2 by folding the definition program1. ∴
7.3 Case study HH2: an efficient exponential box
7.3.1 The program
The second case-study is an effective implementation of the exponential function. The
program is a porting of imperative code used as an assignment in a module by Andrew
Ireland at Heriot-Watt University, originally taken from [81, page 36]. The left hand
side of Figure 7.4 shows this imperative code.
The right hand side of Figure 7.4 shows the Hierarchical Hume implementation of
the same function. Note that due to the static nature of wires, duplication is required.
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{ x = X ∧ n = N }
p := 1;
if x 6= 0 then
while (n 6= 0)
begin
if odd(n)
then p := p * x;
n := n div 2;
x := x * x;
end
else p := 0;
{ p = fexp X N }
Figure 7.4: Left: the exponential function in imperative code. Right: the exp box imple-
menting the exponential function in Hierarchical Hume| |
The inp box implements the first if statement, while the while loop is split into
the join and comp boxes. Again, due to the static nature of wires, the join box is
introduced due to the wire duplication, and to simplify the comp box. Finally, the
res box joins the two branches of the first if statement. The comp box uses the odd
function, defined recursively in Hume:
odd 0 = false; odd 1 = true; odd n = odd (n-2);
7.3.2 Partial correctness
The imperative code of Figure 7.4 specifies the partial correctness property by Hoare
triples. It is specified using the following function, which implements the exponential
operator recursively:
fexp x 0 = (if x = 0 then 0 else 1);
fexp x n = (if x = 0 then 0 else x*(fexp x (n-1)));
Chapter 7. Hierarchical Hume case studies 144
Note that the undefined fexp 0 0 (00) case is assumed to be 0. The partial correctness
property is formalised as:
2(res = fexp inp1 inp2), (7.3)
and relies on the following facts:
p∗(fexp x n) = fexp a b∧odd n⇒ (p∗x)∗(fexp (x∗x) (n div 2)) = fexp a b (7.4)
p∗ (fexp x n) = fexp a b∧¬(odd n)⇒ p∗ (fexp (x∗x) (n div 2)) = fexp a b (7.5)
Proof outline. (7.4) and (7.5) are mechanised as odd1 and nodd1, and are proved by
first generalising to
odd n ⇒ fexp x n = x ∗ (fexp (x ∗ x) (n div 2))
¬(odd n) ⇒ fexp x n = fexp (x ∗ x) (n div 2),
which are mechanised as fexp2 and fexp3, and are proved by a two-step induction on
n, with 0 and 1 as base cases. ∴
The lemmas of the fexp and odd functions are mechanised as follows:
lemma fexp1: fexp 0 n = 0
lemma fexp2: odd n −→ fexp x n = x*(fexp (x*x) (n div 2))
lemma fexp3: ¬(odd n) −→ fexp x n = fexp (x*x) (n div 2)
lemma odd1: J p*(fexp x n) = fexp a b; odd n K
=⇒ (p*x)*(fexp (x*x) (n div 2)) = fexp a b
lemma nodd1: J p*(fexp x n) = fexp a b; ¬odd n K
=⇒ p*(fexp (x*x) (n div 2)) = fexp a b.
The partial correctness property (7.3) is mechanised as exp main, and is verified as
follows:
Proof outline. The ‘scheduling property’ is first verified by the hume sch tac tactic.
In all the remaining lemmas the unf nesting tac tactic is first applied, strengthened
by the scheduling property and the previously verified lemmas. The properties are
mechanised (in the correct order) below. For all (D1) and (D2) style invariants, the
property is first verified for the result buffer, then the (output) wire(s). Henceforth,
to ease the reading, the result buffer is normally ignored in the proof outlines, albeit
these properties are mechanised still.
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Now, the property that w1 equals inp1 and w2 equals inp2 when not empty, is
verified by the Iiws tac tactic. From the definition of inp, w6 will always be 0, and this
is only the case when inp1 is 0, thus
2(w6 6= ⊥ ⇒ w6 = fexp inp1 inp2) (7.6)
which follows from the definition of fexp. If not empty, w5 and w4 wires equal inp1
and inp2, while w3 will be 1. This is verified by the IIws tac tactic.
The while loop in the imperative version is represented by the join and comp
boxes, connected by the w7, w8, w9 and w10, w11, w12 wires. Thus, together these form
a (D4) type invarant, and in the imperative program the loop invariant is p∗fexp x n =
fexp X N . In Hierarchical Hume, the loop has a (D2) dependency on the w3, w4 and
w5 wires, which is the entry of the loop. Thus,
2(w3 6= ⊥ ∧ w4 6= ⊥ ∧ w5 6= ⊥ ⇒ w5 ∗ (fexp w3 w4) = (fexp inp1 inp2),
is first verified by the IIws tac tactic. Now, in the Hierarchical Hume loop, p, x and n
are represented by the join and comp result buffers and the w7, w8, w9 and w10, w11,
w12 wires. Moreover, while in the imperative case it is implicit that x 6= 0, this must
be captured by the Hierarchical Hume invariant, which becomes:
2( (join res1 6= ⊥ ∧ join res2 6= ⊥ ∧ join res3 6= ⊥
⇒ join res3 ∗ (fexp join res1 join res2) = (fexp inp1 inp2) ∧ join res1 6= 0)
∧ (w7 6= ⊥ ∧ w8 6= ⊥ ∧ w9 6= ⊥ ⇒ w9 ∗ (fexp w7 w8) = (fexp inp1 inp2) ∧ w7 6= 0)
∧ (comp res1 6= ⊥ ∧ comp res2 6= ⊥ ∧ comp res3 6= ⊥
⇒ comp res3 ∗ (fexp comp res1 comp res2) = (fexp inp1 inp2) ∧ comp res1 6= 0)
∧ (w10 6= ⊥ ∧ w11 6= ⊥ ∧ w12 6= ⊥
⇒ w12 ∗ (fexp w10 w11) = (fexp inp1 inp2) ∧ w10 6= 0)).
This is mechanised by expl10 and verified by the IIws tac tactic, followed by the appli-
cation of (7.4) and (7.5). Then, the ‘exit step’ of the loop induces
2(w13 6= ⊥ ⇒ w13 = fexp inp1 inp2),
verified by the IIws tac tactic. With this, (7.6), and the definition of res,
2(w14 6= ⊥ ⇒ w14 = fexp inp1 inp2).
is verified by the Iows tac tactic, from which (7.3) directly follows. ∴
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The partial correctness lemmas and theorem are mechanised as follows:
lemma pr sch: ` program −→ 2($s ∈ #{Super,Execute})
lemma exp l1: ` program −→ 2(isVal<$w1> −→ @w1 = @fst<exp inp>)
lemma exp l2: ` program −→ 2(isVal<$w2> −→ @w2 = @snd<exp inp>)
lemma exp l3a: ` program −→ 2(isVal<fst4<$inp res>>
−→ @fst4<inp res> = @fst<exp inp> ∧ @fst4<inp res> 6= # 0)
lemma exp l3: ` program −→ 2(isVal<$w3>
−→ @w3 = @fst<exp inp> ∧ @w3 6= # 0)
lemma exp l4a: ` program −→ 2(isVal<snd4<$inp res>>
−→ @snd4<inp res> = @snd<exp inp>)
lemma exp l4: ` program −→ 2(isVal<$w4>
−→ @w4 = @snd<exp inp>)
lemma exp l5a: ` program −→ 2(isVal<thd4<$inp res>>
−→ @thd4<inp res> = # 1)
lemma exp l5: ` program −→ 2(isVal<$w5> −→ @w5 = # 1)
lemma exp l6a: ` program −→ 2(isVal<for4<$inp res>>
−→ @for4<inp res> = # 0)
lemma exp l6: ` program −→ 2(isVal<$w6> −→ @w6 = # 0)
lemma exp l7a: ` program −→ 2(isVal<for4<$inp res>>
−→ @fst<exp inp> = # 0)
lemma exp l7: ` program −→ 2(isVal<$w6> −→ @fst<exp inp> = # 0)
lemma exp l8: ` program −→ 2(isVal<$w6>
−→ @w6 = fexp<@fst<exp inp>,@snd<exp inp>>)
lemma exp l9a: ` program
−→ 2(isVal<fst4<$inp res>> ∧ isVal<snd4<$inp res>> ∧ isVal<thd4<$inp res>>
−→ (@thd4<inp res>*fexp<@fst4<inp res>,@snd4<inp res>>)
= fexp<@fst<exp inp>,@snd<exp inp>>)
lemma exp l9: ` program −→ 2(isVal<$w3> ∧ isVal<$w4> ∧ isVal<$w5>
−→ (@w5*fexp<@w3,@w4>) = fexp<@fst<exp inp>,@snd<exp inp>>)
lemma expl10 val1: ` program
−→ 2((isVal<fst4<$comp res>>)=(isVal<snd4<$comp res>>)
∧ (isVal<fst4<$comp res>>)=(isVal<thd4<$comp res>>))
lemma expl10 val2: ` program
−→ 2((isVal<fst3<$join res>>)=(isVal<snd3<$join res>>)
∧ (isVal<fst3<$join res>>)=(isVal<thd3<$join res>>))
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| |
Figure 7.5: Exponential function transformation| |
lemma expl10: ` program −→
2((isVal<fst3<$join res>> ∧ isVal<snd3<$join res>> ∧ isVal<thd3<$join res>>−→
(@thd3<join res>*fexp<@fst3<join res>,@snd3<join res>>)
= fexp<@fst<exp inp>,@snd<exp inp>> ∧ @fst3<join res> 6= # 0)
∧ (isVal<$w10> ∧ isVal<$w11> ∧ isVal<$w12> −→
(@w12*fexp<@w10,@w11>) = fexp<@fst<exp inp>,@snd<exp inp>>
∧ @w10 6= # 0)
∧ (isVal<fst4<$comp res>> ∧ isVal<snd4<$comp res>> ∧ isVal<thd4<$comp res>>
−→ (@thd4<comp res>*fexp<@fst4<comp res>,@snd4<comp res>>)
= fexp<@fst<exp inp>,@snd<exp inp>> ∧ @fst4<comp res> 6= # 0)
∧ (isVal<$w7> ∧ isVal<$w8> ∧ isVal<$w9> −→ (@w9*fexp<@w7,@w8>)
= fexp<@fst<exp inp>,@snd<exp inp>> ∧ @w7 6= # 0))
lemma expl11a: ` program −→ 2(isVal<for4<$comp res>>
−→ @for4<comp res> = fexp<@fst<exp inp>,@snd<exp inp>>)
lemma expl11: ` program −→ 2(isVal<$w13> −→
@w13 = fexp<@fst<exp inp>,@snd<exp inp>>)
lemma expl12a: ` program −→ 2(isVal<$res res> −→
@res res = fexp<@fst<exp inp>,@snd<exp inp>>)
lemma expl12: ` program −→ 2(isVal<$w14> −→
@w14 = fexp<@fst<exp inp>,@snd<exp inp>>)
theorem exp main: ` program −→ 2(isVal<$exp res> −→
@exp res = fexp<@fst<exp inp>,@snd<exp inp>>)
7.3.3 Transformation
The transformation is shown in Figure 7.5. By using (7.3), it follows the exact same
structure as the proof of Theorem trans thm in Section 7.2. The following lemmas and
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theorems are mechanised for this proof:
lemma main trans lemma: ` program −→ eprog mst
lemma main trans lemma: ` program −→ (∃∃ st. eprog st)
theorem trans thm: ` program −→ eprogram
7.4 Case study HH3: the SAFER system
7.4.1 Overview of the SAFER system
| |
Figure 7.6: Left-to-right: SAFER deployed on an astronaut; the six degree of movement
axis; the mounting of the thrusters. Bottom: the hand controller (source: [153])| |
Simplified Aid For Eva Rescue (SAFER) is a lightweight backpack propulsion system
developed by NASA [153]. It is intended to provide self-rescue capabilities for astro-
nauts outside the spacecraft in space. The left-most drawing of Figure 7.6 shows the
system deployed on an astronaut. It allows movement along and around all three axes,
as illustrated in the middle diagram. This is controlled by a hand-controller operated
by the astronaut – and by an automatic attitude hold (AAH), which attempts to nullify
rotation.
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The hand controller is shown on the bottom-left hand side of Figure 7.6. In this
embedding, only the control mode switch, hand controller grip and AAH button are
used: the control mode switch changes the mode between rotation and transition; the
hand controller grip has three rotary axes and one transverse axis. To issue a command,
the astronaut moves the hand controller grip from the null centre position to the
mechanical hardstop on the axis. To terminate a command, the grip is either released
or moved back to the null centre position. In the transition mode, a (potentially
compound) command may institute manoeuvring in the ±X, ±Y , ±Z and ± pitch
directions; while in the ±X, ±pitch, ±roll or ±yaw directions in rotation mode. The
AAH button (on the hand controller grip) switches the AAH on (one-click) and off
(two-clicks).
Commands from the hand-controller and various sensors are sent to the software,
which returns a list of the thrusters that should be fired. A thruster is filled with
pressured GN2 gas. If the vent of a thruster is open, this gas is released, creating a
force and acceleration in the opposite direction. The SAFER system consists of twenty
four thrusters, organised such that four thrusters are pointing in each of the ±X, ±Y
and ±Z directions. This enables a six-degree of freedom manoeuvring control along
and around the three axes. The right hand side of Figure 7.6 shows the mounting of
the thrusters and thruster names, which are adopted in the Hume embedding. The
software system is embedded in Hume.
Requirements
The SAFER system is a medium-sized real world example, with a large set of re-
quirements which should be verified. The system has been mechanised [12, 153], and
several of the requirements have been independently verified [12, 153, 194]. Most of
the requirements are listed in Appendix C of [153], while [12] and [194] suggest some
additional properties. Here, the following requirements are treated:
1. when AAH is inactive, and no hand grip commands are present, there should be
no thruster firings (source: [194]);
2. at most, one translation command shall be acted upon, with the axes chosen in
priority order X, Y , Z (source: [153], property 40);
3. hand controller rotation commands shall suppress any translation commands that
are present, but AAH-generated rotation commands may coexist with transla-
tions (source: [153], property 39);
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4. no two selected thrusters should oppose one another, i.e. have cancelling effect
with respect to the centre of mass (source: [12] and Section C.4.1 of [153]);
7.4.2 The Flying Scotsman: SAFER in Hierarchical Hume
Overview of the embedding
This section discusses the embedding of parts of the software system of SAFER in Hi-
erarchical Hume. The system was originally mechanised in PVS [164] in [153], and has
later been embedded in VDM-SL [130] in [12]. The main functionality of the software
system can be divided into fault detection and EVA/ground checkout and manoeuvring
control. Both the PVS and VDM-SL versions only focus on the manoeuvring control,
and this is followed here as well. Moreover, the software system accepts inputs from the
hand controller and sensors, and produces a list of thrusters to execute. In PVS, the
complete hand controller and all sensors are included, albeit only the relevant parts for
the AAH and thruster selection are actually defined. VDM-SL is a testing tool requir-
ing that the specification is executable. Consequently, all the undefined PVS functions
are stripped out. This is also the case in Hume, thus the VDM-SL embedding is the
closest to the one described here. The system inputs are from the hand controller and
the output is to the thrusters. In addition, the system must store the state of the AAH.
In both PVS and VDM-SL, SAFER is modelled as a state machine: each cycle
reads the sensors and the current AAH state, and produces a list of thrusters to fire
and a new AAH state. One such cycle is assumed to last 5ms. Each part of the system
is represented as a function, and in each cycle, the computation order is controlled by
function composition. In Hume, the parts are represented by boxes, and the compu-
tation order is controlled by the wiring. To achieve a one-to-one mapping between a
SAFER cycle and Hume cycle, the program is nested by a box SAFER, shown in Figure
7.7. This program can be divided into three parts: the hand controller, which consists
of the grip command box; the AAH which comprises all boxes prefixed by AAH, and
the thruster selection logic, which comprises the remaining boxes. These parts are dis-
cussed separately below, preceded by a discussion of the types. The full source code is
listed in Appendix C, where the hand-controller inputs are represented by a (dummy)
generator, and the thrusters fired are converted to a string and sent to standard output.
Types
Figure 7.8 shows all the type definitions. A thruster is either on or off, i.e. there is
no speed. axis command is used to show the direction for one axis, while command
contains the axis command for all three axes (translation or rotation). In both PVS
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| |
Figure 7.7: The SAFER box: the SAFER system in Hierarchical Hume| |
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data axis_command = NEG | ZERO | POS;
type command = (axis_command,axis_command,axis_command);
type axis_pred = (bool,bool,bool);
data thruster_name = B1 | B2 | B3 | B4 | F1 | F2 | F3 | F4 | L1R | L1F
| R2R | R2F | L3R | L3F | R4R | R4F | D1R | D1F | D2R | D2F | U3R
| U3F | U4R | U4F;
type thruster_list = [thruster_name];
data control_mode_switch = ROT | TRAN;
data AAH_control_button = button_up | button_down;
data AAH_engage_state = AAH_off | AAH_started | AAH_on | pressed_once
| AAH_closing | pressed_twice;
Figure 7.8: SAFER types in Hume| |
and VDM-SL, function types over each axis are heavily used. Hume does not allow
function types on wires. However, since the functions are over the axes, this can be
represented as a triple, as illustrated by command and axis pred. thruster name
defines the names of each of the 24 thrusters, and follows the naming scheme from
Figure 7.6. control mode switch is the mode read from the hand-controller, while
AAH control button is the current value of the AAH button on the hand-controller.
Finally, AAH engage state is used to model the AAH button state.
The hand controller
With the exception of the AAH control button, the grip command box handles all the
inputs from the hand controller. The hand controller can be moved among four axes,
and the control mode switch is either set to rotation (ROT) or transition (TRAN). The
grip command box turns these signals into a transition command and two duplicated
rotation commands. The rotation command is duplicated since it is required by both
the thruster selection logic and the AAH:
box grip_command
in (vert,horiz,trans,twist::axis_command, mode :: control_mode_switch)
out (tran,rot1,rot2::command)
match
(v,h,tr,tw,TRAN,_) -> ((h,tr,v),(ZERO,tw,ZERO),(ZERO,tw,ZERO))
| (v,h,tr,tw,ROT,_) -> ((h,ZERO,ZERO),(v,tw,tr),(v,tw,tr));
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| |
Figure 7.9: SAFER AAH engagement state diagram (source: [153])| |
The automatic attitude hold (AAH)
The AAH capability is invoked to maintain a near-zero rotation rate. Thus, the AAH
only creates a rotation command. This requires sensor input, in addition to hand
controller input and the state in the previous cycle, which are not provided in either the
PVS or the VDM-SL version. In PVS, the command is not generated, while a dummy
value is created in VDM-SL. The latter approach is also followed here. The AAH
contains many other interesting requirements, thus the remaining parts of the AAH
are embedded. The AAH is represented by the following four boxes: AAH pre fanout,
AAH post fanout, AAH button transition and AAH transition. The AAH post fan-
out generates a dummy (ZERO,ZERO,ZERO) command, which represents the rotation
command from the AAH. With the exception of this, AAH pre fanout and AAH post
fanout simply “fans out” the inputs to several other boxes, and are thus not discussed
further.
The AAH has five state components, which must be remembered between each cy-
cle, forming the feedback loops of box SAFER. These are the active axis (type axis pred)
which identifies which axis the AAH is currently active. Since the AAH will only gener-
ate a rotation command, this refers to (pitch, roll, yaw). ignore hcm (type axis pred)
identifies on which axis the hand controller (hcm) can be ignored. toggle keeps track of
the status of the AAH, e.g. if it is engaging or disengaging. Figure 7.9 shows how it is
updated. time-out is used to separate two single clicks from a double-click. And, the
clock is a simple counter incremented in each cycle. The AAH engagement diagram of
Figure 7.9 is implemented by the AAH button transition box:
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box AAH_button_transition ..
(AAH_off ,button_down,_,_,_) -> (AAH_started,AAH_started)
| (AAH_started,button_down,_,_,_) -> (AAH_started,AAH_started) ...
The box accepts the current “engage value”, the value of the AAH button, the ac-
tive axis, the clock and time-out values, and returns the new “engage value”. This
value is remembered for the next cycle, and is used by the AAH transition box. The
result is thus duplicated. The remaining AAH state components are updated by the
AAH transition box:
box AAH_transition ...
( _ ,AAH_off,AAH_started ,(r1,r2,r3), _ ,cl,tout)
-> ((true,true,true),(r1 != ZERO,r2 != ZERO,r3 != ZERO),cl+1,tout)
| ( _ , _ , AAH_off , _ , ihcm ,cl,tout)
-> ((false,false,false),ihcm,cl+1,tout)
| ((a1,a2,a3),AAH_on ,pressed_once,(r1,r2,r3),(i1,i2,i3),cl,tout)
-> ((naa a1 r1 i1, naa a2 r2 i2, naa a3 r3 i3),
(i1,i2,i3),cl+1,cl+click_timeout)
| ((a1,a2,a3), eng , _ ,(r1,r2,r3),(i1,i2,i3),cl,tout)
-> ((naa a1 r1 i1,naa a2 r2 i2,naa a3 r3 i3),(i1,i2,i3),cl+1,tout);
The inputs of the box are: the (old) active axis; the new and old engage value; the
rotation command from the hand controller (that is grip command); the (old) ignore
hcm; the (old) clock; and the old time-out. It produces the new active axis, ignore
hcm, clock and time-out.
The ignore hcm will only change value when the AAH is starting (engage is changing
from AAH off to AAH started). It holds for an axis if the rotation command (from the
hand controller) is ZERO for that axis, and can thus be ignored; the clock is always in-
cremented by 1, i.e. one cycle tick; the time-out is only changed if the button is pressed
(once) while the AAH is on. This time-out “counter” is then initialised to see if the
button is pressed once more within 0.5s. This is the definition of the two-clicks of the
AAH control button, and the AAH is then switched off (by AAH button transition).
Here, click timeout is a constant, which is 100 since 100 cycles of 5ms is 0.5s; the ac-
tive axis holds for all axes when the AAH is starting (engage is changing from AAH off
to AAH started), and is false for all axes when AAH is disengaged. For all other
cases, it depends on the current active axis value for the given axis, together with the
rotation command and ignore hcm value for the same axis. The naa function returns
the new active axis value for an axis, when given these parameters:
naa true ZERO _ = true;
naa true _ true = true;
naa _ _ _ = false;
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Thruster selection
The thruster selection logic has two functionalities. Firstly, the commands from the
hand controller and AAH are joined to create one (translation and rotation) com-
mand. Here, a hand-controller rotation command takes precedence over a translation
command, while translation command can co-exist with rotation commands from the
AAH. Moreover, a translation can only be acted upon in one axis at a time, with the
priority X, Y , Z. Secondly, based on this command, the correct set of thrusters are
selected. The first part is achieved by the integrated commands, integrated fanout
and prioritized tran cmd boxes. The integrated commands box is defined as fol-
lows:
box integrated_commands ..
(tran,(ZERO,ZERO,ZERO), _ ,(false,false,false), _ )
-> (tran,(ZERO,ZERO,ZERO),true)
| ( _ ,( r , p , ya ), _ ,(false,false,false), _ )
-> ((ZERO,ZERO,ZERO),(r,p,ya),false)
| (tran,(ZERO,ZERO,ZERO),(a1,a2,a3), _ , _ )
-> (tran,(a1,a2,a3),true)
| ( _ ,( r , p , ya ),(a1,a2,a3), _ ,(i1,i2,i3))
-> ((ZERO,ZERO,ZERO), (comb_rot_cmds r a1 i1, comb_rot_cmds p a2 i2,
comb_rot_cmds ya a3 i3), false);
The box inputs are: the translation and rotation commands from the grip command;
the (dummy) AAH rotation command; the (old) active axis; and the old ignore hcm.
It returns a translation command and a combined rotation command, together with a
boolean used by the prioritized tran cmd box. This holds if a non-ZERO translation
command is created.
Now, if there is no rotation command from the hand controller and AAH is off for
all axes, then there is only the translation command. If there is a rotation command
and AAH is off for all axes, then the rotation command is used and no translation
command is generated. If there is no rotation command from the hand controller, and
AAH is on for at least one axis, then the translation command and rotation command
from the AAH is used. Finally, if rotation command is present and AAH is active (for
at least one axis), then there is no transition command, and the rotation commands
from the AAH and hand controller are combined. This is achieved by applying the
comb rot cmds function on each axis:
comb_rot_cmds ZERO aah _ = aah;
comb_rot_cmds _ aah true = aah;
comb_rot_cmds hcm _ _ = hcm;
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The function accepts, for one axis, the rotation command from the hand controller and
AAH, together with the ignore hcm for that axis. If there is no command from the
grip then the AAH value is used. If this is not the case, and the ignore hcm holds
(meaning ignore the hand controller), then the AAH command is used. If not, then
the hand controller has priority. The transition command and boolean value from the
integrated commands box are sent to prioritized tran cmd box:
box prioritized_tran_cmd ...
( tran ,false) -> tran
| ((ZERO,ZERO,ZERO), _ ) -> (ZERO,ZERO,ZERO)
| ((ZERO,ZERO,zacc), _ ) -> (ZERO,ZERO,zacc)
| ((ZERO,yacc, _ ), _ ) -> (ZERO,yacc,ZERO)
| ((xacc, _ , _ ), _ ) -> (xacc,ZERO,ZERO);
A false boolean denotes ignore the translation command; the remaining matches
implements the X,Y , Z priority. The integrated fanout box “fans out” the rotation
command.
The second part of the thruster selection logic selects which thrusters to fire based
on the integrated command. The left, right, up and down (LRUD) thrusters result
from Y , Z and roll commands, while back and forward (BF) thrusters result from the
X, pitch and yaw commands. Based on this classification, each type of thruster is
found by two boxes: the BF box fires the B1-B4 and F1-F4 thruster name from Figure
7.8, while the LRUD box fires the remaining. The boxes are implemented by pattern
matching, each containing 27 (33) matches, since each command may have 3 different
values (and there are 3 commands):
box LRUD ...
| (NEG,NEG,POS) -> ([],[])
| (NEG,ZERO,NEG) -> ([L1R],[L1F,L3F])
...
box BF ...
| (NEG,NEG,POS) -> ([B3],[B1,B4])
| (NEG,ZERO,NEG) -> ([B2,B4],[])
...
LRUD and BF returns two lists of thrusters, a list of mandatory thrusters and a list of
optional thrusters. These 4 lists are joined into a single list by the thruster join box.
The concatenation depends on the rotation command:
box thruster_join ..
(lm,lo,bm,bo,(ZERO,ZERO,ZERO)) -> (lm ++ lo ++ bm ++ bo)
| (lm,lo,bm,_ ,(ZERO,ZERO, _ )) -> (lm ++ lo ++ bm)
| (lm,_ ,bm,bo,( _ , _ ,ZERO)) -> (lm ++ bm ++ bo)
| (lm,_ ,bm,_ ,( _ , _ , _ )) -> (lm ++ bm );
Chapter 7. Hierarchical Hume case studies 157
The ++ operator combines two lists. In addition to the four lists of thrusters, it ac-
cepts the rotation command. In all cases, the mandatory lists are fired. If this is a
(ZERO,ZERO,ZERO) command, the thrusters in both optional lists are also fired; if the
pitch and yaw commands are empty only the optional LRUF thrusters are fired; if not,
then if the roll command is ZERO then only the optional BF thrusters are fired; finally,
if none of these holds then only the two mandatory thruster lists are joined.
7.4.3 Verification of SAFER requirements
The program is mechanised in Isabelle/HHume as previously described, and the hand
controller and thrusters are handled by the environment. Moreover, Isabelle/HOL’s
inductive data type, list and function package are used to represent Hume types and
functions. The hand-controller and thruster are handled by the environment.
Generic properties
The four requirements are verified separately in the following sections. There are
some generic properties required to verify several of these requirements. Firstly, the
‘scheduler property’ 2(s ∈ {Execute, Super}) is verified by the hume sch tac tactic.
Secondly, all the internal input wires, like 2(w1 6= ⊥ ⇒ w1 = inp6), are verified by the
unf nesting tac and Iiws tac tactics. All the verified lemmas, as well as the lemmas and
theorems discussed below, are mechanised in Appendix A.5.1.
Requirement 1
The first requirement states that if the AAH is inactive and there are no hand grip
commands, then no thrusters are fired. This property is formalised as follows:
2(〈inp6, inp7, inp8, inp9〉 = 〈ZERO, ZERO, ZERO, ZERO〉
∧inp1 = 〈false, false, false〉 ⇒ res6 6= ⊥ ⇒ res6 = 〈〉)
(7.7)
inp6 to inp9 are the inputs from the hand controller grip, meaning it is in a neu-
tral position, while inp1 is the active axis of the AAH. Since they are all false, the
AAH is disabled for all axes. Note that this property is independent of the dummy
(ZERO,ZERO,ZERO) command from the AAH. (7.7) is then verified as follows:
Proof outline. In all proofs, the unf nesting tac tactic is first applied, strengthened by
the previously verified properties. Moreover, all the lemmas have the same assumptions
as (7.7). First, the IIws tac tactic is used to verify that grip command produces ZERO-
transition and rotation commands on w22 and w23. This, together with the inp1 =
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〈false, false, false〉 assumption, implies that the transition w27 and rotation w29
commands from integrated commands are ZERO-commands. This is used to show that
the wires w30 to w35 are all ZERO. From these facts, it is shown that both the mandatory
and optional thruster lists from BF and LRUD on wires w36 to w39 are empty []. All
of these properties are verified by the IIws tac tactic. Since all the input thruster lists
to thruster join are empty, an empty list is generated on wire w41. On termination,
this value is copied to res6, thus (7.7) holds. The properties on w41 and res6 are verified
by the Iows tac tactic. ∴
Requirement 2
The second requirement consists of two parts. The first part states that, at most, one
translation command shall be acted upon. Wires w33, w30 and w31 contain “the final”
X,Y and Z transition, before they are turned into thruster lists by LRUD and BF. Thus, if
all of them are full, then at least two of them must be ZERO. This property is formalised
by creating a predicate max one axis over three axis commands in Isabelle/HOL, which
holds if, and only if, at least two of them are ZERO. This first part is thus formalised
as follows:
2
(
w33 6= ⊥ ∧ w30 6= ⊥ ∧ w32 6= ⊥ ⇒ max one axis(w33, w30, w31)
)
(7.8)
Proof outline. If the input on w28 is false, then the command (triple) on w27 is
“fanned out” to the three output wires. For this case, it is first verified that when w28
has the non-empty false value, then, if not empty, w27 is 〈false, false, false〉, and
(7.8) trivially holds. If the input on w28 is true, (7.8) follows from the definition of
the box (pattern matches) and max one axis. Both of these cases are verified by the
IIws tac tactic, and the definition of max one axis. ∴
The second part of this requirement asserts that the transition command has an
X, Y , Z priority. Again, this is formalised over the w33, w30 and w31 wires. Now,
the input from the hand-grip controller for the X and Y axis are inp7 and inp8. The
requirement is then formalised over these definitions as follows:
2(w30 6= ⊥ ∧ w30 6= ZERO⇒ inp7 = ZERO) (7.9)
2(w31 6= ⊥ ∧ w31 6= ZERO⇒ inp7 = ZERO ∧ inp8 = ZERO). (7.10)
The first part verified that only one of w33, w30 and w31 can be non-ZERO. The w30 wire
is the Y axis generated translation command. (7.9) states that if w30 is a non-ZERO
command, then the X input is ZERO, thus X has higher priority than Y . The w31 wire
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is the Z axis generated translation command, and (7.10) asserts that if the w30 wire
contains a non-ZERO command, then the X and Y inputs are ZERO, thus Z has lower
priority than X and Y . These two properties show the X, Y , Z priority.
Proof outline. The proofs of (7.9) and (7.10) are by case analysis on the control
mode (inp10 = ROT or inp10 = TRAN), and all properties are verified by the IIws tac
tactic. In the inp10 = ROT case, only an X transition command can be generated from
grip command. Thus, the w22 wire is 〈inp7, ZERO, ZERO〉. In the inp10 = TRAN case,
the same wire is 〈inp7, inp8, inp6〉. integrated commands either generates the same
translation command on w27 as w22 or a ZERO-command. In the second case, w28 is
false, whilst it is true in the first case. In the case where w28 is false, w30 and w31
will be ZERO, thus (7.9) and (7.10) hold. Moreover, w30 and w31 will, if not ZERO, be
given the second and third values of w27 respectively. In the inp10 = ROT, these are
always ZERO. The inp10 = TRAN case holds by the logic of the prioritized tran cmd.
The inp10 = ROT and inp10 = TRAN cases are verified separately, where (7.9) and (7.10)
follows by the following rule (see Section 3.6), since (inp10 6= ROT) ≡ (inp10 = TRAN):
lemma inv case:
assumes: ` P −→ 2(A −→ B) and ` P −→ 2(¬A −→ B)
shows: ` P −→ 2B ∴
Requirement 3
The third requirement also consists of two parts. The first part asserts that any hand
controller translation commands shall be suppressed by hand controller rotation com-
mands. The existence of a rotation command depends on the control mode of the hand
controller, thus this property is formalised as follows:
2(inp10 = TRAN ∧ inp9 6= ZERO ∧ w27 6= ⊥ ⇒ w27 = 〈ZERO, ZERO, ZERO〉) (7.11)
2(inp10 = ROT ∧ 〈inp6, inp9, inp8〉 6= 〈ZERO, ZERO, ZERO〉
∧ w27 6= ⊥ ⇒ w27 = 〈ZERO, ZERO, ZERO〉)
(7.12)
Proof outline. When the control mode is TRAN, then only a pitch rotation command
is possible, which is given on inp9, while in ROT it is possible to rotate around all the
axes. The property asserts that if the input of SAFER contains a rotation command,
then the generated translation command on wire w27 (from integrated commands) is a
ZERO-command. Both these properties are verified by first showing that grip command
produces ZERO translation commands on w22. This is then used to prove (7.11) and
(7.12). All properties are verified by the IIws tac tactic. ∴
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The second part asserts that translation may co-exist with rotation commands
from the AAH. This is formalised by asserting that as long as there are no rotation
commands from the hand-controller, then the generated translation command is the
translation command given by the inputs. Again, this is formulated as two theorems,
depending on the control mode of the hand controller:
2(inp10 = TRAN ∧ inp9 = ZERO ∧ w27 6= ⊥ ⇒ w27 = 〈inp7, inp8, inp6〉) (7.13)
2(inp10 = ROT ∧ 〈inp6, inp9, inp8〉 = 〈ZERO, ZERO, ZERO〉
∧ w27 6= ⊥ ⇒ w27 = 〈inp7, ZERO, ZERO〉)
(7.14)
Proof outline. The proof of (7.13) and (7.14) follows the same pattern as the proof
of (7.11) and (7.12). ∴
Requirement 4
| |
tc [] = True
tc (B1#vs) = (F1 /∈ set vs) ∧ tc vs
tc (F1#vs) = (B1 /∈ set vs) ∧ tc vs
tc (B2#vs) = (F2 /∈ set vs) ∧ tc vs
tc (F2#vs) = (B2 /∈ set vs) ∧ tc vs
tc (B3#vs) = (F3 /∈ set vs) ∧ tc vs
tc (F3#vs) = (B3 /∈ set vs) ∧ tc vs
tc (B4#vs) = (F4 /∈ set vs) ∧ tc vs
tc (F4#vs) = (B4 /∈ set vs) ∧ tc vs
tc (L1R#vs) = (R2R /∈ set vs) ∧ (R2F /∈ set vs) ∧ tc vs
tc (L1F#vs) = (R2R /∈ set vs) ∧ (R2F /∈ set vs) ∧ tc vs
tc (R2R#vs) = (L1R /∈ set vs) ∧ (L1F /∈ set vs) ∧ tc vs
tc (R2F#vs) = (L1R /∈ set vs) ∧ (L1F /∈ set vs) ∧ tc vs
tc (L3R#vs) = (R4R /∈ set vs) ∧ (R4F /∈ set vs) ∧ tc vs
tc (L3F#vs) = (R4R /∈ set vs) ∧ (R4F /∈ set vs) ∧ tc vs
tc (R4R#vs) = (L3R /∈ set vs) ∧ (L3F /∈ set vs) ∧ tc vs
tc (R4F#vs) = (L3R /∈ set vs) ∧ (L3F /∈ set vs) ∧ tc vs
tc (D1R#vs) = (U3R /∈ set vs) ∧ (U3F /∈ set vs) ∧ tc vs
tc (D1F#vs) = (U3R /∈ set vs) ∧ (U3F /∈ set vs) ∧ tc vs
tc (U3R#vs) = (D1R /∈ set vs) ∧ (D1F /∈ set vs) ∧ tc vs
tc (U3F#vs) = (D1R /∈ set vs) ∧ (D1F /∈ set vs) ∧ tc vs
tc (D2R#vs) = (U4R /∈ set vs) ∧ (U4F /∈ set vs) ∧ tc vs
tc (D2F#vs) = (U4R /∈ set vs) ∧ (U4F /∈ set vs) ∧ tc vs
tc (U4R#vs) = (D2R /∈ set vs) ∧ (D2F /∈ set vs) ∧ tc vs
tc (U4F#vs) = (D2R /∈ set vs) ∧ (D2F /∈ set vs) ∧ tc vs
Figure 7.10: The tc function: Thruster consistency mechanised in Isabelle/HOL| |
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The fourth requirement asserts that no two thrusters being fired should have a can-
celling effect, i.e. oppose one another. This property is called thruster consistency [12],
and is mechanised in Isabelle/HOL as the primitive recursive tc function over a list of
thrusters, shown in Figure 7.10. There, set is a built-in function which turns a list into
a set. The fourth property is then formalised as follows:
2(res6 6= ⊥ ⇒ tc res6). (7.15)
Proof outline. The proof of (7.15) uses the set BF set ≡ {B1,B2,B3,B4,F1,F2,F3,F4}.
Moreover, a predicate BF Type x for a thruster x (of type thruster name), defined by
pattern matching, holds if x ∈ BF set, while BF Types extends this to a list of thrusters.
LRUD set, LRUD Type and LRUD Types are similarly defined for LRUD thrusters. The
following property
BF Types bs ∧ LRUD Types ls ∧ tc bs ∧ tc ls⇒ tc (bs · ls) (7.16)
is first verified by induction on bs. It asserts that the concatenation of two thruster
consistent lists of different “types”, as defined above, results in a thruster consistent list.
Then, tc w38, tc w39, tc (w38 ·w39) and BF Types w38, BF Types w39, BF Types (w38 ·w39)
are verified by first applying the IIws tac tactic. The remaining sub-goals are proved
by the Isabelle/HOL auto tactic, which implicitly contains the required rewrite rules
generated from the definitions of the tc, BF Type and BF Types functions. The same
is verified for w36 and w37, although they are of LRUD Types, thus LRUD Type and
LRUD Types generated rewrite rules are used instead of the rules from BF Type and
BF Types, albeit this is automatically handled by the auto tactic. These properties
and (7.16), are strong enough to prove 2(w41 6= ⊥ ⇒ tc w41), where the IIws tac tactic
is first applied, followed by an application of (7.16) and the standard Isabelle/HOL
simplifier2. (7.15) follows directly from this using the Iows tac tactic. ∴
7.5 Summary & discussion
This chapter has shown use of Hierarchical Hume and the reasoning techniques in-
troduced in Chapter 6. These experiments have shown that the tactics developed in
Chapter 6 have a high degree of automation for provable properties, albeit they quickly
become slow with the size of the program. For example, using a 2.4 GHc Intel core 2
Duo iMac with 1 GB memory, many of the SAFER lemmas could take over half an
2Actually, the result buffer of thruster join is verified this way, and the property of w41 follows
by the Iows tac tactic
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hour to solve. This is a problem in Isabelle, since the proof is not stored, as in e.g.
PVS. Thus each time Isabelle is restarted, the tactic is reapplied, meaning the already
verified proofs have to be re-searched.
One possibility for optimising the tactics is to use other built-in Isabelle reason-
ing tools, such as the sledgehammer tactic, which applies automatic resolution based
provers to verify a goal [142].
Another solution is a more controlled rewriting, which may require a deeper em-
bedding. Firstly, the super-step phase, which can only consume wires and empty result
buffers, is unnecessary slow, since the shallow embedding cannot capture this in gen-
eral. Secondly, the unf nesting tac tactic reduces a proof of a nested property to within
the box capturing the wires/buffers the property is over. However, it does not remove
non-required assumptions like other boxes, which introduce unnecessary proof search.
Moreover, the tactic specifies detailed application of rules and tactics on particular sub-
goals, and does not capture the overall reasoning pattern. Consequently, the tactics
may fail if the program and property deviates slightly from the expectations.
Proof planning [32] is a higher-level method of reasoning, where common patterns
of reasoning are captured by a proof plan. Abstracting the tactic into a proof plan
would enable more re-use, since it would be less exposed to minor changes. Isabelle
supports proof planning through IsaPlanner [57, 58]. More controlled rewriting can be
achieved by a proof plan called rippling [33], which guarantees termination. Thus, it
may be possible to solve the looping of the vending machine example of Chapter 5.
Rippling was originally developed for the step-case of inductive proofs, and may thus
be suitable for the inductive style of verifying invariants in TLA. Rippling within the
Hume/TLA context is discussed further in Section 9.4.
The tactics cannot solve, or provide guidance, for non-theorems or theorems that
require strengthening or generalisation. Even the simplest (D1) style wire invariant
requires a proof of the result buffer, albeit this detail was abstracted over in text of
some of the case studies. The other invariant styles require more strengthening.
The SAFER system is the largest Hierarchical Hume case study, and verification
and testing has independently been discussed using PVS [153, 194] and VDM-SL [12].
VDM-SL is fully automatic, however, it can only check selected cases and thus cannot
give formal correctness guarantees. In [194], Di Vito creates proof tactics in PVS for
systems modelled as state machines. He achieves a higher degree of automation for
the SAFER properties, compared to the Hierarchical Hume version. The reduced level
of automation can be attributed to: i) the work is at the programming language level
(a lower level of abstraction); ii) extra overhead from embedding Hierarchical Hume
on top of TLA; iii) extra overhead from the Hierarchical Hume into Isabelle/HHume
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translation; iv) a more complex coordination layer embedding of the computation,
compared to a high-level and atomic functional representation in PVS. Finally, the
Isabelle/HHume version can be extended with liveness, whilst in PVS, this will require
a complete re-embedding of the system.
Note that both the invariant proofs and transformation proofs could have been ver-
ified in other state-based refinement systems, like B or Event-B, however, these cannot
be extended with liveness, and integration with the expression layer, as discussed in
Section 9.2, may not be so direct.
Currently, in a failed costing, the program is transformed, and the transformation
is verified ad-hoc as described above. The next chapter describes a different approach
where the transformation and verification are joined by outlining a box calculus for
transformations.
Chapter8
Towards a box calculus for transformations1
8.1 Introduction
| |
Figure 8.1: Thesis roadmap: Chapter 8| |
The verification of transformations in Chapter 7 was ad-hoc: a program was first
transformed, and then verified. To enhance automation and user interaction, a better
approach may be to define a calculus to direct these transformations. The transformed
program is synthesised, and no ad-hoc verification is required, thus introducing the
correctness by construction principle [14]. Common transformations can then be cap-
tured by strategies which combines lower level rules. Moreover, by defining the calculus
at the Hume level, the users are liberated from the underlying logical details.
1The main contents of this chapter have been published in [87].
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In this chapter such a calculus is proposed, and Figure 8.1 highlights which part
of the roadmap is being implemented here. The calculus is intended to guarantee that
each step of a transformation preserves the program’s behaviour. The approach is
merely outlined, and although an underlying TLA logic is assumed, the logical details
are informal. The properties discussed here are not formally proved. This is beyond
the scope of this thesis.
The Hume layer dependency is strong within a transformation – manipulating one
layer necessarily requires manipulation of the other. Thus, in order to define the
calculus, more details of the expression layer must be incorporated into the discussion.
This is achieved by (informally) updating the Hume structural operational semantics
(SOS) [112] with hierarchical features and using these in the TLA embedding. This
is discussed in the next section, together with the syntax and semantics of the rules.
This is followed by a description of rules and strategies in Section 8.3. Here, a selection
of rules and strategies are derived while the remaining relevant rules and strategies
are summarised. Section 8.4 provides two examples of applying the calculus, before
relevant work is discussed, and the chapter is concluded.
8.2 Rule syntax and semantics
To simplify the presentation, the non-relevant features of the Hume SOS are ignored.
Moreover, the calculus is intended for transformation, and not property, verification.
This requires the ability to manipulate coordination features of nested components,
meaning these must be hidden (∃-bound). Representing them as free variables, as in
Chapters 6 and 7, will impose too many restrictions on usage.
A Hierarchical Hume program configuration thus consists of a triple
〈θ, η, bcs〉 :
θ is the wire heap with allocated space for each wire. It also holds potential initial
wire values; η is the internal heap, including internal wires for hierarchical boxes. The
consistent use of heap instead of stack reflects the Hume SOS. bcs is a list of box
configurations. Each box configuration consists of the elements
〈id, iws, ows, rs, ii, nci, io, ibcs〉 :
id is the box’s name; iws is a list of locations holding the input wires; ows is a list
of locations holding the output wires; rs is a list of matches; ii is a list of locations
of internal input wires; io is a list of locations of internal output wires; nci are the
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non-connected internal wires, i.e. the internal wires that are not in ii and io; and ibcs
is a list of box configurations of internal (nested) boxes. For simplicity, a Hierarchical
Hume box may have more than one match, meaning the termination condition depends
on which pattern succeeds. This is a natural extension of Hierarchical Hume. A flat
box is represented as 〈id, iws, ows, rs, [], [], [], []〉.
runbcs
is a predicate on the pairs of before heaps 〈θ, η〉 and after heaps 〈θ′, η′〉 for the bcs box
configurations. It represents the execution of the program, and the full TLA program
specification thus becomes
∃η : Initθ ∧ Initη ∧2[runbcs]〈θ,η〉.
Other auxiliary variables like box state st and the scheduler s will probably be required
but these are ignored here due to the high-level nature of the discussion. The box
calculus consists of a set of conditional rewrite rules. A rule changes the triple 〈θ, η, bcs〉
and has the syntax
〈θ, η, bcs〉 ` Rule(X1, · · · , Xn) ⇓ 〈θ′, η′, bcs′〉.
This should be read as “Rule with parameters X1, · · · , Xn will, under the configura-
tion 〈θ, η, bcs〉 create the configuration 〈θ′, η′, bcs′〉”. To achieve a set of rules that is
expressive enough, steps that change timing behaviour must be allowed. It is there-
fore imperative that the preconditions are strong enough to ensure that the actual
behaviour remains unchanged. This is mostly a coordination issue and the nature of
this layer often requires temporal properties. Thus, the HW-Hume level is used as a
starting point for the calculus, and the examples in Section 8.4 are in HW-Hume.
A transformation from the configuration 〈θ, η, bcs〉 into the configuration 〈θ′, η′, bcs′〉
is represented as expected in TLA:
(∃η′ : Initθ′ ∧ Initη′ ∧2[runbcs’]〈θ′,η′〉)⇒ (∃η : Initθ ∧ Initη ∧2[runbcs]〈θ,η〉).
For simplicity the execute phase is assumed to be atomic. This simplifies for example
joining two boxes. With the given assumptions (see rule derivation in Section 8.3),
this is straightforward in an atomic execute phase. In a sequential (non-atomic) phase,
this is more involved since the boxes execute in different states. However, this is only
allowed in nesting boxes where η is ∃-bound. Thus, it is still provable, but requires
a more complex refinement mapping, and the proof may require auxiliary variables.
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Such details are ignored henceforth. Now, to simplify reasoning, combining the TLA
rules (E1) (TLA2) and (STL4) to instantiate the refinement mapping and verify a
transformation is captured by ⇒T :
〈θ′, η′〉 ⇒ 〈θ, η〉 [runbcs’]〈θ′,η′〉 ⇒ [runbcs]〈θ,η〉
〈θ′, η′, bcs′〉 ⇒T 〈θ, η, bcs〉 .
An important feature, which underpins the calculus, is the transitivity of ⇒T :
Theorem 8.1. 〈θ, η, bcs〉 ⇒T 〈θ′, η′, bcs′〉 and 〈θ′, η′, bcs′〉 ⇒T 〈θ′′, η′′, bcs′′〉 implies
〈θ, η, bcs〉 ⇒T 〈θ′′, η′′, bcs′′〉 .
Proof outline. The proof reduces to transitivity of ⇒ which is trivial. ∴
8.3 Rules & strategies
| |
Gen Rules(rs): Returns a generalisation of rs. In patterns variables
are replaced by ‘ ’ while the rest is unchanged. In expression everything
but ‘∗′ is replaced by ‘ ’, and all function calls are removed.
get box(B, bcs): Returns box configuration with box id B from list bcs.
HeapLocs Copy
(
[l1, · · · ln], H1, H2
)
: Returns a tuple 〈[l′1, · · · l′n], H ′2〉 holding
a copy of [l1, · · · ln] of H1 into H2 and the updated H2.
is Blocked(B): Holds if box B cannot be executed.
len(L): Returns the length of list L.
mutually exclusive(rs): Holds if the patterns of rule set rs are mutually exclusive.
project
(
[(p1 → e1), · · · (pn → en)], [(p′1 → e′1), · · · (p′m → e′m)]
)
: Pairwise comb-
ines each pattern pi and p
′
j with ei and e
′
j where i ∈ 1..n and j ∈ 1..m.
L1@L2: Concat list L1 in front of list L2.
Time Dependency(B, bcs): Predicate that holds iff changing the number of
steps in B cannot alter the overall behaviour when running program defined by
box configuration bcs.
Figure 8.2: Box calculus auxiliary functions| |
The general categories of transformation rules in the box calculus will be familiar from
many comparable calculi. There are rules to: introduce/eliminate identity boxes; in-
troduce/eliminate nesting boxes; introduce/eliminate wires; combine/separate boxes
horizontally and vertically; expand/contract match patterns and results; and reorder
patterns and results. Special to Hume are rules for moving activity between result
expressions within boxes and coordination between boxes. Indeed, in Hume, coordina-
tion and expression level transformation are tightly coupled, and there are necessarily
strong links between the apparently distinct categories above.
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A full “formal” definition of all the rules will not be given, since the focus is on
the approach rather than all the underlying details. Moreover, a full derivation of all
rules would require more space than just a chapter. This discussion is therefore limited
to just a few rule and strategy derivations and a sketch of their correctness proofs.
The remaining rules and strategies are summarised below. Details, such as rule pre
conditions, have there been omitted. The rule derivations also requires some auxiliary
functions, which do not have any side effects on the program configuration. These are
shown in Figure 8.2.
Standard logical terminology is used in the rules: a rule postfixed by ‘I’ is a rule
that “introduces something”, and its dual, the elimination rule, is postfixed by ‘E’. The
rule derivations are also augmented by a graphical representation which only shows the
direct coordination impact of the rules.
In Chapters 6 and 7 it was shown that box nesting greatly mitigates the impact
of a box transformation, since timing contraints are localised and may be considered
independently of the rest of the program. The elements where such a transformation
may have an impact is called the box context, and include the siblings, parents, and
the box itself, together with the wires connecting them.
8.3.1 Summary of rules & strategies
CaseE(B, i) : Moves case expression in match i of box B into B’s rule set
CaseI(B, i, j) : Replaces match i to j in box B by a case-expression.
DupE(B, x, y) : Removes wire connected to x of B which is equal to wire
connected to y of box B.
DupI(A, x, x′, B, y, y′) : Duplicates wire connecting x of box A and y of B,
with wire names x′ (of A) and y′ (of B) respectively.
DupBoxE(A,B) : Eliminates box A which is a duplicate of box B.
DupBoxI(B,N) : Duplicates box B, which is given name N .
HCompE(B, [i1, · · · , in], [o1, · · · , om], X, Y ) : Horizontally de-composes box B
into boxes X and Y , where X has inputs [i1, · · · , in] and outputs [o1, · · · , om].
Y will have the inputs/output of B not in [i1, · · · , in]/[o1, · · · , om].
HCompI(A,B,N): Horizontally composes box A and box B into N .
HieE(B): Replaces B with it’s (only) child box.
HieI(B,N): Replaces box B by N which only holds B.
IdE(B): Eliminates identity box B.
IdI(B, v,N): Introduces an identity box N to wire connected to v of box B.
MatchE(B, n): Eliminates match n of box B.
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MatchI(B) : Introduces an empty match to box B.
MatchVarE(B, v) : Replaces variable v in box B by constants
(unfolds the finite type).
MatchVarI(B, i, o): Replaces constants in inputs i and output o by a variable.
Rename(A,N): Renames box A to N .
Replace
(
[A1, · · · , An], [B1, · · · , Bm]
)
: Replaces boxes A1, · · · , An by B1, · · · , Bm.
ReplaceExpr(A, n, e) : The expression of match n of box A is replaced by e.
ThreadE(B, x, y) : Removes threading of input x and output y of box B.
ThreadI(A, x,B) : Threads wire connected to x of box A through box B.
Unfold(B, n, f) : Unfolds function f in match n of box B.
ValueE(B, x) : Replaces wire w of box B by ‘∗’.
ValueI1(A, x,B, y, v) : Introduces value v to expressions of wire x of box A
and pattern of wire y of box B.
ValueI2(A, x, v, B, y, w) : Copies all expression of wire v to wire x of box A and
all of wire w to wire y of box B.
VCompE(B,N, [o1, · · · on],M, [i1, · · · in]) : Vertically de-composes box B into
two sequentially composed boxes N and M , where N has B’s inputs and
[o1, · · · on] as outputs, and M has [i1, · · · in] as inputs and B’s outputs.
VCompI(A,B,N) : Vertically composes box A and box B into a new box
with name N .
VRename(A, x,N): Renames wire x of box A to N .
WireE(B, x) : Eliminates (empty) wire connected to wire x of box B.
WireI(A, x,B, y) : Introduces an empty wire holding only ‘∗’ patterns/
expressions from (new) wire x of box A to (new) wire y of box B.
8.3.2 Derivation of HieI
The first rule, HieI, nests one box with name B inside another box A with name N .
This rule introduces a bounded context for B, only consisting of N and B. By applying
this rule, the top level timing dependencies can be ignored when transforming B, and
many (temporal) preconditions of rules require a bounded context. The rule copies
input and output wires to the internal heap, by using the HeapLocs Copy function.
These are the new wires of the newly created nested box B′, and the internal wires of
the nesting box A. Further, A consists of one nested box B′ and generalises B’s rule
set into the more restricted hierarchical form, by Gen Rules:
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〈B, iws, ows, rs, iw, nci, ow, ibcs〉 = get box(B, bcs)
〈niw, η′′〉 = HeapLocs Copy(iws, θ, η)
〈now, η′〉 = HeapLocs Copy(ows, θ, η′′)
B′ = 〈B, niw, now, rs, iw, nci, ow, ibcs〉 irs = Gen Rules(rs)
A =
〈
N, iws, ows, irs, niw, [], now, [B′]
〉
〈θ, η, bcs〉 ` Replace([A], [B]) ⇓ 〈θ, η′, bcs′〉
〈θ, η, bcs〉 ` HieI(B,N) ⇓ 〈θ, η′, bcs′〉
Theorem 8.2.
If 〈θ, η, bcs〉 ` HieI(A,N) ⇓ 〈θ′, η′, bcs′〉
then 〈θ′, η′, bcs′〉 ⇒T 〈θ, η, bcs〉
Proof outline. η is only extended and θ is not changed, thus 〈θ′, η′〉 ⇒ 〈θ, η〉 holds.
In bcs, B is replaced by A. Since A’s rule set generalises B’s the matching will be the
same. Further, since A only contains B, the computation and termination will be the
same, and therefore also the result. Therefore runbcs’ ⇒ runbcs holds. ∴
8.3.3 Derivation of HCompI
In the derivation of HCompI, two non-nested boxes, A and B, are horizontally com-
posed into a new box called N . However, A and B must always have the same Blocked
status, since N will be Blocked if either of them is. If one, but not the other, is Blocked
the behaviour of the composed box N will not capture the sum of A and B. The
inputs and outputs of A prefix B’s inputs and outputs. For all matches, the patterns
and expressions of A and B are pairwise composed by project. This projection might
introduce non-determinacy, so the patterns must be mutually exclusive. Finally, A
might execute while B fails to pattern match the inputs, and vice verse. This is cap-
tured by postfixing the composed rule set below with a rule set where A’s rule set is
composed with only ‘∗’s, and the same for B. The box N ′, capturing all the above,
replaces A and B:
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〈A, iwsA, owsA, rsA, [], [], [], []〉 = get box(A, bcs)
〈B, iwsB, owsB, rsB, [], [], [], []〉 = get box(B, bcs)
2
(
is Blocked(A) ≡ is Blocked(B))
mutually exclusive(rsA) mutually exclusive(rsB)
iws = iwsA@iwsB ows = owsA@owsB
nA = len(iwsA) mA = len(owsA)
nB = len(iwsB) mB = len(owsB)
∗A = [〈∗, · · · , ∗︸ ︷︷ ︸
nA
〉 → 〈∗, · · · , ∗︸ ︷︷ ︸
mA
〉] ∗B = [〈∗, · · · , ∗︸ ︷︷ ︸
nB
〉 → 〈∗, · · · , ∗︸ ︷︷ ︸
mB
〉]
rs = project(rsA, rsB) @ project(rsA, ∗B) @ project(∗A, rsB)
N ′ = 〈N, iws, ows, rs, [], [], [], []〉
〈θ, η, bcs〉 ` Replace([N ′], [A,B]) ⇓ 〈θ, η, bcs′〉
〈θ, η, bcs〉 ` HCompI(A,B,N) ⇓ 〈θ, η, bcs′〉
The unification with the empty list ensures that the boxes are not nested with get box.
The mutual exclusiveness test is straightforward, and the establishment of the Blocked
state requires a temporal invariance proof. This has therefore been prefixed with 2.
Theorem 8.3.
If 〈θ, η, bcs〉 ` HCompI(A,B,N) ⇓ 〈θ, η, bcs′〉
then 〈θ′, η′, bcs′〉 ⇒T 〈θ, η, bcs〉
Proof outline. There is no nesting, hence η = η. Further, it is obvious that θ′ = θ
and η′ = η, thus 〈θ′, η′〉 ⇒ 〈θ, η〉. The proof of runbcs’ ⇒ runbcs is by case-analysis on
the box state of A and B: Since 2
(
is Blocked(A) ≡ is Blocked(B)), A and B are
always Blocked at the same time. Hence, if one is Blocked then so is the other, and
since N will be Blocked if either of them are, so is N . If both A and B succeed then,
since all possible matches are composed, so will N . Since the patterns are mutually
exclusive only one pattern can succeed, and the result is obviously the same. If both
boxes fail to execute, then so will N since it only composes A and B. Finally, the case
where only one box succeeds is captured by the case where each match is composed
with only ‘∗’s. Thus the goal holds. ∴
8.3.4 Derivation of VCompE
The third, and final, rule VCompE, vertically decomposes a box: it assumes a box
B with one match, where the expression has the form of a function composition of
functions f and g on the input. The box is vertically split between f and g such
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as the result of f in new box N , is the input on the wires to new box M , which
has the expression g. However, this split introduces an extra step. The predicate
Time Dependency(B, bcs) holds if changing the number of steps to compute B
may change behaviour of the full program, defined by bcs. Hence, the negation of
Time Dependency, ensures that the extra steps do not change the behaviour:
¬Time Dependency(B, bcs)
〈B, iwsB, owsB, rsB, [], [], [], []〉 = get box(B, bcs)
rsB = [〈v1, · · · , vm〉 → g(f〈v1, · · · , vm〉)]
rsN = [〈v1, · · · , vm〉 → f〈v1, · · · , vm〉]
rsM = [〈i1, · · · , in〉 → g〈i1, · · · , in〉)]
N = 〈N, iws, [o1, · · · , on], rsN , [], [], [], []〉
M = 〈M, [i1, · · · , in], ows, rsM , [], [], [], []〉
〈θ, η, bcs〉 ` Replace([B], [N,M ]) ⇓ 〈θ, η, bcs′〉
〈θ, η, bcs〉 ` VCompE(B,N, [o1, · · · , on],M, [i1, · · · , in]) ⇓ 〈θ, η, bcs′〉
Theorem 8.4.
If 〈θ, η, bcs〉 ` VCompE(B,N, [o1, · · · , on],M, [i1, · · · , in]) ⇓ 〈θ, η, bcs′〉
then 〈θ′, η′, bcs′〉 ⇒T 〈θ, η, bcs〉
Proof outline. The rule represents function de-composition lifted up to the coordi-
nation layer. The wiring ensures sequential execution. Thus showing that computing f
then g in one cycle, will produce the same result as f in one cycle and then g in the next
cycle, is trivial. The de-composition introduces an extra cycle which may change the
overall behaviour of the context. However, the predicate ¬Time Dependency(B, bcs)
ensures that this is not the case. ∴
8.3.5 Strategies
The rules will often be too low-level to work with. Instead a user will work with
higher-level strategies, which are derived from rules and other strategies. An example
of a strategy, although still rather low-level, is the elimination of threading. A wire is
threaded through a box if there is a one-to-one correspondence between a pattern x
and an expression y in all matches. x cannot be used in other expressions (except y).
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Further, x and y must form an identity box. When eliminated, the threaded value will
arrive earlier at the destination. This must not have any effect on the context. Finally,
a Blocked state on B will prevent the threaded value leaving B, which is not the case
when the thread is eliminated. This must again not have any impact on the context.
Since the rule is derived from other rules these precondition can be ignored as they are
implicitly captured by the preconditions of the rules in the derivation.
For example threading elimination, ThreadE, is derived as follows: x and y are
horizontally de-composed into a new box Id by HCompE; Id is then an identity box
eliminated by IdE:
〈θ, η, bcs〉 ` HCompE(B, [x], [y], Id, B) ⇓ 〈θ1, η1, bcs1〉
〈θ1, η1, bcs1〉 ` IdE(Id) ⇓ 〈θ′, η′, bcs′〉
〈θ, η, bcs〉 ` ThreadE(B, x, y) ⇓ 〈θ′, η′, bcs′〉
The correctness proof for strategies are trivial since they only rely on Theorem 8.1:
Theorem 8.5.
If 〈θ, η, bcs〉 ` ThreadE(B, x, y) ⇓ 〈θ′, η′, bcs′〉
then 〈θ′, η′, bcs′〉 ⇒T 〈θ, η, bcs〉
Proof outline. Since the two given rules are applied sequentially, the proof reduces
to the transitivity of ⇒T . This is proved by Theorem 8.1. ∴
The second strategy derived, DupI, shows how to duplicate a wire: The wire
connecting variable x of box A with variable y of box B is copied to a new wire
between variable x′ and y′ of boxes A and B, respectively. The same initial value is
given, and the expression of x in A are copied to x′, while the matches of y in B are
copied to y′:
〈θ, η, bcs〉 `WireI(A, x′, B, y′) ⇓ 〈θ1, η1, bcs1〉
〈θ1, η1, bcs1〉 ` ValueI2(A, x′, x, B, y′, y) ⇓ 〈θ′, η′, bcs′〉
〈θ, η, bcs〉 ` DupI(A, x, x′, B, y, y′) ⇓ 〈θ′, η′, bcs′〉
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Theorem 8.6.
If 〈θ, η, bcs〉 ` DupI(A, x, x′, B, y, y′) ⇓ 〈θ′, η′, bcs′〉
then 〈θ′, η′, bcs′〉 ⇒T 〈θ, η, bcs〉
Proof outline. The proof is the same as in Theorem 8.5. ∴
8.4 Examples
Application of the calculus is illustrated by two examples. The first example shows
the decomposition of a half adder box into a binary tree of three elementary logic gate
boxes. The second example shows the decomposition of a full adder box into two half
adders and an elementary logic gate.
8.4.1 Example 1: half adders
Figure 8.3.a shows the source box half1 of the transformation, while Figure 8.3.b and
Figure 8.3.c show the resulting half2 box in diagrammatical and source code form.
The overall impact of the translation is from a truth table representation into a nesting
box containing a multi-box AND/XOR configuration. The calculus is applied stepwise
in a forward style, starting with half1. A dot ‘.’ notation is used to refer to nested
boxes, starting from the first level. If a rule has more than one parameter, it is sufficient
to give the full path to one of the boxes, since a rule is only applied to one context
at a time. To ease reading, the program configuration triple is omitted. A graphical
representation of each step is shown in Figure 8.4:
1. Rule HieI(half1, half2) replaces box half1 with a box half2 that nests half1.
2. There are no ∗’s in the context nested by half2. This implies that there are no
dependencies, and identity boxes for both input wires of half1 can be introduced:
IdI(half2.half1, x, Id) followed by IdI(half2.half1, y, Id′). The input/output
variables of the identity boxes are v/v’ by default. These are renamed to x/x1
and y/y1 respectively: VRename(half2.Id, v, x), VRename(half2.Id, v’, x1),
VRename(half2.Id’, v, y) and VRename(half2.Id’, v’, y1).
3. The two identity boxes are then horizontally composed into one box called fanout:
HCompI(half2.Id, Id’, fanout):
box fanout
in (x,y::Bit) out (x1,y1::Bit)
match
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-- Only 0 and 1
type Bit = int 1;
box half1
in (x,y::Bit)
out (s,c::Bit)
match
(0,0) -> (0,0) |
(0,1) -> (1,0) |
(1,0) -> (1,0) |
(1,1) -> (0,1);
a) half1: truth table.
b) half2: xor and and gates
box diagram.
box half2
in (x,y::Bit) out (s,c::Bit)
match
(_,_) -> (_,_)
boxes
box fanout
in (x,y::Bit)
out (x1,y1,x2,y2::Bit)
match
(x,y) -> (x,y,x,y);
wire fanout (half1.x,half2.y)
(xor.x,xor.y,and.x,and.y);
box xor
in (x,y::Bit) out (z::Bit)
match
(0,0) -> 0 |
(0,1) -> 1 |
(1,0) -> 1 |
(1,1) -> 0;
wire xor(fanout.x1,fanout.y1)
(half1.s);
box and
in (x,y::Bit) out (z::Bit)
match
(0,0) -> 0 |
(0,1) -> 0 |
(1,0) -> 0 |
(1,1) -> 1;
wire and (fanout.x2,fanout.y2)
(half1.c);
end;
c) half2: source code.
Figure 8.3: Half adders in Hierarchical Hume.| |
(x,y)->(x,y) | (x,*)->(x,*) | (*,y)->(*,y) ;
A simple invariant of the internal behaviour of half2 shows that it will never
be the case that only one of fanout’s inputs is empty. The last two matches of
fanout will therefore never succeed. This is the only precondition in the match
elimination rule which can therefore be applied: MatchE(half2.fanout, 3) and
MatchE(half2.fanout, 2).
4. The two wires connecting fanout and half1 are duplicated and named x2 and
y2: DupI(half2.fanout, x1, x2, half1, x, x2) followed by
DupI(half2.fanout, y1, y2, half1, y, y2).
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Figure 8.4: Transformation of half adder.| |
5. In half1 there are two sets of identical inputs: {x, y} and {x2, y2}. The output
s can be seen to depend only on the first set, while c only depends on the
second. The box can thus be de-composed. The first of these boxes is exactly the
same as the xor while the second is the same as the and box of Figure 8.3(b/c):
HCompE(half2.half1, [x,y], [s], xor, and). Finally, the inputs of the and box
are renamed: VRename(half2.and, x2, x) and VRename(half2.and, y2, y).
8.4.2 Example 2: full adders
The second example is more complex: a full adder adder1, represented as a truth table
(Figure 8.5a) is transformed into a representation adder2 using two half adders and an
OR gate (Figure 8.5b/c). As above, the transformation is step-by-step and each step
is graphically illustrated in Figure 8.6:
1. First, all matches of adder1 are moved inside a case expression. Since the pat-
terns are total with respect to the Bit type this is allowed: CaseI(adder1, 1, 8):
box adder1
in (x,y,c::Bit) out (s,c’::Bit)
match
(a,b,c) -> case (a,b,c) of ...;
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box adder1
in (x,y,c::Bit)
out (s,c’::Bit)
match
(0,0,0) -> (0,0) |
(0,1,0) -> (1,0) |
(1,0,0) -> (1,0) |
(1,1,0) -> (0,1) |
(0,0,1) -> (1,0) |
(0,1,1) -> (0,1) |
(1,0,1) -> (0,1) |
(1,1,1) -> (1,1) ;
a) adder1: truth table.
b) adder2: half adders and or gate.
box adder2
in (x,y,c::Bit) out (s,c’::Bit)
match
(_,_,_) -> (_,_)
boxes
box h1
in (x,y::Bit) out (s,c::Bit)
match
(0,0) -> (0,0) |
(0,1) -> (1,0) |
(1,0) -> (1,0) |
(1,1) -> (0,1);
wire h1(adder2.x,adder2.y)(h2.x,or.x);
box h2
in (x,y::Bit) out (s,c::Bit)
match ... -- same as h1
wire h2(h1.c,adder2.c)(adder2.s,or.y);
box or
in (x,y::Bit) out (z::Bit)
match
(0,0) -> 0 |
(0,1) -> 1 |
(1,0) -> 1 |
(1,1) -> 1;
wire or(h1.c,h2.c)(adder2.c);
end;
c) adder2: source code.
Figure 8.5: Full adders in Hierarchical Hume.| |
The case expression is then replaced by the function composition g · f(a,b,
c): ReplaceExpr(adder1, 1, g · f(a,b,c)) where f and g are shown in Figure
8.7. The next step vertically de-composes this box, where f is the expression
of the first box and g the expression of the second box. However, this will
introduce an extra step, and since the context is unknown, the adder1 box is
first nested: HieI(adder1, adder2). The boxes can then safely be de-composed:
VCompE(adder2.adder1, h1h2, [s,x’,c’], or, [z,x,y]).
2. The newly created or box has one match with the expression g, where g con-
sists of a (total) case expression. g is unfolded and the case-expression is moved
into the match: Unfold(adder2.or, g) followed by CaseE(adder2.or, 1). The
result is illustrated on the left side below. The first pattern and expression
are identical (and total), and may thus be replaced by a variable: Match-
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Figure 8.6: Transformation of full adder.| |
VarI(adder2.or, x, s). A variable is now threaded and can be eliminated (since
there are no ∗’s in the context): ThreadE(adder2.or, x, s). The result is illus-
trated on the right side:
box or
in(z,x,y::Bit) out(s,c’::Bit)
match
(0,0,0) -> (0,0) |
(1,0,0) -> (1,0) |
(0,0,1) -> (0,1) |
(1,0,1) -> (1,1) ...;
box or
in(x,y::Bit) out(c’::Bit)
match
(0,0) -> 0 |
(0,0) -> 0 |
(0,1) -> 1 |
(0,1) -> 1 ...;
Matches 2, 4, 6 and 8 are now duplicates of their previous matches, and can
therefore be removed: MatchE(adder2.or, 8),MatchE(adder2.or, 6),
MatchE(adder2.or, 4) and MatchE(adder2.or, 2). Finally, the output wire is
renamed to z: VRename(adder2.or, c’, z). The or box is now the same as in
Figure 8.5c.
3. Box h1h2 consists of one match with expression f. This function can be replaced
by the function composition gg ·ff(a,b,c) where ff and gg are shown in Figure
8.7: ReplaceExpr(adder2.h1h2, 1, gg · ff(a,b,c)). Since the context does not
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f(a,b,c) = case (a,b,c) of
(0,0,0) -> (0,0,0) |
(0,0,1) -> (1,0,0) |
(0,1,0) -> (1,0,0) |
(0,1,1) -> (0,0,1) ...;
g(a,b,c) = case (a,b,c) of
(0,0,0) -> (0,0) |
(1,0,0) -> (1,0) |
(0,0,1) -> (0,1) |
(1,0,1) -> (1,1) ...;
ff(a,b,c) = case (a,b,c) of
(0,0,0) -> (0,0,0) |
(0,0,1) -> (1,0,0) |
(0,1,0) -> (0,1,0) |
(0,1,1) -> (1,1,0) ...;
gg(a,b,c) = case (a,b,c) of
(0,0,0) -> (0,0,0) |
(0,0,1) -> (0,1,0) |
(0,1,0) -> (1,0,0) |
(0,1,1) -> (1,1,0) ...;
Figure 8.7: Auxiliary functions required in the full adder transformation.| |
contain any ∗’s vertical function de-composition can be applied:
VCompE(adder2.h1h2, h1, [s,x’,c’], h2, [x,y,c]).
4. gg of box h2 is unfolded and the (total) case-expression is moved into the body:
Unfold(adder2.h2, gg) and CaseE(adder2.h2, 1) as illustrated on the left side
below. The last pattern and second expression of all matches can be replaced by a
variable, which creates a threading that can be eliminated: MatchVarI(adder2.h2,
c, s) and ThreadE(adder2.h2, c, s), as illustrated on the right side:
box h2
in(x,y,c::Bit) out(s,x’,c’::Bit)
match
(0,0,0) -> (0,0,0) |
(0,0,1) -> (0,1,0) |
(0,1,0) -> (1,0,0) |
(0,1,1) -> (1,1,0) ...;
box h2
in(x,y::Bit) out(s,c’::Bit)
match
(0,0) -> (0,0) |
(0,0) -> (0,0) |
(0,1) -> (1,0) |
(0,1) -> (1,0) ...;
Matches 2, 4, 6 and 8 are now duplicates of previous matches and therefore re-
moved: MatchE(adder2.h2, 8), MatchE(adder2.h2, 6), MatchE
(adder2.h2, 4) and MatchE(adder2.h2, 2). By renaming the last output to c’
a correct implementation of a half adder is created: VRename
(adder2.h2,c’,c).
5. The transformation of h1 follows the same pattern as h2 (and or): First the case
expression is removed, followed by a variable introduction and threading elimi-
nation: Unfold(adder2.h1, ff), CaseE(adder2.h1, 1), MatchVarI
(adder2.h1, c, x’) and ThreadE(adder2.h2, c, x’). Then the duplicate matches
are removed, which creates a correct implementation of a half -adder: MatchE
(adder2.h1, 8), MatchE(adder2.h1, 6), MatchE(adder2.h1, 4) and MatchE
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(adder2.h1, 2). By renaming c’ to c the transformation is concluded: VRe-
name(adder2.h1,c’,c). An even lower representation can be achieved by apply-
ing the half-adder transformation to h1 and h2 as explained above.
8.5 Related work
A full Hume transformation combines rules and strategies, and is thus a strategy. As
discussed in Chapter 6, and following Visser’s classification [192], it can be seen both
as a program migration and a program refinement.
A single rule application which is not merely program rephrasing of the expres-
sion layer will have an impact on both layers. This strong interplay between the
two aspects of a Hume program, is distinctive compared with synthesis techniques,
like Bird-Meertens Formalism [26] and calculational programming [99]. Moreover, a
generic rule has no particular direction with respect to the two layers, and should thus
be classified as a program refactoring. Many strategies, in particular the lower-level,
should also be seen as program refactorings.
Following work with other refinement based formalisms like B [8], Event-B [9], and
probably also the ZRC [40] refinement calculus for Z, applying many small refinements,
instead of one large refinement greatly helps automating the proof in a theorem prover.
This is for example illustrated in [39] for Event-B. The box calculus draws upon this,
since a single rule has a small impact on the overall program, and a strategy is a
sequence of such small rule steps. High-level strategies are comparable to newly in-
troduced refinement patterns [100], which are used to capture common refinements.
However, a strategy is probably more detailed due to the context being a programming
language rather than a more abstract specification.
Just as Hume integrates a finite state coordination language with a functional tran-
sition control language, the work presented here draws on the twin traditions of process
network and functional program transformation. The coordination aspects of the rules
have many similarities with those found in the box calculus for Petri nets [54] as well
as process calculi [18]. The control aspects resemble classic functional programming
techniques including curry/uncurry, fold/unfold [36] and functional refactoring [134].
Previously, horizontal box integration has been explored in establishing informally that
FSM-Hume actually is finite state [146].
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8.6 Summary & discussion
A calculus supporting the systematic transformation of program components through
the introduction, modification, elimination, composition and separation of boxes and
wires, has been outlined and applied to examples. A major strength and novelty of
the calculus is that it combines changes to control aspects within boxes with those to
coordination aspects between boxes.
The next chapter discusses three separate topics, which are relevant to the main
topic of this thesis.
Chapter9
Relevant explorations
9.1 Introduction
| |
Figure 9.1: Thesis roadmap: Chapter 9| |
This chapter contains three separate explorations which are relevant to the topic of the
thesis, but not on the critical path. In the thesis roadmap these parts represents the
dotted boxes, as highlighted in Figure 9.1.
One of the motivation for the use of theorem proving, and particularly Isabelle/HOL,
was that this work is seen as a first step towards a Hume verification environment, and
should be integrated with the expression layer mechanisation conducted in parallel. In
Section 9.2, an initial experiment of this integration is shown.
A key feature of TLA, is that it can capture liveness and safety properties within
the same uniform logic. This thesis focuses on the safety aspect. Section 9.3 discusses
182
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how this can be extended to liveness.
The tactics developed in this thesis has a high degree of automation if the conjecture
is sufficiently strong. However, in most cases the conjecture had to be strengthened by
several auxiliary lemmas, in a “weakest precondition” fashion. This had to be achieved
manually. Section 9.4 outlines an approach based on a proof plan called rippling [33]
to automatically discover (D3) type invariants.
9.2 Integrating the expression layer1
This section discusses the integration with the VDM (Vienna Development Method)
[108] based mechanisation of the expression layer [135]. For the purpose of the work
here, the VDM logic provides pre-condition and post-condition style properties (similar
to Hoare logic) of the expression layer. These are then used in the proofs within the
TLA embedded coordination layer. The most relevant background is first given, before
the integration is explained and shown for an example. Note that Isabelle 2005 is used,
requiring an adaption of Isabelle/Hume, thus disabling the generated tactics.
9.2.1 Background: a VDM-style logic for the expression layer
The allowed types are represented by an inductive data type HoVal. Here, primitive
types like int and bool are embedded shallowly. The empty type ⊥ and reference types
to the heap are also supported. The heap is represented by mechanising a finite map
with look-up and update functions. It is represented by the type acronym Heap, with
actual type nat ⇒ HoVal.
The operational semantics for an expression e are given a deep inductive embedding,
and are written E, h ` e ⇓ (v,hh,p): given environment E and heap h, the expression
e returns a value (HoVal) v, a new heap hh and the required resources p. On top of
this, a higher-level VDM-style logic is derived where a judgement has the form G  e
: A: G is the context; while A is the assertion. The judgement denotes that A holds
for e in context G. The assertion is mechanised shallowly, and has the type λ E h hh
v p. P(E,h,hh,v,p). The shallow representation is the key for a direct integration. The
integration assumes an empty context {}, thus G is not discussed further. Firstly, valid
in context is defined as G  e : A ≡ (| G) −→ ( e : A), where | {} is trivial. The
key property is soundness of G  e : A:
1The VDM logic is mechanised by Hans-Wolfgang Loidl, and the integration is joint work with
him. In this section, he has conducted the work purely on the expression layer.
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theorem soundness: G  e : A =⇒ G  e : A
Finally, note that validity ( e : A) is defined as:
 e : A ≡ (∀ E h hh v p . (E, h ` e ⇓ (v,hh,p)) −→ A E h hh v p)
9.2.2 Integrating the TLA and VDM-style embeddings
In the integration, the expression layer is represented by E, h ` e ⇓ (v,hh,p), and the
required properties are proved by {}  e : A. The coordination layer is represented
in TLA using types HoVal and Heap. e will update the state, and A (from {}  e
: A) will capture required properties of e, used in the TLA proofs of coordination
layer properties. The lifted TLA logic, together with the shallow VDM assertions, ease
the integration. However, to enable integration, e must be represented as a function,
which cannot be directly achieved due the deep embedding of e. Thus, a function exe is
defined. It accepts an environment E, a heap h and an expression e, and returns a triple
consisting of a value v, a new heap hh and resource consumed p. This is axiomatised
with respect to the semantic definition of e:
axioms exe: (exe E h e = (v,hh,p)) = (E, h ` e ⇓ (v,hh,p))
vdmexe is then used to connect exe, {}  e : A and the desired property as a HOL
predicate, which is used in a TLA proof of coordination layer properties:
theorem vdmexe: J (v,hh,p) = exe E h e; {}  e : A K =⇒ A E h hh v p
Proof outline. The assumption applied to the soundness theorem implies {}  e : A.
By the definition of validity in context, this implies (| {}) −→ ( e : A) which implies
(G1)  e : A. Moreover, the definition of exe and the assumption of vdmexe, implies E,
h ` e ⇓ (v,hh,p). The goal then follows from unfolding (G1), by using the definition of
validity, followed by an application of it. ∴
9.2.3 An example
The integration is illustrated by the even-odd example from Section 5.5.2, consisting
of the two communicating even and odd boxes. The embedding of Section 5.5.2 is
changed by adding a heap of type Heap statefun. Moreover, the box state, scheduler
and program counter are unchanged, while the result buffers and wires are of type:
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w1, w2, even res, odd res :: HoVal statefun.
Since both the even and odd boxes have the same expression layer, they are represented
as the expression body. It accepts an environment E with a mapping from variable x
to a HoVal of type integer, i.e. the constructor I i, where i is of type int. The TLA em-
bedding is independent of how body is implemented. All that is required is the theorem
theorem body1: {}  body : λ E h hh v p. ∀ i r. E x = (I i) −→ v = (I (i+1)).
To simplify the TLA encoding, a function exebody is then defined as
exebody v h ≡ exe emptyEnv(x := v) h body.
The overall structure of the execute phase of each box is similar to Section 4.5: a test
on the program counter followed by a check on the box state. Following the Hume
semantics [112], patterns are first checked for matches, and the expression layer is only
called if a match succeeds. Here, this means that the input wire is not empty (#⊥). If
this is empty, everything are unchanged. If not, the wire is consumed and exebody is
called2:
if $w2 = #⊥
then (even res,even st,w2,heap)$ = (#⊥,#Matchfail,$w2,$heap)
else (w2,even st)$ = #(⊥,Runnable) ∧ (even res,heap,rsrc)$ = exebody<$w2,$heap>
The odd exe action is similar. The super-step can no longer be atomic and distributed
among the boxes, since the same heap is updated by all boxes. Distributing it will now
require a lower abstraction level, where the super-step phase contains several sequential
(TLA) steps. Instead, one specific action that super-steps all boxes is defined. The
initial state init and full program specification program are similar to Section 4.5.
The same property as in Section 4.5 is verified, however here the two sets Even and
Odd for integers replaces EvenN and OddN for naturals. Now, exebody1 joins the body1
and vdmexe theorems with the definition of exebody, while l1 shows that the wire is
either empty or an integer:
lemma exebody1: (vv,hh,st) = exebody (I n) h =⇒ vv = I (n+1)
lemma l1: ` program −→ 2((∃ n. $w1 = #(I n)) ∨ $w1 = #⊥)
∧ (∃ n. $w2 = #(I n)) ∨ $w2 = #⊥)
∧ (∃ n. $even res = #(I n)) ∨ $even res = #⊥)
2rsrc contains the information about resources and is not used in this program.
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∧ (∃ n. $odd res = #(I n)) ∨ $odd res = #⊥))
Proof outline. The proof of exebody1 follows directly from the definition of exebody
and Theorem body1 and the vdmexe theorem. The proof of l1 follows the structure of
a TLA invariant, with case analysis on the scheduler, the program counter, the box
states and pattern matching. The main part of the proof requires body1 and is mainly
by correct instantiation of bound variables. ∴
theorem main:
` program −→ 2((∀ n. $w1 = #(I n)) −→ #n ∈ #Even)
∧ (∀ n. $w2 = #(I n)) −→ #n ∈ #Odd)
∧ (∀ n. $even res = #(I n)) −→ #n ∈ #Even)
∧ (∀ n. $odd res = #(I n)) −→ #n ∈ #Odd))
Proof outline. The proof structure is similar to the proof of Lemma l1, and uses the
lemmas l1 and exebody1. ∴
The proof that 2(∀ n. $w1 = #(I n)) −→ #n ∈ #Even) and 2(∀ n. $w2 = #(I n)) −→
#n ∈ #Odd) follows by applying (STL5) to Theorem main.
9.2.4 Discussion
This section has illustrated how the TLA and VDM techniques can be integrated into a
proof environment for Hume. Moreover, the actual definitions are independent of each
other, since the integration only depends on the proved theorems (e.g. body1). Section
5.5.1 illustrated how TLA (TLA+) could be used to model check real-time properties.
Such real time properties, as well as space properties, should be possible to verify in
this VDM/TLA embedding. Another future work is to derive the exe axiom properly.
Now, the main problem is the heap representation. The formal semantics define a
wire heap and one separate heap for each box. This involves a very costly deep copy
between the wire heap and box heaps, and the cost model does not capture this. This
example used one heap, which was not accessed by any variables since dynamic types,
like lists, were not used. A similar one heap approach, was suggested by Vasconcelos’
PhD thesis [189]. Here, heap regions was used. However, for correctness properties a
single heap representation, require a proof that a box does not change the part of the
heap “owned” by other boxes. An elegant solution to capture this, is to introduce the
frame rule of separation logic [170], into the VDM-logic.
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9.3 Liveness
9.3.1 Liveness in flat Hume
Liveness in TLA was introduced in Section 2.3.1. Here, it is discussed for the abstract
TLA formalisation of Hume shown in Figure 4.2, although the sequential embedding
can be updated similarly. Moreover, as with the TLA proof rules, the focus is on
leads-to properties P ; Q. Now, liveness properties cannot be proved from the speci-
fication shown in Figure 4.2, since 2[S∧∧i∈BS Bi]〈s,ws,res,st〉 does not rule out the infinite
sequence of stuttering steps:
〈〈s,ws,res,st〉, 〈s,ws,res,st〉, 〈s,ws,res,st〉, 〈s,ws,res,st〉, · · · 〉,
where 〈s,ws,res,st〉 is the initial value of these state components. To prove liveness prop-
erties, the specification must be constrained by liveness assumptions, and as explained
in Section 2.3.1, these constraints should take the form of a fairness assumption. More-
over, these must be sub-actions of S ∧∧i∈BS Bi to ensure machine closure [5, page 519],
i.e. additional safety constraints are not introduced. Fairness assumptions on S, Bi
(for all i ∈ BS) and S ∧∧i∈BS Bi fall into this category and are implied by the Hume
semantics. Moreover, all these actions are always enabled, albeit this must be formally
verified. Assuming this, then by applying standard temporal reasoning,
2Enabled〈S〉〈s,ws,res,st〉 ⇒ 32Enabled〈S〉〈s,ws,res,st〉 ⇒ 23Enabled〈S〉〈s,ws,res,st〉
can be deduced. Since, S is always enabled, and by the definition of SF and WF ((2.3)
on page 15
)
, Hl implies SF〈s,ws,res,st〉(S) ≡ 23〈S〉〈s,ws,res,st〉 and WF〈s,ws,res,st〉(S) ≡
23〈S〉〈s,ws,res,st〉, which means that Hl implies
SF〈s,ws,res,st〉(S) ≡WF〈s,ws,res,st〉(S). (9.1)
The same can be deduced for S ∧∧i∈BS Bi and all the Bi actions. Thus, using these,
both weak and strong fairness can be used to prove P ; Q, which means applying
(WF1) or (SF1) respectively. Only weak fairness is discussed further. For a machine
closed action A of a TLA embedded Hume program, (WF1) is instantiated as
` P ∧ [S ∧∧i∈BS Bi]〈s,ws,res,st〉 ⇒ (P ′ ∨Q′)
` P ∧ 〈S ∧ (∧i∈BS Bi) ∧ A〉〈s,ws,res,st〉 ⇒ Q′
` P ⇒ Enabled 〈A〉〈s,ws,res,st〉
` 2[S ∧∧i∈BS Bi]〈s,ws,res,st〉 ∧WF〈s,ws,res,st〉(A)⇒ (P ; Q).
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Here, line 1 shows that if P holds then either P or Q must hold after both if the
subscript is left unchanged and if the next action is applied. Line 2 states, executing
A, implies that Q holds afterwards, while line 3 states that A must be weak enough
such that P implies that it is enabled. To illustrate, A is instantiated to S, to prove
that (s = Execute) ; (s = Super):
1. ` s = Execute ∧ [S ∧∧i∈BS Bi]〈s,ws,res,st〉 ⇒ (s′ = Execute ∨ s′ = Super)
2. ` s = Execute ∧ 〈S ∧ (∧i∈BS Bi) ∧ S〉〈s,ws,res,st〉 ⇒ s′ = Super
3. ` s = Execute⇒ Enabled 〈S〉〈s,ws,res,st〉
` 2[S ∧∧i∈BS Bi]〈s,ws,res,st〉 ∧WF〈s,ws,res,st〉(S)⇒ (s = Execute ; s = Super)
Proof outline. Line 1 states that by applying the next state action, or leaving the
state space unchanged s either remains Execute or becomes Super . This trivially
holds by S. Line 2 states that executing the next action (and S) such that the state
space changes, forces s to become Super , while line 3 asserts that S is enabled when
s = Execute. Both of these trivially hold. ∴
The ; operator is transitive (Lemma LT13 of Appendix A.1). Reasoning about a
P ; Q correctness property, will most likely require reducing this to smaller sub-
goals:
(P ; R1) ∧ (R1 ; R2) ∧ · · · ∧ (Rn ; Q).
For example, let wi be an input wire, and wo an output wire of box i ∈ BS, where
p projects the value of resi connected to wo. To verify P (wi) ; Q(wo), the proof
can be reduced to P (wi) ; Q
(
p(resi)
)
and Q
(
p(resi)
)
; Q(wo). Moreover, for a
“coordination iteration” loop, as in Section 7.2, the (LATTICE) rule can be applied to
prove “termination” if the type is well-founded and always reducing.
For example, to verify P (wi) ; Q
(
p(resi)
)
, s must be Execute and sti cannot
be Blocked . Moreover, the fairness constaint A must imply that with these assump-
tions, together with P (wi), Q
(
p(res′i)
)
holds as a result. Thus, it may be necessary to
strengthen the fairness constraint to (s = Execute ∧ Bei ) and (s = Super ∧ Bsi ) for all
i ∈ BS, albeit this requires more research. Moreover, to show Q(p(resi)) ; Q(wo), is
must be shown that wo is empty. This requires a proof that the destination box of wo
is not Blocked . This proof may require a proof that other boxes are not Blocked , and
so on. This may even depend on the Blocked status of the other boxes in the program.
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Model checking example: revisiting the traffic lights3
Liveness for model checking is illustrated by updating the traffic light example from
Section 5.5.1 with liveness. Moreover, 23P properties, which can be writeen True ;
P , are discussed. It is sufficient with weak fairness for the complete next-state action,
thus (5.5) is updated to:
Init ∧ Inittl1,tl2 ∧2[N ∧ S ∧ E ∧Ntl1,tl2 ]〈tl1,tl2,v〉 ∧WF〈tl1,tl2,v〉(N ∧ S ∧ E ∧Ntl1,tl2).
The first liveness property states that at any given time, there will always be a time
in the future when the lights are green:
23
(
tl1 = (0, 0, 1)
) ∧23(tl2 = (0, 0, 1))
An example of a leads-to property is that if tl1 is red then tl2 will eventually become
green, which is specified as
(
tl1 = (1, 0, 0) ; tl2 = (0, 0, 1)
) ∧ (tl2 = (1, 0, 0) ; tl1 = (0, 0, 1))
9.3.2 Liveness in Hierarchical Hume
The dependency liveness properties have on the Blocked status of, potentially, all boxes
in a program, is another example of the advantage of the structuring introduced by Hi-
erarchical Hume. Here, this dependency can be reduced and controlled. However, while
first-level boxes may have the same fairness assumptions as in flat Hume, execution of
nested boxes depends on the parent. Now, since nested boxes execute when the par-
ent’s state is Execute or Super , a possible fairness constraint is WF〈s,ws,res,st〉(boxsch(i) ∈
{Execute, Super} ⇒ Bi), but this requires further research. Note that termination of a
nesting box can be expressed as sti ∈ {Execute, Super}; sti = Terminated.
When constraining a program with fairness, the fairness constraints must be pre-
served by a transformation, and thus also incorporated into the box calculus. This is
verified by (WF2) and (SF2), for weak and strong fairness respectively. Note that, as
shown in the definition of (WF2) and (SF2), refinement mapping (i.e. substitutions)
does not distribute over Enabled. The verification of transformation of programs with
liveness constraints is more difficult than the safety aspect, and requires further study.
3This example is published in [91]
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| |
mult: inp1 := w1; inp2 := w2;
{ True }
a := inp1; b := inp2;
r := 0; x := a; y := b;
while (y 6= 0)
begin
r := r + x; y := y − 1;
end
o := r;
out := o;
{out = inp1 ∗ inp2 }
out = inp1 ∗ inp2
Figure 9.2: Left: imperative multiplication as iteration. Right: Hume multiplication as
iteration| |
9.3.3 Discussion
The Hume coordination layer possesses many interesting liveness properties which TLA
is well equipped to handle. This section has discussed fairness constraints of the Hume
coordination layer, illustrated the proof of a small scheduling liveness property, and
shown liveness verification by model checking. Fairness constraints for Hierarchical
Hume have also been briefly discussed. The liveness work is still at a very early
stage of development, and liveness is, in general, considered much harder than safety.
However, as with safety properties, by exploring the strict structure and scheduling of
Hume programs, it may be possible to implement tactics to automate liveness proofs
as well.
9.4 Towards property discovery automation4
This section discusses the use of rippling [33] and proof critics [103] to discover (D3)
type invariants and verify transformations. It is achieved by adapting previous work
with imperative programs [105, 106] into TLA-embedded Hierarchical Hume programs.
The mult box from Section 7.2 is used as illustration, however the result buffer and
scheduling phases of the nested box are abstracted over to ease the reading. This
is shown on the right hand side of Figure 9.2, while the left hand side shows the
corresponding Hoare annotated imperative code.
4This section has been published in [86]
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9.4.1 Rippling background
| |
Input sequent: H ` G[f1( c1( . . .)
↑
, f2(b. . .c), f3( c2( . . .)
↑
))]
Method preconditions:
1. there exists a subterm T of G which contains wave-front(s), e.g.
f1( c1( . . .)
↑
, f2(b. . .c), f3( c2( . . .)
↑
))
2. there exists a wave-rule which matches T , e.g.
C → f1( c1(X )
↑
, Y, Z)⇒ c5(f1(X, c3(Y )
↓
, c4(Z )
↓
))
↑
3. the wave-rule condition follows from the context, e.g. H ` C
4. resulting inward directed wave-fronts are potentially removable, e.g. sinkable or
cancellable, i.e.
. . . c3(f2(b. . .c))
↓
. . . or . . . c4(f3( c2( . . .)
↑
))
↓
. . .
Output sequent: H ` G[ c5(f1(. . . , c3(f2(b. . .c))
↓
, c4(f3( c2( . . .)
↑
))
↓
))
↑
]
Figure 9.3: The rippling method [33]| |
Rippling [33] is a proof planning [32] rewriting technique, based upon a difference
reduction strategy. Rippling can be illustrated by considering a conjecture with a hy-
pothesis of the form (∀b′. f(a, b′)) and a goal of the form f(c1(a), b). Here, the c1(. . .)
embedded within the goal prevents a match with the hypothesis. In rippling, such
embedded structures are called wave-fronts. The goal of rippling is to identify and
reduce the number of wave-fronts such that a hypothesis can be applied. Wave-fronts
can be represented using explicit annotations that are added to the goal. For example,
using shading to denote wave-fronts, the goal given above becomes f( c1(a)
↑
, bbc).
In addition to the shading, note that a wave-front is annotated with an arrow. The
arrow indicates which direction the wave-front can be moved, i.e. upward or downward
through the goal structure. There are two reasons for moving a wave-front downward.
Firstly, if a wave-front can be moved to a position corresponding to a universally quan-
tified variable within the given hypothesis, then the wave-front can be eliminated via
the specialisation of the universal hypothesis. This is known as sinking a wave-front,
and the b. . .c annotation within the goal is used to indicate sink positions. Secondly,
multiple wave-fronts can sometimes cancel each other out, a kind of destructive inter-
Chapter 9. Relevant explorations 192
ference. So moving wave-fronts closer together can also make sense. The manipulation
of wave-fronts is achieved via wave-rules, which are rewrite rules that have been anno-
tated by wave-fronts. Wave rules must preserve the unannotated structure of the goal,
known as the skeleton. This preservation maximises the chances of eventually applying
the given hypothesis. In the schematic example given above, the following represents
an applicable wave-rule:
f( c1(X )
↑
, Y )⇒ c2(f(X, c3(Y )
↓
))
↑
Now, a proof plan contains methods and critics [102]. Methods represent common
patterns of reasoning, and Figure 9.3 shows the rippling method. Critics are used to
define patchable exceptions. When a method fails, its associated critics analyse the
proof-failure and initiate a proof patch [102, 103, 104]. Typically the proof patching
process uses meta-variables as place-holders for missing structure. Here, it is expected
that the constraints of the proof will provide instantiations during the planning of the
remainder of the proof. This style of patching a proof is known as middle-out reasoning
[34], and is used in the proof plans below.
9.4.2 Invariant verification
In [105], rippling was used to verify Hoare-triple properties as illustrated on the left
hand side of Figure 9.2. To verify a Hoare-triple, it is converted into a verification con-
dition (VC), a purely logical statement, by a verification condition generator (VCG).
The VC is then verified by a theorem prover. However, before this can be done, each
statement must be turned into a Hoare-triple. This is mostly an automatic process,
however finding and verifying an invariant which holds throughout the while loop,
known as the loop invariant, is the most difficult aspect. Thus, loop invariants are fo-
cused upon here. In the program on the left hand side of Figure 9.2 the loop invariant
is r+ (x ∗ y) = inp1 ∗ inp2. In the proof, the invariant is assumed beforehand, and this
assumption is called the invariant hypothesis (IH)
IH : r + (x ∗ y) = inp1 ∗ inp2. (9.2)
IH is assumed before the loop execution, and it is showed that it holds afterwards.
By using wave-annotation, this goal is expressed as (r + x)
↑
+ (x ∗ (y − 1) ↑ ) =
inp1 ∗ inp2. The proof requires the following wave-rules:
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(X + Y )
↑
+ Z ⇒ X + (Y + Z ) ↓ (9.3)
X ∗ (Y − 1) ↑ ⇒ (X ∗ Y )−X ↑ (9.4)
(X + Y −X ↑ )
↓
⇒ Y, (9.5)
and is derived as follows:
(r + x)
↑
+ (x ∗ (y − 1) ↑ ) = inp1 ∗ inp2 [apply (9.3)]
r + (x+ (x ∗ (y − 1) ↑ ))
↓
= inp1 ∗ inp2 [apply (9.4)]
r + (x+ ( (x ∗ y) − x ↑ ))
↓
= inp1 ∗ inp2 [apply (9.5)]
r + (x ∗ y) = inp1 ∗ inp2 [apply IH]
The last match of itermult responds to the while loop in the imperative program.
Since the match expression is the result of executing a Hume box, it refers to the
primed result state of an action. The annotated result of translating (*,r-x,x,y-1)
into TLA becomes:
r′ = (r + x)
↑
x′ = x y′ = (y − 1) ↑ inp′1 = inp1 inp′2 = inp2. (9.6)
The “loop invariant” in TLA is the same as in the imperative program, and the IH for
the invariant proof is also the same (IH: r + (x ∗ y) = inp1 ∗ inp2). The ripple proof
derivation starts off as
r′ + (x′ ∗ y′) = inp′1 ∗ inp′2 [apply (9.6)]
(r + x)
↑
+ (x ∗ (y − 1) ↑ ) = inp1 ∗ inp2 [· · · ]
and the remaining proof is identical to the imperative program. Note, that the first
annotation step here is handled by the VCG in the imperative version.
9.4.3 Loop invariant discovery
The most difficult aspect of Hoare-triple proofs, is the undecidable task of finding a
strong enough loop invariant, like (9.2). [105] contains novel work, where proof critics
[103] are used to explore partial ripple successes to discover a strong enough loop
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| |
Blockage: r + x
↑
= inp1 ∗ inp2
Critic precondition:
• Precondition 1 of rippling succeeds, i.e.
1. there is a subterm T of G which contains a wave-front(s), e.g. r + x
↑
• Precondition 2 of rippling partially succeeds, i.e.
2. there exists a wave-rule which partially matches, e.g. r + x
↑
with (X + Y )
↑
+ Z ⇒ . . .
Proof patch:
Speculate additional term structure within the conjecture such
that preconditions 2, 3 and 4 will also potentially succeed, i.e.
F1( r + x
↑
, x, y − 1 ↑ ) = inp1 ∗ inp2, where F1 is a higher-order meta-
variable.
Figure 9.4: A tail-invariant proof critic instantiation (adapted from [105])| |
invariant. Firstly, both a while loop and a Hume feedback loop, as in Figure 9.2,
require a tail-invariant, and the proof critic thus provides a tail-invariant patch. We
will now apply the work described in [105] to discover the feedback loop Hume invariant
required for the proof in the previous section. Now, the post-condition for the property
is out = inp1 ∗ inp2, which is updated as follows: out′ = o and o′ = r. Thus, an obvious
first approximation of the loop invariant becomes:
IH : r = inp1 ∗ inp2.
Now, by the TLA “induction rule” and (9.6), the proof of the “loop action” blocks
when attempting to ripple
r + x
↑︸ ︷︷ ︸
blocked
= inp1 ∗ inp2.
where blocking means that no wave rule applies, hence rippling is not possible. How-
ever, the precondition of the tail-invariant proof critic succeeds, as illustrated in Figure
9.4. Thus, this partial match can be explored and the patch suggests a schematic
invariant of the form
F1(r, x, y) = inp1 ∗ inp2, (9.7)
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where F1 is a second-order meta-variable. The expectation is that F1 will be instanti-
ated during the course of the proof. The primed variables in F1(r
′, x′, y′) = inp′1 ∗ inp′2
are first rewritten using (9.6)
F1( r + x
↑
, x, y − 1 ↑ ) = inp1 ∗ inp2.
By wave-rule (9.3), a new meta-variable F2 is introduced by instantiating F1 to λX.λY.
λZ.X + F2(X, Y, Z). Application of (9.3) then derives
r + x+ F2( r + x
↑
, x, y − 1 ↑ )
↓
= inp1 ∗ inp2.
Here, (9.4) suggests a new variable F3, such that F2 is instantiated to λX.λY.λZ.
F3(X, Y, Z) ∗ (Z − 1). The result of applying (9.4) is then
r + x+ F3( r + x
↑
, x, y − 1 ↑ ) ∗ y − F3( r + x ↑ , x, y − 1 ↑ )
↑
↓
Finally, wave rule (9.5) suggests that F3 is instantiated to λX.λY.λZ.Y , resulting in
the following invariant:
r + (x ∗ y) = inp1 ∗ inp2.
The invariant is identical to the invariant in Section 9.4.2, and the proof structure is
the same.
9.4.4 Hume program transformations verification
Here, the invariant discovery is extended to Hume program transformations. This
is illustrated with the transformation verified in Section 7.2, where the emult box is
transformed into the mult box. Section 6.6 showed that such transformations reduce
to the partial correctness property:
out = fmult 0 inp1 inp2. (9.8)
Thus, as in the previous sections, the key to the proof of (9.8), is the loop invariant
of the nested feedback loop of mult. Now, from the definition of fmult the following
conditional wave-rule is derived:
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Y 6= 0→ fmult (R +X) ↑ X (Y − 1) ↑ ⇒ fmult R X Y (9.9)
This is the only rule required in the proof. The loop invariant for this proof is
fmult r x y = fmult 0 inp1 inp2, and the induction hypothesis is obviously the same:
IH: fmult r x y = fmult 0 inp1 inp2
The “loop step” of the mult then induces the following derivation:
fmult r′ x′ y′ = fmult 0 inp′1 inp
′
2 [apply (9.6)]
fmult (r + x)
↑
x (y − 1) ↑ = fmult 0 inp1 inp2 [apply (9.9)]
fmult r x y = fmult 0 inp1 inp2 [apply IH]
Note that in the application of (9.9), the pre-condition of the rule holds, by the defini-
tion of the corresponding pattern. If y = 0, the second match would have succeeded.
Invariant discovery
The tail-invariant critic, where one particular instantiation is illustrated in Figure 9.4,
can be reused to discover the loop invariant in this example, although the particular
rules will defer. Similarly to Section 9.4.3, the first approximation of the invariant is
r = fmult 0 inp1 inp2, which forces rippling to block:
r + x
↑︸ ︷︷ ︸
blocked
= fmult 0 inp1 inp2
However, the precondition of the tail-invariant patch succeeds, which results in the
introduction of a meta-variable F1:
F1(r, x, y) = fmult 0 inp1 inp2
The definition of the priming operators (9.6) results in:
F1( r + 1
↑
, x, y − 1 ↑ ) = fmult 0 inp1 inp2
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Wave-rule (9.9) then suggests instantation F1 directly to fmult, and the same loop
invariant as in the previous section is obtained:
fmult r x y = fmult 0 inp1 inp2
9.4.5 Discussion
The work presented here builds directly on [105, 106], which use rippling [33] and
proof critics [103] to verify imperative programs. Here, this work is reused in the
Hume/TLA context, and extended to verify Hume program transformations. The
work in [105, 106] has been implemented and the Hierarchical Hume examples have
been verified in Section 7.2. Thus, since Isabelle/HOL supports rippling via IsaPlanner
[59, 57, 58], implementation should not be too involved.
9.5 Summary & discussion
In this chapter three explorations, relevant to the critical path of the thesis, are ex-
plored. They have shown that the ’integration with expression layer’ and ‘liveness
extensibility’ motivations behind TLA and theorem proving within Isabelle/HOL are
sound. It has also been shown that automations within the current mechanisation may
be possible by using rippling and proof critics in IsaPlanner.
Chapter10
Future work & conclusion
10.1 Contributions revisited
The main contributions of this thesis, listed in Chapter 1, have been implemented as
follows:
• correctness and transformation verification of Hume programs. The
thesis is the first to discuss verification of correctness properties and transfor-
mations of Hume programs. This is achieved using both model checking and
theorem proving, and tactics are developed to automate the theorem proving
aspect. Chapter 5 discusses Hume reasoning, illustrated by case-studies, while
Chapter 6 discusses verification in the Hierarchical Hume extension. This is il-
lustrated by case-studies in Chapter 7. In [85], several verification approaches for
Hume, including TLA, is outlined;
• TLA is used at the programming language level and in program trans-
formation verification. This work is novel in applying TLA to the program-
ming language level. Chapter 4 formalises Hume in TLA, and mechanises Hume
in TLA+ (TLC) and Isabelle/TLA, while Chapter 6 formalises Hierarchical Hume
in TLA, and mechanises it in Isabelle/TLA. Compared to more abstract specifica-
tion, the programming language level is more concrete and specific, thus enables
the development of tactics in Chapters 5 and 6 to automate the verification.
However, it often requires more proofs, as illustrated in the SAFER case study
in Chapter 7 which has also been embedded as a more abstract model in PVS;
• TLA is mechanised in the Isabelle/HOL theorem prover. This mechani-
sation is achieved in Chapter 3, and is required for the deductive Hume verifica-
tion in subsequent chapters. TLA has previously been mechanised [65, 115, 128,
198
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143, 197, 202], however this mechanisation has several contributions. Particularly,
is the formalisation of sequences which enables proofs of stuttering invariance,
the embedding of TLA∗, proof of stuttering invariance of TLA∗ operators, and
the derivation of the TLA∗ proof system and higher-level TLA rules;
• Hume is formalised in TLA, mechanised in the TLC model checker
and Isabelle/TLA, and tactics developed. From the Hume perspective, the
formalisation and mechanisations in Chapter 4 are major contributions. This is
also the case for the informal proof plans, implemented as tactics in Chapter 5.
The tactics achieved a high automation when the property specified is sufficiently
strong. [91] discusses verification of HW-Hume programs using TLC;
• the development, formalisation and mechanisation of Hierarchical Hume.
In joint work with Robert Pointon, Hierarchical Hume has been developed in this
thesis. It has been formalised in TLA, and mechanised in Isabelle/TLA. Infor-
mal proof plans for both invariant and transformation verification have been
developed, and implemented as proof tactics in Chapter 6. [89] motivates and
illustrates Hierarchical Hume in the context of transformations;
• the verification of scheduling strategies. In Chapter 4, the existing self-out
scheduling extension was shown to be conservative with respect to the standard
Hume lock-step scheduling strategy. In Chapter 6, the Hierarchical Hume ex-
tension was shown to be conservative. Both these properies were verified using
TLA, and the complete detailed proofs are shown in Appendix B. [88] discusses
verification of scheduling algorithms using TLA, illustrated in Hume;
• case studies. Empirical evidence for both the model checking and theorem prov-
ing approach for Hume verification is provided through case studies in Chapter
5. However, the major case studies use theorem proving to verify invariants and
transformations of Hierarchical Hume programs (Chapter 7). These also show
the applicability of Hierarchical Hume as a programming language. This is par-
ticularly the case for the main case study, an implementation of NASA’s SAFER
system [153];
• an outline of a box calculus for Hume transformations. A box calculus
for transformations is outlined in Chapter 8. Here, transformations are guided,
instead of ad-hoc, which may help increase automation. The box calculus is
illustrated by examples, and is published in [87];
• the integration of Isabelle/Hume with expression layer mechanisation
is surveyed. The Isabelle/HOL theorem proving approach is mainly motivated
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by a future integration with a mechanisation of the expression layer in parallel
[135]. This motivation is justified by such an integration experiment, illustrated
by an example (Chapter 9);
• the use of rippling to automate both correctness and transformation
proofs is surveyed. Chapter 9 shows how an existing rippling approach for
imperative programs, can be reused in an Hume/TLA setting. This is used to
speculate (D3) style loop invariants, and extended to transformation verification.
This is not implemented, however rippling is supported in the Isabelle/HOL
framework through IsaPlanner. This has been published in [86];
• the verification of Hume liveness properties is surveyed. Although the
focus in this thesis is on safety properties, TLA was partly chosen to enable a
future liveness extension. Such an extension is briefly surveyed in Chapter 9.
10.2 Limitations
Some topics are not treated in this thesis. Subjects that may have been expected, are
listed and justified below:
• the expression layer is not formalised, and instead structures in the underlying
logics are used to describe its behaviour. In Isabelle/HOL this is due the mech-
anisation of the expression layer conducted in parallel, and the integration work
in Chapter 9 partly answers this gap;
• the focus is not on model checking, which could have been expected for a finite
state automata based language, like the coordination layer. The focus on the
theorem proving approach is motivated by a direct integration with the expression
layer integration [135] and the support for the higher Hume levels. However, it is
believed that a model checking approach is still worth exploring, which is shown
in the Hume case studies (Chapter 5);
• the full Hume language is not treated. In particular, a subset of types is used
and exceptions are ignored. The type restriction only has effect in the expression
layer, while exceptions are ignored to simplify the embedding. This should be
added in the future;
• the properties discussed are limited to invariants and transformations, and ad-
dress only safety. Since safety properties are simpler and more important than
liveness, this is the obvious starting point. The liveness extension is surveyed in
Chapter 9;
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• formal translation rules from Hume into TLA (Isabelle/HOL and TLC) have
neither been defined nor implemented. This becomes more valuable once the
integration with the expression layer is more mature, to enable proofs within
both layers. A specification language at the Hume level should be part of such
an implementation;
• here, the semantics of Hume programs are embedded in TLA, and properties are
verified by semantical reasoning using the TLA proofs rules. A more common
approach, is to represent a programming language in a theorem prover as a
direct inductive embedding of the structural operational semantics (SOS). Then,
a high-level logic, like a Hoare logic, is built on top of this, as illustrated for
Java [162] and C (using separation logic) [184]. This enables syntactic reasoning
at the programming language level, via the high-level logic. This is similar to
the approach taken in the embedding of the Hume expression layer, where the
Hume SOS [112] is first embedded and a VDM logic is built on top of this.
However, as illustrated in Section 9.2, the reasoning within this VDM logic is
still very much semantic. Now, the soundness of the work in this thesis, relies
on the soundness of TLA, and the creation of a “Hume logic” will shift the
focus from software verification to meta-properties like soundness proofs. Thus,
focusing on syntactical reasoning would most likely have significantly decreased
the empirical evidence gained through case-studies. Thus, it is believed that the
more pragmatic method here better illustrates the verification approach. Finally,
note that the box calculus outlined in Chapter 8, can be seen as a first step
towards such syntactic reasoning, since it is at the Hume source code level.
Note that for most of the work here, TLA introduces an unnecessary overhead. The
proofs could have been achieved using simpler formalisations like B [8] and Event-B
[9]. However, TLA has been used to enable support of future liveness extensions, and
is believed to provide more direct support for integration with the expression layer.
10.3 Future work
10.3.1 The TLA mechanisation
A deep mechanisation of TLA in Isabelle/HOL will remove the extra hypothesis re-
quired for several of the TLA∗ proof rules. It will also enable more meta-level proofs,
such as stuttering invariance of the full logic. Moreover, an inductive definition of `
and |∼ may enable a completeness proof of at least the propositional part of the TLA∗
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proof system, and allow a derivation of the “TLA deduction theorem”. None of these
are directly relevant for the Hume work, and have thus not been explored further.
To properly derive state-dependent properties like ∃ and enableness in Isabelle/TLA,
a different state representation is required. Moreover, in [5], Abadi and Lamport in-
troduce the +−. operator. Informally, A +−. B denotes that B holds at least one step
longer than A, and is used to avoid circular reasoning in assume-guarantee specifica-
tions. Mechanising +−. can be particularly useful to reason about hierarchical boxes,
since the children are scheduled independently from the rest of the program.
10.3.2 Properties & specification
A deep mechanisation of (Hierarchical) Hume enables meta-reasoning like, for example,
the proofs in Appendix B. Moreover, generic Hume theorems can be verified, and
explored by the reasoning techniques.
The focus in the thesis has been on safety properties, while real-time properties is
explored in Section 5.5.1, and leads-to properties are surveyed in Section 9.3. There
are also properties that do not have to be specified, such as the absence of deadlocks
and livelocks, and termination of a nesting box i:
(1) Absence of deadlock: 2(∃i ∈ BS. sti 6= Blocked)
(2) Absence of deadlock: 23〈 ∃i ∈ BS. sti 6= Blocked 〉v
(3) Absence of livelock: 23〈 s = Super⇒ ∃i ∈ BS. sti = Runnable 〉v
(4) Termination of nesting box: sti ∈ {Execute, Super}; sti = Terminated
Note that (1) is only applicable for a closed system, since consuming an output stream
may resolve the deadlock, while livelocks may be desirable for a reactive system, which
may only act on user input.
Once the integration with the expression level is mature, a specification language
should be developed at the Hume level, and a translator from Hume into the com-
bined Isabelle/HOL representation should be developed. For Hiearchical Hume, it
may be interesting to integrate the specification language with the match: for exam-
ple, P (inp) -> Q(inp, res) can be written instead of -> , whilst treated like ->
still in the compiler/interpreter.
10.3.3 (Hierarchical) Hume verification automation
The developed tactics are not very fast. Optimisation could address other existing
Isabelle/HOL tools like sledgehammer [142]. In Chapters 5 and 6, proof plans were
graphically shown for the verification of invariants and transformations. These were
implemented as tactics. However, tactics do not capture the high-level structure of the
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proofs, and minor changes to the program structure or property structure will cause
them to fail. Instead, they can be implemented as high-level proof plans [32], which
are supported in Isabelle by IsaPlanner [57, 58]. This may be more robust for small
changes, thus supporting better reuse.
In Section 9.4 a proof plan called rippling was used to discover (D3) type (loop)
invariants, as classified in Section 5.2, and to verify transformations. A next step is to
implement this in IsaPlanner. Moreover, it should be investigated if similar techniques
are applicable to (D4) style invariants. Rippling is a terminating rewrite system [33].
Thus non-termination of the Hume simplifier, which occurred in one case study (Section
5.5.3), could be overcome by the use of rippling.
The tactics do not handle failure analysis. Firstly, as explained in Section 5.2, (D1)
style invariants always require a proof of the corresponding result buffer, and this can
be inferred directly without any sort of program analysis. (D2) type invariant requires
strengthening and, as discussed in Section 6.5.1, this approach resembles Dijkstra’s
weakest precondition predicate transformer wp [56]. Here, wp(C,Q) transforms the
predicate Q on the result state of the atomic command C to the weakest predicate
on the before state of C such that Q holds afterwords. In concurrent executions, like
the Hume coordination layer, Lamport argues that a proper generalisation of such
partial correctness is invariance, and thus introduced the weakest invariant predicate
transformer win [119]. From the TLA viewpoint, win(I∧2[N ]v, P ) = Q implies that Q
is the weakest predicate which is invariant over I∧2[N ]v such that Q⇒ P . This is the
type of predicate transformation required for (D3) and (D4) type invariants. However,
for a (D2) invariant Q becomes unnecessarily “big” which may cause problems and,
at least, slow down the proof tactics. Instead, a more “sequential” strengthening is
desirable. For example, a weakest pre-invariant predicate transformer wpin where
wpin(I ∧2[N ]v, P ) = Q implies the weakest invariant such that I ∧2[N ]v ⇒ 2Q and
I ∧2[N ∧Q∧Q′]v ⇒ 2P . Creating such a wpin predicate transformer for at least the
(Hiearchical) Hume context is a subject of further study.
Moreover, integrating the rippling work of Section 9.4 and wpin (win) with topology
and data-flow analysis should provide a very good framework for automation. Here,
topology and data-flow analysis could be used to identify the type of invariant. Based
on this identification the correct technique could be applied, e.g. wpin in the case of a
(D2) invariant, rippling in the case of a (D3) invariant, and win in the case of a (D4)
invariant.
Theorem proving and model checking have been separately discussed. Addressing
this integration seems particularly important for Hierarchical Hume. For example,
model checking “nested properties”, with a theorem prover in charge of the overall
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proof. This may help to avoid the state-space explosion problem, since it should be
sufficient to enumerate the full state space of the nesting box. A direct integration
using TLC as an oracle has the potential of introducing true-negatives, since both
TLC and the translations between Isabelle/TLA and TLA+ have to be trusted. A
more mathematical rigourous interface, as for example used for the µ-calculus and
HOL in [15], requires a much more substantial work load.
The first two case-studies in Chapter 7 verified transformations. The proofs relied
on the “result buffer property”: the (internal) output wires of the resulting box, must
with the same input value, have the same values as computed by the expression of the
source box (see Section 6.6). If this property holds, then minimal user interaction is
required when applying the transformation tactic. Proof planning has previously been
used for transformation verification [136, 46], which may also be applicable here. In
particular, in finding and verifying the “result buffer property”, by also integrating the
weakest precondition and loop invariant work discussed above.
10.3.4 The box calculus
The work on the box calculus at the lowest, least expressive HW-Hume level gives
confidence in the calculus and allows focus on the intricate properties of the coordi-
nation layer, which are the same for all Hume levels. Extending the calculus beyond
HW-Hume will mainly require an extension of the purely functional transformation
rules, together with data refinement. A next step here is to identify a sufficient set of
rules which is adequate for the classes of transformations between and within levels.
This will enable support to tackle the problems with respect to costing, which is the
main motivation behind Hume transformations. Moreover, to support more flexibility
it may be necessary to incorporate rules which are not behaviour preserving on their
own, but which can be combined into “correct” rules/strategies.
Besides this “ability to cost programs” motivation, the calculus can be used for op-
timisation. This is particularly interesting, and non-trivial, in Hume since the different
layers will implement the same algorithm completely differently. This can be achieved
by augmenting the rule with the resource cost model, i.e. the change of resource prop-
erties, and only apply resource reducing rules and strategies. This will provide a way
of implementing the costing by construction principle suggested for Hume [175]. This
principle is refinement-based and cost driven. Here, the coordination structure is first
defined, followed by a phase implementing the body of the boxes, and finally, a valida-
tion phase. In the validation phase, program refinement (transformation) is driven by
the costing, and this phase could be implemented by the box calculus augmented by
the cost model. Moreover, incorporating preservation of liveness with the rules, is also
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a matter for future research.
The calculus will be hard to deploy without proper tool support. Firstly, its logical
details must be mechanised. A direct mechanisation of the calculus as described here,
requires a deep mechanisation of Hierarchical Hume in Isabelle/TLA. Notions like
Time Dependency (Figure 8.2 on page 167) must then be formalised, and the rules
and strategies derived.
However, a first and more lightweight approach, is to indirectly use the calculus in
the current embedding by representing rules and strategies as tactics or proof plans
[46, 136]. This approach will still be ad-hoc, since the transformations are conducted
first, and then the verification is attempted. However, a rule application should have
a similar structure regardless of the program, thus the tactic or proof plan should be
able to capture this.
The calculus is defined for the Hume (source code) level. Thus, the user should
not see the underlying logical details. Instead, determining the rules and strategies to
apply should either be automatic, or by selecting a rule or strategy from a menu in a
Hume IDE, like in the HaRe system [183] for refactoring Haskell programs. Finally, in
a failed proof, the failure needs to be translated into Hume source code.
With the exception of the box calculus, the verification process in this thesis has
been ad-hoc: a transformation, or a program with specified properties, is first developed
and then verification is attempted. The box calculus is a first step towards guiding
the development by proofs. However, the formal methods are still applied late in
the development process. Following the B-method, it would be interesting to specify
a Hume program in TLA, refine this into a suitable subset, and synthesise boxes and
wires. Such an approach could enable integration of the implementation and modelling
phases, where some boxes are only specified in TLA, whilst others are implemented.
Moreover, since Hume is encoded in TLA, and the reasoning is within TLA, hardware
components can be specified in TLA, which enables hardware/software co-design, one
of the targets of the HW-Hume level [91]. There is also a lower, intermediate Hume
Abstract Machine (HAM) level, which the Hume code is compiled to, and to which
some resource analyses are applied. TLA can be applied to HAM, and be used to
verify the Hume to HAM translation.
10.3.5 Towards a Hume verification environment
Once integration with the expression layer is more mature, with a specification language
and translator, a significant step towards the long term goal of building a verification
environment for Hume will have been achieved. Here, the vision is to provide certi-
fied software, where a program is accompanied with a correctness proof, similarly to
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McKinna’s deliverables [139] and Necula’s proof carrying code [154].
Such an environment should also incorporate the costing tools. Moreover, a graph-
ical user interface, which can simulate program execution would be highly desirable
particularly, to reproduce counter examples from failed verification tasks. More semi-
formal tools, such as testing, for non-critical parts of programs are also worth exploring.
A final question is how this work with Hume and TLA can be extended beyond the
Hume context. The TLA mechanisation can be used for any TLA embedded system,
and the none Hume-specific tactics, such as invariant strengthening and TLA simplifi-
cation can also be used in this context. Moreover, the mechanisation of sequences can
be used with other logics. The remaining tactics are very much geared towards Hume,
and are unlikely to be directly re-used in other contexts. However, some parts, such as
the automatic unlifting from TLA into HOL, can be separated out, and used to help
verify generic TLA invariants and refinements. Proofs of such generic TLA invariants,
as explained in a Disc Paxos paper [73] for example, are based upon building up a
strong enough invariant from smaller ones. Due to its inductive nature, the rippling
approach, described in Section 9.4, should be very much applicable for such proofs
in a backward fashion. Moreover, rippling has previously been used to find complex
witnesses [141], and may thus be used to find refinement mappings.
10.4 Concluding remarks
The results of using TLA for Hume coordination verification are very encouraging. The
formalism appears to be ideal for Hume’s design, and through the use of proof tactics
has shown that automation is possible. Moreover, by exploiting the lifted nature of
TLA, integration with other reasoning techniques was very direct. Thus, it should be
ideal for generic coordination languages, like HTL [77], which are independent of the
computation inside the components. However, it is assumed that the communication
is state-based.
The work with transformations is also very encouraging. Following the motivation
behind a Hume transformation, the source of the transformation is always one box.
Thus, by the introduction of Hierarchical Hume, the simple prototype tactics were
able to achieve a substantial degree of automation. The advantages of introducing Hi-
erarchical Hume have also been shown, and such structuring is important, particularly
for scalability.
To conclude, the use of TLA to reason at the programming level, is very promising,
particularly for coordination languages. Moreover, the results with Hierarchical Hume
are very encouraging, and should be incorporated into all Hume tools, where the goal
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is to deploy Hume on industrial-sized programs.
AppendixA
Mechanised theorems in Isabelle/HOL
Here, the lemmas and theorems which have been mechanically proved in Isabelle/HOL
are listed.
A.1 The TLA mechanisation
A.1.1 Intensional
theorem intI: assumes:
∧
w. w  A shows: ` A
theorem intD: assumes: ` A shows: ∧ w. w  A
theorem inteq reflection: assumes: ` x=y shows: x ≡ y
theorem int iffI: assumes: ` F −→ G and ` G −→ F shows: ` F = G
theorem int iffD1: assumes: ` F = G shows: ` F −→ G
theorem int iffD2: assumes: ` F = G shows: ` G −→ F
theorem imp tr: assumes: ` A −→ B and ` B −→ C shows: ` A −→ C
A.1.2 Sequences
lemma suffix first: first (s |s n) = s n
lemma suffix plus: s |s n |s m = s |s (m + n)
lemma suffix commute: ((s |s n) |s m) = ((s |s m) |s n)
lemma suffix zero: s |s 0 = s
lemma suffix tail: s |s 1 = tail s
lemma tail suffix suc: s |s (Suc n) = tail (s |s n)
lemma seq app first tail: (first s) ## (tail s) = s
lemma seq app tail: tail (x ## s) = s
lemma seq app greather than zero: ∀ n > 0. (s ## σ) n = σ (n-1)
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lemma finite or infinite: ∀ s. fin s ∨ inf s
lemma not finite is infinite: (¬ fin s) = inf s
lemma not infinite is finite: (¬ inf s) = fin s
lemma empty is finite: assumes: emptyseq s shows: fin s
lemma empty suffix is empty:
assumes: emptyseq s shows: ∀ n. emptyseq (s |s n)
lemma empty suffix exteq:
assumes: emptyseq s shows: ∀ m. (s |s n) m = s m
lemma seq empty or notempty: emptyseq s 6= notemptyseq s
lemma suc empty:
assumes: emptyseq (s |s m) shows: emptyseq (s |s (Suc m))
lemma fin stut after last:
assumes: fin s shows: ∀ j ≥ (last s). s j = s (last s)
Stuttering invariance
lemma seq empty is nonstut: assumes: emptyseq s shows: nonstutseq s
lemma notempty exist nonstut:
assumes: emptyseq (s |s m) shows: ∃ i. s i 6= s m ∧ i > m
lemma nextnat le unch: assumes: n < nextnat s shows: s n = s 0
lemma stutnempty: assumes: ¬ stutstep s n shows: ¬ emptyseq (s |s n)
lemma notstutstep nexnat1:
assumes: ¬ stutstep s n shows: nextnat (s |s n) = 1
lemma stutstep notempty2: assumes: notemptyseq (s |s n) and stutstep s n
shows: notemptyseq (s |s (Suc n))
lemma stutstep notempty sucnextnat:
assumes: ¬ emptyseq (s |s n) and stutstep s n
shows: (nextnat (s |s n)) = Suc (nextnat (s |s (Suc n)))
lemma nextn empty neq: assumes: ¬ emptyseq s shows: s (nextnat s) 6= s 0
lemma nextn empty gzero: assumes: ¬ emptyseq s shows: nextnat s > 0
lemma empty nextsuffix: assumes: emptyseq s shows: nextsuffix s = s
lemma empty nextsuff id: assumes: emptyseq s shows: nextsuffix s = id s
lemma notstutstep nextsuffix1:
assumes: ¬ stutstep s n shows: nextsuffix (s |s n) = s |s (Suc n)
lemma next first: next 1 = nextsuffix
lemma next zero: next 0 s = s
lemma next suc suffix: next (Suc n) s = nextsuffix (next n s)
lemma next suffix com: nextsuffix (next n s) = (next n (nextsuffix s))
Appendix A. Mechanised theorems in Isabelle/HOL 210
lemma next plus: next (m+n) s = next m (next n s)
lemma next empty: assumes: emptyseq s shows: next n s = s
lemma notempty nextnzero:
assumes: ¬ emptyseq s shows: (next (Suc 0) s) 0 6= s 0
lemma next ex id: ∃ i. s i = (next m s) 0
lemma emptyseq collapse eq: assumes: emptyseq s shows: \ s = s
lemma empty collapse empty: assumes: emptyseq s shows: emptyseq (\ s)
lemma collapse empty empty: assumes: emptyseq (\ s) shows: emptyseq s
lemma notempty collapse notempty:
assumes: notemptyseq s shows: notemptyseq (\ s)
lemma collapse notempty notempty:
assumes: notemptyseq (\ s) shows: notemptyseq s
lemma seqsim refl: s ≈ s
lemma seqsim sym: assumes: s ≈ t shows: t ≈ s
lemma seqeq imp sim: assumes: s = t shows: s ≈ t
lemma seqsim trans: assumes: s ≈ t and t ≈ z shows: s ≈ z
lemma sim first: assumes: s ≈ t shows: first s = first t
lemma seqsim empty2: assumes: s ≈ t and emptyseq s shows: emptyseq t
lemma seq empty eq: assumes: s 0 = t 0 and emptyseq s and emptyseq t
shows: s = t
lemma coleq seqsim: (\ s = \ t) = (s ≈ t)
lemma seqsim notempty notempty:
assumes: s ≈ t and notemptyseq s shows: notemptyseq t
lemma seqsim notstutstep:
assumes: ¬ (stutstep s n) shows: (s |s (Suc n)) ≈ nextsuffix (s |s n)k”
lemma stut nextsuf suc: assumes: stutstep s n
shows: nextsuffix (s |s n) = nextsuffix (s |s (Suc n))
lemma seqsim suffix seqsim: assumes: s ≈ t
shows: nextsuffix s ≈ nextsuffix t
lemma seqsim stutstep: assumes: stutstep s n
shows: (s |s (Suc n)) ≈ (s |s n)
lemma add feqstut: assumes: s = first t shows: stutstep (s ## t) 0
lemma add feqsim: assumes: s = first t shows: (s ## t) ≈ t
lemma add first stut: assumes: first s = second s shows: s ≈ tail s
theorem app similar: assumes: s ≈ t shows: (x ## s) ≈ (x ## t)
lemma simstep disj1: assumes: s ≈ t shows: ∀ n. ∃ m. ((s |s n) ≈ (t |s m))
lemma nextnat le seqsim: n < nextnat s −→ s ≈ (s |s n)
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lemma seqsim prev nextnat: s ≈ s |s ((nextnat s)-1)
theorem sim step (first attempt): assumes: s ≈ t
shows: ∀ n. ∃ m. (s |sn ≈ t |sm) ∧ ( s |s(Suc n) ≈ t |s(Suc m))
A.1.3 Semantics
theorem ev1: (w  3 F) = (∃ n. (w |s n)  F)
theorem aact1: (w  3 〈 P 〉 v) = (∃ i. ((w |s i)  P) ∧ ((w |s i)  v$ 6= $v))
Stuttering invariance
theorem stutinv nstutinv1: assumes: STUTINV F shows: NSTUTINV F
theorem stut before: STUTINV $F
theorem stut always: assumes: STUTINV F shows: STUTINV 2F
theorem stut action: assumes: NSTUTINV P shows: STUTINV 2[P] v
theorem stut const: STUTINV #c
theorem stut fun1: assumes: STUTINV x shows: STUTINV (f <x>)
theorem stut fun2:
assumes: STUTINV x and STUTINV y shows: STUTINV (f <x,y>)
theorem stut fun3:
assumes: STUTINV x and STUTINV y and STUTINV z
shows: STUTINV (f <x,y,z>)
theorem stut and:
assumes: STUTINV F and STUTINV G shows: STUTINV (F ∧ G)
theorem stut or:
assumes: STUTINV F and STUTINV G shows: STUTINV (F ∨ G)
theorem stut imp:
assumes: STUTINV F and STUTINV G shows: STUTINV (F −→ G)
theorem stut eq:
assumes: STUTINV F and STUTINV G shows: STUTINV (F = G)
theorem stut neq:
assumes: STUTINV F and STUTINV G shows: STUTINV (F 6= G)
theorem stut not: assumes: STUTINV F shows: STUTINV (¬ F)
theorem stut exists: assumes: STUTINV F shows: STUTINV (∃ x. F)
theorem stut forall: assumes: STUTINV F shows: STUTINV (∀ x. F)
theorem nstut nexts: assumes: STUTINV F shows: NSTUTINV ◦F
theorem nstut const: NSTUTINV #c
theorem nstut fun1: assumes: NSTUTINV x shows: STUTINV (f <x>)
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theorem nstut fun2:
assumes: NSTUTINV x and NSTUTINV y shows: NSTUTINV (f <x,y>)
theorem nstut fun3:
assumes: NSTUTINV x and NSTUTINV y and NSTUTINV z
shows: NSTUTINV (f <x,y,z>)
theorem nstut and:
assumes: NSTUTINV F and NSTUTINV G shows: NSTUTINV (F ∧ G)
theorem nstut or:
assumes: NSTUTINV F and NSTUTINV G shows: NSTUTINV (F ∨ G)
theorem nstut imp:
assumes: NSTUTINV F and NSTUTINV G shows: NSTUTINV (F −→ G)
theorem nstut eq:
assumes: NSTUTINV F and NSTUTINV G shows: NSTUTINV (F = G)
theorem nstut neq:
assumes: NSTUTINV F and NSTUTINV G shows: NSTUTINV (F 6= G)
theorem nstut not: assumes: NSTUTINV F shows: NSTUTINV (¬ F)
theorem nstut exists: assumes: NSTUTINV F shows: NSTUTINV (∃ x. F)
theorem nstut forall: assumes: NSTUTINV F shows: NSTUTINV (∀ x. F)
theorem nstut after: NSTUTINV F
theorem nstut unch: NSTUTINV (Unchanged v)
theorem nstut actrans: assumes: NSTUTINV P shows: NSTUTINV [P] v
theorem stut ev: assumes: STUTINV F shows: STUTINV 3F
theorem stut aa: assumes: NSTUTINV P shows: STUTINV 3〈P〉 v
theorem nstut aa: assumes: NSTUTINV P shows: NSTUTINV 〈P〉 v
A.1.4 PreFormulas
theorem prefI: assumes:
∧
w. w  A shows: |∼A
theorem prefD: assumes: |∼A shows: ∧ w. w  A
theorem prefeq reflection: assumes: |∼x=y shows: x ≡ y
lemma pre id unch: assumes: stutinv F shows: |∼ F ∧ Unchanged id −→ ◦F
lemma pre ex unch:
assumes: stutinv F shows: ∃ v::(’a ⇒ ’a). |∼ F ∧ Unchanged v −→ ◦F
lemma unch pair: |∼ Unchanged (x,y) = (Unchanged x ∧ Unchanged y)
lemma angle actrans sem: |∼ (〈F〉 v) = (F ∧ ((v$) 6= $v))
lemma after const: |∼ (#c)$ = #c
lemma after fun1: |∼ f<x>$ = f <x$>
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lemma after fun2: |∼ f<x,y>$ = f <x$,y$>
lemma after fun3: |∼ f<x,y,z>$ = f <x$,y$,z$>
lemma after fun4: |∼ f<x,y,z,zz>$ = f <x$,y$,z$,zz$>
lemma after forall: |∼ (∀ x. P x)$ = (∀ x. (P x)$)
lemma after exists: |∼ (∃ x. P x)$ = (∃ x. (P x)$)
lemma after exists1: |∼ (∃! x. P x)$ = (∃! x. (P x)$)
lemma after pair: |∼ (X,Y)$ = (X$,Y$)
lemma after le: |∼ (x < y)$ = (x$ < y$)
lemma after le eq: |∼ (x ≤ y)$ = (x$ ≤ y$)
lemma after mem: |∼ (x ∈ X)$ = (x$ ∈ X$)
lemma after notmem: |∼ (x /∈ X)$ = (x$ /∈ X$)
lemma after if: |∼ (if T then A else B)$ = (if T$ then A$ else B$)
lemma after plus: |∼ (x + y)$ = x$ + y$
lemma after minus: |∼ (x - y)$ = x$ - y$
lemma after times: |∼ (x * y)$ = x$ * y$
lemma after div: |∼ (x div y)$ = x$ div y$
lemma after mod: |∼ (x mod y)$ = x$ mod y$
lemma after finset: |∼ {X}$ = {X$}
lemma after cons: |∼ (x#xs)$ = (x$#xs$)
lemma after app: |∼ (xs@ys)$ = (xs$@ys$)
lemma after list: |∼ [L]$ = [L$]
lemma after if: |∼ (if A then B else C)$ = (if A$ then B$ else C$)
lemma before const: ` $(#c) = #c
lemma before fun1: ` $(f<x>) = f <$x>
lemma before fun2: ` $(f<x,y>) = f <$x,$y>
lemma before fun3: ` $(f<x,y,z>) = f <$x,$y,$z>
lemma before fun4: ` $(f<x,y,z,zz>) = f <$x,$y,$z,$zz>
lemma before forall: ` $(∀ x. P x) = (∀ x. $(P x))
lemma before exists: ` $(∃ x. P x) = (∃ x. $(P x))
lemma before exists1: ` $(∃! x. P x) = (∃! x. $(P x))
lemma before pair: ` $(X,Y) = ($X,$Y)
lemma before le: ` $(x < y) = ($x < $y)
lemma before le eq: ` $(x ≤ y) = ($x ≤ $y)
lemma before mem: ` $(x ∈ X) = ($x ∈ $X)
lemma before notmem: ` $(x /∈ X) = ($x /∈ $X)
lemma before if: ` $(if T then A else B) = (if $T then $A else $B)
lemma before plus: ` $(x + y) = ($x) + ($y)
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lemma before minus: ` $(x - y) = $x - $y
lemma before times: ` $(x * y) = $x * $y
lemma before div: ` $(x div y) = $x div $y
lemma before mod: ` $(x mod y) = $x mod $y
lemma before finset: ` ${X} = {$X}
lemma before cons: ` $(x#xs) = ($x#$xs)
lemma before app: ` $(xs@ys) = ($xs@$ys)
lemma before list: ` $[L] = [$L]
lemma before if: ` $(if A then B else C) = (if $A then $B else $C)
A.1.5 Rules
The basic axioms
theorem fmp: assumes: ` F and ` F −→ G shows: ` G
theorem pmp: assumes: |∼ F and |∼ F −→ G shows: |∼ G
theorem sq: assumes: |∼ P shows: ` 2[P] v
theorem pre: assumes: ` F shows: |∼ F
theorem nex: assumes: ` F shows: |∼ ◦F
theorem ax0: ` #True
theorem ax1: ` 2F −→ F
theorem ax2: ` 2F −→ 2[2F] v
theorem ax3: assumes: |∼ F ∧ Unchanged v −→ ◦F
shows: ` 2[F −→ ◦F] v −→ (F −→ 2F)
theorem ax4: ` 2[P −→ Q] v −→ (2[P] v −→ 2[Q] v)
theorem ax5: ` 2[v$ 6= $v] v
theorem pax0: |∼ #True
theorem pax1: |∼ (◦¬F) = (¬◦F)
theorem pax2: |∼ ◦(F −→ G) −→ (◦F −→ ◦G)
theorem pax3: |∼ 2F −→ ◦2F
theorem pax4: |∼ (2[P] v) = ([P] v ∧ ◦2[P] v)
theorem pax5: |∼ ◦2F −→ 2[◦F] v
Derived lemmas from [144]
lemma allT: ` (∀ x. 2(F x)) = (2(∀ x. F x))
lemma allActT: ` (∀ x. 2[(F x)] v) = (2[(∀ x. F x)] v)
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lemma alw: assumes: ` F shows: ` 2F
lemma alw2: assumes: ` F and |∼ F ∧ Unchanged v −→ ◦F shows: ` 2F
lemma alw3: assumes: ` F and stutinv F shows: ` 2F
lemma T1: ` (2F) = (22F)
lemma T2: ` (2[P] v) = (22[P] v)
lemma T3: ` (2[[P] v] v) = (2[P] v)
lemma T4: ` 2[P] v −→ 2[[P] v] w
lemma T5: ` 2[[P] w] v −→ 2[[P] v] w
lemma T6: ` 2F −→ 2[◦F] v
lemma T7: assumes: |∼ F ∧ Unchanged v −→ ◦F
shows: |∼ (2F) = (F ∧ ◦2F)
lemma T8: |∼ (◦(F ∧ G)) = (◦F ∧ ◦G)
lemma H1: assumes: ` 2[P] v and ` 2[P −→ Q] v shows: ` 2[Q] v
lemma H2: assumes: ` F shows: ` 2[F] v
lemma H3: assumes: ` 2[P −→ Q] v and ` 2[Q −→ R] v
shows: ` 2[P −→ R] v
lemma H4: ` 2[[P] v −→ P] v
lemma H5: ` 2[2F −→ ◦2F] v
Various derived lemmas
lemma P1: |∼ 2F −→ ◦F
lemma P2: |∼ 2F −→ F ∧ ◦F
lemma P3: |∼ 2F −→ F −→ ◦F
lemma P4: ` 2F −→ 2[F] v
lemma P5: ` 2[P] v −→ 2[2[P] v] w
lemma M0: ` 2F −→ 2[(F −→ ◦F)] v
lemma M1: ` 2F −→ 2[(F ∧ ◦F)] v
lemma M2: assumes: ` F −→ G shows: ` 2[F] v −→ 2[G] v
lemma M3: assumes: ` F shows: shows ` 2[◦F] v
lemma M4: ` 2[(◦(F ∧ G)) = (◦F ∧ ◦G)] v
lemma M5: ` 2[(2[P] v −→ ◦2[P] v)] w
lemma M6: ` 2[F ∧ G] v −→ 2[F] v ∧ 2[G] v
lemma M7: ` 2[F] v ∧ 2[G] v −→ 2[F ∧ G] v
lemma M8: ` (2[F] v ∧ 2[G] v) = (2[F ∧ G] v)
lemma M9: |∼ 2F −→ F ∧ ◦2F
lemma M10: assumes: |∼ F ∧ Unchanged v −→ ◦F shows: |∼ F ∧ ◦2F −→ 2F
lemma STL2: ` 2F −→ F
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lemma STL3: ` (2F) = (22F)
lemma STL4: assumes: ` F −→ G shows: ` 2F −→ 2G
lemma STL4 2: assumes: ` F −→ G and |∼ G ∧ Unchanged v −→ ◦G
shows: ` 2F −→ 2G
lemma STL4 3: assumes: ` F −→ G and STUTINV G shows: ` 2F −→ 2G
lemma STL5: ` (2(F ∧ G)) = (2F ∧ 2G)
lemma STL5 2:
assumes: |∼ F ∧ Unchanged v1 −→ ◦F and |∼ G ∧ Unchanged v2 −→ ◦G
and |∼ (F ∧ G) ∧ Unchanged v3 −→ ◦(F ∧ G)
shows: ` (2(F ∧ G)) = (2F ∧ 2G)
lemma STL5 21:
assumes: stutinv F and stutinv G shows: ` (2(F ∧ G)) = (2F ∧ 2G)
lemma MM7: assumes: s  2F and s  2G and s  2(F ∧ G) −→ PROP R
shows: PROP R
lemma linalw: assumes: a ≤ b and (w |s a)  2A shows: (w |s b)  2A
lemma STL6: ` ((32F) ∧ (32G)) = (32(F ∧ G))
lemma MM1: assumes: ` F = G shows: ` (2F) = (2G)
lemma MM2: ` 2A ∧ 2(B −→ C) −→ 2(A ∧ B −→ C)
lemma MM3: ` 2(¬A) −→ 2(A ∧ B −→ C)
lemma MM4: ` (#F) = (2(#F))
lemma MM4b: ` (¬#F) = (2(¬#F))
lemma MM5: ` 2F ∨ 2G −→ 2(F ∨ G)
lemma MM6: ` 2F ∨ 2G −→ 2(2F ∨ 2G)
lemma MM7: ` 2(2F −→ G) ∧ 2F −→ 2G
lemma MM8: assumes: |∼ F −→ G shows: ` 2[F] v −→ 2[G] v
lemma MM9: assumes: ` F = G shows: ` (2[F] v) = (2[G] v)
lemma MM10: assumes: |∼ F = G shows: ` (2[F] v) = (2[G] v)
lemma MM11: ` 2[¬(P ∧ Q)] v −→ 2[P] v −→ 2[(P ∧ ¬Q)] v
lemma MM12: ` (2[2[P] v] v) = (2[P] v)
lemma E1: ` (3(F ∨ G)) = (3F ∨ 3G)
lemma E2: ` (2F) = (¬3¬F)
lemma E3: ` F −→ 3F
lemma E4: ` 2F −→ 3F
lemma E5: ` 2F −→ 23F
lemma E6: ` 2F −→ 32F
lemma E7: assumes: |∼ ¬F ∧ Unchanged v −→ ◦¬F
shows: |∼ 3F −→ F ∨ ◦3F
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lemma E8: ` 3(F −→ G) −→ 2F −→ 3G
lemma E9: ` 2(F −→ G) −→ 3F −→ 3G
lemma E10: ` (3F) = (33F)
lemma E11: ` 23F −→ 3F
lemma E12: ` (¬32F) = (23¬F)
lemma E13: ` (32¬F) = (¬23F)
lemma E15: ` (#F) = (3(#F))
lemma E15b: ` (¬#F) = (3(¬#F))
lemma E16: ` 32F −→ 3F
lemma E17: ` 232F −→ 23F
lemma STL6 act: ` ((32[F] v) ∧ (32[G] w)) = (3(2[F] v ∧ 2[G] w))
lemma STL6 E1: ` 2F ∧ 3G −→ 3(2F ∧ G)
lemma STL6 E2: ` 2F ∧ 3G −→ 3(F ∧ G)
lemma STL6 E4: assumes: s  2A and s  3F and ` 2A ∧ F −→ G
shows: s  3G
lemma E18: ` 232F −→ 32F
lemma E19: ` 32F −→ 232F
lemma E20: ` 32F −→ 23F
lemma E21: ` (232F) = (32F)
lemma E22: assumes: ` F = G shows: ` (3F) = (3G)
lemma E23: |∼ ◦F −→ 3F
lemma E24: ` 32Q −→ 2[3Q] v
lemma E25: ` 3〈A〉 v −→ 3A
lemma E26: ` 23〈A〉 v −→ 23A
lemma allBox: ` 2(∀ x. F x)) = (∀ x. s ` 2(F x))
lemma E27: ` (323F) = (23F)
lemma E28: ` 32F ∧ 23G −→ 23(F ∧ G)
lemma E29: |∼ ◦3F −→ 3F
lemma allActBox: s  2[(∀ x. F x)] v) = (∀ x. s  2[(F x)] v)
lemma exEE: ` (∃ x. 3(F x)) = (3(∃ x. F x))
lemma exActE: ` (∃ x. 3〈F x〉 v) = (3〈(∃ x. F x)〉 v)
lemma LT1: ` F ; F
lemma LT2: assumes: ` F −→ G shows: ` F −→ 3G
lemma LT3: assumes: ` F −→ G shows: ` F ; G
lemma LT4: ` F ∧ (F ; G) −→ 3G
lemma LT5: ` 2(F −→ 3G) −→ 3F −→ 3G
lemma LT6: ` 3F ∧ (F ; G) −→ 3G
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lemma LT7: ` 23F ∧ (F ; G) −→ 23G
lemma LT8: ` 23G −→ (F ; G)
lemma LT11: ` (F ; G) −→ (F ; (G ∨ H))
lemma LT12: ` (F ; H) −→ (F ; (G ∨ H))
lemma LT13: ` (G ; H) ∧ (F ; G) −→ (F ; H)
lemma LT14: ` ((F ∨ G) ; H) −→ (F ; H)
lemma LT15: ` ((F ∨ G) ; H) −→ (G ; H)
lemma LT16: ` (F ; H) ∧ (G ; H) −→ ((F ∨ G) ; H)
lemma LT17: ` ((F ∨ G) ; H) = ((F ; H) ∧ (G ; H))
lemma LT18: ` (A ; (B ∨ C)) ∧ (B ; D) ∧ (C ; D) −→ (A ; D)
lemma LT19: ` (A ; (D ∨ B)) ∧ (B ; D) −→ (A ; D)
lemma LT20: ` (A ; (B ∨ D)) ∧ (B ; D) −→ (A ; D)
lemma LT21: ` ((∃ x. F x) ; G) = (∀ x. (F x ; G))
lemma LT22: ` (F ; (G ∨ H)) −→ ¬3G −→ (F ; H)
lemma LT23: |∼ (P −→ ◦Q) −→ (P −→ 3Q)
lemma LT24: ` 2I ∧ ((P ∧ I) ; Q) −→ P ; Q
lemma LT25: ` (F ; #False) = (2¬F)
lemma LT26: assumes: ` 3F −→ 23F shows: ` F −→ 23F
lemma LT28: assumes: |∼ P −→ ◦P ∨ ◦Q shows: |∼ (P −→ ◦P) ∨ 3Q
lemma LT29: assumes: |∼ P −→ ◦P ∨ ◦Q and |∼ P ∧ Unchanged v −→ ◦P
shows: ` P −→ 2P ∨ 3Q
lemma LT30:
assumes: |∼ N ∧ P −→ ◦P ∨ ◦Q shows: |∼ N −→ (P −→ ◦P) ∨ 3Q
lemma LT31: assumes: |∼ N ∧ P −→ ◦P ∨ ◦Q and |∼ P ∧ Unchanged v −→ ◦P
shows: ` 2N −→ P −→ 2P ∨ 3Q
lemma LT32:
assumes: |∼ (P ∧ [N] f) −→ ◦P ∨ ◦Q and |∼ P ∧ Unchanged f −→ ◦P
shows: ` 2[N] f −→ P −→ 2P ∨ 3Q
lemma AA1: ` 2[#False] v −→ ¬3〈Q〉 v
lemma AA2: ` 2[P] v ∧ 3〈Q〉 v −→ 3〈P〉 v
lemma AA3: ` 2[P −→ Q] v ∧ 2P ∧ 3〈A〉 v −→ 3Q
lemma AA5: ` 2[P −→ Q] v −→ 3〈P〉 v −→ 3〈Q〉 v
lemma AA6: ` 2[P −→ Q] v ∧ 3〈P〉 v −→ 3〈Q〉 v
lemma AA7: assumes: |∼ P −→ Q shows: ` 3〈P〉 v −→ 3〈Q〉 v
lemma AA8: ` 2[P] v ∧ 3〈A〉 v −→ 3〈2[P] v ∧ A〉 v
lemma AA9: ` 2[P] v ∧ 3〈A〉 v −→ 3〈[P] v ∧ A〉 v
lemma AA10: ` ¬(2[P] v ∧ 3〈¬P〉 v)
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lemma AA11: ` ¬3〈v$ = $v〉 v
lemma AA12: ` (2[P] v) = (¬3〈¬P〉 v)
lemma AA13: ` 3〈P〉 v −→ 3〈v$ 6= $v〉 v
lemma AA14: ` (3〈P ∨ Q〉 v) = (3〈P〉 v ∨ 3〈Q〉 v)
lemma AA15: ` 3〈P ∧ Q〉 v −→ 3〈P〉 v
lemma AA16: ` 3〈P ∧ Q〉 v −→ 3〈Q〉 v
lemma AA17: ` 3〈[P] v ∧ A〉 v −→ 3〈P ∧ A〉 v
lemma AA18: ` 2[P] v ∧ 3〈A〉 v −→ 3〈P ∧ A〉 v
lemma AA19: ` 2P ∧ 3〈A〉 v −→ 3〈P ∧ A〉 v
lemma AA20: assumes: |∼ P −→ ◦P ∨ ◦Q and |∼ P ∧ A −→ ◦Q
and |∼ P ∧ Unchanged w −→ ◦P
shows: ` 2(2P −→ 3〈A〉 v) −→ (P ; Q)
lemma AA21: |∼ 3〈◦F〉 v −→ ◦3F
lemma AA22: assumes: |∼ N ∧ P −→ ◦P ∨ ◦Q and |∼ (N ∧ P) ∧ A −→ ◦Q
and |∼ P ∧ Unchanged w −→ ◦P
shows: ` 2N ∧ 2(2P −→ 3〈A〉 v) −→ (P ; Q)
lemma AA23: assumes: |∼ N ∧ P −→ ◦P ∨ ◦Q and |∼ (N ∧ P) ∧ A −→ ◦Q
and |∼ P ∧ Unchanged w −→ ◦P
shows: ` 2N ∧ 23〈A〉 v −→ (P ; Q)
lemma AA24: ` (3〈〈P〉 f〉 f) = (3〈P〉 f)
lemma AA25: assumes: |∼ 〈P〉 v −→ 〈Q〉 w shows: ` 3〈P〉 v −→ 3〈Q〉 w
lemma AA26: ` (32[¬P] v) = (¬23〈P〉 v)
lemma AA27: ` (¬32[¬P] v) = (23〈P〉 v)
lemma AA28: ` (3〈A〉 v) = (33〈A〉 v)
lemma AA29: ` 2[N] v ∧ 23〈A〉 v −→ 23〈N ∧ A〉 v
lemma AA30: ` (3〈3〈P〉 f〉 f) = (3〈P〉 f)
lemma AA31: ` 3〈◦F〉 v −→ 3F
lemma log1: assumes: (` P) = (` Q) shows: (` 2P) = (` 2Q)
lemma nex pax2: assumes: ` F −→ G shows: |∼ ◦F −→ ◦G
lemma next and: |∼ (◦(F ∧ G)) = (◦F ∧ ◦G)
lemma next or: |∼ (◦(F ∨ G)) = (◦F ∨ ◦G)
lemma next imp: |∼ (◦(F −→ G)) = (◦F −→ ◦G)
lemma next not: |∼ (◦¬F) = (¬◦F)
lemma next eq: |∼ (◦(F = G)) = ((◦F) = (◦G))
lemma next noteq: |∼ (◦(F 6= G)) = ((◦F) 6= (◦G))
lemma next const: |∼ (◦#c) = #c
lemma next fun1: |∼ (◦f<x>) = (f<◦x>)
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lemma next fun2: |∼ (◦f<x,y>) = (f<◦x,◦y>)
lemma next fun3: |∼ (◦f<x,y,z>) = (f<◦x,◦y,◦z>)
lemma next fun4: |∼ (◦f<x,y,z,zz>) = (f<◦x,◦y,◦z,◦zz>)
lemma next forall: |∼ (◦(∀ x. P x)) = (∀ x. ◦(P x))
lemma next exists: |∼ (◦(∃ x. P x)) = (∃ x. ◦(P x))
lemma next exists1: |∼ (◦(∃! x. P x)) = (∃! x. ◦(P x))
lemma next le: |∼ (◦(x < y)) = ((◦x) < (◦y))
lemma next le eq: |∼ (◦(x ≤ y)) = ((◦x) ≤ (◦y))
lemma next mem: |∼ (◦(x ∈ X)) = ((◦x) ∈ (◦X))
lemma next notmem: |∼ (◦(x /∈ X)) = ((◦x) /∈ (◦X))
lemma next if: |∼ (◦(if T then A else B)) = (if ◦T then ◦A else ◦B)
lemma next plus: |∼ (◦(x + y)) = ((◦x) + (◦y))
lemma next minus: |∼ (◦(x - y)) = ((◦x) - (◦y))
lemma next times: |∼ (◦(x * y)) = ((◦x) * (◦y))
lemma next div: |∼ (◦(x div y)) = ((◦x) div (◦y))
lemma next mod: |∼ (◦(x mod y)) = ((◦x) mod (◦y))
lemma next finset: |∼ (◦X) = ◦X
lemma next pair: |∼ (◦(F,G)) = (◦F,◦G)
lemma next cons: |∼ (◦(x#xs)) = ((◦x)#(◦xs))
lemma next app: |∼ (◦(xs@ys)) = ((◦xs)@(◦ys))
lemma next list: |∼ (◦[L]) = [◦L]
lemma next if: |∼ (◦(if A then B else C) = (if ◦A then ◦B else ◦C)
lemma next always: |∼ 2F −→ ◦2F
lemma next ev: assumes: stutinv F shows: |∼ 3F −→ ¬F −→ ◦3F
lemma next action: |∼ 2[P] v −→ ◦2[P] v
Higher level derived rules
theorem TLA1: assumes: |∼ P ∧ Unchanged f −→ ◦P
shows: ` (2P) = (P ∧ 2[P −→ ◦P] f)
theorem TLA2:
assumes: ` P −→ Q and |∼ ([A] f) −→ ([B] g)
shows: ` 2P ∧ 2[A] f −→ 2Q ∧ 2[B] g
theorem mTLA2: assumes: |∼ ([A] f) −→ [B] g shows: ` 2[A] f −→ 2[B] g
theorem mTLA2 split: assumes: |∼ A −→ [B] g and |∼ Unchanged f −→ [B] g
shows: |∼ ([A] f) −→ [B] g
theorem INV1: assumes: |∼ I ∧ [N] f −→ ◦I shows: ` I ∧ 2[N] f −→ 2I
theorem INV2: ` 2I −→ ((2[N] f) = (2[N ∧ I ∧ ◦I] f))
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theorem R1: assumes: |∼ Unchanged w −→ Unchanged v
shows: ` 2[F] w −→ 2[F] v
theorem R2:
assumes: |∼ Unchanged w−→ Unchanged v and `2[P] w and `2[P−→ Q] w
shows: ` 2[Q] v
theorem act1:
assumes: |∼ Unchanged w −→ Unchanged v and ` 2[(P −→ [Q] v)] w
shows: ` 2[P] w −→ 2[Q] v
theorem invmono: assumes: ` I −→ P and |∼ P ∧ [N] f −→ ◦P
shows: ` I ∧ 2[N] f −→ 2P
theorem preimpsplit: assumes: |∼ I ∧ N −→ Q and |∼ I ∧ Unchanged v −→ Q
shows: |∼ I ∧ ([N] v) −→ Q
theorem preinvsplit: assumes: |∼ I ∧ N −→ ◦I and |∼ I ∧ Unchanged v −→ ◦I
shows: |∼ I ∧ [N] v −→ ◦I
theorem refinement1: assumes: ` P −→ Q and |∼ ([A] f) −→ [B] g
shows: ` P ∧ 2[A] f −→ Q ∧ 2[B] g
theorem refstep:
assumes: |∼ Unchanged v −→ Unchanged w and |∼ P −→ Q ∨ Unchanged w
shows: |∼ ([P] v) −→ [Q] w
theorem spec inv2 mono:
assumes: ` I ∧ 2[N] v −→ 2J and ` I ∧ 2[N ∧ J ∧ ◦J] v −→ P
shows: ` I ∧ 2[N] v −→ P
theorem inv join: assumes: ` P −→ 2Q and ` P −→ 2R
shows: ` P −→ 2(Q ∧ R)
lemma inv case:
assumes: ` P −→ 2(A −→ B) and ` P −→ 2(¬A −→ B)
shows: ` P −→ 2B
A.1.6 Liveness
Properties about Enabled
lemma EnabledI: ` F −→ Enabled F
lemma Enabled mono:
assumes: w ` Enabled F and ` F −→ G shows: w  Enabled G
lemma Enabled disj1: ` (Enabled F −→ Enabled (F ∨ G))
lemma Enabled disj2: ` (Enabled F −→ Enabled (G ∨ F))
lemma Enabled conj1: ` (Enabled (F ∧ G) −→ Enabled F)
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lemma Enabled conj2: ` (Enabled (G ∧ F) −→ Enabled F)
lemma Enabled conjE:
assumes: w  Enabled (F ∧ G) and Jw  Enabled F ; w  Enabled G K−→ Q
shows: Q
lemma Enabled disjD: ` Enabled (F ∨ G) −→ (Enabled F) ∨ (Enabled G)
lemma Enabled disj: ` Enabled (F ∨ G) = ((Enabled F) ∨ (Enabled G))
lemma Enabled ex: ` Enabled (∃ x. F x) = (∃ x. Enabled (F x))
Properties about WF and SF
lemma WF alt: ` (WF(A) v) = ((23¬Enabled (〈A〉 v)) ∨ 23〈A〉 v)
lemma SF alt: ` (SF(A) v) = ((32¬Enabled (〈A〉 v)) ∨ 23〈A〉 v)
lemma AlwaysWFI: ` WF(A) v −→ 2WF(A) v
lemma WF always: ` (2WF(A) v) = (WF(A) v)
lemma AlwaysSFI: ` SF (A) v −→ 2SF (A) v
lemma SF always: ` (2SF(A) v) = (SF(A) v)
lemma Enabled WFSF: ` 2Enabled (〈 F 〉 v) −→ ((WF(F) v) = (SF(F) v))
lemma WF1 old:
assumes: |∼ N ∧ P −→ ◦P ∨ ◦Q and |∼ (N ∧ P) ∧ A −→ ◦Q
and ` P ∧ N −→ Enabled (〈A〉 v) and |∼ P ∧ Unchanged w −→ ◦P
shows: ` 2N ∧ (WF(A) v) −→ (P ; Q)
theorem WF1:
assumes: |∼ P ∧ [N] f −→ ◦P ∨ ◦Q and |∼ P ∧ 〈N ∧ A〉 f −→ ◦Q
and ` P −→ (Enabled (〈A〉 f)) and |∼ P ∧ Unchanged f −→ ◦P
shows: ` 2[N] f ∧ (WF(A) f) −→ (P ; Q)
theorem SF1:
assumes: |∼ (P ∧ [N] f) −→ (◦P ∨ ◦Q) and |∼ (P ∧ 〈(N ∧ A)〉 f) −→ ◦Q
and ` (2P ∧ 2[N] f ∧ 2F) −→ 3Enabled (〈A〉 f)
and |∼ P ∧ Unchanged f −→ ◦P
shows: ` (2[N] f ∧ (SF(A) f) ∧ 2F) −→ (P ; Q)
theorem WF2:
assumes: |∼ 〈(N ∧ B)〉 f −→ 〈M〉 g and |∼ P ∧ ◦P ∧ 〈(N ∧ A)〉 f −→ B
and ` P ∧ Enabled (〈M〉 g) −→ Enabled (〈A〉 f)
and ` 2[(N ∧ ¬B)] f ∧ (WF(A) f) ∧ 2F
∧ (32Enabled (〈M〉 g)) −→ 32P
shows: ` 2[N] f ∧ (WF(A) f) ∧ 2F −→ WF(M) g
theorem SF2:
assumes: |∼ 〈(N ∧ B)〉 f −→ 〈M〉 g and |∼ P ∧ ◦P ∧ 〈(N ∧ A)〉 f −→ B
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and ` P ∧ Enabled (〈M〉 g) −→ Enabled (〈A〉 f)
and ` 2[(N ∧ ¬B)] f ∧ (SF(A) f) ∧ 2F
∧ (23Enabled (〈M〉 g)) −→ 32P
shows: ` 2[N] f ∧ (SF(A) f) ∧ 2F −→ SF(M) g
Various liveness properties
theorem wf leadsto:
assumes: wf r and ∀ x. w  F x ; (G ∨ (∃ y. #((y,x) ∈ r) ∧ F y))
shows: w  F x ; G
lemma stut Enabled: STUTINV (Enabled (〈F〉 v))
lemma stut WF: assumes: NSTUTINV F shows: STUTINV WF(F) v
lemma stut SF: assumes: NSTUTINV F shows: STUTINV SF(F) v
lemma live invmono: assumes: ` I −→ P and |∼ P ∧ [N] f −→ ◦P
shows: ` I ∧ 2[N] f ∧ Live −→ 2P
theorem live refinementmono:
assumes: ` P −→ Q and |∼ ([A] f) −→ [B] g and ` P ∧ 2[A] f ∧ L1 −→ L2
shows: ` P ∧ 2[A] f ∧ L1 −→ Q ∧ 2[B] g ∧ L2
theorem strenghen live invmono:
assumes: ` I ∧ J −→ P and |∼ P ∧ [N ∧ J ∧ ◦J] f −→ ◦P
and ` I ∧ 2[N] f ∧ Live −→ 2J
shows: ` I ∧ 2[N] f ∧ Live −→ 2P
A.1.7 State
lemma basevars:
∧
vs. basevars vs −→ ∃ u. vs u = c
lemma basevars range:
∧
vs. range vs = UNIV −→ ∃ u. vs u = c
lemma bpair1:
∧
(x :: state ⇒ ’b) y :: state ⇒ ’c.
range (LIFT(x, y)) = UNIV −→ UNIV ⊆ range x
lemma base pair1: basevars (x,y) −→ basevars x
lemma bpair2:
∧
(x :: state ⇒ ’a) y :: state ⇒ ’b.
range (LIFT(x, y)) = UNIV −→ UNIV ⊆ range y
lemma base pair2: basevars (x,y) −→ basevars y
lemma base pair: basevars (x,y) −→ basevars x ∧ basevars y
lemma base pair: ∧ x y. basevars (x,y) −→ basevars x ∧ basevars y
lemma unit base: basevars (v::state ⇒ unit)
lemma baseE: assumes: basevars v and ∧ x. v x = c −→ Q shows: Q
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theorem base enabled:
assumes: basevars vs and ∃ c. ∀ u. vs (first u) = c −→ (((first s) ## u) ` F )
shows: s  Enabled F
A.2 The Hume mechanisation
Tuple projection
lemma tup proj2: (x = (a,b)) = (fst x = a ∧ snd x = b)
lemma tup proj3: (x = (a,b,c)) = (fst3 x = a ∧ snd3 x = b ∧ thd3 x = c)
lemma tup proj4: (x = (a,b,c,d)) = (fst4 x = a ∧ snd4 x = b ∧ thd4 x = c
∧ for4 x = d)
lemma tup proj5: (x = (a,b,c,d,e)) = (fst5 x = a ∧ snd5 x = b ∧ thd5 x = c
∧ for5 x = d ∧ fif5 x = e)
lemma tup proj6: (x = (a,b,c,d,e,f)) = (fst6 x = a ∧ snd6 x = b ∧ thd6 x = c
∧ for6 x = d ∧ fif6 x = e ∧ six6 x = f)
lemma tup proj7: (x = (a,b,c,d,e,f,g)) = (fst7 x = a ∧ snd7 x = b ∧ thd7 x = c
∧ for7 x = d ∧ fif7 x = e ∧ six7 x = f ∧ sev7 x = g)
lemma tup proj8: (x = (a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h)) = (fst8 x = a ∧ snd8 x = b
∧ thd8 x = c ∧ for8 x = d ∧ fif8 x = e ∧ six8 x = f ∧ sev8 x = g ∧ eig8 x= h)
lemma tup proj9: (x = (a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h,i)) = (fst9 x = a ∧ snd9 x = b
∧ thd9 x = c ∧ for9 x = d ∧ fif9 x = e ∧ six9 x = f ∧ sev9 x = g
∧ eig9 x= h ∧ nin9 x= i)
lemma tup proj10: (x = (a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h,i,j)) = (fst10 x = a ∧ snd10 x = b
∧ thd10 x = c ∧ for10 x = d ∧ fif10 x = e ∧ six10 x = f ∧ sev10 x = g
∧ eig10 x= h ∧ nin10 x= i ∧ ten10 x = j)
lemma tup proj11: (x = (a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h,i,j,k)) = (fst11 x = a ∧ snd11 x = b
∧ thd11 x = c ∧ for11 x = d ∧ fif11 x = e ∧ six11 x = f ∧ sev11 x = g
∧ eig11 x= h ∧ nin11 x= i ∧ ten11 x = j ∧ ele11 x = k)
lemma tup lup1: fst (x,y) = x
lemma tup lup2: snd (x,y) = y
lemma tup lup3: fst3 (x,y,z) = x
lemma tup lup4: snd3 (x,y,z) = y
lemma tup lup5: thd3 (x,y,z) = z
lemma tup lup6: fst4 (a,b,c,d) = a
lemma tup lup7: snd4 (a,b,c,d) = b
lemma tup lup8: thd4 (a,b,c,d) = c
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lemma tup lup9: for4 (a,b,c,d) = d
lemma tup lup10: fst5 (a,b,c,d,e) = a
lemma tup lup11: snd5 (a,b,c,d,e) = b
lemma tup lup12: thd5 (a,b,c,d,e) = c
lemma tup lup13: for5 (a,b,c,d,e) = d
lemma tup lup14: fif5 (a,b,c,d,e) = e
lemma tup lup15: fst6 (a,b,c,d,e,f) = a
lemma tup lup16: snd6 (a,b,c,d,e,f) = b
lemma tup lup17: thd6 (a,b,c,d,e,f) = c
lemma tup lup18: for6 (a,b,c,d,e,f) = d
lemma tup lup19: fif6 (a,b,c,d,e,f) = e
lemma tup lup20: six6 (a,b,c,d,e,f) = f
lemma tup lup21: fst7 (a,b,c,d,e,f,g) = a
lemma tup lup22: snd7 (a,b,c,d,e,f,g) = b
lemma tup lup23: thd7 (a,b,c,d,e,f,g) = c
lemma tup lup24: for7 (a,b,c,d,e,f,g) = d
lemma tup lup25: fif7 (a,b,c,d,e,f,g) = e
lemma tup lup26: six7 (a,b,c,d,e,f,g) = f
lemma tup lup27: sev7 (a,b,c,d,e,f,g) = g
lemma tup lup28: fst8 (a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h) = a
lemma tup lup29: snd8 (a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h) = b
lemma tup lup30: thd8 (a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h) = c
lemma tup lup31: for8 (a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h) = d
lemma tup lup32: fif8 (a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h) = e
lemma tup lup33: six8 (a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h) = f
lemma tup lup34: sev8 (a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h) = g
lemma tup lup35: eig8 (a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h) = h
lemma tup lup36: fst9 (a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h,i) = a
lemma tup lup37: snd9 (a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h,i) = b
lemma tup lup38: thd9 (a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h,i) = c
lemma tup lup39: for9 (a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h,i) = d
lemma tup lup40: fif9 (a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h,i) = e
lemma tup lup41: six9 (a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h,i) = f
lemma tup lup42: sev9 (a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h,i) = g
lemma tup lup43: eig9 (a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h,i) = h
lemma tup lup44: nin9 (a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h,i) = i
lemma tup lup45: fst10 (a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h,i,j) = a
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lemma tup lup46: snd10 (a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h,i,j) = b
lemma tup lup47: thd10 (a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h,i,j) = c
lemma tup lup48: for10 (a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h,i,j) = d
lemma tup lup49: fif10 (a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h,i,j) = e
lemma tup lup50: six10 (a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h,i,j) = f
lemma tup lup51: sev10 (a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h,i,j) = g
lemma tup lup52: eig10 (a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h,i,j) = h
lemma tup lup53: nin10 (a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h,i,j) = i
lemma tup lup54: ten10 (a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h,i,j) = j
lemma tup lup55: fst11 (a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h,i,j,k) = a
lemma tup lup56: snd11 (a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h,i,j,k) = b
lemma tup lup57: thd11 (a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h,i,j,k) = c
lemma tup lup58: for11 (a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h,i,j,k) = d
lemma tup lup59: fif11 (a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h,i,j,k) = e
lemma tup lup60: six11 (a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h,i,j,k) = f
lemma tup lup61: sev11 (a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h,i,j,k) = g
lemma tup lup62: eig11 (a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h,i,j,k) = h
lemma tup lup63: nin11 (a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h,i,j,k) = i
lemma tup lup64: ten11 (a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h,i,j,k) = j
lemma tup lup65: ele11 (a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h,i,j,k) = k
Hume values
lemma not isVal: ¬(isVal k) =⇒ k = None
lemma isEmpty bot: isEmpty k =⇒ k = None
lemma isEmpty bot2: isEmpty k = (k = None)
lemma stut tobeforeval: STUTINV @f
lemma nstut toafterval: NSTUTINV f@
lemma t2: |∼ (◦@x) = (x@)
lemma not isVal: (¬(isVal k)) = (k = None)
lemma inv cas: (A ∧ B) =⇒ I = ((A =⇒ I) ∧ (B =⇒ I))
lemma isVal not None: isVal v = (v 6= None)
lemma isVal some: isVal v = (∃ y. v = Some y)
lemma isVal full: isVal v = (v 6= None ∧ (∃ y. v = Some y))
lemma isVal some: isVal v =⇒ (toVal v = y) = (v = Some y)
lemma some isVal: x = Some a =⇒ isVal x
lemma valproj1: J(w  x$) = (w  y$)K =⇒ (w  x@) = (w  y@)
lemma valproj2: J(w  $x) = (w  $y)K =⇒ (w  @x) = (w  @y)
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lemma valproj3: J(w  x$) = (w  $y)K =⇒ (w  x@) = (w  @y)
lemma valproj4: J(w  $x) = (w  y$)K =⇒ (w  @x) = (w  y@)
lemma valproj1fn1: Jf(w  x$) = (w  y$)K =⇒ (w  f<x>@) = (w  y@)
lemma valproj1fn2: Jf(w  $x) = (w  $y)K =⇒ (w  @f<x>) = (w  @y)
lemma valproj1fn3: Jf(w  x$) = (w  $y)K =⇒ (w  f<x>@) = (w  @y)
lemma valproj1fn4: Jf(w  $x) = (w  y$)K =⇒ (w  @f<x>) = (w  y@)
lemma valproj2fn1: J(w  x$) = f(w  y$)K =⇒ (w  x@) = (w  f<y>@)
lemma valproj2fn2: J(w  $x) = f(w  $y)K =⇒ (w  @x) = (w  @f<y>)
lemma valproj2fn3: J(w  x$) = f(w  $y)K =⇒ (w  x@) = (w  @f<y>)
lemma valproj2fn4: J(w  $x) = f(w  y$)K =⇒ (w  @x) = (w  f<y>@)
lemma valprojfn1: Jg(w  x$) = f(w  y$)K =⇒ (w  g<x>@) = (w  f<y>@)
lemma valprojfn2: Jg(w  $x) = f(w  $y)K =⇒ (w  @g<x>) = (w  @f<y>)
lemma valprojfn3: Jg(w  x$) = f(w  $y)K =⇒ (w  g<x>@) = (w  @f<y>)
lemma valprojfn4: Jg(w  $x) = f(w  y$)K =⇒ (w  @g<x>) = (w  f<y>@)
lemma isvalproj1: JisVal(w  x$);isVal(w  y$)K
=⇒ ((w  x$) = (w  y)=((w  x@) = (w  y@))
lemma isvalproj2: JisVal(w  $x);isVal(w  $y)K
=⇒ ((w  $x) = (w  $y))=((w  @x) = (w  @y))
lemma isvalproj3: JisVal(w  x$);isVal(w  $y)K
=⇒ ((w  x$) = (w  $y))=((w  x@) = (w  @y))
lemma isvalproj4: JisVal(w  $x);isVal(w  y$)K
=⇒ ((w  $x) = (w  y$))=((w  @x) = (w  y@))
lemma isvalproj1fn1: JisVal(f(w  x$));isVal(w  y$)K
=⇒ (f(w  x$) = (w  y$))=((w  f<x>@) = (w  y@))
lemma isvalproj1fn2: JisVal(f(w  $x));isVal(w  $y)K
=⇒ (f(w  $x) = (w  $y))=((w  @f<x>) = (w  @y))
lemma isvalproj1fn3: JisVal(f(w  x$));isVal(w  $y)K
=⇒ (f(w  x$) = (w  $y))=((w  f<x>@) = (w  @y))
lemma isvalproj1fn4: JisVal(f(w  $x));isVal(w  y$)K
=⇒ (f(w  $x) = (w  y$))=((w  @f<x>) = (w  y@))
lemma isvalproj2fn1: JisVal(w  x$);isVal(f(w  y$))K
=⇒ ((w  x$) = f(w  y$))=((w  x@) = (w  f<y>@))
lemma isvalproj2fn2: JisVal(w  $x);isVal(f(w  $y))K
=⇒ ((w  $x) = f(w  $y))=((w  @x) = (w  @f<y>))
lemma isvalproj2fn3: JisVal(w  x$);isVal(f(w  $y))K
=⇒ ((w  x$) = f(w  $y))=((w  x@) = (w  @f<y>))
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lemma isvalproj2fn4: JisVal(w  $x);isVal(f(w  y$))K
=⇒ ((w  $x) = f(w  y$))=((w  @x) = (w  f<y>@))
lemma isvalprojfn1: JisVal(f(w  x$));isVal(g(w  y$))K
=⇒ (f(w  x$) = g(w  y$))=((w  f<x>@) = (w  g<y>@))
lemma isvalprojfn2: JisVal(f(w  $x));isVal(g(w  $y))K
=⇒ (f(w  $x) = g(w  $y))=((w  @f<x>) = (w  @g<y>))
lemma isvalprojfn3: JisVal(f(w  x$));isVal(g(w  $y))K
=⇒ (f(w  x$) = g(w  $y))=((w  f<x>@) = (w  @g<y>))
lemma isvalprojfn4: JisVal(f(w  $x));isVal(g(w  y$))K
=⇒ (f(w  $x) = g(w  y$))=((w  @f<x>) = (w  g<y>@))
lemma valin1: JisVal v K =⇒ (v = intoVal y) = (toVal v = y)
lemma valin2: JisVal (w  x$) K =⇒ ((w  x$) = intoVal v) = ((w  x@) = v)
lemma valin3: JisVal (w  $x) K =⇒ ((w  $x) = intoVal v) = ((w  @x) = v)
lemma valin4: JisVal (w  x$) K =⇒ ((w  x$) = intoVal v) = ((w  x@) = v)
lemma valin5: JisVal (g(w  x$))K
=⇒ ((g(w  x$)) = (intoVal v)) = ((w  g<x>@) = v)
lemma valin6: JisVal (g(w  $x))K
=⇒ ((g(w  $x)) = (intoVal v)) = ((w  @g<x>) = v)
lemma valin1’: JisVal v K =⇒ (v = Some y) = (toVal v = y)
lemma valin2’: JisVal (w  x$) K =⇒ ((w  x$) = Some v) = ((w  x@) = v)
lemma valin3’: JisVal (w  $x) K =⇒ ((w  $x) = Some v) = ((w  @x) = v)
lemma valin4’: JisVal (w  x$) K =⇒ ((w  x$) = Some v) = ((w  x@) = v)
lemma valin5’: JisVal (g(w  x$))K
=⇒ ((g(w  x$)) = (Some v)) = ((w  g<x>@) = v)
lemma valin6’: JisVal (g(w  $x))K
=⇒ ((g(w  $x)) = (Some v)) = ((w  @g<x>) = v)
lemma valintoto: isVal v =⇒ (v = intoVal y) = (toVal v = y)
lemma valintoto lift:  isVal<x$> =⇒ (x$ = intoVal <v>) = (x@ = v)
lemma valintoto unl: isVal (w  x$)
=⇒ ((w  x$) = (intoVal v)) = ((w  x@)= v)
lemma valintoto unl2: isVal (w  $x)
=⇒ ((w  $x) = (intoVal v)) = ((w  @x)= v)
lemma valintoto unl fun: isVal (g(w  x$))
=⇒ ((g(w  x$)) = (intoVal v)) = ((w  g<x>@) = v)
lemma valintoto unl fun2: isVal (g(w  $x))
=⇒ ((g(w  $x)) = (intoVal v)) = ((w  @g<x>) = v)
lemma condsym: P =⇒ A = B =⇒ P =⇒ B = A
Appendix A. Mechanised theorems in Isabelle/HOL 229
lemma exe bod: ((if P then Q else R) =⇒ I) =
(((P ∧ Q) =⇒ I) ∧ ((¬P ∧ R) =⇒ I))
lemma exe bod2: ((M ∧ (if P then Q else R)) =⇒ I) =
((( (M ∧ P) ∧ Q) =⇒ I) ∧ (((M ∧ ¬P) ∧ R) =⇒ I))
lemma exe bl: assumes: w  P =⇒ I and w  Q =⇒ I
shows: w  (if R then P else Q) =⇒ I
lemma unch opt val: |∼ x$ = $y =⇒ x@ = @y
lemma after opt val: |∼ x$ = y$ =⇒ x@ = y@
lemma before opt val: |∼ $x = $y =⇒ @x = @y
lemma unch opt fun unl: g(w  x$) = g(w  $y)
=⇒ (w  g<x>@) = (w  @g<y>)
lemma isVal valintoto: isVal(w  $w4) =⇒ (w  $w4) = Some (w  @w4)
lemma isEmpty None: isEmpty v =⇒ v = None
Pattern matching
lemma pmatch1:
assumes: x = PConsume and ¬(PMatch x wire) shows: isEmpty wire
lemma pmatch2: assumes: ¬(PMatch PConsume wire) shows: isEmpty wire
lemma pmatch3: assumes: PMatch PConsume wire shows: isVal wire
lemma pmatch const1: (mConst A B) = (B = Some A)
lemma pmatch con1: mCon A = (∃ v. Some v = A)
lemma pmatch con2: (mCon A)=(isVal A)
lemma lift m1: |∼ (mConst<A,$B>)=(isVal<$B> ∧ @B = A)
lemma lift m2: |∼ mCon<$A> = (isVal<$A> ∧ (∃ v. @A = v))
lemma lift m3: |∼ (mConst<A,B$>)=(isVal<B$> ∧ B@ = A)
lemma lift m4: |∼ mCon<A$> = (isVal<A$> ∧ (∃ v. A@ = v))
Output wires
lemma assertout1: isEmpty res =⇒ assertOut res wire
lemma assertout2: isEmpty wire =⇒ assertOut res wire
lemma assertout3: assertOut res wire = (isEmpty res ∨ isEmpty wire)
lemma nwireE: Jx = nwire A B; x = A =⇒ P; x = B =⇒ PK =⇒ P
lemma nwire1: (nwire a b = a) ∨ (nwire a b = b)
lemma nwire2: nwire x y 6= x =⇒ nwire x y = y
lemma nw1: isVal x =⇒ nwire x y = x
lemma nw2: ¬isVal x =⇒ nwire x y = y
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lemma nwire1 lift: (nwire (w  $a) (w  $b) = (w  $a))
∨ (nwire (w  $a)(w  $b) = (w  $b))
lemma nwire1 lift fun: (nwire (w  g<$a>) (w  $b) = (w  g<$a>))
∨ (nwire (w  g<$a>)(w  $b) = (w  $b))
A.3 Hume case studies
A.3.1 Even and odd numbers
theorem mainth: ` evenodd −→ 2((isVal<$w1> −→ @w1 ∈ #OddN)
∧ (isVal<$odd res> −→ @odd res ∈ #OddN)
∧ (isVal<$w2> −→ @w2 ∈ #EvenN)
∧ (isVal<$even res>−→ @even res ∈ #EvenN))
theorem evenwire: ` evenodd −→ 2(isVal<$w2> −→ @w2 ∈ #EvenN)
theorem oddwire: ` evenodd −→ 2(isVal<$w1> −→ @w1 ∈ #OddN)
A.3.2 The vending machine
lemma vend mon1: ` vending
−→ 2((isVal<snd3<$con res>> −→ #0 ≤ @snd3<con res>)
∧ (isVal<$w4> −→ #0 ≤ @w4))
theorem vend money: ` vending −→ 2(isVal<$w4> −→ #0 ≤ @w4)
A.4 The Hierarchical Hume mechanisation
lemma sch1: S b pc t psch ∈ {Super,Execute,Terminated}
lemma sch2: S Execute pc t psch ∈ {Super,Execute}
lemma sch3: S Super pc t psch ∈ {Terminated,Execute}
lemma sch4: (S b pc t psch = Super) ∨ (S b pc t psch = Terminated)
lemma sch5: S Super ppc t True = Terminated
lemma S1sch1: S1 s pc t ∈ {Super,Execute}
lemma S1sch2: S1 Execute False c = Execute
lemma termcond1: termcond x = (x ∈ {Terminated,Blocked,Matchfail})
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A.5 Hierarchical Hume case studies
A.5.1 The SAFER system
Generic properties
lemma SAFER sch: ` program −→ 2($s ∈ #Super,Execute)
lemma SAFER inp1: ` program−→2(isVal<$w18>−→ @w18 = @fst11<safer inp>)
lemma SAFER inp2: ` program−→2(isVal<$w15>−→ @w15 = @snd11<safer inp>)
lemma SAFER inp3: ` program−→2(isVal<$w19>−→ @w19 = @thd11<safer inp>)
lemma SAFER inp4: ` program−→2(isVal<$w20>−→ @w20 = @for11<safer inp>)
lemma SAFER inp5: ` program−→2(isVal<$w21>−→ @w21 = @fif11<safer inp>)
lemma SAFER inp6: ` program −→ 2(isVal<$w1> −→ @w1 = @six11<safer inp>)
lemma SAFER inp7: ` program−→2(isVal<$w2>−→ @w2 = @sev11<safer inp>)
lemma SAFER inp8: ` program−→ 2(isVal<$w3>−→ @w3 = @eig11<safer inp>)
lemma SAFER inp9: ` program −→ 2(isVal<$w4> −→ @w4= @nin11<safer inp>)
lemma SAFER inp10: ` program−→2(isVal<$w5>−→ @w5 = @ten11<safer inp>)
lemma SAFER inp11: ` program−→2(isVal<$w7>−→ @w7 = @ele11<safer inp>)
lemma SAFER aahprf1: ` program −→
2(isVal<thd11<$aahprf res>> −→ @thd11<aahprf res> = @fst11<safer inp>)
lemma SAFER aahprf2: ` program−→2(isVal<$w25>−→ @w25 = @fst11<safer inp>)
lemma SAFER aahprf3: ` program −→
2(isVal<for11<$aahprf res>> −→ @for11<aahprf res> = @snd11<safer inp>)
lemma SAFER aahprf4: ` program−→2(isVal<$w26>−→ @w26 = @snd11<safer inp>)
lemma rot tran: (X 6= ROT) = (X = TRAN)
Requirement 1
lemma Req1 AAH command1: ` program
−→2(isVal<fst3<$aahpof res>>−→ @fst3<aahpof res> = #(ZERO,ZERO,ZERO))
lemma Req1 AAH command2: ` program −→ 2(isVal<$w24>
−→ @w24 = #(ZERO,ZERO,ZERO))
lemma Req1 GC ZERO1: ` program −→ 2(@six11<safer inp> = #ZERO
∧ @sev11<safer inp> = #ZERO ∧ @eig11<safer inp> = #ZERO
∧ @nin11<safer inp> = #ZERO −→ isVal<fst3<$gc res>>
−→ @fst3<gc res> = #(ZERO,ZERO,ZERO))
lemma Req1 GC ZERO2: ` program −→ 2(@six11<safer inp> = #ZERO
∧ @sev11<safer inp> = #ZERO ∧ @eig11<safer inp> = #ZERO
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∧ @nin11<safer inp> = #ZERO −→ isVal<snd3<$gc res>>
−→ @snd3<gc res> = #(ZERO,ZERO,ZERO))
lemma Req1 GC ZERO3: ` program −→ 2(@six11<safer inp> = #ZERO
∧ @sev11<safer inp> = #ZERO ∧ @eig11<safer inp> = #ZERO
∧ @nin11<safer inp> = #ZERO −→ isVal<$w22>
−→ @w22 = #(ZERO,ZERO,ZERO))
lemma Req1 GC ZERO4: ` program −→ 2(@six11<safer inp> = #ZERO
∧ @sev11<safer inp> = #ZERO ∧ @eig11<safer inp> = #ZERO
∧ @nin11<safer inp> = #ZERO −→ isVal<$w23>
−→ @w23 = #(ZERO,ZERO,ZERO))
lemma Req1 IC ZERO1: ` program −→ 2(@six11<safer inp> = #ZERO
∧ @sev11<safer inp> = #ZERO ∧ @eig11<safer inp> = #ZERO
∧ @nin11<safer inp> = #ZERO ∧ @fst11<safer inp> = #(False,False,False)
−→ isVal<fst3<$ic res>> −→ @fst3<ic res> = #(ZERO,ZERO,ZERO))
lemma Req1 IC ZERO2: ` program −→ 2(@six11<safer inp> = #ZERO
∧ @sev11<safer inp> = #ZERO ∧ @eig11<safer inp> = #ZERO
∧ @nin11<safer inp> = #ZERO ∧ @fst11<safer inp> = #(False,False,False)
−→ isVal<snd3<$ic res>> −→ @snd3<ic res> = #(ZERO,ZERO,ZERO))
lemma Req1 IC ZERO3: ` program −→ 2(@six11<safer inp> = #ZERO
∧ @sev11<safer inp> = #ZERO ∧ @eig11<safer inp> = #ZERO
∧ @nin11<safer inp> = #ZERO ∧ @fst11<safer inp> = #(False,False,False)
−→ isVal<$w27> −→ @w27 = #(ZERO,ZERO,ZERO))
lemma Req1 IC ZERO4: ` program −→ 2(@six11<safer inp> = #ZERO
∧ @sev11<safer inp> = #ZERO ∧ @eig11<safer inp> = #ZERO
∧ @nin11<safer inp> = #ZERO ∧ @fst11<safer inp> = #(False,False,False)
−→ isVal<$w29> −→ @w29 = #(ZERO,ZERO,ZERO))
lemma Req1 PTC ZERO1: ` program −→ 2(@six11<safer inp> = #ZERO
∧ @sev11<safer inp> = #ZERO ∧ @eig11<safer inp> = #ZERO
∧ @nin11<safer inp> = #ZERO ∧ @fst11<safer inp> = #(False,False,False)
−→ isVal<fst3<$ptc res>> −→ @fst3<ptc res> = #ZERO)
lemma Req1 PTC ZERO2: ` program −→ 2(@six11<safer inp> = #ZERO
∧ @sev11<safer inp> = #ZERO ∧ @eig11<safer inp> = #ZERO
∧ @nin11<safer inp> = #ZERO ∧ @fst11<safer inp> = #(False,False,False)
−→ isVal<snd3<$ptc res>> −→ @snd3<ptc res> = #ZERO)
lemma Req1 PTC ZERO3: ` program −→ 2(@six11<safer inp> = #ZERO
∧ @sev11<safer inp> = #ZERO ∧ @eig11<safer inp> = #ZERO
∧ @nin11<safer inp> = #ZERO ∧ @fst11<safer inp> = #(False,False,False)
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−→ isVal<thd3<$ptc res>> −→ @thd3<ptc res> = #ZERO)
lemma Req1 PTC ZERO4: ` program −→ 2(@six11<safer inp> = #ZERO
∧ @sev11<safer inp> = #ZERO ∧ @eig11<safer inp> = #ZERO
∧ @nin11<safer inp> = #ZERO ∧ @fst11<safer inp> = #(False,False,False)
−→ isVal<$w33> −→ @w33 = #ZERO)
lemma Req1 PTC ZERO5: ` program −→ 2(@six11<safer inp> = #ZERO
∧ @sev11<safer inp> = #ZERO ∧ @eig11<safer inp> = #ZERO
∧ @nin11<safer inp> = #ZERO ∧ @fst11<safer inp> = #(False,False,False)
−→ isVal<$w30> −→ @w30 = #ZERO)
lemma Req1 PTC ZERO6: ` program −→ 2(@six11<safer inp> = #ZERO
∧ @sev11<safer inp> = #ZERO ∧ @eig11<safer inp> = #ZERO
∧ @nin11<safer inp> = #ZERO ∧ @fst11<safer inp> = #(False,False,False)
−→ isVal<$w31> −→ @w31 = #ZERO)
lemma Req1 ICF ZERO1: ` program −→ 2(@six11<safer inp> = #ZERO
∧ @sev11<safer inp> = #ZERO ∧ @eig11<safer inp> = #ZERO
∧ @nin11<safer inp> = #ZERO ∧ @fst11<safer inp> = #(False,False,False)
−→ (isVal<fst4<$icf res>>−→ @fst4<icf res> = #ZERO) ∧ (isVal<snd4<$icf res>>
−→ @snd4<icf res> = #ZERO) ∧ (isVal<thd4<$icf res>>
−→ @thd4<icf res> = #ZERO))
lemma Req1 ICF ZERO2: ` program −→ 2(@six11<safer inp> = #ZERO
∧ @sev11<safer inp> = #ZERO ∧ @eig11<safer inp> = #ZERO
∧ @nin11<safer inp> = #ZERO ∧ @fst11<safer inp> = #(False,False,False)
−→ (isVal<$w34> −→ @w34 = #ZERO) ∧ (isVal<$w35> −→ @w35 = #ZERO))
lemma Req1 ICF ZERO3: ` program −→ 2(@six11<safer inp> = #ZERO
∧ @sev11<safer inp> = #ZERO ∧ @eig11<safer inp> = #ZERO
∧ @nin11<safer inp> = #ZERO ∧ @fst11<safer inp> = #(False,False,False)
−→ (isVal<$w32> −→ @w32 = #ZERO))
lemma Req1 LRUD ZERO1: ` program −→ 2(@six11<safer inp> = #ZERO
∧ @sev11<safer inp> = #ZERO ∧ @eig11<safer inp> = #ZERO
∧ @nin11<safer inp> = #ZERO ∧ @fst11<safer inp> = #(False,False,False)
−→ (isVal<fst<$lrud res>> −→ @fst<lrud res> = #[])
∧ (isVal<snd<$lrud res>> −→ @snd<lrud res> = #[]))
lemma Req1 LRUD ZERO2: ` program −→ 2(@six11<safer inp> = #ZERO
∧ @sev11<safer inp> = #ZERO ∧ @eig11<safer inp> = #ZERO
∧ @nin11<safer inp> = #ZERO ∧ @fst11<safer inp> = #(False,False,False)
−→ (isVal<$w36> −→ @w36 = #[]) ∧ (isVal<$w37> −→ @w37 = #[]))
lemma Req1 BF ZERO1: ` program −→ 2(@six11<safer inp> = #ZERO
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∧ @sev11<safer inp> = #ZERO ∧ @eig11<safer inp> = #ZERO
∧ @nin11<safer inp> = #ZERO ∧ @fst11<safer inp> = #(False,False,False)
−→ (isVal<fst<$bf res>> −→ @fst<bf res> = #[])
∧ (isVal<snd<$bf res>> −→ @snd<bf res> = #[]))
lemma Req1 BF ZERO2: ` program −→ 2(@six11<safer inp> = #ZERO
∧ @sev11<safer inp> = #ZERO ∧ @eig11<safer inp> = #ZERO
∧ @nin11<safer inp> = #ZERO ∧ @fst11<safer inp> = #(False,False,False)
−→ (isVal<$w38> −→ @w38 = #[]) ∧ (isVal<$w39> −→ @w39 = #[]))
lemma Req1 TJ ZERO1: ` program −→ 2(@six11<safer inp> = #ZERO
∧ @sev11<safer inp> = #ZERO ∧ @eig11<safer inp> = #ZERO
∧ @nin11<safer inp> = #ZERO ∧ @fst11<safer inp> = #(False,False,False)
−→ (isVal<$tj res> −→ @tj res = #[]))
lemma Req1 TJ ZERO2: ` program −→ 2(@six11<safer inp> = #ZERO
∧ @sev11<safer inp> = #ZERO ∧ @eig11<safer inp> = #ZERO
∧ @nin11<safer inp> = #ZERO ∧ @fst11<safer inp> = #(False,False,False)
−→ (isVal<$w41> −→ @w41 = #[]))
theorem Req1 main: ` program −→ 2(@six11<safer inp> = #ZERO
∧ @sev11<safer inp> = #ZERO ∧ @eig11<safer inp> = #ZERO
∧ @nin11<safer inp> = #ZERO ∧ @fst11<safer inp> = #(False,False,False)
−→ isVal<six6<$safer res>> −→ @six6<safer res> = #[])
Requirement 2
lemma Prop2 IC ZERO1: ` program −→ 2( isVal<thd3<$ic res>>
∧ isVal<fst3<$ic res>>
−→ (@thd3<ic res> = #False −→ @fst3<ic res> = #(ZERO,ZERO,ZERO)))
lemma Prop2 IC out1: ` program
−→ 2( isVal<thd3<$ic res>> = isVal<fst3<$ic res>>)
lemma Prop2 IC ZERO2: ` program −→ 2(isVal<$w28> ∧ isVal<$w27>
−→ (@w28 = #False −→ @w27 = #(ZERO,ZERO,ZERO)))
lemma moa1: max one axis ZERO ZERO a
lemma moa2: max one axis a ZERO ZERO
lemma moa3: max one axis ZERO a ZERO
lemma moa4: max one axis ZERO ZERO ZERO
lemma Prop2 1 PTC1: ` program −→ 2( isVal<fst3<$ptc res>>
∧ isVal<snd3<$ptc res>> ∧ isVal<thd3<$ptc res>>
−→ max one axis<@fst3<ptc res>,@snd3<ptc res>,@thd3<ptc res>>)
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lemma Prop2 1 PTC2: ` program −→ 2( isVal<fst3<$ptc res>>
= isVal<snd3<$ptc res>> ∧ isVal<fst3<$ptc res>> = isVal<thd3<$ptc res>>)
theorem Prop2 main1: ` program −→ 2( isVal<$w33> ∧ isVal<$w30>
∧ isVal<$w31> −→ max one axis<@w33,@w30,@w31>)
lemma Prop2 2 GC 1: ` program −→ 2(@ten11<safer inp> = #ROT
∧ isVal<fst3<$gc res>>−→ @fst3<gc res> = (@sev11<safer inp>,#ZERO,#ZERO))
lemma Prop2 2 GC 2: ` program −→ 2(@ten11<safer inp> = #TRAN
∧ isVal<fst3<$gc res>> −→ @fst3<gc res>
= (@sev11<safer inp>,@eig11<safer inp>,@six11<safer inp>))
lemma Prop2 2 GC 3: ` program −→ 2(@ten11<safer inp> = #ROT
∧ isVal<$w22> −→ @w22 = (@sev11<safer inp>,#ZERO,#ZERO))
lemma Prop2 2 GC 4: ` program −→ 2(@ten11<safer inp> = #TRAN
∧ isVal<$w22>
−→ @w22 = (@sev11<safer inp>,@eig11<safer inp>,@six11<safer inp>))
lemma Prop2 2 IC 1: ` program −→ 2(isVal<thd3<$ic res>> ∧ @thd3<ic res>
= #False ∧ isVal<fst3<$ic res>> −→ @fst3<ic res> = #(ZERO,ZERO,ZERO))
lemma Prop2 2 IC out1: ` program −→
2( isVal<thd3<$ic res>> = isVal<fst3<$ic res>>)
lemma Prop2 IC 2: ` program −→ 2(isVal<$w28> ∧ @w28 = #False
∧ isVal<$w27> −→ @w27 = #(ZERO,ZERO,ZERO))
lemma Prop2 2 IC 3: ` program −→ 2( isVal<thd3<$ic res>>
∧ @thd3<ic res> = #True ∧ @ten11<safer inp> = #ROT ∧ isVal<fst3<$ic res>>
−→ @fst3<ic res> = (@sev11<safer inp>,#ZERO,#ZERO))
lemma Prop2 2 IC 4: ` program −→ 2(isVal<thd3<$ic res>>
∧ @thd3<ic res> = #True ∧ @ten11<safer inp> = #TRAN ∧ isVal<fst3<$ic res>>
−→ @fst3<ic res> = (@sev11<safer inp>,@eig11<safer inp>,@six11<safer inp>))
lemma Prop2 2 IC 5: ` program −→ 2(isVal<$w28> ∧ @w28 = #True
∧ @ten11<safer inp> = #ROT ∧ isVal<$w27>
−→ @w27 = (@sev11<safer inp>,#ZERO,#ZERO))
lemma Prop2 2 IC 6: ` program −→ 2(isVal<$w28> ∧ @w28 = #True
∧ @ten11<safer inp> = #TRAN ∧ isVal<$w27>
−→ @w27 = (@sev11<safer inp>,@eig11<safer inp>,@six11<safer inp>))
lemma Prop2 2 PTC1: ` program −→ 2( @ten11<safer inp> = #ROT
−→ (isVal<snd3<$ptc res>> ∧ @snd3<ptc res> 6= #ZERO
−→ @sev11<safer inp> = #ZERO))
lemma Prop2 2 PTC2: ` program −→ 2( ¬(@ten11<safer inp> = #ROT)
−→ (isVal<snd3<$ptc res>> ∧ @snd3<ptc res> 6= #ZERO
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−→ @sev11<safer inp> = #ZERO))
lemma Prop2 2 PTC3: ` program −→ 2(isVal<snd3<$ptc res>>
∧ @snd3<ptc res> 6= #ZERO −→ @sev11<safer inp> = #ZERO)
lemma Prop2 2 PTC4: ` program −→ 2( @ten11<safer inp> = #ROT
−→ (isVal<thd3<$ptc res>> ∧ @thd3<ptc res> 6= #ZERO
−→ @sev11<safer inp> = #ZERO ∧ @eig11<safer inp> = #ZERO))
lemma Prop2 2 PTC5: ` program −→ 2( ¬(@ten11<safer inp> = #ROT)
−→ (isVal<thd3<$ptc res>> ∧ @thd3<ptc res> 6= #ZERO
−→ @sev11<safer inp> = #ZERO ∧ @eig11<safer inp> = #ZERO))
lemma Prop2 2 PTC6: ` program −→ 2(isVal<thd3<$ptc res>>
∧ @thd3<ptc res> 6= #ZERO
−→ @sev11<safer inp> = #ZERO ∧ @eig11<safer inp> = #ZERO)
theorem Prop2 2 main1: ` program −→ 2(isVal<$w30>
∧ @w30 6= #ZERO −→ @sev11<safer inp> = #ZERO)
theorem Prop2 2 main2: ` program −→ 2(isVal<$w31> ∧ @w31 6= #ZERO
−→ @sev11<safer inp> = #ZERO ∧ @eig11<safer inp> = #ZERO)
Requirement 3
lemma Prop3 GC 1: ` program −→ 2(@ten11<safer inp> = #TRAN
∧ @nin11<safer inp> 6= #ZERO −→ isVal<snd3<$gc res>>
−→ @snd3<gc res> 6= #(ZERO,ZERO,ZERO))
lemma Prop3 GC 2: ` program −→ 2(@ten11<safer inp> = #ROT ∧
(@six11<safer inp>,@nin11<safer inp>,@eig11<safer inp>) 6= #(ZERO,ZERO,ZERO)
−→ isVal<snd3<$gc res>> −→ @snd3<gc res> 6= #(ZERO,ZERO,ZERO))
lemma Prop3 GC 3: ` program −→ 2(@ten11<safer inp> = #TRAN
∧ @nin11<safer inp> 6= #ZERO −→ isVal<$w23>
−→ @w23 6= #(ZERO,ZERO,ZERO))
lemma Prop3 GC 4: ` program −→ 2(@ten11<safer inp> = #ROT ∧
(@six11<safer inp>,@nin11<safer inp>,@eig11<safer inp>) 6= #(ZERO,ZERO,ZERO)
−→ isVal<$w23> −→ @w23 6= #(ZERO,ZERO,ZERO))
lemma Prop3 IC 1: ` program −→ 2( @ten11<safer inp> = #TRAN
∧ @nin11<safer inp> 6= #ZERO
−→ isVal<fst3<$ic res>> −→ @fst3<ic res> = #(ZERO,ZERO,ZERO))
lemma Prop3 IC 2: ` program −→ 2( @ten11<safer inp> = #ROT
∧ @six11<safer inp>,@nin11<safer inp>,@eig11<safer inp>) 6= #(ZERO,ZERO,ZERO)
−→ isVal<fst3<$ic res>> −→ @fst3<ic res> = #(ZERO,ZERO,ZERO)
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theorem Prop3 main1: ` program −→ 2( @ten11<safer inp> = #TRAN
∧ @nin11<safer inp> 6= #ZERO
−→ isVal<$w27> −→ @w27 = #(ZERO,ZERO,ZERO))
lemma Prop3 main2: ` program −→ 2( @ten11<safer inp> = #ROT
∧ (@six11<safer inp>,@nin11<safer inp>,@eig11<safer inp> 6= #(ZERO,ZERO,ZERO)
−→ isVal<$w27> −→ @w27 = #(ZERO,ZERO,ZERO))
lemma Prop3 2 GC 1: ` program −→ 2(@ten11<safer inp> = #TRAN ∧
@nin11<safer inp> = #ZERO −→ (isVal<snd3<$gc res>>
−→ @snd3<gc res> = #(ZERO,ZERO,ZERO)) ∧ (isVal<fst3<$gc res>>
−→ @fst3<gc res> = (@sev11<safer inp>,@eig11<safer inp>,@six11<safer inp>)))
lemma Prop3 2 GC 2: ` program −→ 2(@ten11<safer inp> = #ROT
∧ (@six11<safer inp>,@nin11<safer inp>,@eig11<safer inp>) = #(ZERO,ZERO,ZERO)
−→ (isVal<snd3<$gc res>> −→ @snd3<gc res> = #(ZERO,ZERO,ZERO))
∧ (isVal<fst3<$gc res>>−→ @fst3<gc res> = (@sev11<safer inp>,#ZERO,#ZERO)))
lemma Prop3 2 GC 3: ` program −→ 2(@ten11<safer inp> = #TRAN
∧ @nin11<safer inp> = #ZERO −→ (isVal<$w23>
∧ −→ @w23 = #(ZERO,ZERO,ZERO)) (isVal<$w22>
−→ @w22 = (@sev11<safer inp>,@eig11<safer inp>,@six11<safer inp>)))
lemma Prop3 2 GC 4: ` program −→ 2(@ten11<safer inp> = #ROT
∧ (@six11<safer inp>,@nin11<safer inp>,@eig11<safer inp>)
= #(ZERO,ZERO,ZERO) −→ (isVal<$w23>
−→ @w23 = #(ZERO,ZERO,ZERO))
∧ (isVal<$w22> −→ @w22 = (@sev11<safer inp>,#ZERO,#ZERO)))
lemma Prop3 2 IC 1: ` program −→ 2( @ten11<safer inp> = #TRAN
∧ @nin11<safer inp> = #ZERO −→ isVal<fst3<$ic res>> −→ @fst3<ic res>
= (@sev11<safer inp>,@eig11<safer inp>,@six11<safer inp>))
lemma Prop3 2 IC 2: ` program −→ 2( @ten11<safer inp> = #ROT
∧ (@six11<safer inp>,@nin11<safer inp>,@eig11<safer inp>)
= #(ZERO,ZERO,ZERO) −→ isVal<fst3<$ic res>>
−→ @fst3<ic res> = (@sev11<safer inp>,#ZERO,#ZERO))
theorem Prop3 main3: ` program −→ 2(@ten11<safer inp> = #TRAN
∧ @nin11<safer inp> = #ZERO)) −→ isVal<$w27>
−→ @w27 = (@sev11<safer inp>,@eig11<safer inp>,@six11<safer inp>)
theorem Prop3 main4: ` program −→ 2( @ten11<safer inp> = #ROT
∧ (@six11<safer inp>,@nin11<safer inp>,@eig11<safer inp>)
= #(ZERO,ZERO,ZERO)) −→ isVal<$w27>
−→ @w27 = (@sev11<safer inp>,#ZERO,#ZERO)
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Requirement 4
lemma lrud bf1: LRUD Type x ∨ BF Type x
lemma lrud bf2: (LRUD Type x) 6= (BF Type x)
lemma lrud bf3: (LRUD Type x) = (¬BF Type x)
lemma lrud bf4: (BF Type x) = (¬LRUD Type x)
lemma lrud bf types1: xs 6= [] −→ (LRUD Types xs) −→ (¬BF Types xs)
lemma lrud bf types2: xs 6= [] −→ (BF Types xs) −→ (¬LRUD Types xs)
lemma lrud bf types3: LRUD Type x −→ ¬BF Types (x#xs)
lemma lrud set1: (LRUD Types xs) =(set xs ⊆ LRUD set)
lemma lrud set2: LRUD Type x −→ x ∈ LRUD set
lemma bf set1: (BF Types xs) = (set xs ⊆ BF set)
lemma bf set2: BF Type x −→ x ∈ BF set
lemma lrud bf set1: (x ∈ BF set) = (x /∈ LRUD set)
lemma lrud bf add: J BF Types bs; LRUD Types ls; tc bs ; tc ls K
=⇒ tc (ls @ bs)
lemma bf add: J BF Types as; BF Types bs K =⇒ BF Types (as @ bs)
lemma lrud add: J LRUD Types as; LRUD Types bs K
=⇒ LRUD Types (as @ bs)
lemma lrud bf add2: J BF Types bs; LRUD Types ls; tc bs ; tc ls K
=⇒ tc (bs @ ls)
lemma assoc4: (a @ b @ c @ d) = ((a @ b) @ (c @ d))
lemma Prop4 LRUD 1: ` program
−→ 2(isVal<fst<$lrud res>> −→ tc <@fst<lrud res>>)
lemma Prop4 LRUD 2: ` program
−→ 2(isVal<snd<$lrud res>> −→ tc <@snd<lrud res>>)
lemma Prop4 LRUD 3: ` program −→ 2(isVal<fst<$lrud res>>
∧ isVal<snd<$lrud res>> −→ tc <@fst<lrud res> @ @snd<lrud res>>)
lemma Prop4 LRUD 4: ` program −→ 2(isVal<$w36> −→ tc <@w36>)
lemma Prop4 LRUD 5: ` program −→ 2(isVal<$w37> −→ tc <@w37>)
lemma Prop4 LRUD 6a: ` program
−→ 2(isVal<fst<$lrud res>> = isVal<snd<$lrud res>>)
lemma Prop4 LRUD 6: ` program
−→ 2(isVal<$w36> ∧ isVal<$w37> −→ tc <@w36 @ @w37>)
lemma Prop4 LRUD 7: ` program
−→ 2(isVal<fst<$lrud res>> −→ LRUD Types <@fst<lrud res>>)
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lemma Prop4 LRUD 8: ` program
−→ 2(isVal<snd<$lrud res>> −→ LRUD Types <@snd<lrud res>>)
lemma Prop4 LRUD 9: ` program −→ 2(isVal<fst<$lrud res>>
∧ isVal<snd<$lrud res>> −→ LRUD Types <@fst<lrud res> @ @snd<lrud res>>)
lemma Prop4 LRUD 10: ` program
−→ 2(isVal<$w36> −→ LRUD Types <@w36>)
lemma Prop4 LRUD 11: ` program
−→ 2(isVal<$w37> −→ LRUD Types <@w37>)
lemma Prop4 LRUD 12a: ` program
−→ 2(isVal<fst<$lrud res>> = isVal<snd<$lrud res>>)
lemma Prop4 LRUD 12: ` program
−→ 2(isVal<$w36> ∧ isVal<$w37> −→ LRUD Types <@w36 @ @w37>)
lemma Prop4 BF 1: ` program −→ 2(isVal<fst<$bf res>> −→ tc <@fst<bf res>>)
lemma Prop4 BF 2: ` program−→2(isVal<snd<$bf res>>−→ tc <@snd<bf res>>)
lemma Prop4 BF 3: ` program −→ 2(isVal<fst<$bf res>> ∧ isVal<snd<$bf res>>
−→ tc <@fst<bf res> @ @snd<bf res>>)
lemma Prop4 BF 4: ` program −→ 2(isVal<$w38> −→ tc <@w38>)
lemma Prop4 BF 5: ` program −→ 2(isVal<$w39> −→ tc <@w39>)
lemma Prop4 BF 6a: ` program
−→ 2(isVal<fst<$bf res>> = isVal<snd<$bf res>>)
lemma Prop4 BF 6: ` program
−→ 2(isVal<$w38> ∧ isVal<$w39> −→ tc <@w38 @ @w39>)
lemma Prop4 BF 7: ` program
−→ 2(isVal<fst<$bf res>> −→ BF Types <@fst<bf res>>)
lemma Prop4 BF 8: ` program
−→ 2(isVal<snd<$bf res>> −→ BF Types <@snd<bf res>>)
lemma Prop4 BF 9: ` program −→ 2(isVal<fst<$bf res>>
∧ isVal<snd<$bf res>> −→ BF Types <@fst<bf res> @ @snd<bf res>>)
lemma Prop4 BF 10: ` program −→ 2(isVal<$w38> −→ BF Types <@w38>)
lemma Prop4 BF 11: ` program −→ 2(isVal<$w39> −→ BF Types <@w39>)
lemma Prop4 BF 12a: ` program−→2(isVal<fst<$bf res>> = isVal<snd<$bf res>>)
lemma Prop4 BF 12: ` program
−→ 2(isVal<$w38> ∧ isVal<$w39> −→ BF Types <@w38 @ @w39>)
lemma Prop4 TJ l1: ` program −→ 2(isVal<$tj res> −→ tc<@tj res>)
lemma Prop4 TJ l2: ` program −→ 2(isVal<$w41> −→ tc<@w41>)
theorem Prop4 main: ` program
−→ 2(isVal<six6<$safer res>> −→ tc <@six6<safer res>>)
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A.6 Expression layer integration
theorem vdmexe: J (v,hh,p) = exe E h e; {}  e : A K =⇒ A E h hh v p
A.6.1 The even-odd example
theorem body1: {}  body : λ E h hh v p. ∀ i r. E x = (I i) −→ v = (I (i+1))
lemma vdmexe2: J {}  e : P; (v,hh,p) = exe E h e K =⇒ P E h hh v p
lemma vdmexe3:
∀ E h hh v p e P. ({}  e : P) ∧ ((v,hh,p) = exe E h e) −→ P E h hh v p
lemma exebody1: (vv,hh,st) = exebody (I n) h =⇒ vv = I (n+1)
lemma l1: ` program −→ 2((∃ n. $w1 = #(I n)) ∨ $w1 = #⊥)
∧ (∃ n. $w2 = #(I n)) ∨ $w2 = #⊥)
∧ (∃ n. $even res = #(I n)) ∨ $even res = #⊥)
∧ (∃ n. $odd res = #(I n)) ∨ $odd res = #⊥))
theorem main:
` program −→ 2((∀ n. $w1 = #(I n)) −→ #n ∈ #Even)
∧ (∀ n. $w2 = #(I n)) −→ #n ∈ #Odd)
∧ (∀ n. $even res = #(I n)) −→ #n ∈ #Even)
∧ (∀ n. $odd res = #(I n)) −→ #n ∈ #Odd))
AppendixB
Scheduling proofs
This appendix details the proofs that self-output scheduling, and hierarchical schedul-
ing without nested boxes, refine lock step scheduling. None of these proofs has been
mechanised, since this require a deep embedding. The proofs follow Lamport’s struc-
tured way of writing mathematical proofs [122]: the proof is written hierarchically;
sub-goal numbering and indention is used to separate each level where the jth sub-goal
of the current level i proof is labelled 〈i〉j; 〈i〉j Q.E.D denotes the proof of the cur-
rent level i− 1 goal; implication is written Assume: A Prove: B; and finally, Case
replaces Assume in case analysis, while the goal remains the same as the parent goal.
B.1 Proof of self-out scheduling
Firstly, the Selfout state in self-out scheduling is subsumed by Runnable in lock-step
scheduling. However, in the other direction, a Runnable (lock-step) state, is not nec-
essary Selfout . Let the self-out states be postfixed by s. This relationship of Runnable
and Selfout between lock-step and self-out scheduling, is then expressed as:
Lemma B.1. sti = Runnable iff sti ∈ {Runnables, Selfouts}
Due to the · · · notation for refinement mapping in TLA, this s postfixing is not necessary
and this is thus not used henceforth. Firstly, Theorem 4.1 is formalised as sH ⇒ H,
where the self-out scheduling sH is formalised in Figure 4.4 and lock-step scheduling
H is formalised in Figure 4.2. Both sH and H hides the scheduling state st and the
scheduler s with ∃. The scheduling proof is achieved by proving the sHl ⇒ Hl, where
H expresses H[s/s, st/st], i.e. s and st replaced by the witnesses s and st respectively.
Theorem 4.1 follows by applying rule (E1) to Hl which introduces ∃ s, st.H l, which
equals H by definition. The proof is then concluded by applying rule (E2) to sHl which
introduces ∃ s, st.sHl, which equals sH by definition. Now, s is trivially defined as
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s , s. For st the witness follows from Lemma B.1, and is defined as follows for each
i ∈ BS:
sti , if sti = Selfout then Runnable else sti
To prove Theorem 4.1, sHl is first strengthened by the invariant K
K , s = Execute⇒ ∀ i ∈ BS. sti 6= Matchfail,
proved in the following lemma
Lemma B.2. I ∧2[S ∧ N ]〈s,ws,res,st〉 ⇒ 2K.
To enhance readability the following lemma is first proved
Lemma B.3. I ∧2[S ∧ N ∧K ∧K ′]〈s,ws,res,st〉 ⇒ I ∧2[S ∧
∧
i∈BS Bi]〈s,ws,res,st〉,
which add K and K ′ to the assumption and uses the refinement mapping in the con-
clusion. Note, that · · · distributes over all operators used in the proof. Lemma B.2
and Lemma B.3 are proved separately in the following two section, and these results
are used in the final section to prove Theorem 4.1.
B.1.1 Proof of Lemma B.2
〈1〉1. Assume: I ∧2[S ∧ N ]〈s,ws,res,st〉
Prove: 2K
proof: By rule (INV1) and some simplification the proof reduces to:
〈2〉1. Assume: I
Prove: K
proof: Unfolding I gives ∀ i ∈ BS. sti = Runnable, hence ∀ i ∈ BS. sti 6=
Matchfail, thus K. ∴
〈2〉2. Assume: K ∧ 〈s,ws,res,st〉′ = 〈s,ws,res,st〉
Prove: K ′
proof: Trivial since s and the st are the free variables of K. ∴
〈2〉3. Assume: 1. K
2. S
3. N
Prove: K ′
proof: The proof is by case-analysis on the scheduling phase s:
〈3〉1. Case: s = Execute
proof: Assumption 〈3〉1 applied to assumption 〈2〉3.2 implies that s′ = Super,
hence s′ 6= Execute and s′ = Execute⇒ ∀ i ∈ BS. st′i 6= Matchfail, thus K ′. ∴
〈3〉2. Case: s = Super
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proof: Assumption 〈3〉2 and 〈2〉3.2 implies that s′ = Execute. Thus, ∀ i ∈
BS. st′i 6= Matchfail must hold. By the definition of ∀ and rule (F2), the proof
reduces to the following proof for a fixed but arbitrary i ∈ BS:
〈4〉1. Prove: st′i 6= Matchfail
proof: Assumption 〈2〉3.3 implies∧
i∈BS
(
s = Execute⇒ sBei ) ∧ (s = Super⇒ sBsi )
hence
(s = Execute⇒ sBei ) ∧ (s = Super⇒ sBsi ),
with assumption 〈3〉2 the following hold
sBsi . (B.1)
The proof follows by a case-split on Qi:
〈5〉1. Case: Qi
proof: By assumption 〈5〉1 and (B.1) sti is either Runnable or Selfout .
Thus, st′i 6= Matchfail. ∴
〈5〉2. Case: ¬Qi
proof: By assumption 〈5〉2 and (B.1) sti = Blocked, thus st′i 6= Matchfail.
∴
〈5〉3. Q.E.D.
proof: By 〈5〉1 and 〈5〉2. ∴
〈4〉2. Q.E.D.
proof: By 〈4〉1. ∴
〈3〉3. Q.E.D.
proof:By 〈3〉1 and 〈3〉2. ∴
〈2〉4. Q.E.D.
proof:By 〈2〉1, 〈2〉2 and 〈2〉3. ∴
〈1〉2. Q.E.D.
proof: By 〈1〉1. ∴
B.1.2 Proof of Lemma B.3
〈1〉1. Assume: I ∧2[S ∧ N ∧K ∧K ′]〈s,ws,res,st〉
Prove: I ∧2[S ∧∧i∈BS Bi]〈s,ws,res,st〉
proof: A specialisation of (TLA2) using (STL4) reduces the proof to
〈2〉1. Assume: I
Prove: I
proof: This is trivial since simplification implies I ≡ I. ∴
〈2〉2. Assume: S ∧ N ∧K ∧K ′
Prove: S ∧∧i∈BS Bi
proof: Unfolding N and some simplification reduces the proof to:
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〈3〉1. Assume: S ∧K ∧K ′
Prove: S
proof: This is trivial since simplification implies S ≡ S. ∴
〈3〉2. Assume: 1. K
2. K ′
3.
∧
i∈BS
(
s = Execute⇒ sBei ) ∧ (s = Super⇒ sBsi )
Prove:
∧
i∈BS Bi
proof: It is sufficient to show the goal for an arbitrary but fixed box i ∈ BS.
This becomes obvious since
∧
i∈BS could be rewritten to bounded quantification
∀i ∈ BS, and then apply rule (F1) and (F2), using the definition of ∀ (¬∃¬).
Assuming that box i is fixed, the goal is thus, by applying (F1) in a backwards
style, reduced to
〈4〉1. Prove: Bi
proof: Firstly, assumption 〈3〉2.3 is reduced to the i conjunct:(
s = Execute⇒ sBei ) ∧ (s = Super⇒ sBsi ) (B.2)
where i is the same fixed identifier as in the current goal. The proof follows
by a case split on s:
〈5〉1. Case: s = Execute
proof: Assumption 〈5〉1 and (B.2) implies
sBei (B.3)
Further, assumption 〈5〉1 implies that sti = Execute. By standard equa-
tional reasoning it is trivial to show that under this assumption
Bi ≡ Bei
holds. Thus, it is sufficient to show Bei . The proof then follows by case
analysis on the SO property:
〈6〉1. Case: SO
proof: The proof follows by case analysis on sti:
〈7〉1. Case: sti = Runnable
proof: By assumption 〈6〉1, the definition of SO and assumption 〈7〉1
a contradiction is obtained. ∴
〈7〉2. Case: sti = Matchfail
proof: By assumption 〈5〉1, 〈7〉2 and 〈3〉2, a contradiction is ob-
tained. ∴
〈7〉3. Case: sti = Blocked
proof: By (B.3), assumption 〈5〉1, 〈6〉1 and 〈7〉3, the definition of
sBei implies:
〈iwsi, resi, sti〉′ = 〈iwsi, resi, sti〉
which implies that
〈iwsi, resi, sti〉′ = 〈iwsi, resi, sti〉.
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Further, assumption 〈7〉3 implies
sti = Blocked
hence Bei holds by definition. ∴
〈7〉4. Case: sti = Selfout
proof: By (B.3), assumption 〈5〉1, 〈6〉1 and 〈7〉4, the definition of
sBei implies:
〈iwsi, resi, sti〉′ = execute(rsi, iwsi),
which means that
〈iwsi, resi, sti〉′ = execute(rsi, iwsi), (B.4)
Further, assumptions 〈7〉4 implies (by definition)
sti = Runnable.
which, together with (B.4), implies Bei . ∴
〈7〉5. Q.E.D.
proof: By 〈7〉1, 〈7〉2, 〈7〉3 and 〈7〉4. ∴
〈6〉2. Case: ¬SO
proof: The proof follows by case analysis on sti:
〈7〉1. Case: sti = Runnable
proof: (B.3), assumption 〈5〉1, 〈6〉2 and 〈7〉1, and the definition of
sBei implies:
〈iwsi, resi, sti〉′ = execute(rsi, iwsi)
hence
〈iwsi, resi, sti〉′ = execute(rsi, iwsi). (B.5)
Moreover, assumption 〈7〉1 implies that
sti = Runnable.
This and (B.5) implies Bei . ∴
〈7〉2. Case: sti = Matchfail
proof: Assumption 〈5〉1, 〈7〉2 and 〈3〉2, and the definition of K in-
duces a contradiction. ∴
〈7〉3. Case: sti = Blocked
proof: (B.3), assumption 〈5〉1, 〈6〉2 and 〈7〉3, and the definition of
sBei implies:
〈iwsi, resi, sti〉′ = 〈iwsi, resi, sti〉
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hence
〈iwsi, resi, sti〉′ = 〈iwsi, resi, sti〉.
Further, assumption 〈7〉3 implies
sti = Blocked
thus Bei holds by definition. ∴
〈7〉4. Case: sti = Selfout
proof: (B.3), assumption 〈5〉1, 〈6〉2 and 〈7〉4, and the definition of
sBei implies
〈iwsi, resi, sti〉′ = execute(rsi, iwsi),
hence
〈iwsi, resi, sti〉′ = execute(rsi, iwsi), (B.6)
Further, assumptions 〈7〉4 implies (by definition)
sti = Runnable.
This and (B.6) implies Bei by definition. ∴
〈7〉5. Q.E.D.
proof: By 〈7〉1, 〈7〉2, 〈7〉3 and 〈7〉4. ∴
〈6〉3. Q.E.D.
proof: By 〈6〉1 and 〈6〉2. ∴
〈5〉2. Case: s = Super
proof: Assumption 〈5〉2 and (B.2) implies
sBsi (B.7)
Further, assumption 〈5〉2 implies that s = Super. Standard equational
reasoning then shows
Bi ≡ Bsi
Thus, it is sufficient to show Bsi . The proof follows by a case-split on Qi:
〈6〉1. Case: Qi
proof: (B.7) and assumption 〈6〉1 implies
〈owsi, resi〉′ = 〈w(iwsi),⊥〉
∧ st′i = if emp(nows′i) then Selfout else Runnable
hence
〈owsi, resi〉′ = 〈w(iwsi),⊥〉
∧ sti′ = if emp(nows′i) then Runnable else Runnable
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hence
〈owsi, resi, sti〉′ = 〈w(iwsi),⊥,Runnable〉
Thus, since assumption 〈6〉1 implies Qi, Bsi holds. ∴
〈6〉2. Case: ¬Qi
proof: (B.7) and assumption 〈6〉2 implies
〈owsi, resi, sti〉′ = 〈owsi, resi,Blocked〉,
hence
〈owsi, resi, sti〉′ = 〈owsi, resi,Blocked〉,
Thus, since assumption 〈6〉2 implies that ¬Qi, Bsi holds. ∴
〈6〉3. Q.E.D.
proof: By 〈6〉1 and 〈6〉2. ∴
〈5〉3. Q.E.D.
proof: By 〈5〉1 and 〈5〉2. ∴
〈4〉2. Q.E.D.
proof: By 〈4〉1. ∴
〈3〉3. Q.E.D.
proof: By 〈3〉1 and 〈3〉2 . ∴
〈2〉3. Assume: 〈s,ws,res,st〉′ = 〈s,ws,res,st〉
Prove: 〈s,ws,res,st〉′ = 〈s,ws,res,st〉
proof: This is trivial. ∴
〈2〉4. Q.E.D.
proof: By 〈2〉1, 〈2〉2 and 〈2〉3. ∴
〈1〉2. Q.E.D.
proof: By 〈1〉1. ∴
B.1.3 Proof of Theorem 4.1
〈1〉1. Assume: ∃s, st. I ∧2[S ∧ N ]〈s,ws,res,st〉
Prove: ∃s, st. I ∧2[S ∧∧i∈BS Bi]〈s,ws,res,st〉
proof: Since s and st are ∃-bound in the goal, rule (E2) reduces the goal to:
〈2〉1. Assume: I ∧2[S ∧ N ]〈s,ws,res,st〉
Prove: ∃s,res,st : I ∧2[S ∧∧i∈BS Bi]〈s,ws,res,st〉
proof: With the substitutions [s/s, st/st] sequentially applied to (E1), the goal
reduces to:
〈3〉1. Prove: I ∧2[S ∧∧i∈BS Bi]〈s,ws,res,st〉
proof: Assumption 〈2〉1 applied to Lemma B.2 implies 2K. Rule (INV2)
implies
2[S ∧ N ]〈s,ws,res,st〉 ≡ 2[S ∧ N ∧K ∧K ′]〈s,ws,res,st〉 (B.8)
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Moreover, assumption 〈2〉1 implies 2[S ∧N ]〈s,ws,res,st〉. This, (B.8) and assump-
tion 〈2〉1 implies
I ∧2[S ∧ N ∧K ∧K ′]〈s,ws,res,st〉
which, applied to Lemma B.3 implies the goal. ∴
〈3〉2. Q.E.D.
proof: By 〈3〉1. ∴
〈2〉2. Q.E.D.
proof: By 〈2〉1. ∴
〈1〉2. Q.E.D.
proof: By 〈1〉1. ∴
B.2 Proof of hierarchical scheduling
The proof of Theorem 6.1 requires strengthening by the following invariants:
Lemma B.4. hI ∧2[hN ∧ hE ]〈s,ws,inp,res,st,pc,expr〉 ⇒ 2K
Lemma B.5. hI ∧2[hN ∧ hE ∧K ∧K ′]〈s,ws,inp,res,st,pc,expr〉 ⇒ 2L
Lemma B.6. hI ∧2[hN ∧ hE ∧K ∧K ′ ∧ L ∧ L′]〈s,ws,inp,res,st,pc,expr〉 ⇒ 2M
Lemma B.7. hI ∧2[hN ∧ hE ∧K ∧K ′ ∧ L ∧ L′ ∧M ∧M ′]〈s,ws,inp,res,st,pc,expr〉 ⇒ 2N
where K, L, M and N are defined as follows:
K , s ∈ {Execute, Super}
L , ∀i ∈ BS. sti 6= Super
M , s = Execute⇒ ∀p ∈ BS1. pc1  p⇒ stp ∈ {Runnable,Blocked,Execute}
N , s = Execute⇒ ∀p ∈ BS1. pc1 ≺ p⇒ stp ∈ {Runnable,Blocked}.
The proofs of these four lemmas are shown in the following four sections. Moreover, to
prove Theorem 6.1 the refinement mapping for the ∃-bound variables (st,s,pc,con and
expr) must be defined. Now, firstly con does not exists in Hhi, pc is a tuple of variables
and not a variable, while there are several new potential box states. The remaining
variables are the same, creating the following refinement mapping:
sti , if sti ∈ {Terminated,Execute} then Runnable else sti
con , pc1 = env ∨ stpc1 6= Execute
F , [st/st, s/s, pc1/pc, con/con, expr/expr]F
As in the self-out scheduling proof, the following lemma is first proved, and then used
in the proof of Theorem 6.1, to enhance readability:
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Lemma B.8. If
∧
i∈BS flat(i) and BS1 = BS then
hI ∧2[hN ∧ hE ∧K ∧K ′ ∧ L ∧ L′ ∧M ∧M ′ ∧N ∧N ′]〈s,ws,inp,res,st,pc,expr〉
⇒
I2 ∧2[N 2seq ∧ S2seq ∧ E ]〈s,ws,inp,res,st,pc,con,expr〉
B.2.1 Proof of Lemma B.4
〈1〉1. Assume: hI ∧ 2[hN ∧ hE ]〈s,ws,inp,res,st,pc,expr〉
Prove: 2(s ∈ {Execute, Super})
proof: By rule (INV1) and some simplification the proof reduces to:
〈2〉1. Assume: hI
Prove: s ∈ {Execute, Super}
proof: Unfolding hI implies s = Execute, thus the goal holds. ∴
〈2〉2. Assume: s ∈ {Execute, Super} ∧
〈s,ws,inp,res,st,pc,expr〉′ = 〈s,ws,inp,res,st,pc,expr〉
Prove: s′ ∈ {Execute, Super}
proof: The goals follows from the first assumption conjunction
s ∈ {Execute, Super}, and the second assumption conjunct which implies s′ = s .
∴
〈2〉3. Assume: 1. hN
2. s ∈ {Execute, Super}
Prove: s′ ∈ {Execute, Super}
proof: The proof is by case-split on the scheduling phase s. By assumption
〈2〉3.4 this reduces to the two cases s = Execute and s = Super:
〈3〉1. Case: s = Execute
proof: Assumption 〈2〉3.1 and 〈3〉1, with hN implies
s′ = S(Execute, pc1, T (st
′
pc),BS1 ∪ {env}).
By the definition of S, regardless of all but the first argument, this can only
result in the two cases s′ = Super and s′ = Execute. ∴
〈3〉2. Case: s = Super
proof: Assumptions 〈2〉3.1 and〈3〉2, and hN implies
s′ = S(Super, pc1,False,BS1 ∪ {env}).
By the definition of S this implies that s′ = Execute. ∴
〈3〉3. Q.E.D.
proof:By 〈3〉1 and 〈3〉2. ∴
〈2〉4. Q.E.D.
proof:By 〈2〉1, 〈2〉2 and 〈2〉3. ∴
〈1〉2. Q.E.D.
proof: By 〈1〉1. ∴
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B.2.2 Proof of Lemma B.5
〈1〉1. Assume: 1. ∧i∈BS flat(i) and BS1 = BS
2. hI ∧ 2[hN ∧ hE ∧K ∧K ′]〈s,ws,inp,res,st,pc,expr〉
Prove: 2(∀i ∈ BS. sti 6= Super)
proof: By rule (INV1) and some simplification the proof reduces to:
〈2〉1. Assume: hI
Prove: ∀i ∈ BS. sti 6= Super
proof: Unfolding of hI implies
∧
i∈BS sti = Runnable, thus the goal holds. ∴
〈2〉2. Assume: ∀i ∈ BS. sti 6= Super ∧
〈s,ws,inp,res,st,pc,expr〉′ = 〈s,ws,inp,res,st,pc,expr〉
Prove: ∀i ∈ BS. st′i 6= Super
proof: Assumption 〈2〉2 implies st′ = st. Since st is a tuple and sti is a projection
of the tuple, this implies ∀i ∈ BS.st′i = sti. Since the assumption also implies
∀i ∈ BS. sti 6= Super the goal trivially holds. ∴
〈2〉3. Assume: 1. hN
2. hE
3. K ∧ K ′
4. ∀i ∈ BS. sti 6= Super
Prove: ∀i ∈ BS. st′i 6= Super
proof: By (F1), it is sufficient show this for an arbitrary, but fixed i ∈ BS:
〈3〉1. Prove: st′i 6= Super
proof: The proof is by case-analysis on the scheduling phase s. Assumption
〈2〉3.3 implies s ∈ {Execute, Super}, thus reducing the split to these two cases:
〈4〉1. Case: s = Execute
proof: Assumption 〈2〉3.1 and unfolding of hN implies that
hBpc ∧
∧
j∈(BS1−{pc}) Uj. Lemma 6.1 (in Chapter 6) implies that BS1 = BS.
Thus, there are two cases i = pc1 ⇒ hBi and i 6= pc1 ⇒ Ui. The proof thus
proceeds by a case-split on i = pc1:
〈5〉1. Case: i = pc
proof: Assumption 〈5〉1 thus implies hBi. With this, assumption 〈4〉1
and Lemma 6.1 implies that
hBefi . (B.9)
The proof follows by case-analysis on sti:
〈6〉1. Case: sti = Runnable
proof: (B.9) and assumption 〈5〉1 implies that the st′i value is set by
hexecuteconf . This uses execute
con, which is defined for flat Hume. Thus,
it may only return Runnable, Blocked or Matchfail , all implying st′i 6=
Super. However, in the case of Runnable, hexecuteconf updates this to
Execute, thus st′i 6= Super. ∴
〈6〉2. Case: sti = Execute
proof: (B.9) and assumption 〈6〉2 implies that the st′i = Terminated.
∴∴
〈6〉3. Case: sti = Super
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proof: By contradiction between assumption 〈2〉3.4 and 〈6〉3. ∴
〈6〉4. Case: sti ∈ {Blocked,Matchfail,Terminated}
proof: (B.9) and assumption 〈6〉2 implies that the st′i = sti. Thus, the
goal holds by assumption 〈2〉3.4. ∴
〈6〉5. Q.E.D.
proof: By 〈5〉1,〈6〉2,〈6〉3 and 〈6〉4. ∴
〈5〉2. Case: i 6= pc
Assumption 〈5〉2 implies Ui, which implies st′i = sti. Thus, the goal holds
by assumption 〈2〉3.4. ∴
〈5〉3. Q.E.D.
proof: By 〈5〉1 and 〈5〉2. ∴
〈4〉2. Case: s = Super
proof: Assumption 〈2〉3.1 and 〈4〉2 implies hBsi which implies Bs2i . The
proof follows by a case-split on ao(resi, owsi):
〈5〉1. Case: ao(resi, owsi)
proof: Assumption 〈5〉1 implies that st′i = Runnable, thus st′i 6= Super. ∴
〈5〉2. Case: ¬ao(resi, owsi)
proof: Assumption 〈5〉2 implies that sti = Blocked, thus st′i 6= Super. ∴
〈5〉3. Q.E.D.
proof: By 〈5〉1 and 〈5〉2. ∴
〈4〉3. Q.E.D.
proof:By 〈4〉1 and 〈4〉2. ∴
〈3〉2. Q.E.D.
proof:By 〈3〉1. ∴
〈2〉4. Q.E.D.
proof:By 〈2〉1, 〈2〉2 and 〈2〉3. ∴
〈1〉2. Q.E.D.
proof: By 〈1〉1. ∴
B.2.3 Proof of Lemma B.6
〈1〉1. Assume: 1. ∧i∈BS flat(i) and BS1 = BS
2. hI ∧ 2[hN ∧ hE ∧K ∧K ′ ∧ L ∧ L′]〈s,ws,inp,res,st,pc,expr〉
Prove: 2M
proof: By rule (INV1) and some simplification the proof reduces to:
〈2〉1. Assume: hI
Prove: M
proof: Unfolding of hI implies
∧
i∈BS sti = Runnable, thus
∀i ∈ BS1.sti ∈ {Runnable,Blocked,Execute}. ∴
〈2〉2. Assume: M ∧ 〈s,ws,inp,res,st,pc,expr〉′ = 〈s,ws,inp,res,st,pc,expr〉
Prove: M ′
proof: Assumption 〈2〉2 implies st′ = st. Since st is a tuple and sti is a projection
of the tuple, this implies ∀i ∈ BS.st′i = sti. Moreover, the assumption implies that
s′ = s and pc′1 = pc1. Since the assumption also implies M , then M
′ trivially holds
since all variables in it is unchanged. ∴
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〈2〉3. Assume: 1. hN
2. hE
3. K ∧ K ′
4. L ∧ L′
5. M
Prove: M ′
proof: The proof is by case-split on the scheduling phase s. By assumption
〈2〉3.4 this reduces to the two cases s = Execute and s = Super:
〈3〉1. Case: s = Execute
proof: Assumption 〈2〉3.1 and 〈3〉1, with hN implies ∧i∈(BS1−{pc}) Ui, which
implies
∧
i∈(BS1−{pc}) st
′
i = sti. Since the update of pc1 is monotone (based on
≺), the case that ∀p ∈ BS1. pc1 ≺ p ⇒ st′p ∈ {Runnable,Blocked,Execute} is
trivial. This reduces the goal to
〈4〉1. Prove: s = Execute⇒ st′pc1 ∈ {Runnable,Blocked,Execute}
proof: First, note that since env /∈ BS1, it is assumed that pc1 6= env. Hence
pc1 = env ∨ T (pc′1) is trivially reduced to T (pc′1). From assumptions 〈2〉3.1
and 〈3〉1, Lemma 6.1, and the definition of hN , hBefi holds. The proof follows
by case-analysis on stpc1 :
〈5〉1. Case: stpc1 = Runnable
Assumption 〈5〉1 implies that stpc1 is updated by executeconf . It is trivial
to show that this implies st′pc1 = Matchfail or st
′
pc1
= Execute. The latter
case trivially implies the goal since T (pc′1) fails, meaning that following
hN , pc′1 = pc1. The former case implies T (pc′1) holds. Thus, by hN ,
pc′1 = next box(pc,BS1 ∪ {env}). The proof follows by case analysis on
pc1 = first box(BS1 ∪ {env}):
〈6〉1. Case: pc1 = first box(BS1 ∪ {env})
proof: Assumptions 〈6〉1, 〈2〉3.1 and 〈3〉1, together with T (pc′1) implies
s′ = S(Execute, pc′1,True,BS1 ∪ {env}) which by S implies s′ = Super.
Thus, the goal holds. ∴
〈6〉2. Case: pc1 6= first box(BS1 ∪ {env})
proof: Assumption 〈6〉1 implies that pc′1 is updated according to ≺, pc1
and BS1 ∪ {env}). Since assumption 〈2〉3.1 and 〈3〉1, with hN implies∧
i∈(BS1\{pc}) Ui, which implies
∧
i∈(BS1\{pc}) st
′
i = sti, and ≺ is monotone,
the goal is trivial since assumption 〈2〉3.5 implies M. ∴
〈6〉3. Q.E.D.
proof: By 〈6〉1 and 〈6〉2. ∴
〈5〉2. Case: stpc1 = Execute
Assumption 〈5〉2, and hBefi imples st′pc1 = Terminated, which implies T (st′pc1).
The proof is similar to the st′pc1 = Matchfail case of 〈5〉1. ∴〈5〉3. Case: stpc1 = Blocked
proof: Assumption 〈5〉3, and hBefi imples st′pc1 = Blocked. The proof is
similar to the st′pc1 = Matchfail case of 〈5〉1. ∴〈5〉4. Case: stpc1 = Super
proof: By contradiction between assumptions 〈5〉4 and 〈2〉3.4. ∴
〈5〉5. Case: stpc1 ∈ {Matchfail,Terminated}
proof: By contradiction between assumptions 〈5〉5 and 〈2〉3.5. ∴
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〈5〉6. Q.E.D.
proof: By 〈5〉1,〈5〉2,〈5〉3,〈5〉4 and 〈5〉5. ∴
〈4〉2. Q.E.D.
proof:By 〈4〉1. ∴
〈3〉2. Case: s = Super
proof: Assumptions 〈2〉3.1 and〈3〉2, and hN implies s′ = S(Super, pc1,False
,BS1 ∪ {env}), and S then implies that s′ = Execute. Moreover, these assump-
tions implies that pc′1 = first box(BS1∪{env}), meaning that the following must
be shown.
〈4〉1. Prove: ∀p ∈ BS1.st′p ∈ {Runnable,Blocked,Execute}
By (F1) it is sufficient to show this for an arbitrary, but fixed i ∈ BS1:
〈5〉1. Prove: st′i ∈ {Runnable,Blocked,Execute}
proof: Assumption 〈2〉3.1 and 〈3〉2 implies hBsi which implies Bs2i . The
proof follows by a case-split on ao(resi, owsi):
〈6〉1. Case: ao(resi, owsi)
proof: Assumption 〈6〉1 implies that st′i = Runnable,
thus st′i ∈ {Runnable,Blocked,Execute}. ∴
〈6〉2. Case: ¬ao(resi, owsi)
proof: Assumption 〈6〉2 implies that sti = Blocked,
thus st′i ∈ {Runnable,Blocked,Execute}. ∴
〈6〉3. Q.E.D.
proof: By 〈6〉1 and 〈6〉2. ∴
〈5〉2. Q.E.D.
proof:By 〈5〉1. ∴
〈4〉2. Q.E.D.
proof:By 〈4〉1. ∴
〈3〉3. Q.E.D.
proof:By 〈3〉1 and 〈3〉2. ∴
〈2〉4. Q.E.D.
proof:By 〈2〉1, 〈2〉2 and 〈2〉3. ∴
〈1〉2. Q.E.D.
proof: By 〈1〉1. ∴
B.2.4 Proof of Lemma B.7
〈1〉1. Assume: 1. ∧i∈BS flat(i) and BS1 = BS
2. hI ∧ 2[hN ∧ hE ∧K ∧K ′ ∧ L ∧ L′ ∧M ∧M ′]〈s,ws,inp,res,st,pc,expr〉
Prove: 2N
proof: By rule (INV1) and some simplification the proof reduces to:
〈2〉1. Assume: hI
Prove: N
proof: Unfolding of hI implies
∧
i∈BS sti = Runnable, thus
∀i ∈ BS1.sti ∈ {Runnable,Blocked}. ∴
〈2〉2. Assume: N ∧ 〈s,ws,inp,res,st,pc,expr〉′ = 〈s,ws,inp,res,st,pc,expr〉
Prove: N ′
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proof: Assumption 〈2〉2 implies st′ = st. Since st is a tuple and sti is a projection
of the tuple, this implies ∀i ∈ BS.st′i = sti. Moreover, the assumption implies that
s′ = s and pc′1 = pc1. Since the assumption also implies N , then N
′ trivially holds
since all variables in it is unchanged. ∴
〈2〉3. Assume: 1. hN
2. hE
3. K ∧ K ′
4. L ∧ L′
5. M ∧ M ′
6. M
Prove: N ′
proof: The proof is by case-split on the scheduling phase s. By assumption
〈2〉3.4 this reduces to the two cases s = Execute and s = Super:
〈3〉1. Case: s = Execute
proof: Assumption 〈2〉3.1 and 〈3〉1, with hN implies ∧i∈(BS1−{pc}) Ui, which
implies
∧
i∈(BS1−{pc}) st
′
i = sti. Thus, ∀p ∈ BS1. pc1 ≺ p ⇒ st′p ∈ {Runnable,
Blocked}. To verify M ′ it must be shown that ∀p ∈ BS1. pc′1 ≺ p ⇒ st′p ∈
{Runnable,Blocked}. Now, pc1 is either unchanged or updated according to the
monotone ≺ well-founded relation. Thus, {p ∈ BS1. pc′1 ≺ p} ⊆ {p ∈ BS1. pc1 ≺
p}, meaning that ∀p ∈ BS1. pc1 ≺ p⇒ st′p ∈ {Runnable,Blocked} is sufficiently
strong. ∴
〈3〉2. Case: s = Super
proof: Assumptions 〈2〉3.1 and〈3〉2, and hN implies s′ = S(Super, pc1,False,
BS1∪{env}), and S then implies that s′ = Execute. Moreover, these assumptions
implies that pc′1 = first box(BS1 ∪ {env}), meaning that the following must be
shown.
〈4〉1. Prove: ∀p ∈ BS1.st′p ∈ {Runnable,Blocked}
By (F1) it is sufficient to show this for an arbitrary, but fixed i ∈ BS1:
〈5〉1. Prove: st′i ∈ {Runnable,Blocked}
proof: Assumption 〈2〉3.1 and 〈3〉2 implies hBsi which implies Bs2i . The
proof follows by a case-split on ao(resi, owsi):
〈6〉1. Case: ao(resi, owsi)
proof: Assumption 〈6〉1 implies that st′i = Runnable,
thus st′i ∈ {Runnable,Blocked}. ∴
〈6〉2. Case: ¬ao(resi, owsi)
proof: Assumption 〈6〉2 implies that sti = Blocked,
thus st′i ∈ {Runnable,Blocked}. ∴
〈6〉3. Q.E.D.
proof: By 〈6〉1 and 〈6〉2. ∴
〈5〉2. Q.E.D.
proof:By 〈5〉1. ∴
〈4〉2. Q.E.D.
proof:By 〈4〉1. ∴
〈3〉3. Q.E.D.
proof:By 〈3〉1 and 〈3〉2. ∴
〈2〉4. Q.E.D.
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proof:By 〈2〉1, 〈2〉2 and 〈2〉3. ∴
〈1〉2. Q.E.D.
proof: By 〈1〉1. ∴
B.2.5 Proof of Lemma B.8
〈1〉1. Assume: 1. ∧i∈BS flat(i) and BS1 = BS
2. hI∧2[hN∧hE∧K∧K ′∧L∧L′∧M∧M ′∧N∧N ′]〈s,ws,inp,res,st,pc,expr〉
Prove: I2 ∧2[N 2seq ∧ S2seq ∧ E ]〈s,ws,inp,res,st,pc,con,expr〉
proof: A specialisation of (TLA2) using (STL4), together with some weakening of
the assumptions, reduces the proof to five cases:
〈2〉1. Assume: hI
Prove: I2
proof: s, ws, st, inp, res and expr follows directly from hI. Lemma 6.1 implies
first box(BS1 ∪ {env}) = first box, thus pc follows from hI. Finally, hI implies that
s = Execute and pc1 = env ∨ stpc1 6= Execute, thus con holds. Thus, I2 holds. ∴
〈2〉2. Assume: 〈s,ws,inp,res,st,pc,expr〉′ = 〈s,ws,inp,res,st,pc,expr〉
Prove: 〈s,ws,inp,res,st,pc,con,expr〉′ = 〈s,ws,inp,res,st,pc,con,expr〉
proof: 〈s,ws,inp,res,st,pc,con,expr〉 is either the same variables as in
〈s,ws,inp,res,st,pc,expr〉, or defined using variables in this tuple. Thus, this triv-
ially holds. ∴
〈2〉3. Assume: hE
Prove: E
proof: hE deviates from E by replacing pc with pc1. Moreover, only wires (ws)
are updated, while the guards uses s in addition to pc/pc1. Now, since s = s,
ws = ws and pc = pc1 the goal follows from assumption 〈2〉3. ∴
〈2〉4. Assume: 1. hN
2. K ∧K ′
3. L ∧ L′
Prove: Sseq2
proof: The proof is by case-analysis of s, which by assumption 〈2〉4.2 is reduced
to two cases:
〈3〉1. Case: s = Execute
proof: Assumptions 〈2〉4.1 and 〈3〉1 implies
s′ = S(Execute, pc′1, pc
′
1 = env ∨ T(st′pc),BS1 ∪ {env}). The proof follows by
case-analysis on pc′1 = last box(BS1 ∪ {env}):
〈4〉1. Case: pc′1 = last box(BS1 ∪ {env})
proof: The proof follows by case-analysis on pc′1 = env ∨ T(st′pc):
〈5〉1. Case: pc′1 = env ∨ T(st′pc1)
proof: With these assumption S implies that s′ = Super and consequently
s′ = Super. Now, assumption 〈4〉1 and Lemma 6.1.1 implies that pc =
last box. Moreover, since s′ = Super, con holds. Thus, Sseq2 holds. ∴
〈5〉2. Case: ¬(pc′1 = env ∨ T(st′pc))
proof: With these assumption S implies that s′ = Execute and conse-
quently s′ = Execute. Assumption 〈4〉1 and Lemma 6.1.1 implies that
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pc = last box. Moreover, assumption 〈5〉1 implies that either pc′1 6= env and
¬T(st′pc1). This, together with assumption 〈2〉4.3 implies that
st′pc1 ∈ {Runnable,Execute}. (B.10)
Moreover, assumption 〈2〉4.1 implies pc′1 = pc1 and hBsfpc′1 , where hB
sf
pc′1
has
three cases: firstly, T(stpc1) implies st
′
pc1
= stpc1 which cannot hold since
it violates ¬T(st′pc1); secondly, stpc1 = Execute implies st′pc1 = Terminated,
which contradicts (B.10); finally, stpc1 = Runnable implies that st
′
pc1
∈
{Execute,Blocked,Matchfail} where only st′pc1 = Execute does not contra-
dict (B.10). Thus, st′pc1 = Execute which implies ¬con. Thus, Sseq2 implies
s′ = Super, and Sseq2 holds. ∴
〈5〉3. Q.E.D.
proof: By 〈5〉1 and 〈5〉2. ∴
〈4〉2. Case: pc′1 6= last box(BS1 ∪ {env})
With these assumption S implies that s′ = Execute and consequently s′ =
Execute. Assumption 〈4〉1 and Lemma 6.1.1 implies that pc = last box, thus
Sseq2 implies s′ = Execute, and Sseq2 holds. ∴
〈4〉3. Q.E.D.
proof: By 〈4〉1 and 〈4〉2. ∴
〈3〉2. Case: s = Super
proof: Assumptions 〈2〉4.1 and 〈3〉2 implies
s′ = S(Super, pc1,False,BS1∪{env}), which by S implies s′ = Execute, and thus
s′ = Execute. Thus, Sseq2 holds. ∴
〈3〉3. Q.E.D.
proof: By 〈3〉1 and 〈3〉2. ∴
〈2〉5. Assume: 1. hN
2. K ∧K ′
3. L ∧ L′
4. M ∧M ′
5. N ∧N ′
Prove: N 2seq
proof: The proof is by case analysis of the scheduling state s, which by assump-
tion 〈2〉5.2 is reduced to two cases:
〈3〉1. Case: s = Execute
proof: Assumption 〈3〉1 implies s = Execute, which reduces the goal to four
conjuncts, each proved separately:
〈4〉1. Case: pc ∈ BS⇒ Be2pc
proof: Assumptions 〈3〉1 and 〈2〉5 implies pc1 ∈ BS1 ⇒ hBepc1 , which by
assumption 〈1〉1.1 implies pc ∈ BS ⇒ hBefpc . The case where pc /∈ BS is
trivial, thus pc ∈ BS is assumed, reducing the proof to
〈5〉1. Assume: hBefpc
Prove: Be2pc
proof: The proof follows by case-analysis on stpc1 :
〈6〉1. Case: stpc1 = Runnable
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proof: Assumption 〈5〉1 and 〈6〉1 implies that
〈iwspc1 , inppc1 , expr, stpc1〉′ = executeconf (rspc1 , iwspc1 , expr)∧ res′pc1 = respc1
executeconf only deviates from execute
con by replacing a Runnable state
with Terminated . Since stpc1 = Terminated implies stpc1 = Runnable,
this implies
〈iwspc1 , inppc1 , expr, stpc1〉
′
= executecon(rspc1 , iwspc1 , expr)∧ respc1 ′ = respc1
All that is remaining is to show that stpc1 = Runnable implies that stpc1 6=
Blocked and con. The first conjunct is trivial. Since this is an execute step
and pc1 6= env the second conjunct reduces to show that stpc1 6= Execute
which is trivial. ∴
〈6〉2. Case: stpc1 = Matchfail
proof: By contradiction between assumption 〈2〉5.4 and 〈6〉2. ∴
〈6〉3. Case: stpc1 = Blocked
proof: Assumption 〈6〉3 implies T (stpc1), which by assumption 〈5〉1 and
〈6〉3 implies
〈expr, iwsi, inpi, resi, sti〉′ = 〈expr, iwsi, inpi, resi, sti〉
Assumption 〈6〉3 implies stpc = Blocked and this implies
〈expr, iwsi, inpi, resi, sti〉
′
= 〈expr, iwsi, inpi, resi, sti〉
Hence, the goal holds. ∴
〈6〉4. Case: stpc1 = Execute
proof: Assumption 〈5〉1 and 〈6〉1 implies
〈expr, iwsi, inpi, resi, sti〉′ = 〈expr, iwsi, inpi, hrun(expr, inpi),Terminated〉
which implies
〈expr, iwsi, inpi, resi, sti〉
′
= 〈expr, iwsi, inpi, hrun(expr, inpi),Runnable〉
Thus, all that is remaining is to show that stpc 6= Blocked and ¬con. The
first conjunct is trivial. Since s = Execute and pc1 6= env, ¬con reduces
to show that ¬(stpc1 6= Execute), that is stpc1 = Execute, which holds by
〈6〉4. ∴
〈6〉5. Case: stpc1 = Super
proof: By contradiction between assumption 〈2〉5.3 and 〈6〉5. ∴
〈6〉6. Case: stpc1 = Terminated
proof: By contradiction between assumption 〈2〉5.4 and 〈6〉6. ∴
〈6〉7. Q.E.D.
proof: By 〈6〉1, 〈6〉2, 〈6〉3, 〈6〉4, 〈6〉5 and 〈6〉6. ∴
〈5〉2. Q.E.D.
proof: By 〈5〉1. ∴
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〈4〉2. Case: ∧i∈BS−{pc} 〈iwsi, inpi, resi, sti〉′ = 〈iwsi, inpi, resi, sti〉
proof: Firstly, ∀ i ∈ BS1. boxsch(i) = s. Now, 〈2〉5.1 implies
∧
i∈BS1−{pc1} .Ui
Assumtion 〈1〉1.1 thus implies ∧i∈BS−{pc} Ui. Since, ∀ i ∈ BS1. boxsch(i) =
s, and assumption 〈3〉1, the definition of Ui implies 〈iwsi, inpi, resi, sti〉
′
=
〈iwsi, inpi, resi, sti〉, hence the goal holds. ∴
〈4〉3. Case: con′ = if pc = env ∨ stpc′ 6= Runnable then True else ¬con
proof: The proof is by case-analysis on pc1 = env:
〈5〉1. Case: pc1 = env
proof: Assumption 〈5〉1 implies pc = env, thus it must be shown that con′
holds. The proof is by case-analsys of the new scheduling state s′, which
by assumption 〈2〉5.2 results in two cases:
〈6〉1. Case: s′ = Super
proof: Assumptions 〈3〉1, 〈6〉1 and 〈2〉5.1 implies that pc1 = last box(BS1
∪{env}). By these assumption, this implies that pc′1 = env, and thus con′
holds. ∴
〈6〉2. Case: s′ = Execute
proof: Assumptions 〈5〉1, 〈6〉2, 〈2〉5.1 and 〈3〉1 implies that pc1 6=
last box(BS1), since pc1 = env then implies that s
′ = Super. Thus, pc′1 6=
pc1 and pc1 ≺ pc′1 by the definition of next box with these assumptions.
Moreover, since pc′1 6= env, is must be shown that stpc′1 6= Execute. With
the above, assumption 〈2〉5.5 entails stpc′1 ∈ {Runnable,Blocked}, thus
stpc′1 6= Execute, and con′ holds. ∴〈6〉3. Q.E.D.
proof: By 〈6〉1 and 〈6〉2. ∴
〈5〉2. Case: pc1 6= env
proof: Assumption 〈5〉2 implies that pc 6= env. The second case that
entails that con′ holds iff stpc
′ 6= Runnable. By unfolding the refinement
mapping, this case is implied by st′pc1 /∈ {Runnable,Execute,Terminated},
and the proof follows by a case split on it:
〈6〉1. Case: st′pc1 /∈ {Runnable,Execute,Terminated}
proof: This requires a proof that con′ = True. By assumptions 〈5〉2
and 〈3〉1, and the definition of the con witness, this proof reduces to show
that st′pc1 6= Execute, which trivially holds by assumption 〈6〉1. ∴〈6〉2. Case: st′pc1 ∈ {Runnable,Execute,Terminated}
proof: Assumptions 〈3〉1, 〈5〉2 and 〈6〉2 reduces this proof to a proof
of con′ = ¬con. Moreover, these assumptions imply that con holds iff
stpc1 6= Execute. The proof follows by a case-analysis:
〈7〉1. Case: stpc1 = Execute
proof:Assumption 〈7〉1 implies ¬con. Thus, it must be shown that
con′ holds.
For s′ = Super, assumptions 〈3〉1 and 〈2〉5.1 implies that T (st′pc1) holds,
and pc′1 = pc1. Assumption 〈6〉2 thus implies that st′pc1 = st′pc′1 =
Terminated 6= Execute. Thus con′ holds.
For s′ = Execute, assumptions 〈2〉5, 〈3〉1.1 and 〈7〉1 implies st′pc1 =
Terminated, meaning that st′pc1 6= Execute. Thus, T (st′pc1) holds, and
since s′ = Execute, it must be that case that pc1 ≺ pc′1 by the definition
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of next box. By assumption, 〈2〉5.5 pc′1 = env or st′pc′1 ∈ {Runnable,
Blocked} and both cases implies con′. ∴
〈7〉2. Case: stpc1 6= Execute
proof: Assumption 〈7〉2 implies con. Thus, it must be shown that
¬con′ holds. Now, assumption 〈6〉2 implies st′pc1 ∈ {Runnable,Execute,
Terminated}. Further, Assumption 〈2〉5.5 and 〈7〉2 implies that stpc1 ∈
{Runnable,Blocked}. Now, with the above assumptions, assumption
〈2〉5.1 implies that stpc1 = Blocked implies that st′pc1 = Blocked, which
induces a contradiction. Hence, it must be the case that stpc1 =
Runnable. Moreover, assumption 〈2〉5.1 implies with this assump-
tion, induces two possible values for st′pc1 : Matchfail or Execute. Since,
st′pc1 ∈ {Runnable,Execute,Terminated} must hold, the only valid case
is st′pc1 = Execute which implies ¬con′. ∴.〈7〉3. Q.E.D.
proof: By 〈7〉1 and 〈7〉2. ∴
〈6〉3. Q.E.D.
proof: By 〈6〉1 and 〈6〉2. ∴
〈5〉3. Q.E.D.
proof: By 〈5〉1 and 〈5〉2. ∴
〈4〉4. Case: pc′ =
if pc 6= env ∧ stpc′ = Runnable⇒ ¬con
then next box(pc) else pc
proof: Assumptions 〈2〉5.1 and 〈3〉1 implies
pc′1 = if pc1 = env ∨ T(st′pc1) then next box(pc1,BS1 ∪ {env}) else pc1
Assumption 〈1〉1.1, Lemma 6.1.3 and the refinement mapping thus implies
pc′ = if pc = env ∨ T(st′pc) then next box(pc) else pc
Thus, it is sufficient to show that
(pc = env ∨ T(st′pc)) ≡ (pc 6= env ∧ stpc′ = Runnable⇒ ¬con),
which simplifies to
(A) pc1 = env ∨ st′pc1 ∈ {Blocked,Matchfail,Terminated}≡
(B) pc1 6= env ∧ st′pc1 ∈ {Runnable,Execute,Terminated} ⇒ stpc1 = Execute.
The pc1 = env case is trivial. The pc1 6= env case follows by a case-analysis
on st′pc1 :〈5〉1. Case: st′pc1 = Runnable
proof: In (A) this is False. For (B) is must be shown that stpc1 6= Execute
This is proved by contradiction. Let stpc1 = Execute. Then assumptions
〈2〉5.1 and 〈3〉1 implies that st′pc1 = Terminated, which contradicts assump-
tion 〈5〉1. ∴
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〈5〉2. Case: st′pc1 = Matchfail
proof: In both (A) and (B) this is trivially True. ∴
〈5〉3. Case: st′pc1 = Blocked
proof: In both (A) and (B) this is trivially True. ∴
〈5〉4. Case: st′pc1 = Execute
proof: In (A) this is False. In (B) this implies stpc1 6= Execute, and the
proof is the same as in 〈5〉1. ∴
〈5〉5. Case: st′pc1 = Super
proof: Assumption 〈5〉5 contradicts assumption 〈2〉5.2. ∴
〈5〉6. Case: st′pc1 = Terminated
proof: In (A) this holds. In (B) it must be shown that stpc1 = Execute.
The proof is by contradiction. Assume stpc1 6= Execute. By assumptions
〈2〉5.1 and 〈3〉1 it can be shown that the only case that does not contradicts
〈5〉6, is when stpc1 = Terminated. However, this contradicts assumption
〈2〉5.4. Thus, is must be the case that stpc1 = Execute. ∴
〈5〉7. Q.E.D.
proof: By 〈5〉1, 〈5〉2, 〈5〉3, 〈5〉4, 〈5〉5 and 〈5〉6. ∴
〈4〉5. Q.E.D.
proof: By 〈4〉1, 〈4〉2, 〈4〉3 and 〈4〉4. ∴
〈3〉2. Case: s = Super
proof: Assumption 〈3〉2 implies s = Super, which reduces the goal four con-
juncts, each proved separately:
〈4〉1. Case: ∧i∈BS Bs2i
proof: Assumptions 〈2〉5.1 and 〈3〉2 implies ∧i∈BS1 hBsi , which by assump-
tion 〈1〉1.1 implies ∧i∈BS Bs2i . It is trivial to show that this implies ∀i ∈
BS. st′i ∈ {Runnable,Blocked}. Moreover,
∧
i∈BS Bs
2
i updates ws, inp and res,
all unaffected by the refinement mapping. Thus,
∧
i∈BS Bs2i holds. ∴
〈4〉2. Case: pc′ = first box
proof: Assumptions 〈2〉5.1 and 〈3〉2 implies pc′1 = first box(BS1 ∪ {env}).
Lemma 6.1.1 then implies that pc′1 = first box, which implies pc = first box
since pc1 is the only free variable of first box. ∴
〈4〉3. Case: con′ = True
proof: It is trivial to show that 〈2〉5.1 implies ∀i ∈ BS1. st′i ∈ {Runnable,
Blocked}. Following the definition of the con, s′ = Super implies con. In the
case of s′ = Execute, pc′1 = first box(BS1 ∪ {env}). If pc′1 = env then con
trivially holds. If pc′1 6= env then pc′1 ∈ BS1. It has already been shown that
∀i ∈ BS1. st′i ∈ {Runnable,Blocked}, thus con trivially holds in this case as
well. ∴
〈4〉4. Case: expr′ = expr
proof: The refinement mapping is defined as expr = expr and the assump-
tions 〈2〉5.1 and 〈3〉2 implies expr′ = expr. Thus, the goal holds. ∴
〈4〉5. Q.E.D.
proof: By 〈4〉1, 〈4〉2, 〈4〉3 and 〈4〉4. ∴
〈3〉3. Q.E.D.
proof: By 〈3〉1 and 〈3〉2. ∴
〈2〉6. Q.E.D.
Appendix B. Scheduling proofs 261
proof: By 〈2〉1, 〈2〉2, 〈2〉3, 〈2〉4 and 〈2〉5. ∴
〈1〉2. Q.E.D.
proof: By 〈1〉1. ∴
B.2.6 Proof of Theorem 6.1
〈1〉1. Assume: 1. ∧i∈BS flat(i) and BS1 = BS
2. ∃ st,s,pc,expr.hI ∧2[hN ∧ hE ]〈s,ws,inp,res,st,pc,expr〉
Prove: ∃ st,s,pc,con,expr.I2 ∧2[N 2seq ∧ S2seq ∧ E ]〈s,ws,inp,res,st,pc,con,expr〉
proof: Since st,s,pc,con and expr are not free in the the goal, rule (E2) reduces the
proof to:
〈2〉1. Assume: hI ∧2[hN ∧ hE ]〈s,ws,inp,res,st,pc,expr〉
Prove: ∃ st,s,pc,con,expr.I2 ∧2[N 2seq ∧ S2seq ∧ E ]〈s,ws,inp,res,st,pc,con,expr〉
proof: By applying the substitutions defined by F sequentially using (E1), the
goal is reduced to:
〈3〉1. Prove: I2 ∧2[N 2seq ∧ S2seq ∧ E ]〈s,ws,inp,res,st,pc,con,expr〉
proof: Applying assumptions 〈1〉1.1 and 〈2〉1 to Lemma B.4 induces 2K.
Rule (INV2) implies
2[hN ∧ hE ]〈s,ws,inp,res,st,pc,expr〉 ≡ 2[hN ∧ hE ∧K ∧K ′]〈s,ws,inp,res,st,pc,expr〉
The same approach can be applied to Lemma B.5, Lemma B.6 resulting in
2[hN ∧ hE ]〈s,ws,inp,res,st,pc,expr〉
≡
2[hN ∧ hE ∧K ∧K ′ ∧ L ∧ L′ ∧M ∧M ′ ∧N ∧N ′]〈s,ws,inp,res,st,pc,expr〉
Thus, by assumption
〈4〉1. .
1 it can be shown that
hI ∧2[hN ∧ hE ∧K ∧K ′ ∧ L ∧ L′ ∧M ∧M ′ ∧N ∧N ′]〈s,ws,inp,res,st,pc,expr〉
By applying this and assumption 〈1〉1.1 to Lemma B.8 the goal has been proved.
∴
〈3〉2. Q.E.D.
proof: By 〈3〉1. ∴
〈2〉2. Q.E.D.
proof: By 〈2〉1. ∴
〈1〉2. Q.E.D.
proof: By 〈1〉1. ∴
AppendixC
SAFER program source code
data axis_command = NEG | ZERO | POS;
type command = (axis_command,axis_command,axis_command);
type axis_pred = (bool,bool,bool);
data thruster_name = B1 | B2 | B3 | B4 | F1 | F2 | F3 | F4 | L1R | L1F |
R2R | R2F | L3R | L3F | R4R | R4F | D1R | D1F | D2R | D2F | U3R |
U3F | U4R | U4F ;
type thruster_list = [thruster_name];
data control_mode_switch = ROT | TRAN;
data AAH_control_button = button_up | button_down;
data AAH_engage_state = AAH_off | AAH_started | AAH_on | pressed_once
| AAH_closing | pressed_twice;
click_timeout = (100 as nat 32);
naa true ZERO _ = true;
naa true _ true = true;
naa _ _ _ = false;
incone n = n + (1 as nat 32);
comb_rot_cmds ZERO aah _ = aah;
comb_rot_cmds _ aah true = aah;
comb_rot_cmds hcm_rot aah _ = hcm_rot;
thruster2string thruster =
case thruster of
B1 -> "B1"
| B2 -> "B2"
| B3 -> "B3"
| B4 -> "B4"
| F1 -> "F1"
| F2 -> "F2"
| F3 -> "F3"
| F4 -> "F4"
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| L1R -> "L1R"
| L1F -> "L1F"
| R2R -> "R2R"
| R2F -> "R2F"
| L3R -> "L3R"
| L3F -> "L3F"
| R4R -> "R4R"
| R4F -> "R4F"
| D1R -> "D1R"
| D1F -> "D1F"
| D2R -> "D2R"
| D2F -> "D2F"
| U3R -> "U3R"
| U3F -> "U3F"
| U4R -> "U4R"
| U4F -> "U4F";
thrusterlist2string [] = "\n";
thrusterlist2string (x:xs) = thruster2string x ++ " " ++ thrusterlist2string xs;
stream output to "std_out";
box sensors
in ( state :: nat 32 )
out ( state’ :: nat 32,
vert, horiz, trans, twist :: axis_command , mode :: control_mode_switch,
button :: AAH_control_button)
match
0 -> (1,NEG,NEG,NEG,NEG,ROT,button_up)
| 1 -> (2,NEG,NEG,ZERO,NEG,ROT,button_up)
| 2 -> (0,POS,NEG,ZERO,NEG,ROT,button_down);
wire sensors
( sensors.state’ initially 0)
( sensors.state, SAFER.vert, SAFER.horiz, SAFER.trans,
SAFER.twist, SAFER.mode, SAFER.button);
box SAFER
in ( aa,ihcm::axis_pred,toggle::AAH_engage_state,tout,clock :: nat 32,
vert, horiz, trans, twist :: axis_command,
mode :: control_mode_switch, button :: AAH_control_button )
out ( aa’, ihcm’::axis_pred,toggle’::AAH_engage_state,tout’,clock’::nat 32,
thrusters::string )
match
(_,_,_,_,_,_,_,_,_,_,_) -> (_,_,_,_,_,_)
boxes
box grip_command
in ( vert, horiz, trans, twist :: axis_command , mode :: control_mode_switch )
out ( tran, rot1, rot2 :: command )
match
(v,h,tr,tw,TRAN) -> ((h,tr,v),(ZERO,tw,ZERO),(ZERO,tw,ZERO))
| (v,h,tr,tw,ROT) -> ((h,ZERO,ZERO),(v,tw,tr),(v,tw,tr));
wire grip_command
( SAFER.vert, SAFER.horiz, SAFER.trans, SAFER.twist, SAFER.mode )
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( integrated_commands.tran, integrated_commands.rot, AAH_transition.rot );
box AAH_pre_fanout
in ( aa::axis_pred,toggle::AAH_engage_state,tout,clock::nat 32,ihcm::axis_pred)
out (aa1,aa2::axis_pred,aa3::axis_pred,ichm1::axis_pred,toggle1,toggle2::
AAH_engage_state,tout1,tout2,clock1,clock2::nat 32,ihcm2::axis_red)
match
(aa,toggle,tout,clo,ichm) -> (aa,aa,aa,ichm,toggle,toggle,tout,tout,clo,clo,ihcm);
wire AAH_pre_fanout
( SAFER.aa,SAFER.toggle,SAFER.tout,SAFER.clock, SAFER.ihcm )
( AAH_button_transition.aa, AAH_transition.aa,
integrated_commands.aa,integrated_commands.ihcm,
AAH_button_transition.state, AAH_transition.toggle,
AAH_button_transition.tout, AAH_transition.tout,
AAH_button_transition.clock, AAH_transition.clock,AAH_transition.ihcm);
box AAH_button_transition
in ( state :: AAH_engage_state, button :: AAH_control_button,
aa :: axis_pred, clock, tout :: nat 64 )
out ( state’, stateout :: AAH_engage_state )
match
(AAH_off,button_down,_,_,_) -> (AAH_started,AAH_started)
| (AAH_started,button_down,_,_,_) -> (AAH_started,AAH_started)
| (AAH_on,button_down,_,_,_) -> (pressed_once,pressed_once)
| (pressed_once,button_down,_,_,_) -> (pressed_once,pressed_once)
| (AAH_closing,button_down,_,_,_) -> (pressed_twice,pressed_twice)
| (pressed_twice,button_down,_,_,_) -> (pressed_twice,pressed_twice)
| (AAH_off,button_up,_,_,_) -> (AAH_off,AAH_off)
| (AAH_started,button_up,_,_,_) -> (AAH_on,AAH_on)
| (AAH_on,button_up,(false,false,false),_,_) -> (AAH_off,AAH_off)
| (AAH_on,button_up,_,_,_) -> (AAH_on,AAH_on)
| (pressed_once,button_up,_,_,_) -> (AAH_closing,AAH_closing)
| (AAH_closing,button_up,(false,false,false),_,_) -> (AAH_off,AAH_off)
| (AAH_closing,button_up,_,cl,tout) -> if cl > tout
then (AAH_on,AAH_on)
else (AAH_closing,AAH_closing)
| (pressed_twice,button_up,(_,_,_),_,_) -> (AAH_off,AAH_off);
wire AAH_button_transition
( AAH_pre_fanout.toggle1,
SAFER.button, AAH_pre_fanout.aa1,
AAH_pre_fanout.clock1, AAH_pre_fanout.tout1)
( SAFER.toggle’, AAH_transition.engage);
box AAH_transition
in ( aa :: axis_pred, engage, toggle :: AAH_engage_state,
rot :: command, ihcm :: axis_pred,
clock, tout :: nat 64 )
out ( aa’, ihcm’ :: axis_pred,
clock’, timeout’ :: nat 64 )
match
(_,AAH_off,AAH_started,(r1,r2,r3),_,cl,tout)
-> ((true,true,true),(r1 != ZERO,r2 != ZERO,r3 != ZERO),incone cl,tout)
| (_,_,AAH_off,_,ihcm,cl,tout)
-> ((false,false,false),ihcm,incone cl,tout)
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| ((a1,a2,a3),AAH_on,pressed_once,(r1,r2,r3),(i1,i2,i3),cl,tout)
-> ((naa a1 r1 i1, naa a2 r2 i2,
naa a3 r3 i3),(i1,i2,i3),incone cl,cl+click_timeout)
| ((a1,a2,a3),eng,_,(r1,r2,r3),(i1,i2,i3),cl,tout)
-> ((naa a1 r1 i1,naa a2 r2 i2,
naa a3 r3 i3),(i1,i2,i3),incone cl,tout);
wire AAH_transition
( AAH_pre_fanout.aa2, -- active axis
AAH_button_transition.stateout, AAH_pre_fanout.toggle2,
grip_command.rot2, -- grip command
AAH_pre_fanout.ihcm2, -- ignore_hcm
AAH_pre_fanout.clock2, AAH_pre_fanout.tout2 )
( AAH_post_fanout.aa, -- active axis
AAH_post_fanout.ihcm, -- ignore_hcm
SAFER.clock’, SAFER.tout’ );
box AAH_post_fanout
in ( aa, ihcm :: axis_pred)
out ( aah :: command,
aa1, ihcm1 :: axis_pred )
match
(aa,ihcm) -> ((ZERO,ZERO,ZERO),aa,ihcm);
wire AAH_post_fanout
( AAH_transition.aa’, AAH_transition.ihcm’ )
( integrated_commands.aah,
SAFER.aa’,SAFER.ihcm’);
box integrated_commands
in ( tran,rot,aah::command,aa,ihcm::axis_pred )
out ( rot1,rot2::command,prio::bool )
match
(tran,(ZERO,ZERO,ZERO),_,(false,false,false),_)
-> (tran,(ZERO,ZERO,ZERO),true)
| (_,(r,p,ya),_,(false,false,false),_)
-> ((ZERO,ZERO,ZERO),(r,p,ya),false)
| (tran,(ZERO,ZERO,ZERO),(a1,a2,a3),_,_)
-> (tran,(a1,a2,a3),true)
| (_,(r,p,ya),(a1,a2,a3),_,(i1,i2,i3))
-> ((ZERO,ZERO,ZERO),
(comb_rot_cmds r a1 i1,comb_rot_cmds p a2 i2,comb_rot_cmds ya a3 i3),
false);
wire integrated_commands
( grip_command.tran, grip_command.rot1, AAH_post_fanout.aah,
AAH_pre_fanout.aa3, AAH_pre_fanout.ihcm2 )
( prioritized_tran_cmd.tran, integrated_fanout.rot,
prioritized_tran_cmd.isPrio );
box prioritized_tran_cmd
in ( tran :: command, isPrio :: bool)
out ( x’, y’, z’ :: axis_command )
match
(tran,false) -> tran
| ((ZERO,ZERO,ZERO),_) -> (ZERO,ZERO,ZERO)
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| ((ZERO,ZERO,zacc),_) -> (ZERO,ZERO,zacc)
| ((ZERO,yacc,_),_) -> (ZERO,yacc,ZERO)
| ((xacc,_,_),_) -> (xacc,ZERO,ZERO) ;
wire prioritized_tran_cmd
( integrated_commands.rot1, integrated_commands.prio )
( BF.A, LRUD.A, LRUD.B );
box integrated_fanout
in (rot :: command)
out (p’, y’, r’ :: axis_command, rot’ :: command)
match
((p,y,r)) -> (p,y,r,(p,y,r));
wire integrated_fanout
( integrated_commands.rot2 )
( BF.B, BF.C, LRUD.C, thruster_join.rot );
box LRUD
in ( A, B, C :: axis_command )
out ( M, O :: thruster_list )
match
(NEG,NEG,NEG) -> ([],[])
| (NEG,NEG,ZERO) -> ([],[])
| (NEG,NEG,POS) -> ([],[])
| (NEG,ZERO,NEG) -> ([L1R],[L1F,L3F])
| (NEG,ZERO,ZERO) -> ([L1R,L3R],[L1F,L3F])
| (NEG,ZERO,POS) -> ([L3R],[L1F,L3F])
| (NEG,POS,NEG) -> ([],[])
| (NEG,POS,ZERO) -> ([],[])
| (NEG,POS,POS) -> ([],[])
| (ZERO,NEG,NEG) -> ([U3R],[U3F,U4F])
| (ZERO,NEG,ZERO) -> ([U3R,U4R],[U3F,U4F])
| (ZERO,NEG,POS) -> ([U4R],[U3F,U4F])
| (ZERO,ZERO,NEG) -> ([L1R,R4R],[])
| (ZERO,ZERO,ZERO)-> ([],[])
| (ZERO,ZERO,POS) -> ([R2R,L3R],[])
| (ZERO,POS,NEG) -> ([D2R],[D1F,D2F])
| (ZERO,POS,ZERO) -> ([D1R,D2R],[D1F,D2F])
| (ZERO,POS,POS) -> ([D1R],[D1F,D2F])
| (POS,NEG,NEG) -> ([],[])
| (POS,NEG,ZERO) -> ([],[])
| (POS,NEG,POS) -> ([],[])
| (POS,ZERO,NEG) -> ([R4R],[R2F,R4F])
| (POS,ZERO,ZERO) -> ([R2R,R4R],[R2F,R4F])
| (POS,ZERO,POS) -> ([R2R],[R2F,R4F])
| (POS,POS,NEG) -> ([],[])
| (POS,POS,ZERO) -> ([],[])
| (POS,POS,POS) -> ([],[]);
wire LRUD
( prioritized_tran_cmd.y’, prioritized_tran_cmd.z’, integrated_fanout.r’ )
( thruster_join.lm, thruster_join.lo );
box BF
in ( A, B, C :: axis_command )
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out ( M, O :: thruster_list )
match
(NEG,NEG,NEG) -> ([B4],[B2,B3])
| (NEG,NEG,ZERO) -> ([B3,B4],[])
| (NEG,NEG,POS) -> ([B3],[B1,B4])
| (NEG,ZERO,NEG) -> ([B2,B4],[])
| (NEG,ZERO,ZERO) -> ([B1,B4],[B2,B3])
| (NEG,ZERO,POS) -> ([B1,B3],[])
| (NEG,POS,NEG) -> ([B2],[B1,B4])
| (NEG,POS,ZERO) -> ([B1,B2],[])
| (NEG,POS,POS) -> ([B1],[B2,B3])
| (ZERO,NEG,NEG) -> ([B4,F1],[])
| (ZERO,NEG,ZERO) -> ([B4,F2],[])
| (ZERO,NEG,POS) -> ([B3,F2],[])
| (ZERO,ZERO,NEG) -> ([B2,F1],[])
| (ZERO,ZERO,ZERO)-> ([],[])
| (ZERO,ZERO,POS) -> ([B3,F4],[])
| (ZERO,POS,NEG) -> ([B2,F3],[])
| (ZERO,POS,ZERO) -> ([B1,F3],[])
| (ZERO,POS,POS) -> ([B1,F4],[])
| (POS,NEG,NEG) -> ([F1],[F2,F3])
| (POS,NEG,ZERO) -> ([F1,F2],[])
| (POS,NEG,POS) -> ([F2],[F1,F4])
| (POS,ZERO,NEG) -> ([F1,F3],[])
| (POS,ZERO,ZERO) -> ([F2,F3],[F1,F4])
| (POS,ZERO,POS) -> ([F2,F4],[])
| (POS,POS,NEG) -> ([F3],[F1,F4])
| (POS,POS,ZERO) -> ([F3,F4],[])
| (POS,POS,POS) -> ([F4],[F2,F3]);
wire BF
( prioritized_tran_cmd.x’, integrated_fanout.p’, integrated_fanout.y’ )
( thruster_join.bm, thruster_join.bo );
box thruster_join
in ( lm, lo, bm, bo :: thruster_list, rot :: command )
out ( thr :: string)
match
(lm,lo,bm,bo,(ZERO,ZERO,ZERO)) -> thrusterlist2string (lm ++ lo ++ bm ++ bo)
| (lm,lo,bm,_,(ZERO,ZERO,_)) -> thrusterlist2string (lm ++ lo ++ bm)
| (lm,_,bm,bo,(_,_,ZERO)) -> thrusterlist2string (lm ++ bm ++ bo)
| (lm,_,bm,_,(_,_,_)) -> thrusterlist2string (lm ++ bm ) ;
wire thruster_join
( LRUD.M, LRUD.O, BF.M, BF.O, integrated_fanout.rot’ )
( SAFER.thrusters );
end;
wire SAFER ( SAFER.aa’ initially (false,false,false),
SAFER.ihcm’ initially (false,false,false),
SAFER.toggle’ initially AAH_off,
SAFER.tout’ initially 0 as nat 32,
SAFER.clock’ initially 0 as nat 32,
sensors.vert , sensors.horiz, sensors.trans, sensors.twist, sensors.mode,
sensors.button)
( SAFER.aa,SAFER.ihcm,SAFER.toggle,SAFER.tout,SAFER.clock,output );
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